**Introduction**

At nos hinc alii sitientis ibimus Afros,
pars Scythiam et rapidum cretae veniemus Oaxen
et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

[But we must go hence – some to the thirsty Africans, some to reach Scythia
and the chalk-rolling Oaxes, and the Britons, wholly sundered from all the
world.]
Virgil, *First Eclogue*¹

As Virgil’s First Eclogue draws to its close, the goatherd Meliboeus med-
itates the prospect of an exile that will drive him towards, and then finally
beyond, the distant limits (south, north-east, and north-west) of what he
takes to be the known world. In the goatherd’s eyes, the land of the Britons
sits somewhere just beyond the long arm of Rome’s civilizing reach. As far
as Meliboeus is concerned, that long arm’s reach determines what does,
and what does not, count as belonging to the world.

The trajectory that will take Meliboeus into exile is definitively con-
trasted with the ‘otium’ (leisure) of his interlocutor, the shepherd Tityrus.
Meliboeus’ land has been seized and bestowed upon a soldier, but Tityrus
has managed to retain his own plot through the benevolent intercession of
‘a god’: ‘deus nobis haec otia fecit’.² The god is, presumably, the young
Octavian, and the First Eclogue has long been regarded as working against
the historical backdrop of land confiscations in Cisalpine Gaul after the
battle of Philippi (42 BCE). And yet, when Meliboeus asks to be given the
name of this god (‘sed tamen, iste deus qui sit, da, Tityre, nobis’), Tityrus
responds in a manner that epitomizes the elliptical, decidedly off-kilter
quality of the poem’s exchanges:

Harvard University Press, 1999), Eclogue I, lines 64–6. Subsequent footnotes give eclogue and line
numbers.
² Eclogues I.6.
If we are to take Tityrus at his first words, ‘the city which they call Rome’ is the god that made possible the leisure in which Meliboeus has found him. Tityrus will later clarify, if that is an appropriate way to describe anything he says in the poem, that it was at Rome that he saw the young man (‘hic illum vidi iuvenem’⁴) who spared him from the deprivations of exile. Across an interval of more than twenty lines, however, the answer to Meliboeus’ question (‘who is this god of yours?’) has appeared to be ‘the city which they call Rome’. For in this poem the city’s name serves as shorthand for networks of power and decision-making, and even for apparently arbitrary distinctions among the forms of life (reclining in the shade; wandering, harried, into exile; observing that it might have been possible to share apples, chestnuts, and pressed cheeses in the waning light) that will be available to those who live under Rome’s thumb.

According to Tityrus, Rome is an entity that is capable of disrupting the unspoken calculations and analogies by which individuals make themselves at home in the world. His experience of Rome has taught him that the city unmakes the perspectives and ratios by which like is expected to relate to like. Tityrus has discovered that Rome sets in place new standards by which even the most ordinary relations must be judged. His visit to Rome helped him to secure his land. And yet, the city has altered forever his understanding of the connections that order the world and make it intelligible. Perhaps this is what has stunned Tityrus into the cascading non sequiturs that dominate his contributions to the poem’s efforts at dialogue. Meliboeus, in turn, can only wonder what occasioned the encounter that has wrought these changes in Tityrus: ‘Et quae tanta fuit Romam tibi causa videndi?’⁵ Taken as a whole, these passages establish a series of tentative

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3 Eclogues I.18; Eclogues I.19–25.  
4 Eclogues I.42.  
5 Eclogues I.26.
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links between two exceptions: the land of the Britons, wholly sundered from the world (‘penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos’), and Rome, which stands apart from other cities as a cypress among osiers.

Notwithstanding Meliboeus’ anxieties, Britain was firmly within Rome’s imaginative orbit by the years to which the composition of the Eclogues is conventionally assigned. During the summers of 55 and 54 BCE, Julius Caesar had landed on the island’s south-east shores. Having pulled an at-least-partially credible appearance of victory from the jaws of disasters wrought by bad weather and the hazards of pitched battle, Caesar induced the Britons to promise to pay tribute to Rome. In 43 CE, under Claudius, a Roman invasion (aided, if Dio Cassius 60.21 is to be believed, by what the ancient Britons would have regarded as the spectacular support of war elephants) initiated the conquest of most of the island.

Within a few more decades, the poet Marcus Valerius Martialis would lament in an epigram that even though his verses were sung in distant Britannia, he derived no money from his far-flung literary celebrity. Rome ruled the province of Britannia (and eventually, the twin provinces of ‘Britannia Superior’ and ‘Britannia Inferior’: there would be further provincial subdivisions of the conquered territories) until the first years of the fifth century, when the Sack of Rome in 410 by the armies of Alaric put a decisive end to Rome’s ability to re-garrison the island. These former

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6. Forms of the name Britannia were used by the Greeks and Romans. When I use the term ‘Britain’, especially in relation to texts from the early Middle Ages, it is to be understood as designating the territories that once comprised the Roman provinces of Britannia. For a discussion of some of the complexities that attend the term see Alan MacColl, ‘The Meaning of “Britain” in Medieval and Early Modern England’, Journal of British Studies 45 (2006), 248–69.


10. ‘Non urbana mea tantum Pipleide gaudent / otia nec vacuis auribus ista damus, / sed meus in Geticis / a rigidio teritur centurione liber, / dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia / quid prodest? nescit sacculus ista meus / ad Martia signa pruinis / a rigidio teritur centurione liber, / dicitur et nostros cantare Britannia / What was regarded as a point of no return. On these and related issues see James Gerrard, The Ruin of Roman Britain: An Archaeological Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Michael E. Jones,
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provinces would only firmly re-enter a new Rome’s consciousness towards the end of the sixth century, when Pope Gregory I sent missionaries to convert the pagan kingdom of Æthelberht of Kent. And yet, there are literal and metaphorical senses in which, throughout the fifth and sixth centuries, and indeed for many centuries afterwards, the inhabitants of the island that had been called Britannia lived entangled in versions of Rome that were as near and familiar as they had ever been. Entanglement and familiarity are, therefore, the terms through which this book studies the persistence of Rome.12

The Fact of Rome

A recent and insightful collection of essays asserts that the ‘uniqueness’ of Rome ‘resides, inter alia, in its double nature of both “place” and “idea”’.13 To this traditional pairing of place and idea I offer, by way of supplement, the ‘fact’ of Rome, emphasizing its derivation from the Latin factum, a word whose remarkable semantic range encompasses deeds, actions, exploits, happenings, and matters that are judged to be real or true (i.e., factual). Most importantly for this book’s purposes, the word designates the results of doing or making. Factum is the perfect passive participle of the verb facere: to make, fashion, construct, etc. Facta are things made, done, built, framed and accomplished. Such facta can be encountered, in a further extension, as the givens of the world in which we live. To attend to the ‘fact’ of Rome is therefore to capture a host of phenomena that can too easily, and altogether too thoroughly, drift from view when ‘place’ and ‘idea’ determine the nature and boundaries of an inquiry.


12 Here, and in a few other places where my terminological debt may be obvious, I am drawing on phrases and coinages associated with Martin Heidegger’s project in Sein und Zeit (SZ) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006). Most important, for my purposes here, is Heidegger’s sense that we are ‘primordially familiar’ (Being and Time (BT), trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 119; SZ, 86 ‘ursprünglich vertraut’) with the world in a non-cognitive manner that underwrites and makes possible our critical and theoretical engagements with things. Being and Time thus anchors human beings in a world that they already understand in a ‘primordial’ sense. My goal in taking recourse to Heidegger’s concept of familiarity is to capture a non-cognitive and non-ideological experience of what I am calling the fact of Rome. More broadly, I am invoking Hubert Dreyfus’ efforts to establish the relevance to Heidegger of Wittgenstein’s conception of the ‘background’ (Hintergrund). See Chapter 1 on this topic.

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This is in no sense a denial that place and idea are foundational categories for the study of Rome. They play a key role in organizing any account of the forms in which Rome disclosed itself to inhabitants of the island of Britain during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Writers during these periods knew that Rome was ‘an elsewhere’: that is, a specific distant city on the banks of the Tiber in central Italy. But at what point in history could so narrow and so literal an identification have done more than merely begin to sum up what the word Rome was taken to mean and stand for?  

Chapter 1 explores the implications of several significant lines of continuity between medieval and so-called Renaissance afterlives of Roman Britain. The chapter moves among texts by authors as different as Gildas (floruist from the fifth to the sixth centuries), the Venerable Bede (673/4–735), anonymous Anglo-Saxon poets, and Sir Thomas Browne (1605–82), setting their works within several centuries of quotidian encounters with ancient ruins and other material remains of the Eternal City’s dominion. The chapter argues that Rome could be experienced, even across wide expanses of time and from the soil of the island that had been Britannia, as domestic and familiar rather than distant and mysterious. This is so, I argue, because Rome had embedded itself deep within what the philosopher Stanley Cavell calls ‘the order of the ordinary’, and because it derived from its position within that order an ability to entangle past and present, self and world, in medieval and early modern Britain. 

This version of Rome is to be understood not simply as a distant city that is alternately subjected to devotion and then, after the Reformation, heated polemic, but rather, as Browne puts it in his Hydriotaphia, as one of the means by which we are prompted to ‘make up our selves’. Rather than look for decisive moments, specific authors and texts, or even simply decades capable of marking a point after which engagements with the ancient past become ‘properly’ critical or self-conscious, as some scholars continue to do when working with materials from the late sixteenth century, I argue that the perception of a break with the past that can, paradoxically, bring that past and one’s relationship to it into view, is an

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epistemological position that was available throughout the centuries that connect the fall of Roman Britain in the early fifteenth century to the final decades of the seventeenth century.

Chapter 2 studies Rome as it helps constitute, and as it figures within, the problem of the self. The chapter broaches this topic by exploring a series of metaphorical, metonymic, and synecdochic formulas in which ‘Rome’ can name a metaphysical condition of the educated imagination – regardless of whether that imagination ever finds itself at Rome or not. This Rome is the plight not only of (for example) intrepid Protestants who really did find themselves at, and then escaped from, Rome, but of anyone who has had their mind and body shaped by Rome, and has recognized that they are living in the grip of that word’s metaphorical possibilities. Juxtaposing authors such as Edmund Spenser (1552–1599), John Donne (1572–1631), Thomas Wilson (1523/4–1581), John Milton (1608–1674), and others (chiefly Continental writers whose influence in Renaissance England was considerable, such as Joachim Du Bellay (1522–1560) and Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533–1592)), the chapter argues that the encounter with Rome is an encounter with the self ‘made strange’ (from the Latin extraeius, external).

Because of this, actual voyages to Rome of the kind ventured by Wilson and Milton can be regarded as especially vexatious encounters not with an exotic, alluring, and finally unknowable other, but rather with an externalized self that disarms precisely because it is utterly familiar.

Chapter 3 yokes together Latin and ‘the Word’: the former designating a human language whose systematic, prescriptive grammar played a vital role in the processes by which individuals constituted and then reached themselves in speech, writing, and thought; the latter marking a divine incursion into human language and history. The first half of the chapter

17 I borrow the phrase from the title of Northrop Frye’s The Educated Imagination (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2002).
18 It bears emphasizing at the outset that my use of the words ‘familiar’ and ‘strange’ is rather different from Catherine Nicholson’s recourse to these terms in her excellent Uncommon Tongues: Eloquence and Eccentricity in the English Renaissance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). Nicholson situates eccentricity at the paradoxical heart of sixteenth-century pedagogical, rhetorical, and literary culture, and argues that classical conceptions of eloquence had ‘as much to do with estrangement as with intimacy and familiarity’ (1, 3). By way of contrast, my own suggestion that the encounter with Rome is an encounter with a self that has been ‘made strange’ refers not to the aesthetics of strangeness (qua oddness) persuasively described by Nicholson, but rather to the word’s etymological derivation from the Latin extraeius. My argument, therefore, focuses not on an encounter between the self and something odd or unaccountable, but rather between the self and an entity that is susceptible to being interpreted as an externalized version of that self. I am using the words ‘familiar’ and ‘strange’, therefore, to capture different angles of convergence upon the same phenomenon.
argues that Latin was the medium in which Rome was experienced most intimately by those who received formal schooling. My point of entry into these matters is a puzzling, but extravagantly suggestive, inquiry into the nuances of the Latin case system by the early medieval grammarian Virgilius Maro Grammaticus (floruit seventh century). Having established the complexity and vitality of the problem explored by Virgilius, I turn to the scene of instruction in Renaissance humanist pedagogy and to some remarks on Latin prose style by Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) and Roger Ascham (1514/5–1568). In each case, I show that the debates in question bear on the problem of the self and thereby enable us to conceive of that entity as a grammatical relation whose complexities swing into and out of view within the structures of Rome’s language. The second half of the chapter drives this argument into new territories by exploring the work of Rome within a short sequence of biblical, confessional, and autobiographical accounts of reading, exegesis, and conversion. Examining a seventeenth-century English translation of Martin Luther’s ‘Vorrede auff die Epistel S. Pauli an die Roemer’ (‘Preface to Paul’s Epistle to the Romans’), I establish a prehistory for the translator’s obvious struggles with some of Luther’s remarks on the subject of Paul and Rome. This involves framing the translator’s efforts against the backdrop of Luther’s, St Augustine’s, and St Paul’s negotiations with Rome. The chapter argues that across this wide range of writers and texts and topics, the Eternal City and its language play a decisive role in breaking down the self and then rebuilding it on a radically new image.

Chapter 4 studies the borders between life and death. Emphasizing that debates about the relationship between the living and the dead involved patrolling, and testing the justice of, borders constructed by (or in polemical response to) Rome, I argue that these debates place Rome at the very centre of a series of unsettling questions about the nature of ‘the human’ as a category of experience. The chapter’s concerns flow through debates concerning the relationship between life, death, and the human voice, and between literary texts and devotional practices, in the course of examining material from Geoffrey Chaucer (circa 1340–1400), prayer books and primers, Thomas More (1478–1535), and William Shakespeare (1564–1616).

The book’s conclusion follows the fact of Rome east rather than west via a seventeenth-century translation of Ovid’s Tristia – a collection of poems written by Ovid near the Black Sea during the years following his exile from Rome. These translations see a former grammar-school boy reconstructing, from the temporal distance of manhood and maturity, a popular curriculum text and, by necessary extension, revisiting the scene of his own
instruction. Ovid’s meditations on the subject of what it means to live apart from Rome, and his expressions of fear that Rome’s language is slipping from his grip, provide a final backdrop against which to reframe the book’s arguments.

The book’s chapters are united by a desire to explore the cultural and intellectual stakes of medieval and Renaissance Britain’s sense of itself as living in the shadow of Rome: that is, as forever living in the shadow of a city whose name could designate both the ancient, fallen, quintessentially human power that had once conquered and colonized Britain, and also the alternately sanctified and demonized edifice of the Roman Church. Within that broad area of concern, I argue that ‘The Ordinary’, ‘The Self’, ‘The Word’, and ‘The Dead’ are compass points by which individuals lived out their orientations to, and against, Rome. Each of these four topics isolates an important dimension of Rome’s enduring ability to shape and complicate the effort to come to terms with the nature of the self and the structure of human community. Each, moreover, lets us regard the Middle Ages and Renaissance as having ceaselessly confronted shifting expressions and perceptions of Rome’s hold over lived experience.

This description of the book’s structure will make it clear that I do not claim to have undertaken anything like a systematic history of Roman Britain and its shifting frontiers, a vision of British and pan-European conceptions of Romanitas, an analysis of myths of origins in English poetry, or an account of the growth of antiquarianism. Some great and influential books (William Camden’s Britannia, for example) figure hardly at all in this study. Instead, the book strives to isolate for discussion a version of Rome that has not figured prominently in the large body of excellent work on the city’s plural legacies in Medieval and Renaissance Britain. Scholars have tended, for good reason, to focus on Rome as a distant city that is

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experienced through the lenses of, for example, religious conflict, or the emergence and re-emergence of nationalist and republican discourses, or international power politics. The Reformation has been one of several inevitable touchstones for scholars, since authorized religion in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England was predisposed to regard Rome and its ways either as foreign and ostentatious, or as strategically concealed and in need of being ferreted out.

What this book offers, instead, is a genealogy of certain significant expressions and experiences of Rome’s nearness and familiarity, especially where those expressions and experiences lurk below or outside self-consciously political or ideological polemics. This involves, for example, arguing in Chapter 1 that a proto-phenomenological attunement to Rome’s immediate proximity can be discerned in texts ranging from the work of Gildas, in the middle of the sixth century, to writers such as Sir Thomas Browne, in the seventeenth century. Ranging across the span of time that connects Gildas to Browne, the book argues that the longstanding scholarly emphasis on the ways in which the city of Rome was an object of deliberate and highly self-conscious study during the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Rome as ancient power, Rome as foreign authority, Rome as Catholic Church, etc.) needs to be supplemented by a greater awareness of the stakes of that distant city’s entanglement in aspects of the ordinary that are mostly experienced in an unconscious manner. This is the version of Rome that is latent in Britain’s ancient roads, in lives lived amidst the vestiges of ancient city walls or within view of ancient and even monastic ruins, in shifting conceptions of time and the calendar, in the complexities of the Latin case system, etc. The phenomena that dominate this book, in short, range from dirt, stones, and poems to grammatical nuances and rhetorical tropes. The book’s goal, throughout, is to explore configurations

of texts and phenomena in which Rome is not distant and foreign but rather intimately familiar and, indeed, too ready-to-hand to be understood as something outside the self and susceptible to being assessed dispassionately as an ‘other’.\[21\]

My effort to keep a wide historical range of texts in view proceeds from a desire to call attention to some significant limitations in traditional conceptions of historical periods. Efforts to characterize the sixteenth century as the period that first brought the proper kind of light to the topic of Rome’s role in the history of Britain remain common. Richard Hingley, for example, asserts that,

Before the later sixteenth century, people in Britain had thought and written about the Roman past, but conventional wisdom suggests that it is only from this time that a self-critical and conscious appreciation of the classical writings that addressed Britain emerged. It was also from this time that the value of past objects and sites started to be recognized.\[22\]

Hingley’s formulation is in some ways unobjectionable. The recovery of classical texts clearly played a significant role in altering the terms in which the material remains of Roman Britain were understood on the cusp of the seventeenth century. This is true perhaps even where it is necessary to speak not of the recovery of texts but of a new vogue for writings by authors who had never in any obvious sense gone missing or been lost, authors who had all along been open to view and available. Any list of such authors would have to include Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, but also Lu\[23\]

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Tacitus, whose *Germania* and *Agricola* are especially important with respect to knowledge concerning Roman Britain, is a significant recovery, but Caesar’s *Commentarii de bello gallico*

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21 The subject–object relation that Descartes inaugurates is not, according to Heidegger, our foundational experience of the world; we dwell within, and as familiars with, the world. See Heidegger on the sites and phenomena that are relevant to his project: ‘In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers nature as having some definite direction’ (*BT*, 100); ‘In den Wegen, Straßen, Brücken, Gebäuden ist durch das Besorgen die Natur in bestimmter Richtung entdeckt’ (*SZ*, 71). References to that which is ready-to-hand draw on Heidegger’s distinction between *Vorhandenheit* (presence-at-hand) and *Zuhandenheit* (readiness-to-hand). The former designates an abstract and systematic view of entities as merely present, observable, and classifiable substances; the latter describes our non-cognitive access to a totality of things in a world that is capable of meeting our needs. See *BT*, esp. 26–7, 115. See below, Chapter 1, n. 82, on Heidegger’s distinction between *Besorgen* (concern) and *Auslegung* (interpretation).


23 The best guide to these topics is the multi-volume *Oxford History of Classical Reception in English Literature* (Oxford University Press). Volume I (edited by Rita Copeland and published in 2016) covers the years 800–1558; Volume II (edited by Patrick Cheney and Philip Hardie, and published in 2015) covers the years 1558–1660.