PHILIPPA FOOT’S
METAETHICS

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Philippa Foot’s Metaethics

Elements in Ethics

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Abstract: This Element presents an interpretation and defense of Philippa Foot’s ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot’s account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot’s metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot’s metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

Keywords: ethical naturalism, moral realism, Philippa Foot, virtue ethics, normativity

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