

Food and Power

The relationship between development and democratization is one of the most compelling topics of research in political science, yet many aspects of authoritarian regime behavior remain unexplained. This book explores how different types of governments take action to shape the course of economic development, focusing on agriculture, a sector that is of crucial importance in the developing world. It explains variation in agricultural and food policy across regime type; who the winners and losers of these policies are; and whether policy influences the stability of authoritarian governments. The book pushes us to think differently about the process linking economic development to political change and to consider growth as an inherently politicized process rather than an exogenous driver of moves toward democracy.

Henry Thomson is an assistant professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. From 2014 to 2017 he was a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. In 2015, his dissertation won the American Political Science Association's Juan Linz Prize for the Best Dissertation in the Comparative Study of Democracy.

Food and Power

*Regime Type, Agricultural Policy, and Political
Stability*

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
 978-1-108-70159-4 — Food and Power
 Henry Thomson
 Frontmatter
[More Information](#)



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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
 One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
 314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
 103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
 a department of the University of Cambridge.

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 education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
 Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108701594

DOI: 10.1017/9781108568951

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First published 2019
 First paperback edition 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data

NAMES: Thomson, Henry, 1984- author.

TITLE: Food and power : regime type, agricultural policy, and political
 stability / Henry Thomson.

DESCRIPTION: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University
 Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2018051440 | ISBN 9781108476812 (hardback) |
 ISBN 9781108701594 (paperback)

SUBJECTS: LCSH: Agriculture and state—Developing countries. |
 Agriculture—Economic aspects—Developing countries. |

Authoritarianism—Developing countries. | Political stability—Developing
 countries. | Economic development—Political aspects—Developing
 countries. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / General.

CLASSIFICATION: LCC HD1417 .T557 2019 | DDC 338.1/91724—dc23
 LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2018051440>

ISBN 978-1-108-47681-2 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-108-70159-4 Paperback

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Acknowledgments

I have incurred a great number of debts in the course of writing this book. The project began as a PhD dissertation in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota from 2012 to 2014, and I must first thank my advisor, John Freeman, and the rest of my dissertation committee, Ben Ansell, Jane Gingrich, C. Ford Runge, and David Samuels, for steering me successfully through this enterprise. Of course, during my time as a graduate student I received help from a great number of others. I thank the Political Science and Applied Economics faculty at the University of Minnesota collectively for the training and support I received there. Dr. Christian Tuschhoff at the Free University of Berlin facilitated a visit in 2012–2013 and provided helpful advice and feedback, as always. Professor Dr. Asan Ali Golam Hassan at the Universiti Utara Malaysia invited me to his institution in 2013, gave very useful guidance, and introduced me to a range of researchers who generously taught me about their country. Participants at conferences in Mainz and Chicago in 2013 also commented on various parts of this project in preliminary stages, helping me to improve my work significantly. Marc Bellemare, Dan Berliner, James Hollyer, Mark Kayser, David Rueda, Christian von Soest, and Milan Svolik gave constructive feedback and advice during the latter stages of the dissertation. I thank all of these people for their input.

The first draft of this book manuscript was prepared during my time as a postdoctoral fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, from 2014 to 2017. I would like to thank the staff, fellows, and other postdocs there for all the advice and support they provided during this period. Particularly deserving of my gratitude are the participants in a book workshop that I

held in 2016: Ben Ansell, Jane Gingrich, Robin Harding, Jan Pierskalla, David Samuels, Luis Schiumieri, and Laurence Whitehead. However, others also provided valuable feedback during this period, including Catherine Boone, Halvard Buhaug, Martin Petrick, Bryn Rosenfeld, Nina von Uexkuell, and Henrik Urdal. I received helpful comments from audiences at the University of Oxford; the Risk Advisory Group, London; the Humboldt Universität, Berlin; the London School of Economics; the University of Navarra; the German Development Institute in Bonn; the Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO) in Halle; the University of Uppsala; and the University of Zurich.

I completed the final version of the manuscript while working as an assistant professor at Arizona State University. I could not have wished for a more welcoming and supportive group of colleagues, and I thank them all for providing the ideal environment for finishing this project. Four anonymous reviewers for both Cambridge University Press and Oxford University Press gave extremely thorough and helpful reviews, which served to significantly strengthen the manuscript. Robert Dreesen at Cambridge University Press has been a supportive and effective editor and a great help in guiding me through the publishing process.

This project could not have been completed without generous funding from a variety of sources, for which I am very grateful. The University of Minnesota supported my research through a series of grants, including the David and Janis Larson Research Fellowship in Political Economy, the Asher N. Christenson Memorial Fellowship, and the Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) funded a year of research in Berlin during 2012–2013. Nuffield College provided support for workshops in both 2015 and 2016.

I thank all of these individuals and organizations for their help. The usual disclaimer applies; all remaining errors or omissions remain my own.