Introduction

Did the beginnings of Roman rule rip apart the fabric of Judaean society, setting the stage for Jesus's movement and the First Revolt? A number of ancient literary sources seem to think so. The Judaean historian Flavius Josephus, for instance, implies that class tensions between the men of power and the multitude, the avaricious rich and violent poor, were one of the causes of the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple during the First Revolt against Rome (66–74 CE), a seminal moment in the history of Judaism and Christianity.[1] Judaean authors of apocalyptic texts similarly condemned Judaean elites for exploiting the labor and resources of the righteous, promising that these oppressors would be punished by God in an impending age.[2] The authors of the New Testament gospels corroborated this portrait, depicting Jesus as a prophet of the people who was executed by wealthy high priests and their lackeys.[3] In different ways, each of these literary sources conflates three binaries – rich/poor, powerful/powerless, and foreign/indigenous – within gripping narratives about the beginnings of Roman rule in Palestine. But does material and comparative evidence for the changing shape of socioeconomic relations in Early Roman Palestine support this view?

Judaean authors' broad observations about wealth and power are generally confirmed by other sources. At the same time, the positions, interactions, and motivations of elites and non-elites were far more complex than the literary sources suggest. This book analyzes a diverse array of literary,

[1] Josephus, *B.J.* 7:260–1. See Goodman 1987, 12–13, 18, *et passim*.
[2] Pss. Sol. 4:1–25; 8:10–12; 1 En. 46:4–8; 53:1–7; 62:1–63:12; T. Mos. 6–7. Representations of class in apocalyptic texts from Early Roman Palestine are treated in Keddie 2013; 2018a; forthcoming a; forthcoming c.
[3] Among others: Keith 2014; Crossley 2015.

archaeological, and comparative evidence in order to enhance and nuance our understanding of the sources, expressions, and consequences of the differences between elites and non-elites in Early Roman Palestine (63 BCE–70 CE). To do so, it focuses on the question of how institutional changes in the earliest phases of Roman rule impacted relations between elites and non-elites.

I argue that institutional change in Early Roman Palestine supported the empowerment of Judaean elites and further entrenched longstanding differentials of power. At the same time, though, these institutional developments often (but not always) ameliorated the economic conditions of non-elites. Socioeconomic relations changed considerably, but this did not entail enhanced exploitation relative to earlier periods or other provinces. The changing socioeconomic positions of elites and non-elites did, however, stimulate the emergence of new material expressions of class distinctions. The difference between elite and non-elite material cultures became more salient, but this ideological demarcation was not a literal translation of economic differentials.

Numerous studies have tackled aspects of socioeconomic relations in Early Roman Palestine. This study builds on this important scholarship while focusing specifically on the impact of interlocking institutional developments on socioeconomic relations among Judaeans during the earliest phases of Roman rule. As such, it contributes to the lively debate in recent years among scholars working on the economy of Early Roman Palestine. At the center of this debate is the question of whether or not socioeconomic relations were antagonistic in the first century CE. If they were, the Jesus movement and First Revolt may be understood as attempts to resist this situation of class exploitation.

One side of this debate, until recently the predominant perspective, tends to use conflict models of preindustrial agrarian societies (e.g., those of John Kautsky and Gerhard Lenski) inductively.[4] Proponents of this approach take Josephus and the New Testament as their main data while using archaeological and documentary data secondarily. These studies envision the "aristocracy" and "peasantry" as relatively homogeneous classes and their relationship as exploitative and extractive.[5] The aristocrats are closely

[4] Lenski 1966; Kautsky 1982. See also Wolf 1966; J. Scott 1976; 1985. Appropriations in scholarship include Herzog 1994; Horsley 1995b, 9; 1996, 76–7; 2006; 2007, 58–62; 2008; 2014, 40–3; Crossan 1991, 43–6; 1994, 24–5; Fiensy 1991, 155–76; 2014, 67–80; Duling 2002; Rohrbaugh 2006. For overviews and critiques of the use of these models in New Testament scholarship, see Overman 1997; Sawicki 2000, 61–80; Mattila 2010; 2014b; Chancey 2011.

[5] See, among others, Horsley and Hanson 1985; Moxnes 1988; Horsley 1993; 1995b; 1996; 2014; Oakman 1986; 2008; 2014; K. Hanson and Oakman 2008; Fiensy 1991; 2014, 67–80; Crossan 1991; Kloppenborg 2000b; Herzog 2000; Arnal 2001; Malina 2001. This conflict-oriented

aligned with Roman power and Roman culture and construed as more-or-less inauthentic Judaeans due to their "Romanization."[6] Meanwhile, indigenous Judaeans (and Christ-followers) are viewed as their pious victims, devoid of any agency except when mobilized towards justified strategies of resistance. This school of thought, which closely resembles the perspectives of the ancient texts,[7] portrays Roman imperialism as the stimulus for new or heightened forms of class exploitation that corroded the egalitarian nature of traditional subsistence-oriented communities.

The other side of this debate has consisted largely of archaeologists who prioritize forms of material evidence over the literature.[8] This perspective has eschewed the use of inductive conflict models and has argued for considerable social harmony, market activity, and economic prosperity in the Early Roman period. Whereas the conflict studies generally favored a primitivist/substantivist perspective in the tradition of Moses Finley (1985), rejecting economic development and market integration in the Roman Empire, this group of scholars has taken more of a modernist/formalist stance that allows for economic growth, trade, and some measure of market integration.[9] This group of scholars has been accused, however, of being too quick to overlook exploitation, predation, state violence, and structural impediments to subsistence and the accumulation of surplus wealth.

scholarship has been influenced to varying degrees by Marxist historiography (e.g., Kreissig 1970; Kippenberg 1978; Ste. Croix 1981; for a recent study in the tradition of Ste. Croix, see Boer and Petterson 2017).

6 Scholars in different fields have traditionally described cultural change in the provinces as "Romanization" (whether using this word or not). As a heuristic, Romanization developed within colonial discourse in the context of modern imperial expansion in the early twentieth century. It has been increasingly rejected in recent years because it posits bounded, autonomous groups (native and Roman), it views cultural change as top-down, unilateral, unilinear, and teleological (where the *telos* is Roman-ness), it assumes a social evolutionary model whereby Roman is deemed more civilized than pre-Roman, and it views any divergences from the process of assimilation as resistance. See Freeman 1997; Webster and Cooper 1996; Mattingly 1997; 2011, 38–9; Woolf 1998, 1–23; Webster 2001; I. Morris 2005; Hingley 2005, esp. 1–48; Rothe 2005; Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 27; Revell 2009, 6; Versluys 2014; Woolf 2014; Pitts and Versluys 2014; Vanacker and Zuiderhoek 2017.

7 See McLaren 1998, 127–78.

8 Edwards 1988; 1992; Overman 1988; J.F. Strange 1997; E. Meyers 1997a; Aviam 2004a; 2011; 2013a; Jensen 2006; Root 2014.

9 For this distinction, see Harland 2002; Fiensy 2014, 120. On the primitivist/modernist impasse in the study of the ancient economy, see I. Morris and Manning 2005; Saller 2005; Mattila 2014b; Boer and Petterson 2017, 9–24. For Finley's adoption of Weberian and Polanyian theories, see Nafissi 2005; on his disregard for archaeological evidence, see Gates-Foster 2016. Finley's primitivist approach has been reinvigorated in recent years by Bang (2002; 2006; 2008; 2012; 2015a; 2015b), while the modernist approach traditionally associated with Rostovtzeff (1957) has been developed by Temin (2001; 2009; 2013).

To be sure, new archaeological finds are making it increasingly difficult to accept the primitivist theory that Palestine (or any of its regions) had an isolated subsistence economy characterized by little to no trade or development.[10] Archaeologists have appealed in recent years, for instance, to the distribution of Eastern Terra Sigillata tableware (and especially Eastern Sigillata A, or ESA) in the Roman East to illuminate patterns of supraregional trade and market integration. Because this work draws on data from Early Roman Palestine, it is of immediate relevance to this study. It is also significant because shipwreck excavations have shown that pottery was usually transported along with grain and other goods.[11] Pottery distribution patterns can therefore serve as an index for trade in more important products.

On the basis of computational modeling that simulates ancient trade networks, Tom Brughmans and Jeroen Poblome concluded that Eastern Sigillata distribution patterns indicate considerable market integration. They have further asserted that this evidence proves that a modernist model is preferable to a primitivist one.[12] Through multiple experiments on the basis of an extensive database of sherds representing four Eastern Sigillata types, they found that "Only high proportions of inter-site links, representing a high integration of markets …[13] have the potential to give rise to the archaeologically observed differences in the width of tableware distributions."[14] Indeed, the wide geographical distribution of Eastern Sigillata types in the eastern empire and the prevalence of a particular type at most sites strongly suggests some degree of market integration.

There are, however, conceptual oversights in Brughmans and Poblome's study. Most importantly, as the authors admit, this analysis does not account for variations in urban and rural distributions.[15] While the distribution of these wares demonstrates a degree of market integration between cities in the Roman East, it does not betray a fully integrated market economy. ESA was far less common in Judaean village contexts than in cities in first-century CE Palestine.[16] This observation urges caution in speaking of anything resembling a "free" market economy. Instead, the tableware evidence

[10] Numerous studies have demonstrated the significance of archaeological data for understanding the Roman economy: Hopkins 1983; Peacock and Williams 1986; Greene 1990; Hitchner 2002; Panella and Tchernia 2002; A. Wilson 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2009; Briese and Vaag 2005; Lo Cascio 2006a; Harris 2011; A. Wilson and Flohr 2016.
[11] Parker 1992, 102–3; Lewit 2011.
[12] Brughmans and Poblome 2016. Cf. Lewit 2011; Bes 2015, esp. 144.
[13] The authors refer here to Temin 2013.
[14] Brughmans and Poblome 2016, 403.
[15] Brughmans and Poblome 2016, 403.
[16] See further Chapter 5.

demonstrates supraregional trade and market integration mainly in cities and highlights the significance of inter-urban trade networks.[17]

At the same time, differences in Eastern Sigillata distribution are a function of social and cultural constraints and not just economic forces of supply and demand. In Palestine in the first century CE, ESA was predominantly sought after by elites, especially in urban contexts. But throughout the late first century BCE, ESA was more widespread and was found in village contexts. Economic forces alone cannot explain this changing distribution pattern. Preferences of taste that were informed by social, cultural, ethnic, and religious dispositions must have also played an important role. Like most dispositions, these were surely learned through social networks. For instance, Palestine's Judaean elites sought out luxury items that they knew were produced elsewhere in the Mediterranean and used by elites in those contexts. Elite purchasing power and demand, then, played a disproportionate role in market integration in cities of the Roman East. This economic agency of elites did not, however, exist in a vacuum. It was embedded in social structures and culture.[18]

A growing body of archaeological data from Early Roman Palestine provides further proof of Palestine's integration into supraregional trade networks.[19] Besides ESA, other types of tableware and oil lamps were imported from the Roman East and Italy.[20] Additionally, excavators in Jerusalem have unearthed fragments of amphoras that originated in Italy, Greece, North Africa, and elsewhere.[21] Archaeobotanical studies have shown that timber marketed in Jerusalem and used in large-scale construction projects including mansions and palaces was imported from other regions of the Roman East and especially the mountains of Lebanon.[22] Similarly, none of the marble used in public buildings in the cities of Early Roman Palestine

[17] See also Woolf 1997.

[18] On economic embeddedness, a Polanyian emphasis of primitivist scholarship as well as a hallmark of New Institutional Economics, see Polanyi 1957, 43–6; Finley 1985, 60; North 1981, 42; Granovetter 1985; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Williamson 1996, 229–31; Furubotn and Richter 2005, 308–11. Bang (2009) and Lyttkens (2013, 7) emphasize that modern economic behavior is just as embedded as ancient economic behavior.

[19] Pastor 2010 supplies an overview of the discussion on trade in Roman Palestine (not just the Early Roman period).

[20] Rosenthal-Heginbottom 2014b. See further Chapter 5.

[21] Ariel 2000; 2003; Finkielsztejn 2006; 2014; Di Segni 2010. On Herod's imports at Masada (as known from the *tituli picti*, amphora stamps, and archaeobotanical remains), see Cotton and Geiger 1989; 1996; Cotton et al. 1996; Marshak 2015, 177–81.

[22] Liphschitz 1994; 2002; 2007, 116–31; 2010; 2013. Note, however, that local timber was typically used in non-elite buildings (Sitry 2006; Leibner 2010). Cf. Josephus, *B.J.* 5:36; m. Me'il. 3:8. On the wood economy, see further Harris 2017. The widespread import of timber from Lebanon was not only driven by elite demand, however. For instance, the first century CE "Ginnosar boat" discovered in the Sea of Galilee was made of cedars from

was local; it was shipped mainly from Asia Minor.[23] Zooarchaeological data demonstrates that Jerusalem's elites ate fish that were imported from the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Nile River.[24] Jerusalemites also exploited mollusk shells that originated in these same regions to make purple dye.[25] Additionally, many of the caprids sacrificed at the Temple were brought into Jerusalem from Nabataea.[26] All of these examples suggest that Palestine was involved in considerable supraregional trade. While less is known about Palestine's exports (with the exception of Palestine's prized export, balsam), we can be sure that traders would not have made their return trips with empty ships, carts, and caravans.[27]

Archaeologists have also uncovered numerous indicators of technological innovation in this period.[28] For instance, Herod's construction of the Temple Mount stimulated the stone industry, resulting in the marketing of new products (e.g., stone vessels and ossuaries).[29] Additionally, Herod's robust building program introduced into the Levant new technologies for activities such as cutting and transporting enormous ashlars and pouring concrete under water.[30] Urban workers in Early Roman Palestine also adapted novel forms of masonry (e.g., *opus reticulatum*), architectural design (e.g., the peristyle mansion, theater, and stadium), and decoration (e.g., frescoes and *opus sectile*), while rural workers gradually developed more efficient methods for producing oil and wine.[31] Furthermore, the

Lebanon (Werker 1990) and thus indicates that there was also local demand from skilled shipbuilders (Kloppenborg 2018, 577–81).

[23] Fischer 1998.

[24] Reese et al. 1986; Bouchnick et al. 2009; van Neer et al. 2004; Horwitz and Lernau 2006; 2010. On later rabbinic sources on fish imported from Egypt, see Sperber 1976. Fradkin (1997) demonstrates that fish from the Mediterranean Sea and Nile River were also consumed in Roman and Byzantine Sepphoris, although she does not isolate the evidence from the Early Roman period. Lernau and Shemesh (2016) show that some Mediterranean fish remains from Gamla indicate that the city was commercially connected with the coastal cities in the late Hellenistic and Early Roman period. Most fish remains from Gamla were, however, from the Sea of Galilee.

[25] Reese et al. 1986; Mienes 2006; 2010; 2014.

[26] Hartman et al. 2013.

[27] See Broshi 2001, 190–2 on exports and transit trade; Sperber 1976 on exports to Egypt mentioned in rabbinic literature. On Nabataean, Tyrian, and Palmyrene trade networks in the West, or "trade diasporas," see Terpstra 2013; 2015; 2016.

[28] See H. Schneider 2007 on areas of technological development in the Roman era. Leibner 2010 supplies an overview of manufacturing in Roman Palestine, but draws most of its evidence from rabbinic sources from the Middle Roman period and later. Cf. Rocca 2008, 232–8.

[29] Magen 2002; Gibson 2003.

[30] Raban 2009.

[31] Building technology and decoration: Japp 2007; Marshak 2015, 217–27. Wine and oil production: Frankel 1999; Aviam 2004b, 51–60.

invention of glass-blowing enabled a surge in the local production of glass products, as is known from the discovery of a glass workshop in Jerusalem.[32]

Altogether, the archaeological evidence of trade and technological development indicate that neither a primitivist nor a modernist model adequately explains the data from Early Roman Palestine. While this evidence demonstrates greater supraregional connectivity and market activity than primitivists expected, it also betrays the disproportionate power of elites over non-elites that modernists have downplayed. Not all of the changes that induced market integration and technological innovation were driven by elite interests and purchasing power, but many of them were – for instance, the acquisition of ESA, marble, and mollusks. Even if elite demand for these products supported trade in other staples that benefited a wider demographic, it is hard to overlook the comparative advantage of elites in cultural and economic change in Early Roman Palestine.

In order to ford this impasse in the study of socioeconomic relations in Early Roman Palestine in light of new archaeological evidence, several scholars have recently called for engagement with the methods and results of research on the Roman economy.[33] There are two components to such engagement. The first involves incorporating theoretical frameworks, such as New Institutional Economics (NIE), that have proven effective in moving beyond the primitivist/modernist debate. The second entails considering the evidence of economic change in other Roman provinces as comparative material. Scholars working on the political history of Early Roman Palestine have executed this task effectively for many years,[34] but scholars focused on socioeconomics have been slower to join this effort.[35]

This study takes up the call to incorporate different methods in order to provide new insights into socioeconomic relations. As with any investigation aimed at historical explanation, a specific methodological framework and set of terms have shaped the research question at the center of this study – namely, how institutional changes impacted relations between elites and non-elites in Early Roman Palestine.[36] Modern categories like elite and non-elite, though ubiquitous, require some explanation and

[32] Israeli and Katsnelson 2006; Leibner 2010, 274–7. See further Foy 2017 on the Roman glass trade.
[33] Harland 2002; Chancey 2011; Fiensy 2014, 118–31; Blanton 2017.
[34] Goodman 1987; 2002; 2008; McLaren 1991; Millar 1993; Gabba 1999. See also the following general studies of the varying degrees of political power of elites in the client-kingdoms and provinces: Braund 1984; Millar 1992; Meyer-Zwiffelhoffer 2002; Lavan 2013; Lavan et al. 2016.
[35] Important exceptions are Gabba 1999; Sartre 2005; and, Udoh 2005.
[36] For a helpful orientation to methodological issues involved in the study of Early Roman Palestine, see Mason 2016.

justification. I have adopted these particular relational categories because they encompass intersecting differentials of power. Elites and non-elites are thus broader categories than aristocracy and peasantry, rich and poor, or rulers and ruled.[37] Unlike these dyads, the elite/non-elite dichotomy accommodates the diverse sources and manifestations of power that could undergird one's relative position within the dynamics of socioeconomic relations.[38] Some elites had considerable economic power but were not involved in politics, for example, while others had considerable political sway but minimal surplus wealth.

Elites and non-elites are distinguishable according to proportions of power. Relative to non-elites, elites had a comparative advantage in power. Michael Mann's work, a convenient synthesis of Marxian and Weberian traditions in historical sociology, provides a useful rubric for identifying the different types and sources of elite power. For Mann, power is "the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment."[39] Social power, in particular, consists of conglomerations of distributive and

[37] As the most common of these categories in scholarship on Early Roman Palestine, "aristocracy" and "peasantry" require additional comments. "Aristocracy," although derived from the ancient word ἀριστοκρατία, misleadingly suggests that all elites were equally involved in "ruling" (κρατεῖν). Aristocracy has the additional drawback that it has usually been used to indicate that heredity was a primary criterion for membership. It is clear, however, that only a portion of elites were hereditary elites in the Graeco-Roman world (Hopkins 1965; 2009, 187– 90; Wees and Fisher 2015, esp. 7; Tacoma 2015b). "Peasants" or "peasantry" are often used instead of non-elites, especially in scholarship on Early Roman Palestine where descriptions of Jesus and the first Christians as peasants carry special theological and political weight (e.g., Crossan 1991; Oakman 2008). The category of "peasants" has three troubling connotations: first, that all non-elites were involved in agricultural production; second, that peasants formed a monolithic demographic bloc characterized by similar and relatively unchanging socioeconomic conditions of dependence; and third, that peasants were bound to the land and their landlords just like medieval serfs (for these critiques, see Mattila 2006; 2010; 2014b; for critiques of these assumptions about Roman peasants, but not the category per se, based on archaeological evidence, see Ghisleni et al. 2011; Vaccaro and MacKinnon 2014). Rollens (2014, 9–43) has made a strong case for preserving this category while qualifying it so as to recognize the diverse socioeconomic conditions of those who constituted the peasantry. While I appreciate her methodologically transparent attempt to salvage this category, I am not convinced that it is a fitting designation for non-elites who were not involved in agricultural production. Other alternatives, such as "masses" and "commoners," are somewhat more appropriate. "Masses" is used in two different ways in the literature. Sometimes it is used to describe all non-elites including slaves. In other instances, it is used for citizen non-elites (the δῆμος), who had some political rights (Ober 1989, 11; 2017). "Non-elites" is preferable, however, because this category explicitly conveys that these social actors lacked the advantages of elites (Clarke 2003, 5). While it is not ideal to identify a social group according to what they lack, this redescription is useful for underscoring their position of vulnerability relative to elites.

[38] In defense of elites/non-elites (or, masses), see further R. Evans 2017.

[39] Mann 1986, 6 (following Weber 1968, I: 53).

collective (or organizational) power, where the former is power one person gains over another in a zero-sum game and the latter is when "persons in cooperation can enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature."[40]

Mann distinguishes four interdependent sources of social power – ideological, economic, military, and political (hence, IEMP is the name of his model).[41] For the study of the Roman imperial state, however, this should be adapted so that military power is subordinated to political power.[42] Ideological, economic, and political power roughly correlate to class, wealth, and status. Where ideological power is control over the production and reproduction of meaning, norms, and practices, class is its expression as a set of subjective dispositions about one's socioeconomic position.[43] Where economic power is control over resources and access to

[40] Mann 1986, 6.

[41] Mann 1986, 2, *et passim*. For an application of the IEMP model in research on ancient socioeconomics, see Manning 2003, 9–10, 134, 236. For critical appraisals of Mann's broader project, and particularly its Eurocentricity, see Hall and Schroeder 2006.

[42] Slootjes 2011, 242; cf. Poggi 2006. The present study organizes military power under the rubric of political power, but it does not focus much specific attention on military matters. I direct the reader to the following works: Isaac 1990b; Shatzman 1991; Kennedy and Braund 1996; Zeichmann 2018a; 2018b. In this study, auxiliaries are considered non-elites with the exception of the relatively small number whose elevated ranks positioned them as sub-elites or elites within the administration of a district, city, or province. As Zeichmann (2019, 55) explains, "soldiers tended to be recruited from society's lower classes, both across the Empire and within Palestine in particular." Moreover, "only after the War did the citizen legions come to Judaea, since before the War the army of Judaea was little more than a local policing force" (56).

[43] Mann 1986, 22–3. Mann (1986, 24–5) follows Weber (1947, 424–9; 1958a, 180–95; 1968, I: 43–6, 341–4) in viewing class as a strictly economic category for social groups involved in these processes. Class, according to Mann, involves relations of economic power that are separate from social stratification. I concur with the Weberian assertion that economic and social stratification should be differentiated, but I reject Mann's understanding of class as a political-economic structure. Wealth and status were distinctive, yet interdependent, sources of elite power that were expressed as class. I maintain that an alternative conceptualization of class should be central to our understanding of ancient elite power (see further Keddie 2018a, esp. 55–73). While class has traditionally been defined in the social sciences as a structural position within the political-economic relations of production (e.g., Marx), as an economic level (e.g., Weber), or as a social relationship (e.g., E.P. Thompson), more recently scholars in different fields have redefined class as a socially habituated subjectivity (Eder 1993; Savage 2000; Skeggs 2004; McCloud 2007a; 2007b; McCloud and Mirola 2009). Building on Bourdieu (1986) and Giddens (1973, 41–52, 99–138), these scholars have sought to distinguish class from economic stratification and collective action. From this perspective, class is a set of subjective dispositions about one's socioeconomic position learned through the habitual practices of social actors within the constraints of their institutional environment. These dispositions are contested and never fixed. Class is thus a cultural (informal) institution; it is a set of ideological representations that constrain human thoughts and actions and can in some cases – but not necessarily – lead to collective action

them, wealth is the accumulation of surplus resources.[44] And where political power is control over social relations through regulations and coercion,[45] status is the recognition of this power (or the lack thereof) within society.[46] Elites gained social power as a function of their positions relative to non-elites and resources within these matrices of social organization.

This adaptation of Mann's methodology for parsing social power enables us to interrogate historical developments in the *longue durée* while still being precise about the sources of any given individual's socioeconomic position within their institutional environment, or the agency of social actors

(Eder 1993). In my adaptation of the IEMP model, class is a form of ideological power. As a function of their comparative advantage in wealth and status, their disproportionate economic and political power, elites to some degree come to share a distinctive set of class dispositions and practices (cf. Mayer 2012; Wees and Fisher 2015, 38).

[44] Mann 1986, 24. For a quantitative model of income inequality in the Roman Empire, see Scheidel and Friesen 2009 (cf. Friesen 2004, 341). I have adapted this model of economic stratification to the evidence from Early Roman Palestine in Keddie 2018, 67–9, tab. 2.1. This simplified model recognizes six different economic levels relative to bare bones subsistence. It includes three levels of elites, who together account for less than 5 percent of the population: municipal elites, regional/provincial elites, and imperial elites. It also consists of three levels of non-elites, which account for the overwhelming majority of the population: destitute, near-subsistence, and stable with moderate surplus resources (aka "middlers"). These economic strata (not "classes") serve as an index for a person's position with respect to the distribution of wealth but do not account for other factors (e.g., droughts) and institutions (e.g., patronage) that impact a person's economic conditions.

[45] Mann 1986, 26–7. Mann correlated the Weberian notion of status to ideological power, but it also corresponds to political power.

[46] Although Finley spoke of status as if it were an emic category, unlike the modern category of class, Morley (2004, 66–81) has argued that it is as political and anachronistic as class (cf. Mayer 2012, 1–21; Wees and Fisher 2015, 34–41). Finley (1985, esp. 35–61) used status according to Weber's (1978, 302–7) definition as the total of a person's social estimation judged according to lifestyle, privileges, etc. Scholars who use status to the exclusion of economic differences are prone to making the "political assumption that it is possible to reconcile the interests of different groups and to establish consensus" (Morley 2004, 81). For this reason, status should not be the sole criterion for understanding elite power. Status in the Graeco-Roman world could be routinized through more-or-less formal institutions. According to Hopkins (1965), criteria for high status included wealth, birth, education, learned skill, ability, achievement, and lifestyle. The main legally defined status differences included citizen/non-citizen, slave/freed/free, military rank, and political position (*ordines*, magistracies, liturgies, etc.). Patronage could also enhance the status of a *patronus*, but was less legally regulated. Gender played a role in determining status, for women were restricted from political offices and other organizations in which men enhanced their status. While women could have high status positions, these were often tied in some way to the status of their fathers, husbands, or sons (Saller 1998; 2007; Milnor 2011; Lieber 2012). Women could, nonetheless, acquire and manage private property (including land) and exercise legal rights. On the roles and limits of high status women in civic life in the Roman East, see Bremen 1996; Friesen 2014; Bain 2014.