INTRODUCTION Charles E. Callwell and British Strategy

Charles Edward Callwell (1859–1928) was one of Britain's great military thinkers. As a soldier he eventually rose to the rank of major-general and was created KCB, having served his country in numerous roles. As a writer he produced a large body of work, including his most famous book, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1896). Less well known, but equally important, is his *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence* (1905). Indeed, his contribution to the art of war was recognised in 1921, when he received the prestigious Chesney medal of the Royal United Service Institution (RUSI), awarded for 'his distinguished work in connection with military literature'.[1] Other winners have included Alfred Thayer Mahan (the first winner), Julian Corbett, J.F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. However, compared with such luminaries, Callwell has been comparatively neglected, despite enduring interest in *Small Wars*. Insufficient scholarly attention has been paid to his career and oeuvre. This book is an attempt to fill the gap. It is the first major study of the man and his work.

Writing any kind of biographical study presents a challenge to the author: namely, to steer a difficult middle course between the extremes of hagiography and hatchet job. Provided these are avoided, such works can be of immense value. Callwell served and wrote at a time of great change for the British armed forces. This study considers subjects such as: Britain's conduct of its small wars of the time (most notably, the South African War of 1899–1902); the strategic debates of the 1900s, as British self-confidence gave way to anxiety in a changing world; the 'Continental commitment' that was the outcome of these debates; and the First World War. Indeed, Callwell himself at times played interesting, varied and important (sometimes central) roles in these events. In the South African War, he served with General Sir Redvers Buller in the campaign to relieve Ladysmith; and he eventually gained his own field command. During his time at the War Office heading the Strategical Section of the

[1] Appendix: Ninetieth Anniversary Meeting, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 65 (1920–21), xvii.

Directorate of Military Operations, he played a notable part in the strategic debates. During the First World War he was Director of Military Operations (DMO) until the end of 1915, playing a major role in the controversies surrounding the planning, execution and subsequent failure of the Dardanelles offensive, more famously known as the Gallipoli campaign.

Callwell's reflections on these subjects were central to his works. The South African War was the largest of Britain's colonial conflicts; and the third edition of *Small Wars*, published in 1906, considered the lessons learned in this, Britain's first, traumatic experience of modern warfare. In *Small Wars*, Callwell established a broad set of principles for fighting 'irregular' wars through an analysis of the lessons of previous campaigns, not just of the British Army, but of other armies as well. It became the standard text on the subject. *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance*, which came out in 1905 at the height of the strategic debates, is a significant study of 'joint warfare', in which the author stresses the interdependence of the army and navy. Callwell's *The Dardanelles* (1919) was one of the first to explain the reasons behind the failure of the Gallipoli campaign. The principal theme of this book is that Callwell's approach represented an attempt to identify a 'British way in warfare': namely, the lessons that would meet what he perceived to be the peculiar requirements of British strategy.

A 'British Way in Warfare'

The question of 'ways in warfare' has proved controversial ever since Liddell Hart's famous lecture on 'Economic Pressure or Continental Victories' at RUSI in 1931, in which he introduced his concept of 'The British way in warfare'.[2] Liddell Hart argued that the mass Continental warfare of the First World War had represented a departure from the traditional British approach:

> Our historic practice . . . was based on economic pressure exercised through sea power. This naval body had two arms; one financial, which embraced the subsidizing and military provisioning of allies; the other military, which embraced sea-borne expeditions against the enemy's vulnerable extremities. By our practice we safeguarded ourselves where we were weakest, and exerted our strength where the enemy was weakest.[3]

[2] Basil Liddell Hart, 'Economic Pressure or Continental Victories', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, 76: 503 (1931), 486–510.
[3] Ibid., 500.

In other words, the 'British way' was an indirect, maritime approach. Since then, there has been a proliferation of studies on the idea of 'ways of war'.[4] Writing on Soviet nuclear strategy in 1977, Jack Snyder introduced the term 'strategic culture', which he defined as 'the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation'.[5] Both concepts have been subject to extensive clarification and critique. For example, Liddell Hart's 'British way' overstressed the dividing lines between a 'Continental' and a 'maritime' strategy.[6] Jeremy Black has noted that 'it is all too easy to reify national attitudes and policies', and it is possible to fall into the trap of using analytical tools such as 'ways of war' or 'strategic culture' in too rigid a fashion.[7]

Liddell Hart may have coined the phrase 'the British way in warfare', but he was by no means the first to explore the idea behind it. For example, Julian Corbett's aim, in classic works such as *England in the Seven Years' War* (1907) and *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1911), was to examine the historical and theoretical aspects of British strategy. Indeed, in his concept of limited war, Corbett addressed one of the central themes of Liddell Hart's 'British way'.[8] This book argues that Callwell sought to develop a theoretical understanding of what he saw as the unique character of British strategy. In so doing, he wrote widely on Britain's 'historic practice'; his ideas were also influenced by geographical, political and cultural factors.

[4] See for example Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).
[5] Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 3.
[6] See for example Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Michael Howard, 'The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal', in Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and Other Essays* (London: Temple Smith, 1983), 169–187; Hew Strachan, 'The British Way in Warfare Revisited', *Historical Journal*, 26: 2 (1983), 447–461; David French, *The British Way in Warfare 1688–2000* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Alex Danchev, 'Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach', *Journal of Military History*, 63: 2 (1999), 313–337.
[7] Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture*, 11.
[8] Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined Strategy*, 2 vols (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907); Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911); Andrew Lambert, 'The Naval War Course, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* and the Origins of "The British Way in Warfare"', in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds), *The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 219–255. For the most recent work on Corbett, see J.J. Widen, *Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and His Contribution to Military and Naval Thought* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012).

An argument which runs consistently throughout Callwell's works is that Britain had its own history, its own wars, from which to learn. Britain's strategic situation was different from that of the great Continental states. As such, he considered both maritime warfare and the small wars that represented the bread and butter of Britain's military commitments. As far the former is concerned, Hew Strachan has argued that Callwell 'wrote about the relationship between sea power and the army long before Corbett or Liddell Hart. His *oeuvre* embraced both arms of British strategy, and he can consequently lay claim to being the father of a much more genuine "British way in warfare"'.[9] Strachan's assertion is seemingly based on the fact that Callwell's first book on maritime warfare, *The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo* (1897), predated Corbett's most important output.[10] Of course, in spite of this high praise, Callwell's work on maritime strategy continues to languish in relative obscurity.

Regarding small wars, Ian Beckett has argued that, as 'the real father of the theory of the British approach to counterinsurgency', we can see Callwell as the founder of 'a real British "Way in Warfare"'.[11] Beckett has also suggested that in *Small Wars* Callwell 'made the only distinctive contribution by any British soldier to the development of military thought in the nineteenth century'. In this he echoed an observation previously made by Jay Luvaas, who noted that: 'This was the one area where British soldiers exceeded all others in experience.'[12] As well as establishing the principles of small wars, Callwell's work represents an emphatic statement about the value of studying the genre; and says much about wider questions of Britain's preparedness to fight, both in the Empire and in Europe. In this broader sense then, Callwell documents the theory and practice of Britain's conduct of war.

Callwell and the Historians

Callwell does not fare very well when compared with Britain's other great military thinkers in terms of the amount of scholarly attention he has received. Corbett, Fuller and Liddell Hart have all been the subjects of

[9] Hew Strachan, 'The British Way in Warfare', in David G. Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds), *Oxford History of the British Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 403.
[10] C.E. Callwell, *The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1897).
[11] Ian Beckett, 'Another British Way in Warfare: Charles Callwell and Small Wars', in Ian Beckett (ed.), *Victorians at War: New Perspectives* (Chippenham: The Society for Army Historical Research, 2007), 101.
[12] Ian Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750* (London: Routledge, 2001), 35; Jay Luvaas, 'European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870–1914', in Michael Howard (ed.), *The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Captain B.H. Liddell Hart* (London: Cassell, 1965), 81.

excellent studies, by historians such as Brian Bond and Brian Holden Reid.[13] Admittedly one would expect so, given that these are front-rank theorists; but much excellent work has also been done on Britain's lesser known (but not unimportant) military and naval thinkers. Jay Luvaas and Donald Schurman have been particularly important in this regard. The former's *The Education of an Army* and the latter's *The Education of a Navy*, both published in 1965, were significant contributions to the history of military thought. Luvaas provided chapters on Sir William Napier, John Mitchell, Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Sir Patrick Macdougall, Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, Sir John Frederick Maurice, G.F.R. Henderson, Spenser Wilkinson, Charles à Court Repington, Fuller and Liddell Hart. Schurman considered the brothers John and Philip Colomb, Mahan, Sir John Knox Laughton, Sir Herbert Richmond and Corbett. Luvaas's stated aim was 'to awaken interest in one or more of the personalities' and 'to suggest areas where further research would pay dividends'. Indeed, thinkers such as Laughton, Richmond and Repington have subsequently been the subjects of individual studies. However, there is much more work to be done. Luvaas himself accepted that he made omissions, such as Callwell, on whom a chapter might well have been included. The aim of this book, indeed, is to do for Callwell what Bond did for Liddell Hart and Holden Reid did for Fuller: namely, to provide an intellectual biography.[14]

Both the 1943 edition of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Edward Mead Earle, and the 1986 edition, edited by Peter Paret, include chapters on colonial warfare, but these consider the subject from the French perspective, with the 'makers' being the famous theorist-practitioners, Bugeaud, Galliéni and Lyautey.[15] Both could perhaps have considered

[13] See for example Donald M. Schurman, *Julian S. Corbett* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981); Widen, *Theorist of Maritime Strategy*; Brian Holden Reid, *J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Brian Holden Reid, *Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (London: Cassell, 1977).

[14] Jay Luvaas, *The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815–1940* (London: Cassell, 1965), viii; see also Donald M. Schurman, *The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867–1914* (London: Cassell, 1965); Andrew Lambert, *The Foundations of Naval History: John Knox Laughton, the Royal Navy and the Historical Profession* (London: Chatham, 1998); Barry D. Hunt, *Sailor Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, 1871–1946* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1982); W. Michael Ryan, *Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington: A Study in the Interaction of Personality, the Press and Power* (New York: Garland, 1987); A.J.A. Morris, *Reporting the First World War: Charles Repington,* The Times*, and the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[15] Jean Gottmann, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare', in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 234–259; Douglas Porch, 'Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial

the subject from the British perspective, with its 'maker' being Callwell.[16] Instead, he is only briefly mentioned in John Shy and Thomas W. Collier's chapter on Revolutionary War in the Paret edition.[17] His name is actually misspelled in the index, although Paret's edition is by no means the only book guilty of this error. There, as elsewhere, his name is spelt 'Caldwell', although the misspelling of his name as 'Calwell' can also be found. Indeed, this was clearly a problem for Callwell during his lifetime: according to the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, the Chesney medal was awarded to 'Major-General Sir Charles Caldwell'![18]

However, in recent years, Callwell has been somewhat rediscovered. First, some of his most important books have been republished. *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance* appeared in the *Classics of Sea Power* series in 1996, with an introductory essay by Colin Gray.[19] *Small Wars* was republished the same year, with a useful, if rather short, introduction by Douglas Porch.[20] Gray's essay is the most extensive piece to be written on Callwell but there is no room for a full treatment in 46 pages, particularly when much of this is merely devoted to *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance* (which is understandable, given that it is an introduction to that book). Gray highlights what he sees as enduring strategic principles but adds the slightly confusing point that the reissue of the book 'is an endeavour to rescue it from undeserved obscurity, while also protecting it from pre-emptive capture by historians'.[21]

It is the contention here that 'capture' by historians is exactly what is needed. After all, military thinkers do not operate in a vacuum. Gray himself makes the point that *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance* can be read as an interesting period piece, as *the* example of advanced British thinking on joint warfare before the War.[22] Moreover, he does test *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance* in light of the First World War, arguing that: 'Callwell got it right long ahead of the

Warfare', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 376–407.

[16] Hew Strachan, Review of *Makers of Modern Strategy*, *English Historical Review*, 103: 406 (1988), 160.

[17] John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, 'Revolutionary War', in Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 830–831.

[18] Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 933; Appendix: Ninetieth Anniversary Meeting, xvii.

[19] See Colin Gray, 'Introduction' to C.E. Callwell, *Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their Relations and Interdependence* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), xv–lxi.

[20] See Douglas Porch, 'Introduction to the Bison Books Edition', in C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), v–xviii.

[21] Gray, 'Introduction', xxi. [22] Ibid., xx–xxi.

practical demonstration in 1915 of what would and would not work in contemporary conditions.'[23] This argument raises interesting questions in view of Callwell's later analysis in his book *The Dardanelles*, a point which Gray does not (or cannot, owing to lack of space) develop. His verdict is that Callwell 'produced a body of writing distinguished in range of subject, quality and regularity of output, and – increasingly – quality of literary expression'.[24] This body of writing he deals with only briefly, and there is much more to say.

Gray presents an interesting contrast between Callwell's literary achievements, and the relative failure of his military career when compared with others in his age cohort who took the important field commands in the First World War. He suggests seven possible reasons for this: Callwell's errors as a column commander in the South African War; his 'facility' with the pen, and possible indiscretion of pen and tongue; the stigma of being a 'theorist' rather than a 'warrior'; in particular, his success as an expert on small wars, as opposed to 'civilised warfare'; his acquiring a reputation for being a good staff officer, rather than field commander; his enthusiasm for amphibious operations in an age of fierce particularism in both the army and the navy; and finally, something in his personal life (although Gray points out that this is pure speculation, even if it is something the biographer must consider).[25] There is something to be said for each of these, except perhaps the last.

The 1996 reissue of *Small Wars* remains the main point of entry for those interested in Callwell. Douglas Porch's introduction suggests that *Small Wars* reflected the 'High Renaissance of imperialism', and that it was soon superseded. However, he also argues that Callwell 'was writing about his world, but from an optic that transcends the narrow boundaries of a historical epoch', and that his methods are still used to overcome insurgency movements.[26] Porch suggests that 'only a modest stretching of credulity' is required to see Callwell as 'the Clausewitz of colonial warfare', given his emphasis on the need to match means to a desired end. However, he highlights the fact that to modern eyes 'Callwell does not show himself at his best' on the point of attacking the enemy's economic base.[27] Porch then suggests that Callwell was over-reliant on operational solutions to political problems, that 'imperial conquest came to be regarded as hardly more than a technical problem to be solved', and that he viewed enemy forces 'not as complex organizations, but as "inferior races" destined to be smashed into submission. Callwell should – indeed, he must – have known better, both from scholarship and practical experience.'[28]

[23] Ibid., xix. [24] Ibid., xxxvi. [25] Ibid., xxii–xxiii; xxv; xxxiii–xxxvi.
[26] Porch, 'Introduction', vi–vii; xvi–xviii. [27] Ibid., xi–xv. [28] Ibid., viii, xv.

Indeed, Callwell *did* know better. He knew that victory for the regular troops was not a given, and he avoided laying down hard and fast rules. For example, on the objectives of small wars, Callwell wrote that this was not a subject on which 'rules of conduct could with advantage be drawn up. Each case must be decided on its merits.'[29] Finally, Porch raises the possibility that historians 'may fault Callwell for displaying in full measure the fatal prejudice of the soldiers of his era when he argued that technology is never decisive .... No doubt, those who ignored the effects of technology desperately underestimated the importance of firepower in 1914.'[30] On the contrary, the importance of firepower was hardly underestimated, least of all by Callwell, who experienced the effects of Boer firepower and later wrote about it (see Chapter 3).

To these studies of Callwell's work may be added Ian Beckett's 'Another British Way in Warfare: Charles Callwell and Small Wars' (2007).[31] Beckett deals only with small wars, although in that sense his paper complements Gray's essay, which he frequently cites. He addresses Callwell's career and intellectual milieu, discusses issues such as the changes made to *Small Wars* in its second (1899) and third (1906) editions, and examines Callwell's influence and legacy. However, Beckett's paper is even shorter (at 13 pages) than Gray's essay, and it is possible to go into somewhat more detail about these subjects. For example, there is more to be said about the sources that Callwell consulted and the revisions he made to *Small Wars*.

The second and most important factor in the rediscovery of Callwell was the boom in literature on counterinsurgency (COIN) during the '9/11 Wars' in Afghanistan and Iraq. *Small Wars* was established as part of the canon of British COIN literature, with Callwell frequently appearing first in a line of succession of British theorist-practitioners.[32] Indeed, he is the first author to be discussed in Brigadier Gavin Bulloch's historical survey in the British manual, *Countering Insurgency* (2009).[33] The US doctrine, FM 3–24 *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, states that he 'provides lessons learned that remain applicable today'.[34] Writers who have

[29] Callwell, *Small Wars*, 42. [30] Porch, 'Introduction', x–xi.
[31] Beckett, 'Another British Way in Warfare', 89–102.
[32] See for example T.R. Moreman, 'Callwell, Sir Charles Edward (1859–1928)', in H.C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 559; Alexander Alderson, 'Britain', in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds), *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations and Challenges* (London: Routledge, 2010), 32.
[33] Gavin Bulloch, 'The Development of Doctrine for Countering Insurgency: the British Experience', in *British Army Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, Countering Insurgency* (2009), CS 1–1.
[34] *U.S. Army Field Manual No 3–24* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), 391.

sought to apply Callwell to modern-day COIN include David Betz in his 'Counter-Insurgency, Victorian Style' (2012), and Major John P. Sullivan of the US Marine Corps (USMC) in a 2006 study on the continuing relevance of *Small Wars* and the USMC *Small Wars Manual* (1940).[35] The approach taken by this book is somewhat different. Callwell's work should be understood in historical context, before it is seen through the eyes of the twenty-first-century counterinsurgent.

Indeed, in recent years the pendulum has swung, with an increasing number of works questioning the COIN narrative. Describing Callwell as a COIN theorist entails the possibility that his work will be decontextualised in pursuit of timeless aphorisms. As Jonathan Gumz has written, 'we have to avoid using history as a bland cupboard from which to raid lessons learned which serve to confirm ideas already arrived at in the present'.[36] The debate over Britain's track record in COIN shows no signs of slowing down, but an increasing number of studies have cast serious doubt on the idea that the British possessed a particular talent for it, and that this talent was built on an approach which emphasised minimum force.[37] Indeed, an approach which instead focuses on the role of violence in British COIN might return Callwell to his proper context. We should see the exercise of violence as a spectrum, rather than as a dichotomy of 'butcher and bolt' versus 'hearts and minds'.

Among the critics of COIN, Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile have been particularly prominent.[38] They argue that COIN is not a specialised category of war. 'Rather', Porch writes, 'it consists of the application of petty war tactics that its advocates since the 1840s have puffed as infallible prescriptions for effortless conquest, nation-building, and national grandeur.' Callwell was one such advocate: indeed, Porch gives him pride of place by describing him as 'a founder of the small wars school'. The goal of this 'school', argues Porch, 'was to emphasize not only the nobility of

[35] David Betz, 'Counter-Insurgency, Victorian Style', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 54: 4 (2012), 161–182; John P. Sullivan, 'The Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* and Colonel C.E. Callwell's *Small Wars*: Relevant to the Twenty-First Century or Irrelevant Anachronisms?', *Small Wars Journal*, 2: 3 (2006), 71–90.

[36] Jonathan Gumz, 'Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 32: 4 (2009), 581.

[37] See for example M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, *The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency: Strategic Problems, Puzzles and Paradoxes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); David French, *The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[38] Douglas Porch, *Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Gian Gentile, 'A Strategy of Tactics: Population-Centric COIN and the Army', *Parameters*, 34 (2009), 5–17; Gentile, *Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency* (New York: The New Press, 2013).

imperial soldiering, but also its unique requirements, in an attempt to demonstrate that "small wars" should be accorded a professional status equal, if not superior to, continental soldiering'. Porch contends that the 'school' rejected more sophisticated European ideas in favour of a set of tactical approaches and racial stereotypes of an inferior enemy, such that 'Callwell can hardly claim to be the Clausewitz of colonial warfare'. Porch describes *Small Wars* as a piece of 'deceptive marketing', because there 'was nothing particularly "small" about small wars – most proved to be protracted, unlimited, murderous, expensive, total-war assaults on indigenous societies'. Since this is what Porch believes to be the reality of COIN, he concludes that 'in one small book, Callwell laid out in 1896 the contours of modern COIN as a distinct category of warfare'.[39]

Porch's arguments have been criticised elsewhere, notably by David Ucko. Ucko argued that Porch's book was too ideological in tone, and that it was really about Iraq.[40] One might see this in Porch's contention that the colonial worldview infuses modern COIN.[41] Indeed, there are several issues with Porch's interpretation of Callwell's work. The argument advanced in *Counterinsurgency* that Callwell was not the 'Clausewitz of colonial warfare' rather contradicts Porch's own previous assertion that 'only a modest stretching of credulity' is required to see Callwell as 'the Clausewitz of colonial warfare'. It is argued here that *Small Wars* is more than just a tactical manual. Callwell was also very clear that the reality of small wars was that they often degenerated into 'protracted, thankless, invertebrate war' and that – to use Porch's phrase – there was nothing 'small' about small wars.[42] Perhaps the crucial issue is the question of whether Callwell can be described as part of a 'school' that rejected European methods in favour of elevating colonial practice. Callwell's opinions on this score need to be contextualised, both in terms of his oeuvre more generally, and British military thought in the late nineteenth century. He did reject 'stereotyped' European tactics and referred to fighting small wars as 'an art by itself'. However, there are three crucial points here. First, his reference to 'a code from which it is perilous to depart' reflects the writing of the Swiss military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini, whose principles of the art of war had a profound impact on British military thought, rather than some disrespect for European practice.[43] Second, his attitudes reflected the debate in British military thought between those who favoured following the German model, seen

[39] Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, xi, 5, 50–51.
[40] David Ucko, 'Critics Gone Wild: Counterinsurgency as the Root of All Evil', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 25: 1 (2014), 161–179; see also Douglas Porch, 'Reply to David Ucko', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 25: 1 (2014), 180–185.
[41] Porch, *Counterinsurgency*, 76. [42] Callwell, *Small Wars*, 26–27. [43] Ibid., 23.