Introduction

The eponymous protagonist of Thomas Hardy’s *Tess of the d’Urbervilles* gave birth to a boy who fell gravely ill. Fearing scandal (Tess was unmarried), her father refused to allow the parish priest to visit their home. As her son, aptly named “Sorrow,” approached death, Tess baptized him herself. Yet because the baptism was not administered by a priest, she mistakenly thought it invalid. When Sorrow died, Tess was devastated. Not only had she lost her son, her pain was amplified a thousand-fold because she was certain he was damned:

She thought of the child consigned to the nethermost corner of hell, as its double doom for lack of baptism and lack of legitimacy; saw the arch-fiend tossing it with his three-pronged fork, like the one they used for heating the oven on baking days; to which picture she added many other quaint and curious details of torment sometimes taught the young in this Christian country.¹

What gave rise to this superstition? Who taught Tess that children who die unbaptized are damned? Surely no reasonable religion would teach that children are condemned simply because they weren’t sprinkled with water. If we had put this objection to Tess or her priest, however, a response would have been ready to hand: “in every person born into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation.”² The Church teaches that every child deserves

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² Article 9 of the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, in *The Harmony of the Protestant Confessions: Exhibiting the Faith of the Churches of Christ, Reformed after the Pure*
damnation. Innocent in the eyes of the world, Sorrow was guilty in the eyes of God: he had contracted “original sin” in his mother’s womb.

The doctrine of original sin had been taught in the West since the fifth century. According to the Council of Carthage, Adam, the first man, was created without sin and with the possibility of immortality. But he disobeyed God and ate of the forbidden fruit. As a result, he transmitted sin and death to his descendants. Therefore, the Council proclaimed, children must be baptized “for the remission of sins.” There is no place “where little children may live blessedly even if they have gone forth from this world without baptism.” For “what Catholic could doubt that he who has not deserved to be a co-heir with Christ is going to share the lot of the devil?”

There is no biblical basis for this doctrine. It rests, ultimately, on a grammatical mistake; as one commentator put it, a “péché originel grammatical.” Augustine, who first used the phrase “peccatum originale” and whose teaching decisively influenced Carthage, relied on an “Old Latin” Bible that mistranslated Rom. 5:12. He mistakenly thought Paul explicitly stated that Adam’s sin was transmitted to his descendants. The Vulgate did not affirm inherited sin quite so straightforwardly, but it retained the clause “in quo omnes peccaverunt (in whom [Adam] all sinned),” which also functioned as a prooftext for the doctrine. This translation is regarded by modern commentators — as it was by Greek-speaking church fathers — as an unlikely construction of eph’ hō. Paul merely meant that all, or most, human beings follow Adam’s example and sin, not that they all inherit Adam’s sin.
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Not only is the doctrine of original sin not taught in Scripture, it is clearly opposed to the teaching of Jesus. “Unless you change and become like children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven” (Matt. 18:3). “Let the little children come to me, and do not stop them; for it is to such as these that the kingdom of heaven belongs” (Matt. 19:14). Why should adults imitate children if the latter are damnable sinners? How could the kingdom of heaven belong to children if children belong to the devil? The goal of Jesus’ ministry was the salvation of the world (John 12:47), not the condemnation of children. Before Augustine, Christians had no difficulty understanding all this.

Take the fourth-century bishop Gregory of Nyssa, for example. At some point between 371 and 395, his friend Hierios wrote him a letter, asking why God allows infants to die. His perplexity, however, didn’t stem from anxiety over infant damnation. Gregory and Hierios both assumed that all babies go to heaven. Hierios was confused, rather, about whether infants will receive great rewards in heaven. Because God is just, it seems that he will reward the virtuous – especially martyrs – more than infants. But it seems tragic for infants to be eternally deprived of rewards they never had a chance to earn. Gregory resolved the dilemma by arguing that the kingdom of heaven is not the reward of virtue. It is our natural end, such that “[w]e may say that the enjoyment of that future life does indeed belong of right to the human being.”6 Infants and martyrs alike will be saved. What if the West had adopted the Nyssan’s teaching instead of Augustine’s? How much pointless pain would bereaved parents have been spared? If only Tess had Gregory as a priest!

The doctrine of original sin is pernicious. It is not found in Scripture. It was not taught by the earliest church fathers. But these are not the only, or even the most decisive, reasons for rejecting it. Even if we granted arguendo that Augustine’s view of original sin was both spiritually salutary and a legitimate development of Scripture and tradition, it still wouldn’t be credible to the educated person today. It is, after all, wholly incompatible with a scientific view of the world. A large body of interdisciplinary evidence supports the hypothesis that the human condition is the product of a long evolutionary history of random genetic variation and

natural selection, not inherited “corruption” caused by a single act at the dawn of history. Moreover, evolutionary pressure has selected for behavior that Christianity considers sinful, such as selfishness. And in any case, we evolved as a group, so one man couldn’t have transmitted sin to everyone else. Just as rational people no longer believe that the Sun revolves around the Earth, or that the Earth is six thousand years old, they no longer believe that humanity has been corrupted by Adam’s Fall. As Julius Gross put it, in the course of concluding his magisterial history of the doctrine, “modern science killed original sin.”

Or so the story goes. So, at any rate, a composite sketch of a number of popular stories of original sin’s demise goes. This book tells a different one. The history of the doctrine is far more complex than the foregoing sketch suggests. Original sin was not founded solely on a mistranslation. Nor did Augustine invent it. And, far from blindly following his authority, theologians after Augustine – from the Middle Ages until the present day – have vigorously debated the nature of the doctrine. Yet there is no doubt that confusion surrounds its contemporary meaning.

Many theologians agree with Julius Gross to the effect that evolution has rendered original sin untenable. At the popular level, however, many Christians – and prominent Christian leaders – reject evolution because they believe it is incompatible with original sin. Others believe that original sin is a crucial corollary to the gospel but are loath to reject the mainstream scientific consensus. But it’s far from clear how the doctrine of original sin could be reconciled with evolution without unacceptable theological consequences. In light of the difficulties with the state of original justice – for example, the aforementioned problem that we are disposed to sin because of our evolutionary history – a common proposal in modern theology has been to separate original sin from a historical Fall. Perhaps, some have argued, we have always been opposed to God. But how does this square with the doctrine that God created all things
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good? There are difficulties, it seems, with all the common approaches to the problem. Denying original sin obscures the universal need for redemption. Affirming original sin and the Fall seems incompatible with evolution. And affirming original sin without a Fall seems to compromise the goodness of creation. In light of this, a fresh perspective on original sin, theologically rigorous and in dialogue with salient research in evolutionary biology, is needed.

This book aims to provide one. I argue that Thomas Aquinas can help us reconcile original sin and evolution. His account of original sin, however, has been neglected, and as a result it has been misunderstood. After a discussion of Augustine and his medieval reception, I offer a reading of Thomas’s doctrine of original sin and a reformulation of his account, in dialogue with evolutionary theory and salient modern theologians. The book’s primary contributions, accordingly, are to historical theology, systematic theology, and theology and science. We can now briefly review salient scholarship in these fields. I begin with literature on Thomas’s account of original sin and then turn to the status quaestionis in systematic theology and theology and science.

ORIGINAL SIN IN SCHOLARSHIP

In comparison to the extensive treatment other areas of his theology have received in recent decades, Thomas’s account of original sin has been neglected. The most in-depth treatment is still J. B. Kors’s monograph, published nearly a century ago. There was a large debate over Thomas’s view of original justice in the first half of the twentieth century, but the last detailed study of that issue was published in 1955. Histories of original sin more broadly have generally relied on Kors. My book...
differs in three major ways. First, I offer original, critical analysis of Thomas’s views. These historical studies, by and large, summarize Thomas. Second, they assume that Thomas’s account was static – and fully coherent throughout his career. A central argument of this book is that Thomas’s account of original justice developed, leading to problems for his view of the transmission and nature of original sin. Third, rather than treating Thomas’s account in isolation, I connect it to other areas of his thought, including his view of the need for grace and salient aspects of his account of providence.

Another strand of scholarship is represented by Otto Pesch’s influential ecumenical study of Luther and Aquinas.\(^\text{12}\) A Dominican at the time, Pesch was indebted to the predominant reading of the Order of Preachers, which prioritizes the treatise on grace and the corruption of human nature (STh I–II, qqs. 109–14). On this “Augustinian” reading of Thomas, infants with original sin have lost their natural teleological orientation to God and are born with sinful self-love instead. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange had defended this interpretation earlier in the century.\(^\text{13}\) This is still the standard scholarly reading of Aquinas.\(^\text{14}\) I argue against it, at length, in Chapter 3. In addition to the foregoing studies, there have been various introductory or partial treatments of Thomas’s account.\(^\text{15}\) We can now turn to constructive accounts of original sin.

of original sin. He also proposed, constructively, that a “World-Soul” rebelled against God and is responsible for evil. This has not been influential.


\(^{15}\) For example, Gustav Siewerth’s posthumously published *Die Christliche Erbsündelehre: Entwickei auf Grund der Theologie des heiligen Thomas von Aquin* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964) includes an elegantly written overview of Thomas’s account. More recent treatments include Rudi te Velde, “Evil, Sin and Death: Thomas Aquinas on Original Sin,” in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. R. Van Nieuwenhove and J. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 143–66; Mark Johnson, “Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin: Doctrine, Authority, and
F. R. Tennant was the first to rethink the doctrines of the Fall and original sin in light of Darwin. Evolution rules out a historical Fall, and strictly speaking “original sin” is a misnomer: “sin” means an act of disobedience to a divine command. These doctrines are meaningful, however, insofar as they refer to our evolutionarily derived dispositions to sin. Moreover, Tennant suggested that Irenaeus’s theological anthropology was more defensible in an evolutionary context than Augustine’s. Since Tennant, there have been various proposals to identify original sin with some particular evolved tendency, such as the disposition to violence, or anxiety, or selfishness. Korsmeyer agreed that we were inclined to sin because of evolution, but he added (rightly, to my mind, if somewhat vaguely) that original sin should relate to the need for redemption in Christ.

Piet Schoonenberg influentially proposed that original sin is the “sin of the world”: the complex sinful situation into which human beings are...
8 Aquinas, Original Sin, and the Challenge of Evolution

born, which includes environmental, social, and personal factors.20 This idea—which I will suggest is rooted in Schleiermacher’s hamartiology—has been modified in various ways. For example, some have dropped the idea that infants are intrinsically disposed to sin and identified original sin with birth into a sinful environment.21 A prominent Thomist and philosopher of religion, Brian Davies, has tentatively suggested that the core of Aquinas’s account could be separated from a historical Fall and linked with a proposal, à la Schoonenberg, that emphasizes birth into a sinful world.22


22 Writes Davies, “it is impossible to be sure how his [Aquinas’s] theology of Original Sin would read were he alive to develop it now. However, suppose that we think it reasonable to speculate that he would not be pursuing it with the historical approach to Adam and Eve that he presents in the SCG. In that case, how would he present it? Perhaps along the lines that some theologians have done while knowing the writings of Aquinas very well and while greatly respecting them. Here I think in particular of Timothy McDermott and Hebert McCabe. Both of these authors agree that there is no getting away from the idea of human evolution, and both of them agree that we cannot read the account of Adam and Eve in Genesis as historical. On the other hand both of them note that Aquinas thinks of Original Sin as something that infects us just by being born as human beings coming to exist in a world in which there prevails an opposition to what God is all about.” Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 383. Thus, “perhaps his theology of Original Sin can be separated from his historical assumptions concerning Adam and Eve while leaving his notion of human salvation intact” (p. 384). “On this account, we are all infected by sin since all of us came to birth in a world stained by it” (p. 383). Cf. Davies’s introduction to On Evil by Thomas Aquinas, trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). My view, developed in the coming chapters, is this. Thomas did insist on a historical Fall, for a number of reasons. Chief among them was his commitment to the view that God did not, and does not, cause original sin. If we hadn’t fallen into sin, then either we wouldn’t have original sin, or God would be its cause. It would be misleading, then, to simply say that Aquinas’s view does not require a Fall. On the other hand, if original justice really is supernatural—which it is in Aquinas’s mature thought—then it never could have been transmitted by Adam, and originating original sin must be at least logically separated from originated original sin (see Chapter 2). In light of this, the direction to take Thomas’s account is not Haught’s (Christ was born without sin into a
Another common approach is to reinterpret original sin as the universality of “personal” sin. The idea is that we all, in our own way, reenact the scene of disobedience depicted in Genesis 3. I will suggest in Chapter 5 that this proposal stems from a common reading of Kant’s account of radical evil. Whatever its precise provenance, a number of theologians – Protestant and Catholic alike – have defended this view. Alfred Vanneste argued that this was the true intention of the Catholic dogmas concerning the Fall and original sin. Karl Barth offered a Christocentric version of this proposal: original sin is the universal, culpable lack of faithfulness to Jesus Christ. Henri Rondet uses Schoonenberg’s language – original sin is the sin of the world – but as he unpacks his account it seems close to Vanneste’s reduction of sin to actual sin.

In recent years, interest in the doctrine has been increasing. Ian McFarland has written a substantive monograph that retrieves a broadly Augustinian account of the fallen will (though not an Augustinian account of the Fall). To be born in original sin is to be born with a will turned away from God, regardless of whether one ultimately descends from a person created in original justice. In dialogue with Zwingli, Oliver Crisp proposes a “moderate Reformed doctrine” of original sin: we inherit corruption – but not original guilt – from an early population of human beings who were created without corruption.

Matthew Levering devotes a chapter of his recent monograph on creation to an sinful world; thus the doctrine of original sin cannot be identified with birth into a sinful world). Rather, the focus of the account developed here is on the human person’s need for the redeeming grace of Jesus Christ. Moreover, the question of the Fall’s historicity cannot be settled by the logical possibility of separating originated from originating sin. What is needed is (inter alia) further reflection on Paul’s use of Adam and the doctrines of creation and providence.

ecumenical discussion of Edwards, Aquinas, and original sin. There is a rapidly growing literature on human origins, the Fall, and the book of Genesis, especially (though not exclusively) among broadly evangelical and Catholic theologians. Philosophers of religion have also contributed to the discussion by challenging theologians to address the metaphysical assumptions at play in their accounts of original sin and evolution.

This book’s constructive proposal is the first retrieval and revision of Thomas’s authentic doctrine of original sin. Unlike modern Irenaean accounts (à la Tennant), original sin is not a mere disposition to sin. Unlike Schoonenbergian accounts, original sin is not being born into a sinful world. Unlike Vanneste’s and Barth’s accounts, original sin is not reduced to personal sin. Unlike attempts to separate Augustine’s account from a historical Fall, original sin is not simply self-love. Original sin is, rather, the lack of sanctifying grace, the deifying grace of the Holy Spirit, sent by the Father to lead us into the knowledge and love of Jesus Christ. This is importantly, if somewhat subtly, different from Thomas’s own view, on which original sin is the lack of due original justice.

Matthew Levering, *Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and Good Creator* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic), 227–71. Levering focuses on one of Thomas’s favorite analogies: original sin is like being born into a disgraced family.
