Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and W. V. Quine (1908–2000) have long been seen as key figures of analytic philosophy who are opposed to each other, due in no small part to their famed debate over the analytic/synthetic distinction. This volume of new essays assembles for the first time a number of scholars of the history of analytic philosophy who see Carnap and Quine as figures largely sympathetic to each other in their philosophical views.

The essays acknowledge the differences which exist, but through their emphasis on Carnap and Quine’s shared assumption about how philosophy should be done – that philosophy should be complementary to and continuous with the natural and mathematical sciences – our understanding of how they diverge is also deepened. This volume reshapes our understanding not only of Carnap and Quine, but of the history of analytic philosophy generally.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT OF CARNAP AND QUINE

EDITED BY

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For my teachers
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