

Introduction: Emotions and Empire

Whilst in the neighbourhood of the Rufus, I observed many women in deep mourning for their husbands, who had been shot in some of the conflicts with Europeans. Many children were pointed out to me as being fatherless from the same cause; and I have no doubt that the loss of lives in these districts has been considerable from such affrays. . . . All that would be required to cement the good understanding that has so happily commenced, would be the formation of a permanent station on the Murray, at the Junction of the Rufus, under the direction of someone who has a knowledge of the manners and customs of the Aborigines; . . . it would be the means, I doubt not, of effectually preventing, for the future, those wholesale losses of property, and those fearful scenes of retaliation and bloodshed which have heretofore so frequently occurred.

Edward John Eyre, Adelaide, 1842.¹

Edward Eyre's despatch is redolent of the emotions aroused by colonial conflict and cross-cultural exchange. Following terrible interracial violence along the new 'overland' route between Melbourne and Adelaide, culminating in the Rufus River Massacre of late 1841, many white settlers were filled with rage and fear. Eyre was sent to the region to make peace. His account sought to elicit recognition of the Aboriginal inhabitants as human beings with families, who felt sorrow for the loss of their husbands, parents or children, and toward whom colonists had responsibilities. Rather than ferocious warriors, Eyre depicted Aboriginal men as fathers with dependents. To strengthen his argument for the establishment of a Protector – a role that he was to take up himself – he envisaged a happier future in which good will would prevail between colonists and Indigenous people. While Eyre was unusual at this time in seeking to prompt compassion for Aboriginal people among white settlers, such arguments were an integral aspect of the history of imperialism, and point toward the important role of the emotions in creating relationships between people across divides of culture, space and time.

¹ 'Despatch from Mr Eyre', *Southern Australian*, 18 February 1842, p. 3.

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This book explores changing ideas about who to feel *for* and *with* across the British Empire, from the late eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century. It examines the role of the compassionate emotions, today glossed as empathy, in the establishment and maintenance of imperialism, focusing on relations between Britain and her Australasian colonies, and between settlers and Indigenous people. It traces the way that emotional narratives created relationships between self and distant others, yet also served to maintain cultural distinctions and legitimate conquest. These emotional relationships took forms specific to the settler colony, where empathy was an essential means of uniting dispersed communities and linking the metropolis and her colonies – but also served to exclude, especially on racial grounds. British imperialism brought distant peoples into communication, fostering new relationships constructed via competing, intensely affective narratives, as well as new ideas about humanity and nation, cosmopolitanism and empire, slavery, convicts and Indigenous peoples. Often drawn from the domestic referents of family, childhood and inheritance, these were amplified and challenged by imperial networks, revealing the imbrication of feelings, morality and debates integral to conquest. Drawing upon a wide range of sources, especially popular culture, this book maps the history of what eighteenth-century moral philosopher Adam Smith called ‘fellow feeling’ across the British Empire, and its role in creating diverse emotional communities, united by shared allegiances and goals.

Smith’s broad conception of sympathy encompassed what during the twentieth century increasingly came to be called ‘empathy’, a term only introduced to English in 1909 in translation of the German term ‘*Einfühlung*’ (or ‘feeling into’). In its earliest turn-of-the-century usage, empathy referred to an aesthetic experience, such as a reaction to a work of art, as well as a bodily response. During the twentieth century, empathy subsumed the multidimensional concept of sympathy as it was used by earlier observers. In this book, I aim to use terms such as ‘sympathy’ within their historical context; however, in drawing on the extensive recent critical literature focused upon a broad and inclusive usage of ‘empathy’, I use this latter term to refer to the constellation of sympathetic emotions. Some now consider empathy to refer to a closer identification with another’s emotional state than sympathy, but I choose to retain the inclusive sense of Smith’s ‘fellow-feeling’.² Within scholarship exploring emotions such as pity or compassion it has become orthodox to

² Karsten Stueber, ‘Empathy’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empathy/>; Carolyn Burdett, ‘Is Empathy the End of Sentimentality?’ *Journal of Victorian Culture* 16 (2) (2011), 259–74.

emphasize the ways in which they mask complicity with oppressive practices. However, some have challenged the view that emotional relationships always advanced imperialism, showing that bonds of friendship, for example, may undermine the seemingly inevitable reinforcement of racial boundaries and inequalities of power.³ Despite the significant limits of empathetic understanding, I argue that we must understand such feelings as politically malleable and contingent *processes* rather than static entities, and distinguish between diverse contexts of reception and response in exploring the role of emotional discourse within imperial relations. Rather than judging emotions such as empathy as ‘positive’, or ‘negative’, I seek to map their political effects in historical context.

Researching the History of the Emotions

Over the last three decades, growing interest in the history and culture of the emotions has demonstrated their important role in human life, as well as their cultural and temporal variability. The seemingly universal experience and expression of the emotions has in fact varied tremendously across time and place. In history, this research field emerged most immediately from gender history and the history of the family during the 1990s, and challenged the opposition between the supposedly domestic, feminine, ‘private’ sphere, and the rational, male, public domain, as a historical construction with little basis in fact. Such work demonstrated the importance of gender as a means of naturalizing social hierarchies and the differential distribution of power. Like gender, emotions, supposedly so closely linked to the private female domain, can be shown to pervade all aspects of life, and perform the epistemological function of defining ‘not just male and female, public and private, but also subject and object, human and nonhuman, determined and free’.⁴ Scholars working across diverse periods and cultures have now demonstrated how emotional experience has defined, reproduced and reified central social, political

³ Studies that emphasize the ways that emotions maintain inequality include, e.g., Lauren Berlant (ed.), *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004); Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotions* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). More contingent political effects are the focus of e.g., Marianne Noble, *The Masochistic Pleasures of Sentimental Literature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2000); Cindy Weinstein, *Family, Kinship and Sympathy in Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Studies that examine the potential of emotions to challenge the status quo include Leela Gandhi, *Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of Friendship* (Duke University Press, Durham, 2006).

⁴ Rachel Ablow, ‘Introduction: Victorian Emotions’, *Victorian Studies*, 50(3) (2008), 375–7, quotations p. 375.

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and scientific categories.⁵ Anthropologists documented the diversity of emotional vocabularies and norms, and argued that emotion is tied to the politics of everyday interaction and therefore that a key focus of the study of emotion is constituted by the politics of social life (rather than the psychology of the individual).⁶ Emotions may be collective, historically created and locally contingent, and respond dynamically to circumstance, response or refusal in systems of circulation and exchange that Sara Ahmed terms ‘emotional economies’.⁷ A rich field of scholarship has now elaborated a variety of conceptual and methodological ways to understand the historical role of the emotions.

A central interdisciplinary question has concerned the relationship between universally experienced bodily responses – often considered the domain of scientists and especially neuroscientists – and their cultural expression.⁸ While still debated, most accept that these domains are not opposed, and that biological and cultural studies of emotion inform one another: discourse, and especially language, shapes both the experience and expression of emotion. A broad scholarly consensus distinguishes between the biological and embodied nature of ‘affects’, and the social and cultural expression of ‘emotions’, although acknowledging the complex relationship between these two dimensions.⁹

Another crucial methodological issue regards how to access the emotional life of people in past times – how do we interpret their expressions of emotions, usually conveyed in language, performance or visual imagery, to understand actual emotional states? This is sometimes termed the ‘experience versus expression question’ – that is, how do we recover the

⁵ Ablow, ‘Introduction’. For overviews, see Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotion: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and contributions to Susan Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016).

⁶ Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (eds.), *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Catherine A. Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, ‘The Anthropology of Emotions’, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15 (1986), 405–36.

⁷ Sara Ahmed, ‘Happy Objects’, in Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (eds.), *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 29–51.

⁸ Plamper, *History of Emotion*.

⁹ Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 135–79; Elspeth Probyn, *Blush: Faces of Shame* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). Resisting the emphasis on meaning inherent within poststructuralism, affect theorists insist upon the excessive qualities of embodied experience, and their potential to transform or exceed social rules. See, for example, Clare Hemmings, ‘Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn’, *Cultural Studies* 19(5) (2005), 548–67; Brian Massumi, ‘Fear (The Spectrum Said)’, *positions* 13 (2005), 31–48; Stephanie Trigg, ‘Affect Theory’, in Susan Broomhall, ed., *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2016), pp. 10–13.

subjectivity of historical actors who may have been constituted so differently from us? In seeking to reconstruct past emotions, a range of useful approaches has been developed, that more or less emphasizes the collective, normative aspects of emotional cultures. An especially flexible formulation is Barbara Rosenwein's notion of 'emotional communities', which she argues are 'largely the same as social communities' such as families, neighbourhoods, syndicates and factories. Emphasizing negotiation, challenge and frequent deviancy from norms, this concept allows for simultaneous participation within multiple 'circles'. Drawing from this approach, I aim to uncover the 'systems of feeling' that define what members of these emotional communities consider valuable or harmful, and which therefore generate emotions. Conversely, systems of feeling also determine which emotions are devalued or ignored – such as the often-derided 'royal-watchers', a community I examine in my final chapter. Emotions are a communicative tool expressed through conventions, and so in order to reconstruct the affective bonds between people and their emotional expression, I examine and contextualize a wide range of 'emotions-related utterances' in documentary sources.¹⁰

This emphasis on language points to the importance of shared ideas and narratives in forming communities among people not personally known to one another. Here the study of emotions intersects with post-colonial scholarship, which has revealed the importance of Western conceptions of history and culture, and the devices we use to conceive, construct and convey meaning about other peoples, as profoundly implicated in imperialism and oppression.¹¹ This central concern with representation has been expanded by cultural theorists to embrace, following Pierre Bourdieu, 'a pluralized field of colonial narratives, which are seen less as signs than as practices, or as signifying practices rather than elements of a code'.¹² Viewing the emotions as 'practices' allows us to see them in terms of a practical engagement with the world, and overcomes persisting false binaries created between body and mind, and

¹⁰ Barbara H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History', *American Historical Review* 107 (2002), 821–45; Andrew Lynch, 'Emotional Community' in Susan Broomhall (ed.), *Early Modern Emotions: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2016), pp. 3–6; William Reddy's complementary concept of 'emotives', or utterances that characterize the self (and others) in emotional terms, emphasizes their performative function and power to enact change: William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For studies that examine diverse socialities and spaces and their relationship to distinctive affective regimes, see Susan Broomhall (ed.), *Spaces for Feeling: Emotions and Sociabilities in Britain, 1650–1850* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015).

¹¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

¹² Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 8.

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expression and experience, by revealing their interrelationship. As practices, emotions constitute ‘objects of feeling’ – those toward whom we feel pity, anger or love. Monique Scheer argues that this framework ‘elaborates most thoroughly the infusion of the physical body with social structure, both of which participate in the production of emotional experience’.¹³ In practice theory, subjects are not viewed as prior to practices, but rather as the product of them; the body is deeply shaped by the habitus (the engrained habits, skills and dispositions that define one’s social location).¹⁴

The consumption of media such as texts, visual images and music constitute an important emotional practice that transforms knowledge into bodily engagement. Fictional representations in literature, theatre and film can be analysed as artefacts ‘used by actors in their emotional practices, as providers of templates of language and gesture as well as mediators of social norms’.¹⁵ I examine such artefacts in historical context, looking for evidence for their intended, as well as their actual, effects across the empire, within what has been termed an ‘imperial commons’, a lively, empire-wide print culture. The dramatic nineteenth-century expansion of print and communication technologies drove the creation of increasingly larger imagined communities, united by values, myths and emotional narratives that shaped the cultural and historical imagination. The Victorian press linked Britain and her colonies, and gave readers a sense of their shared world.¹⁶ Several recent studies trace the contribution of bestselling books to the creation of an imperial commons as they circulated across the globe, translated into diverse cultural, linguistic and social contexts. Within distinctive communicative systems, the book’s ‘specific historical iterations’ produced diverse effects, its accessibility facilitated by the partiality of intellectual property law, and augmented by the ‘scrapbooking’ method of newspapers reproducing text from each other across the empire, prompting a mode of reading that juxtaposed diverse frameworks, events, people and arguments in a ‘widespread and homemade global idiom . . . a demotic form of world literature’.¹⁷ These

¹³ Monique Scheer, ‘Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuan Approach to Understanding Emotion’, *History and Theory*, 51(2) (2012), 193–220, quotation p. 199; Ahmed, *Cultural Politics of Emotion*, 8–9, 83.

¹⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 53–54.

¹⁵ Scheer, ‘Are Emotions a Kind of Practice?’, 217–18.

¹⁶ Julie F. Codell, *Imperial Co-histories: National Identities and the British and Colonial Press* (Cranberry, NJ: Associated University Press, 2003); Joanne Shattock and Michael Wolff, *The Victorian Periodical Press* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982).

¹⁷ Antoinette Burton and Isabel Hofmeyr, ‘Introduction’ in Antoinette Burton and Isabel Hofmeyr (eds.), *Ten Books That Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial*

portable, mobile, accessible texts might imagine how imperialism worked, or simply provide engaging accounts of shared concerns, such as the place of children in the metropolis, mission work or slavery.

In emotional practice, these ‘artefacts’ were mediated by performance, manuscript, print or more recently, digital forms, constituting, as Maureen McLane has argued, ‘the means through, and historical conditions under which human imagination materializes itself’.¹⁸ Through their translation across diverse cultural and spatial contexts of reception, narratives that aroused feelings crossed boundaries of class, race, and gender, even as they contributed to creating them. To recover this condition of mediality, I undertake what Daniel Hack terms ‘close reading at a distance’ – the combination of both attending to the text, but also its wider and diverse reception to understand both better.¹⁹ As I examine in Chapter 3, when ‘overlander’ George Hamilton rendered his direct experiences of frontier violence in art and text, and sought to justify frontier violence on the grounds of self-defence, he quoted from Charles Dickens’ novel *Bleak House* to attack the ‘greasy Chadbands’ who insisted on Aboriginal rights. In evoking the hypocrisy of those, like Dickens’s fictional character, who urged compassion but did not practice it, Hamilton sought to align his readers with colonists, and set them against Indigenous people. As this example shows, these interpretive schemes also define some lives as more distinctly human than others, telling readers who belongs within a shared community and is therefore worthy of concern.²⁰ In examining key texts, images and authors that were taken up in Australia, and their reception across the imperial world, I seek to understand how emotional narratives defined specific objects of empathy, turning responses toward, or away from, specific objects or communities, whether white settlers, Aboriginal people, missionaries, orphans or members of the royal family.

Commons (Duke University Press, 2014), p. 1; Isabel Hofmeyr, *The Portable Bunyan: A Transnational History of the Pilgrim’s Progress* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Tony Ballantyne, ‘Moving Texts and “Humane Sentiment”’: Materiality, Mobility and the Emotions of Imperial Humanitarianism’, *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 17(1) (2016), doi:10.1353/cch.2016.0000; Tony Ballantyne, ‘Contesting the Empire of Paper: Cultures of Print and Anti-Colonialism in the Modern British Empire’, in Jane Carey and Jane Lydon (eds.), *Indigenous Networks: Mobility, connections and exchange* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 219–40.

¹⁸ Maureen McLane, *Balladeering, Minstrelsy, and the Making of British Romantic Poetry* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 7.

¹⁹ Daniel Hack, *Reaping Something New: African American Transformations of Victorian Literature* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 3.

²⁰ Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (London: Verso, 2010), p. 51.

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Visual culture provides an important means of accessing historical emotions, as I explore throughout this book, and especially in Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 7. Although images are as much shaped by contemporary conventions, cultural predispositions and allegiances as other cultural forms, nonetheless I argue that through images we can see something of contemporary emotions – including ambivalence, and the moral uncertainties of the invaders. Visual theorists have shown that ‘looking’ is a politically and historically specific process, and that images are highly ambivalent historical traces that assume meaning when enmeshed in narrative – whether written, oral, visual or embodied context. In this way, globalizing visual cultures constitute an important dimension of the imperial commons.²¹ Contexts for interpreting visual meanings change over time, allowing us to recognize more clearly the premises and conventions of other eras, and to interpret the image in new ways.²²

Like texts, by arousing emotions such as empathy or compassion, images bring distant peoples into communication and create social relationships. Images may be performative, but also perlocutionary in seeking to persuade, frighten, anger or evoke compassion. Art tends to be especially interested not just in depicting emotions but also in creating them. Indeed, Erin Sullivan suggests that ‘there are very few works of art that set out *not* to make their audiences feel something’.²³ As I argue in Chapter 3, images can evoke our own compassion, disgust, sorrow or fear in the present, in ways that forensic historical analysis sometimes cannot.

Changing Emotional Regimes across the British Empire

As Chapter 2 explores further, during the period of Britain’s colonial expansion in the eighteenth century, a broad emotional regime often termed the ‘cult of sensibility’ emerged across Europe and America, influenced by philosophers of moral sentiment such as David Hume and Adam Smith. This emotional orientation was defined through contrasts drawn between home and other, domestic and cosmopolitan priorities, and fluctuated according to political context. During the 1790s, for

²¹ John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (London: Penguin, 1973); W. J. T. Mitchell, *What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Deborah Poole, *Vision, Race and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean Image World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Nicholas Mirzoeff, *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011).

²² Lynda Nead, ‘The Secret of England’s Greatness’, *Journal of Victorian Culture*, 19(2) (2014), 161–182, doi: 10.1080/13555502.2014.919083.

²³ Erin Sullivan, ‘The Role of the Arts in the History of the Emotions’, *Emotions: History, Culture, Society*, 2(1) (2018), 113–31, quotation p. 126.

example, British perceptions that the French Revolution was driven by an excess of sentiment and egalitarianism prompted a backlash evident in a suspicion of excessive displays of sentimentality and the desire to distance themselves from ‘the French fashion for tears, sensibility and revolution’.²⁴ Increasingly hierarchical ideas about human difference and the classification of the natural world acted to exclude non-white peoples from full humanity, and an opposition between emotion and reason was elaborated in which so-called savage peoples were less in control of their emotions and therefore lacked the capacity for civility.²⁵ In imagining new Antipodean ‘homes’, a series of key oppositions were invoked that contrasted the natural emotions of parenthood with an unnatural universalism, pitting near against distant, national against cosmopolitan, in what was to remain an enduring imperial theme. Such exclusions relegated Indigenous people to the past, as their seemingly inevitable disappearance became a matter for mourning.

The discourse of humanitarian sensibility was applied to a range of reforms, and notably the British movement to abolish slavery which reached a triumphant conclusion in August 1833, when British Parliament finally abolished slavery throughout the British colonies. While historians have fiercely debated the respective importance of emotional, religious, economic and political factors in contributing to the movement’s ultimate success, it is clear that the achievement of abolition marked a climax of public sentiment, and emotional discourse that successfully mobilized empathy for slaves was key to the campaign.²⁶ The British anti-slavery campaign bridged the so-called ages of sensibility and sentimentality, and exemplifies the politicization of emotional regimes,

²⁴ Thomas Dixon, *Weeping Britannia: Portrait of a Nation in Tears* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 122; G. J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*; anti-slavery sentiment also dipped during this decade: Robin Blackburn, *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776–1848* (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 131–5.

²⁵ Nicole Eustace, *Passion Is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Kathleen Wilson, ‘Empire, Gender, and Modernity in the Eighteenth Century’, in Philippa Levine (ed.), *Gender and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 14–45; Margrit Pernau et al., *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

²⁶ Elizabeth B. Clark, ‘“The Sacred Rights of the Weak”: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America’, *Journal of American History*, 82(2) (1995), 463–93; Christine Levecq, *Slavery and Sentiment: The Politics of Feeling in Black Atlantic Antislavery Writing, 1770–1850* (Durham: University of New Hampshire Press, 2008); Brychan Carey, *British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment and Slavery, 1760–1807* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Margaret Abruzzo, *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).

entwined with debates about empire and nation, and political ideologies of liberalism and republicanism.²⁷ The discourse of sensibility was also linked to the expansion of international British missionary networks from 1790 to 1812, a period when British interests begin to multiply around the globe.²⁸ While historians have not always considered the anti-slavery and missionary movements together, as Zoë Laidlaw has noted, religious values and humanitarianism were mutually constitutive for those such as the physician, Quaker and philanthropist Thomas Hodgkin, a co-founder of the Aborigines Protection Society in 1837. During this period, evangelical Protestantism contributed to the new ‘sentimentalism’, which sustained key aspects of the discourse of sensibility including the view that sympathetic feeling was natural and virtuous, as well as an optimistic view of human nature. Fundamental to both was the impulse to feel with another, and to act to alleviate their suffering.²⁹ The climax of public sentiment aroused by the anti-slavery movement’s success propelled a new wave of missionary activity during the 1830s and 1840s.

Over the last two decades, interest in the history of ‘humanitarianism’ has prompted an important body of work that has traced the emergence of a growing concern for the suffering of distant others within a long genealogy of human rights.³⁰ This work allows us to understand how globalization and imperialism were linked to the expanding category of the human, for example, as communicative technologies and colonial experience generated new ideas about distant others; the category of ‘humanitarian’ constitutes a productive historiographical means of foregrounding important connections and continuities across place and period. Many historians use the term ‘humanitarian’ to denote all those historical actors who worked to ameliorate the plight of non-white peoples, including members of

²⁷ Blackburn, *Overthrow*; Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Levecq, *Slavery and Sentiment*.

²⁸ Andrew Porter, *Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

²⁹ Zoë Laidlaw, ‘Heathens, Slaves and Aborigines: Thomas Hodgkin’s Critique of Missions and Anti-Slavery’, *History Workshop Journal* 64 (2007), 133–61; John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Fred Kaplan, *Sacred Tears: Sentimentality in Victorian Literature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 16. For discussion of the relationship between ‘sensibility’, ‘sentimental’ and ‘sentimentalism’, see Carey, *British Abolitionism*, 4–9.

³⁰ Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: Norton, 2007); Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (London: Cornell University Press, 2011); D. J. B. Trim and Brendan Simms, ‘Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention’ in Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp. 1–24.