

Index

- a priori* knowledge, 147, 232, 242
 aboutness, 57
 alethic pluralism. *See* truth, pluralist theory of
 analytic/synthetic distinction, 136–149, 232, 242
 analyticity
 and mathematics, 147, 231, 233, 241, 246
 metaphysical and epistemic, 142, 146–148
 and necessity, 147
 and truthmaker gaps, 136, 213
 Angere, Staffan, 51
 Aristotle, 3, 6
 Armstrong, David M., 137
 analyticity, 138–141, 144
 behaviorism and phenomenalism, 8–9
 correspondence theory of truth, 40, 42, 127
 internal relations, 55, 120
 laws of nature, 159
 master argument, 177–181
 mathematics, 230
 maximalism, 71–74, 86, 91
 necessary truths, 58
 necessitarianism, 54
 nominalism, 175, 178, 186, 190
 ontological commitment, 45–47
 ostrich nominalism, 190, 195
 presentism, 216
 properties, 175, 178
 property of truth, 121
 propositions, 20
 realism, 154–155
 sparse properties, 108
 states of affairs, 23
 supervenience, 179
 totality states of affairs, 83
 truthmakers, 28, 35, 84, 97, 109, 185, 197
 Ayer, Alfred Jules, 159
 Azzouni, Jody, 240
 indispensability, 227–230
 mathematical nominalism, 236–238, 245
 ontological commitment, 4, 45, 47–49, 228
- Baia, Alex, 58, 209–210, 216
 Balaguer, Mark, 230–231
 Barcan formula, converse, 93–95
 Barnes, Elizabeth, 23
 Baron, Sam
 deflationary truthmaking, 98
 indispensability, 226
 nonmaximalism, 77, 86
 Platonism, 239–242
 presentism, 87, 179, 203, 206
 behaviorism, 9, 27, 32
 belief box, 3–4, 63, 228, 233, 235, *See also*
 cognitive accounting
 Bennett, Karen, 183, 185
 Berkeley, George, 8
 Bigelow, John, 50
 nonmaximalism, 73, 156, 209
 presentism, 205
 realism, 154
 supervenience principle, 48, 72–73, 77, 85, 90, 179, 192–194
 Bird, Alexander, 25
 Blackburn, Simon, 210
 de re modality, 186
 projectivism, 160–164
 quasirealism, 160, 165
 realism, 154
 Boghossian, Paul Artin, 137, 146–148
 book of the world, 195, 218
 Brentano, Franz, 185
 Briggs, Ray, 57
 Brower-Toland, Susan, 52
 B-schema, 37, 99–101, 134, 191, 210–211
 bundle theory, 194
- Cameron, Ross Paul
 B-schema, 38, 99
 disjunction principle, 68
 fiction, 256–258, 261
 mathematical trivialism, 241–244
 maximalism, 72, 74–76

- ontological commitment, 46, 48
 presentism, 205
 realism, 156–159
 truthmaker theory of truth, 112
- Caplan, Ben, 33, 206, 210
- Carnap, Rudolf, 59, 230
- Cartwright, Richard, 124
- cheater catching, 24–27, 58, 206
- Chrisman, Matthew, 128
- cognitive accounting, 3–4, 27, 32–33, 63, 194,
 196, *See also* ontological accounting
- Colyvan, Mark, 231, 241
- conjunction principle, 34–35, 40, 80
- constructive empiricism, 158–159, 169–171
- constructivism, 156, 159
 moral, 168
- conventionalism
 mathematical, 230
 modal, 186, 242
 truth by convention, 146
- counterfactuals, 8–10, 25, 32, 167, 245
- counterpart theory, 65, 179–180, 185
- creeping minimalism, 11, 164–168
- Crisp, Thomas M., 215
- David, Marian, 109, 124, 126
- Davidson, Donald, 67, 106
- Davidson, Matthew, 206
- de re* modality, 157, 162, 167, 186–189
- deRosset, Louis, 185
- Devitt, Michael, 190–192, 195
- disjunction principle, 66–69
- dispositions, 25, 158, 205, 245
- Divers, John, 5
- Dodd, Julian, 17, 73, 80, 92, 101, 198
- Donelson, Raff, 165
- Dreier, James, 164
- Dummett, Michael, 154, 170, 230
- Dworkin, Ronald, 165
- Edwards, Douglas, 87, 123, 130–132
- eliminative materialism, 158
- emotivism, 164, 166, *See also* noncognitivism
- empty world, 69
- Englebretsen, George, 199
- epistemicism, 8, 85
- epistemology, 7–8, 77–78, 85–86, 146
- error theory, 151–152, 156–159
 mathematical, 231, 233, 236–239, 244, 246
 metaethical, 164, 166
- eternalism, 200–204, 206, 208–209, 213–214,
 263
 definition of, 201, 214–218
- Euthyphro contrast, 2–3, 133
- experimental philosophy, 214
- explanation. *See also* truthmaking, explanation-
 first
 alethic, 31–44, 211
 contrastive, 38–39
 and correspondence theory of truth, 39–43
 deductive-nomological, 36–37
- expressivism, 163, *See also* noncognitivism
 about modality, 186
- facts, 7, 125–127, 263, *See also* states of affairs
 negative, 83–84, 87–88, 95, 126
- fiction
 Meinongianism about, 252
 truth in, 247–250
- fictional characters, 45, 59, 252, 255–261, 263
- fictionalism, 159
 mathematical, 227, 231, 236, 239, 246
- Field, Hartry
 definition of Platonism, 228–230
 nominalism in mathematics, 225–227
- Fine, Arthur, 151, 169–171
- Fine, Kit, 5–6, 12, 95–98, 101, 134
- Fiocco, M. Oreste, 76–77
- Firth, Roderick, 167
- free will, 12
- Frege, Gottlob, 106, 231, 235, *See also*
 neo-Fregeanism
- fundamentality, 12, 257–258, *See also*
 truthmakers, fundamentality and
- general truths, 53, 202
- Gettier, Edmund L., 7–8, 77–78, 147
- Gibbard, Allan, 184
- Gödel sentences, 82–83
- Goff, Philip, 190
- Griffith, Aaron M., 33, 53, 102
- grounding, 54, 57, 75, 95–98, 101–102, 113,
 122
- grounding problem, 185
- growing block, 221–222
- Gupta, Anil, 117
- haecceities, 205
- Hale, Bob, 236
- Harman, Gilbert, 137, 144–147
- Heathcote, Adrian, 82
- Heil, John, 22, 154, 238
- Hill, Christopher, 116
- Hinchliff, Mark, 214, 216
- history, philosophy of, 12
- Hofmann, Frank, 145, 195
- Hofweber, Thomas, 4, 237, 240, 245
- Hornsby, Jennifer, 99, 191
- Horvath, Joachim, 145
- Horwich, Paul, 108, 115, 117, 121, 128

Hume, David, 60, 161, 204
hyperintensionality, 52, 57

ideal observer theory, 167
idealism, 151, 153–156, 159, 170
indeterminacy, 12
indispensability argument, 223–227
Ingram, David, 110–111
Ingthorsson, Rögvaldur, 137
internal relations, 55, 120
intuitionism, 231

Jago, Mark, 22, 27, 58
analytic/synthetic distinction, 142
dilemma for nonmaximalism, 87–90, 208
dualism about truth, 79
maximalism, 74, 83, 113
Milne sentence, 83
necessitarianism, 54
nonmaximalism, 112
truthmaker theory of truth, 41, 112, 118–122

Keller, Simon, 205
Khlentzos, Drew, 81
Kierland, Brian, 205–207
Kitamura, Naoaki, 33
Kriegel, Uriah, 185
Kripke, Saul A., 8
Kroon, Frederick W., 251–254

Lange, Marc, 25
Latour, Bruno, 153, 170
law of excluded middle, 68–69
laws of nature, 25, 28, 145, 159, 245
Leibniz's Law, 184–185
Lewis, David
maximalism, 129
modal realism, 5, 65, 152, 159, 184
necessitation, 57
negative existentials, 81, 88
nominalism, 179–180, 185, 187, 191
presentism, 9
sparse properties, 51, 108
supervenience principle, 48, 72–73, 77, 85,
90, 179, 192–198, 202, 262
truth, 123, 166
liar paradox, 8, 12, 82, 85, 121
Liggins, David, 33
logicism, 235
López de Sa, Dan, 44, 82
Lowe, E. J.
correspondence theory of truth, 123, 126
essential dependence, 57, 113, 157
maximalism, 74
necessary truths, 58

Ludlow, Peter, 215
Lynch, Michael P., 152

MacBride, Fraser, 24, 58, 123, 129–130, 197
Markosian, Ned, 204
Martin, C. B., 8, 25, 154
mathematical truths, 59, 226–227
and analyticity, 147, 231–233, 241, 246
and triviality, 234
mathematics
autonomy of, 226, 242, 246
naturalism about, 227, 230
Maudlin, Tim, 25
maximalism, 24, 65, 194
advocates for, 71–73
defense of, 73–79
definition of. *See also* nonmaximalism
and error theory, 158
necessity for truthmaking, 26, 29, 58, 92, 110,
126, 212
and nominalism, 196
and presentism, 202
tensed, 209
and truth, 111, 113, 122, 129
McKinnon, Neil, 205
meaning, 132
medieval philosophy, 52
Meinong, Alexius, 257. *See also* fiction,
Meinongianism about, *See also* presentism,
Meinongian
Melia, Joseph, 5, 191
Mellor, D. H., 53
mereological universalism, 183
Merricks, Trenton
aboutness, 57
cheater catching, 25–27
maximalism, 92
necessitation, 53
presentism, 214–215
propositions, 20
trivial truthmakers, 58, 69–70
metaethics, 9–10, 160–168, 231
metaphysics
descriptive vs. revisionary, 6
Miller, Kristie, 77, 86
Milne, Peter, 81–83
mind-independence, 153, 156–159
minimalism about truth. *See* truth, deflationary
theory of
modal profiles, 181–185
Molnar, George, 72, 81, 86
monism, 22
Monton, Bradley, 205–207
Moore, George Edward, 160–161, 168
Mulligan, Kevin, 84, 113, 154, 190

- natural ontological attitude, 169, 171
- necessary beings, 20, 59–62, 64–65, 95, *See also*
Barcan formula, converse
- necessary truths, 52, 56–62, 64, 98, 147
and contingent truthmakers, 141
and triviality, 69–70, 242
- necessitarianism. *See* necessitation, necessity of
- necessitation, 232
necessity of, 52–56, 178
sufficiency of, 56–64, 253
- negative existentials
and correspondence theory of truth, 123, 126
and explanation, 33, 38
in fiction, 250
Milne sentence, 82
and necessitation, 52
and presentism, 203
and supervenience, 73, 192, 196
as truthmaker gaps, 80–84, 90, 155, 202, 208,
213
truthmakers for, 158, 180, 245
- neo-Fregeanism, 235–236, 239
- nominalism
easy road, 178–186, 203
about fictional characters, 256–258, 260
hard road, 178–179, 190–197, 219
mathematical, 225–229, 235–237, 240, 242
ostrich, 190–197, 262–263
about properties, 28, 144, 176–199, 225,
262
and truthmaking, 23
- no-miracles argument, 169
- noncognitivism, 151–152, 156, 159, 247, *See also*
expressivism, *See also* emotivism
- nonmaximalism, 29, *See also* maximalism
and analyticity, 140
and cheater catching, 58
defense of, 79–87
dilemma for, 87–90
and dualism about truth, 78–79
and explanation, 42
and presentism, 209
and realism, 155
and truth, 113
- Norton, James, 77, 86
- O’Leary-Hawthorne, John, 112
- ontological accounting. *See also* cognitive
accounting
and analyticity, 136–137, 141–143, 148–149
definition of, 5
and nominalism, 179, 198
and nonmaximalism, 81
and ontological commitment, 45, 48
and presentism, 211–212, 219
and realism, 171
and supervenience, 48
and triviality, 69
and truthmaking, 27, 31–33, 55, 61
ontological commitment, 45–49, 261, *See also*
ontological accounting, *See also* cognitive
accounting
criteria of, 4, 226, 233
and mathematics, 224
and triviality, 244
truthmaker theory of, 45–48, 226
- ontological inventory, 3–4, 63, 228, 233,
See cognitive accounting
- ontology, 3, 5, 33, *See also* cognitive accounting,
See also ontological commitment
easy, 260
- open question argument, 160
- Oppy, Graham, 112
- Parfit, Derek, 7
- parity, 186–190, 198
- Parsons, Josh, 53, 178, 205
- Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L., 108
- Pendlebury, Michael, 80, 154
- Perrine, Timothy, 32, 78
- personal identity, 7
- pessimistic induction, 169
- phenomenalism, 8–9, 27, 32, 100
- physicalism, 12
- Plato, 2, 230
- Platonism
definition of, 228–230
about fictional characters, 259
and indispensability, 224
mathematical, 59–61, 147, 159, 223–246,
260–261, 263
trivialist, 238–239, 243
- plenitude, 183–186, 197
- possible worlds, 4–5, 20, 64–65, 185
- pragmatism, 62, 154–155, *See also* truth,
pragmatic theory of
- predications
contingent, 53, 73, 130, 177–183, 192, 196,
198, 262
essential, 180, 198
- presentism
Baron’s objection to, 87
and cheater catching, 24–26
and common sense, 214–218
definition of, 201, 214–218, 220
easy road, 203–208, 213, 218
hard road, 203, 208–214, 218–220
Lucretianism, 205–206
and maximalism, 91
Meinongian, 205

- presentism (cont.)
and nominalism, 179
and ontological parsimony, 218–221
truthmaker objection to, 9, 201–203, 262
problem of universals, 125
projectivism, 160–164, 167, *See also* quasirealism
about modality, 186
properties. *See also* nominalism, about properties
nature of, 108
realism about, 28, 175–176, 262, *See also*
universals
sparse vs. abundant, 42, 51, 108–109, 120,
130–131
tensed, 25
propositions, 12, 19–22, 60, 102, 121, 141
psychologism, 231
Putnam, Hilary
indispensability, 224
metaethics, 165
presentism, 214–215, 217
realism, 150, 170
- quasirealism, 128, 156, 160–167, 231
quietism, 129–133, 151, 169, 171
Quine, Willard Van Orman, 41, 57, 101, 125
analytic/synthetic distinction, 136–137,
144–148
de re modality, 186
indispensability, 224, 227
ontological commitment, 4, 45–49, 224, 226,
228, 233
ostrich nominalism, 190
Quineanism
about mathematics, 241
- Rasmussen, Joshua, 122–124, 127
Rayo, Agustín, 230, 238–239, 241–243
Read, Stephen, 154, 231
realism. *See also* properties, realism about
Cornell, 162–163, 167–168
entity, 171
and mind-independence, 158
moral, 161, 164–168
nature of, 10–11, 154–160
scientific, 151, 153, 168–172
structural, 171
and truth, 10, 150–154
reference, 130–131
reflective equilibrium, 80
relativism, 156, 159
moral, 153, 164, 166, 168
relevance logic, 61, 246
Restall, Greg, 52, 57
triviality argument, 66–69
Rettler, Bradley, 32, 48
- Rhoda, Alan R., 205, 207–208
Robinson, Denis, 12
Rodríguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo
conjunction principle, 34–35, 63, 80
disjunction principle, 67–68
explanation-first truthmaking, 40, 43–44
Milne sentence, 82–83
necessary truths, 57, 59
negative existentials, 83
nonmaximalism, 91
primitivism about truthmaking, 113–114
problem of universals, 177
Rorty, Richard, 165
Rosen, Gideon, 179–180
Russell, Bertrand, 7, 21, 83, 202
Russell, Gillian, 142, 148
Rychter, Pablo, 191
- Saenz, Noël Blas, 126
Sanson, David, 33, 206, 210
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, 153
Scanlon, T. M., 165
Schaffer, Jonathan
grounding, 57, 96, 113
monism, 22
necessary truths, 58
ontological commitment, 47, 63
Schnieder, Benjamin, 191
semantic ascent, 21
Shafer-Landau, Russ, 165
Sidelle, Alan, 186
Sider, Theodore
cheater catching, 24–27, 29, 203, 206
eternalism, 215
fundamentality, 5–6
presentism, 24–27
Simon, Jonathan, 62, 78
Simons, Peter, 84, 263
analyticity, 138
maximalism, 74
necessitation, 62
nonmaximalism, 88
realism, 154
tropes, 190
Simpson, Matthew, 130
slingshot argument, 67
Smith, Barry, 57, 62, 78, 84, 154, 190
social constructionism, 153
Sorensen, Roy
contingent maximalism, 72
truthmaker gaps, 85–88
truth-teller, 77, 209, 213
states of affairs
argument for, 46, 177–178, 181
defense of, 199

- and parity, 186–189
- and realism about properties, 28
- required as truthmakers, 22
- skepticism about, 92, 95
- totality, 23, 83, 88, 95, 126, 157–158, 166, 202–203, 245
- as truthmakers, 23, 121
- Stenwall, Robin, 80
- Stoneham, Tom, 216
- Strawson, P. F., 6
- subjectivism, 156, 159, 162
 - moral, 164, 166, 168
- substitutional quantification, 115, 237
- superassertibility, 9–10
- supervenience gaps, 73, 77–78, 85, 209, 212–213
- supervenience principle, 48, 72, 179, 202, *See also* Bigelow, John, supervenience principle, *See also* Lewis, David, supervenience principle
 - and nominalism, 192
 - strong vs. weak, 73, 90
- Tałasiewicz, Mieszko, 137
- Tallant, Jonathan
 - cheater catching, 25
 - explanation-first truthmaking, 39, 52
 - explanationism, 133–134, 210
 - maximalism, 92
 - presentism, 205, 210, 212–213, 220
 - truth, 110–111
- Tarski, Alfred, 41, 118, *See also* T-schema theology, 12
- Thomas, Andrew, 124
- Thomasson, Amie L.
 - conventionalism, 146
 - fiction, 59, 248, 250, 254–255, 259–261
- Torrengo, Giuliano, 210
- trivialism, 59–60
 - about fictional characters, 259–261
 - mathematical, 223, 232–246, 259–261
- tropes
 - and bundle theory, 193
 - defense of, 199
 - and nominalism, 176–178
 - and parity, 186–189
 - and realism about properties, 28, 125
 - skepticism about, 92, 95
- truth
 - asymmetry of truth and being. *See* Euthyphro contrast
 - coherence theory of, 124, 129, 150–152, 155
 - concept of, 106–107, 111
 - correspondence theory of, 39–44, 75, 79, 122–129, 133, 150–153, 164–165, 169
 - deflationary theory of, 10–11, 39, 41–44, 98, 107, 114, 118, 120–122, 124, 127–135, 151–152, 164–166, 169
 - and disquotation, 243
 - dualism about, 78–79, 84
 - epistemic theory of, 151–152, 169
 - in fiction, 247–250
 - metaphysical deflationism about, 42, 51, 108–111, 119–122
 - omnipresence of, 106–107
 - pluralist theory of, 78, 151–152
 - pragmatic theory of, 124, 129, 152
 - primitivist theory of, 11, 107, 124
 - property of, 108–111
 - prosentential theory of, 41
 - truthmaker theory of, 111–122
 - and truthmaking, 11, 44, 78–79, 106–111
 - verificationist theory of, 152
- truth by convention, 142–144
- truth schema. *See* T-schema
- truth-bearers, 19–22, 138, *See also* propositions
- truth-conditions, 238
- truthmaker gaps. *See also* nonmaximalism
 - and analyticity, 136
 - and dilemma for nonmaximalism, 88–90
 - and frivolity, 72
 - impossibility for truthmaker theory, 72
 - and realism, 155
 - and slippery slope argument, 29, 75, 91, 209
 - and supervenience, 73, 196
 - and triviality, 58, 70
 - versus supervenience gaps, 76, 84–87
- truthmaker semantics, 12
- truthmakers
 - fundamentality and, 5–6, 22–23, 32, 102
 - “Goldilocks,” 43–44
 - minimal, 35
 - pluralism about, 22–24, 96
 - semantic, 19, 139–142
 - trivial, 58, 70, 232, 234, 240
- truthmaking. *See also* necessitation
 - deflationary, 98–101, 134, 191, 210–211, 213, 251
 - and essential dependence, 113
 - explanation-first, 33–44, 59, 62, 75, 78, 80, 84–85, 129, 134, 232, 234
 - and grounding, 113, 122
 - as internal relation, 55
 - ontology-first, 32–33, 35–36, 41, 58, 76, 78, 80, 84–85, 129, 232
 - primitivism about, 113–114
 - projectivist, 160–164
 - simple account of, 51–52
 - trivial, 69–70, 136, 232, 234

296

truth-teller, 77, 85–86, 213
T-schema, 41, 99, 128, 134, 210, 243
underdetermination, 169
universals, 175–176, 225, 229–231
vagueness, 8
van Fraassen, Bas C., 153, 158, 168–171
van Inwagen, Peter, 249–250
Veber, Michael, 57, 77–78, 85–88
Waechter, Jonas, 83
Westphal, Jonathan, 209

Index

Williams, Michael, 107
Williamson, Timothy, 5–6, 27–28, 93–95
 necessitism, 64–66
 vagueness, 8
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 7, 83, 243, 263
Wodeham, Adam, 52
Wright, Cory D., 108
Wright, Crispin, 9–10, 151, 168, 236, 238
Yagisawa, Takashi, 250
Zardini, Elia, 82
Zimmerman, Dean W., 214