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Elements in Ethics

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CONTEMPORARY VIRTUE ETHICS

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Contemporary Virtue Ethics

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Abstract: This Element provides an overview of the central components of recent work in virtue ethics. The first section explores themes in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, while the second turns the discussion to major alternative theoretical perspectives. The third section focuses on two challenges to virtue ethics. The first challenge is the self-centeredness or egoism objection, which is the notion that certain kinds of virtue ethics are inadequate because they advocate a focus on the person's own virtue and flourishing at the expense of, or at least without due regard for, the concerns of others. The second consists of situationist challenges to the idea that there are indeed virtues and that personality is integrated enough to support virtues.

Keywords: virtue ethics, neo-Aristotelianism, situationism, self-centeredness objection

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