

1 ‘Democracy Promotion’ and Moral Authority

The Construction of Moral Authority

While this book focuses on US and European policy in Jordan, it also provides an illustration of what exactly greater US and European policy presence in the Global South means. As one of the biggest recipients of US and European foreign aid worldwide, Jordan represents in this regard not just a case study, but a state of the art. This book discusses what external ‘democracy promoters’ in Jordan *actually do* when they promote democracy. Since 1989 Jordan has been widely praised as a ‘liberalising’ and ‘reforming’ monarchy that is in the process of slow but gradual democratisation. This book will attempt to question such descriptions and, more importantly, will argue that external efforts at ‘democracy promotion’ in fact only reinforce Jordanian authoritarianism.

The dominant approaches to the study of ‘democracy promotion’ suffer from a number of deficiencies. The work of Carothers, De Gramont and Bush, for instance, features a narrow focus on developing policy recommendations and largely ignores more fundamental questions.¹ While much more critical, the work of Robinson, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson is marked by a structuralism that downplays the role of individual agency or dominant discourses in shaping and (re)producing the effects of ‘democracy promotion’.² Finally, Guilhot’s focus on the background of Western ‘democracy promoters’

¹ See among others Carothers, T., *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Carothers, T. and De Gramont, D., *Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013); and Bush, S.S., *The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

² See, among others, Robinson, W.I., ‘Globalization, the world system, and “democracy promotion” in U.S. foreign policy’, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 5, October 1996, pp. 615–65; Robinson, William I., *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Gills, B., Rocamora, J. and Wilson, R. (eds.), *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press, 1993).

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and Hobson and Kurki's focus on the conceptual assumptions of the latter is another area of concern. While they provide excellent studies of the aforementioned topics, the reader learns little about 'democracy promotion's' empirical reality.³ Also, much research on the topic, such as Carapico's *Political Aid and Arab Activism*, views the project of 'democracy promotion' as consisting of only those activities that US and European donors explicitly subsume under the category of 'democracy promotion' in their funding reports.⁴ Such an approach runs the risk of excluding some of the most important aspects of the 'democracy promotion' project. These include the particular notions of political economy and security that underlie Western interventions aimed at 'democracy promotion'.

This book attempts to answer the following key questions: Why has Jordanian authoritarianism been so remarkably stable despite extensive US and European efforts at 'democracy promotion'? What kind of power is (re)produced as seemingly universal narratives of democracy engage with the political context of Jordan? What explains the continuous growth of US and European 'democracy promotion' portfolios, considering the absence of any meaningful political liberalisation? And, finally, the main overarching research question, what exactly do US and European 'democracy promoters' do when they work on 'democracy promotion' programmes in Jordan?

In trying to address these questions, this book discusses 'democracy promotion' through a focus on practice. Instead of assessing whether 'democracy promotion' in Jordan does indeed work, or how it could be improved, this book investigates the often unintended and contradictory side effects that spring from 'democracy promotion's' underlying functionalist, teleological and universal assumptions as 'democracy promoters' engage with the specific political context of Jordan. The intention is to demonstrate how the interaction of universal narratives of democracy with the political context of Jordan leads to a (re)production of imagined

³ While Guilhot's study has a very strong empirical foundation, it focuses almost entirely on the institutional background of 'democracy promotion' and on the social history of individual 'democracy promoters'. Guilhot, N., *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and International Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Hobson and Kurki provide a discussion of the conceptual politics of 'democracy promotion'. Hobson, C. and Kurki, M. (eds.), *The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).

⁴ This is the case in most studies on the topic. While providing a fascinating in-depth study of attempts at 'democracy promotion' throughout the Middle East, Carapico does not discuss the notions of political economy and security that underlie them. Instead, she focuses on the fields of law, electoral representation, women's rights and civil society promotion. Carapico, S., *Political Aid and Arab Activism: Democracy Promotion, Justice, and Representation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

moral hierarchies that then serve as an efficient rationale for a politics of control and intervention. The central argument of this book is that US and European ‘democracy promotion’ in Jordan in fact only reinforces Jordanian authoritarianism, that it confirms desired Western self-understandings as ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’ *vis-à-vis* ‘the Jordanian non-democratic other’ and that it serves as an efficient rationale for a politics of domination. I thus suggest that Jordanian authoritarianism is so stable not despite, but in part directly because of attempts at ‘democracy promotion’.

While it was only after the end of the Cold War that the idea of ‘democracy promotion’ became ‘a generic framework for the foreign policies of all Western countries’,⁵ its origins both in terms of practice and ideology date back much further. As shown by Smith, the idea of ‘democracy promotion’ first gained some prominence during the Philippine-American war between 1899 and 1902 and the subsequent US occupation:

It was a way of governing this possession on which both imperialists and anti-imperialists could agree. Imperialists could thereby tout the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, while anti-imperialists could reassure themselves that the ideals of self-government would not be endangered . . . The result was important for the future of American foreign policy for the simple reason that American power now had a mission that justified its exercise . . . now the United States had a moral purpose to its imperialism and could rest more easily.⁶

Yet the idea of ‘democracy promotion’ only became institutionalised in US politics after authoritarian regimes supported by the US and former European colonial powers – such as Iran under the Shah – came under increasing popular pressure in the late 1970s, and after the democratic transitions in Spain and Portugal among others.⁷ The gradual ‘replacement of coercive means of social control with consensual ones’,⁸ as described by Robinson, eventually reached its climax in the post-Cold War era, of which ‘democracy promotion’ was to become ‘one of the defining characteristics’,⁹ as remarked by Hobson and Kurki.

Against the backdrop of a seeming affirmation of liberal market democracy as a morally superior and universally applicable mode of governance,

⁵ Schmitter, P.C. and Brouwer, I., ‘Conceptualizing, researching and evaluating democracy promotion and protection’, *European University Institute (EUI)*, Florence, working paper no. 99/9, 1999, chapter III.2.

⁶ Smith, T., *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 43.

⁷ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, pp. 15–16. ⁸ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 16.

⁹ Hobson, C. and Kurki, M., ‘Introduction: the conceptual politics of democracy promotion’, in: Hobson, C. and Kurki, M. (eds.), *The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 1.

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the notion of 'democracy promotion' is based on a staunchly teleological understanding of human history. According to Mitchell, the description of the latter as universal *telos* and 'genetic destiny' can be viewed as giving '[c]ontemporary political arrangements ... a degree of inevitability'.¹⁰ Attempts at 'democracy promotion' are thus deemed to aid a given country in progressing along a supposedly irreversible trajectory, and in reproducing clearly definable conditions, all of which have been derived from mystified narratives of past processes of democratisation and modernisation in 'the West'.¹¹ In claiming to have identified what progress and democracy mean, 'democracy promotion' and its ideological background in modernisation theory and neoconservative thought consequently feature the same kind of totalitarian character that Horkheimer and Adorno have identified in enlightenment thought.¹²

While, as Žižek remarks, it 'is easy to make fun of Fukuyama's notion of the End of History', it is important to note that 'the dominant ethos today is "Fukuyamaian": liberal-democratic capitalism is accepted as the finally found formula of the best possible society'.¹³ In order to maintain its seeming moral authority, this 'imperialism of the universal',¹⁴ as it is pointedly called by Bourdieu, tends to ignore 'the contextual': first, in order to open up the discursive space and the practical distance that enables and calls for the universally deployable 'democracy promotion' expert; second, in order to enable sense making of a context of contingency and fluidity; and third, in order to maintain the semblance of a universally existing and applicable moral truth. These points can be considered foundational requirements for the very idea of 'democracy promotion' itself.

¹⁰ Mitchell, T., *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 179.

¹¹ For a discussion of the centrality of social democracy instead of liberal democracy in the consolidation of democratic rule in Europe after the Second World War, see Berman, S., 'The past and future of social democracy and the consequences for democracy promotion', in: Hobson, C. and Kurki, M. (eds.), *The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 68–84. For a discussion of the role that conflict and power-sharing arrangements, and not ideological commitment, played in democratic transitions, see Salamé, G. (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994) and Kienle, E., 'Democracy promotion and the renewal of authoritarian rule', in: Schlumberger, (ed.), *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 231–249.

¹² Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T.W. and Noerr, G.S. (eds.), *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, tr. Jephcott, E. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 3–4.

¹³ Žižek, S., *In Defense of Lost Causes* (London: Verso, 2008), p. 421.

¹⁴ Bourdieu, P., *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market*, tr. Nice, R. (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 19.

In regard to the centrality of the claim of moral authority, German philosopher and political theorist Carl Schmitt succinctly argued in a 1927 critique of liberal democracy that '[t]he concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism'.¹⁵ In trying to critique a universal notion of morality, however, one can also quickly end up adopting overly relativistic viewpoints that question the existence of *any* morality. Grappling with this issue, Hopgood suggests that a 'kind of residual moral truth'¹⁶ can be found in human rights reporting for instance. Hopgood notes that this truth 'clearly resonates fully only with a particular audience, one largely, although far from exclusively, rooted in the idealism of the West and its often sentimental, uncritical, unreflective, and contradictory attachment to notions of innocence, enlightenment, and moral progress'.¹⁷

All this is to say that even if theoretically some kind of objectively superior ideal form of democracy existed as humanity's moral peak, it would necessarily be so abstract that in the process of contingent human interpretation and contextual application it would immediately lose its universal applicability and objectivity, thereby eliminating any basis for the possible existence of an absolute moral superiority.¹⁸ Since the construction of moral authority therefore relies on the absence of context, as also illustrated by Hopgood,¹⁹ the on-the-ground processes of promoting and attempting to contextualise a certain idea of democracy as morally superior immediately compromise the idealism that underlies Western liberal world views.

The staunch belief in the possibility of contextualising a 'higher-order impartiality'²⁰ through Western 'democracy promotion' thus fundamentally ignores the contingency of human agency and the impact of contextual factors. The aspiration or pretence to implement moral authority consequently leads to a dangerously self-confirming line of argument, in which discourses 'produce self-fulfilling and self-sealing systems of action

¹⁵ Schmitt, C., *The Concept of the Political*, tr. Schwab, G. (London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 54.

¹⁶ Hopgood, S., *Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International* (London: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 5; also see pp. 205–207.

¹⁷ Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame*, p. 207. Also see Mouffe, C., 'Democracy in a multipolar world', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2009, p. 557.

¹⁸ Hopgood adds the important reservation that in 'the moment this recognition [that there is a form of moral truth] is cast into words, interpretation and mobilization, the triggering of the will begins, and then we are fully in the world of social construction'. Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame*, p. 215; see also p. 207.

¹⁹ Hopgood, *Keepers of the Flame*, p. 206.

²⁰ Nagel, T., 'Moral conflict and political legitimacy', in: Raz, J. (ed.), *Authority* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 301.

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and justification'.²¹ Any outcome of 'democracy promotion' is then used 'by democracy promoters to urge the northern industrialized democracies to take a more proactive role in fostering democracy throughout the world',²² as remarked by Schraeder. The presentation of democracy as functionally superior for the achievement of various often contradictory ends, such as stability, economic development, equality, security and peace – under the overarching argument of a higher morality – thus ultimately serves, in Mouffe's words, the establishment of 'order in a context of contingency'.²³

The alleged moral superiority of a universally applicable model of democracy can only be maintained if the latter can be protected from the very contextual factors that 'democracy promotion' necessarily engages with when it is translated into projects on the ground. In short, the project of 'democracy promotion' needs to be presented as being *beyond politics*. If 'democracy promotion' is understood along these lines, contextual factors do not hold any major importance, as democracy has then already unequivocally been established as the universally superior mode of governance that acts upon the contextual, rather than the other way round. It is precisely the ignoring of some of the most fundamental questions about democracy, democracy's meaning, the various forms that democracy can take and the problematic relations it entails in specific contexts *vis-à-vis* other values that gives the project of 'democracy promotion' as carried out by the US and by European states its moral authority and vigour and makes it such a useful and effective tool for a politics of control and domination. It is by subordinating 'the contextual' to 'the universal' and 'the political' to 'the technical' that the 'order' to which Mouffe refers in the quotation above can be achieved and that the required distance is created, making 'the expert' a spokesperson of democracy in Jordan.²⁴

What Democracy?

Democracy is widely referred to as what Gallie called an essentially contested concept.²⁵ This means that any conceptualisation of

²¹ Wilson, Z., *Wishful Thinking, Wilful Blindness and Artful Amnesia: The UN and the Promotion of Good Governance, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, PhD thesis, 2004), p. 28.

²² Schraeder, P.J., 'The state of the art in international democracy promotion: results of a joint European-North American research network', *Democratization*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 30.

²³ Mouffe, 'Democracy in a multipolar world', p. 549.

²⁴ See Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*.

²⁵ Gallie, W.B., 'Essentially contested concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, Vol. 56, 1955–1956, pp. 183–187.

democracy is always a reflection of very specific contexts and particular ideological and normative approaches, and that no single definition can ever be described as the only valid one.²⁶ As demonstrated by among others Robinson, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, however, US and European ‘democracy promotion’ is more accurately described as the promotion of polyarchy, liberal democracy or low-intensity democracy.²⁷ While this distinct model of democracy is at times also described, in direct reference to its conceptual founding fathers, as the Schumpeterian-Dahlian model, I mostly adopt the term ‘procedural democracy’, as it emphasises well its strong focus on democratic procedures. While all these terms are effectively used to describe the same phenomenon, they emphasise different aspects of it, including rule by a relatively small group of elected officials, mass participation channelled through elections, isolation of political rights from socio-economic rights and a strong focus on democratic institutions and procedures such as elections.

As Robinson puts it, the key function of this procedural definition of democracy lies in its departure from totalitarian singularities and its attempt to resolve ‘the intrinsically contradictory nature of democratic thought under capitalism, in which one side stresses the sanctity of private property, and therefore legitimizes social and economic inequalities . . ., while the other side stresses popular sovereignty and human equality’.²⁸ The inherent tension that persists – albeit to a lesser degree – in understandings of procedural democracy too is thus addressed by an *ex ante* definitional disregard for democracy’s relevance to socio-economic matters and by a simultaneous conceptual narrowing down of democracy’s meaning to procedural questions alone.²⁹ The widely asserted universal moral superiority of Western liberal democratic values is consequently, as argued by Mouffe, not ‘the manifestation of a deeper objectivity that would be exterior to the practices that brought it into being’³⁰ but the direct result of conscious ideological attempts at constructing democracy

²⁶ See Kurki, M., ‘Democracy and conceptual contestability: reconsidering conceptions of democracy in democracy promotion’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2010, p. 371.

²⁷ Robinson describes US ‘democracy promotion’ as the promotion of polyarchy. Robinson, ‘Globalization, the world system, and “democracy promotion” in U.S. foreign policy’, pp. 623–624. Gills, Rocamora and Wilson use the term ‘low intensity democracy’. Gills, Rocamora and Wilson, *Low Intensity Democracy*.

²⁸ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p. 52.

²⁹ See also Ayers, A.J., ‘Demystifying democratisation: the global constitution of (neo)liberal politics in Africa’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006, pp. 321–338.

³⁰ Mouffe, ‘Democracy in a multipolar world’, p. 549.

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as a means of social control that does not automatically challenge social difference, including socio-economic inequalities.³¹

I argue that it is in this context that proclamations of liberal democracies as 'the only truly and fully modern societies'³² must be understood. According to Huntington, debate about the precise form and meaning of democracy was over by the 1970s, as 'Schumpeter had won'.³³ Further debate was deemed undesirable as, Huntington declared, '[f]uzzy norms do not yield useful analysis',³⁴ cannot be resolved into numbers and hence remain an illusion. To paraphrase Horkheimer and Adorno, the man of science/man of modernity now knew what democracy was and how it could be achieved, to the extent that he considered himself capable of making and promoting it.³⁵ The process of maintaining the illusory nature of other models of democracy was further aided by the emergence of democratisation as a distinct field of study. As demonstrated by Kurki, most so-called 'transitologists', such as Schmitter, Karl, Burnell and Whitehead, do indeed claim to view democracy as an essentially contested concept, but in the end nevertheless return to certain procedural elements as minimum default positions.³⁶ Elliott importantly reminds us in this regard that 'promoting democracy as a contested concept would imply that we can no longer think of Western countries like the UK as perfect and uncontested models of how democracy should be done'.³⁷

The conceptual de-contestation of democracy was thus the key enabling factor for the global 'democracy promotion' project. The research published in 1989 by Diamond, Linz and Lipset – funded through the very first grant of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)³⁸ – is a good illustration of the conceptual dominance of procedural democracy in both 'democracy promotion' research and practice. In their understanding of democracy, Diamond et al. thus speak of 'a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system ... Indeed, a distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called economic and social democracy be separated from the

³¹ Robinson, 'Globalization, the world system, and "democracy promotion" in U.S. foreign policy', pp. 626–627.

³² Diamond, L., and Plattner, M.F., 'Introduction', in: Diamond and Plattner (eds.), *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. ix.

³³ Huntington, S.P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1993), p. 6.

³⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 9.

³⁵ Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 4, 6.

³⁶ Kurki, 'Democracy and conceptual contestability', pp. 369–375.

³⁷ Elliott, C., *Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy: Temporal Othering in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2017), p. 32.

³⁸ Guilhot, *The Democracy Makers*, p. 91.

question of governmental structure'.³⁹ In a more recent publication, Diamond asserts without reservation that '[t]he goal for every country should be a political system that combines democracy on the one hand with freedom, the rule of law, and good government on the other – in other words, *liberal democracy*'.⁴⁰

In light of statements such as this, Müllerson characterised Diamond as 'either playing God or at least sounding like a secular messiah'.⁴¹ Comparable to other religions, this 'secular religion'⁴² – as Smith describes US 'democracy promotion' in general – has a very similar tendency to construct a self-contained and self-confirming system that fundamentally fails to grasp a reality that is much more diverse than imagined. The problem is thus proceduralism's denial of the fact that what may be seen as 'democratic' by some may be viewed as utterly 'undemocratic' by others.⁴³ Specific manifestations of moral values, such as equality for instance, in the concrete consequently 'always entail, as their very condition of possibility, some form of inequality'.⁴⁴

Just as the alleged moral superiority of procedural democracy is ideologically constructed, so is the so-called 'unity of goodness' embraced by some advocates of 'democracy promotion'. This is perhaps most apparent in the work of Huntington. As Schmitter points out,⁴⁵ in his more recent work, Huntington changed his mind, turning away from viewing political order as the main concern⁴⁶ to arguing 'that democracy is good in itself and that . . . it has positive consequences for individual freedom, domestic stability, international peace, and the United States of America'.⁴⁷

³⁹ Diamond, L., Linz, J. and Lipset, S.M., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, Volume 4* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. xvi.

⁴⁰ Diamond, L., 'Universal democracy?' *Policy Review*, No. 119, 2003, p. 81; emphasis original. Emphasis in subsequent quotations is in the original text unless otherwise indicated.

⁴¹ Müllerson, R., *Democracy: A Destiny of Humankind? A Qualified, Contingent and Contextual Case for Democracy Promotion* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009), p. 11.

⁴² Smith, T., 'From "fortunate vagueness" to "democratic globalism": American democracy promotion as imperialism', in: Hobson, C. and Kurki, M. (eds.), *The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 201.

⁴³ See Mouffe, 'Democracy in a multipolar world', p. 550.

⁴⁴ Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2009), p. 39.

⁴⁵ Schmitter, P.C., 'Review: democracy's third wave – *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* by Samuel P. Huntington', *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 348–351.

⁴⁶ In his earlier work Huntington still wrote rather pejoratively that a 'pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume that all good things go together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal aids in the achievement of others'. Huntington, S.P., *Political Order in Changing Societies* (London: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 5.

⁴⁷ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. xv.

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Similar to other scholars, Huntington thus came to draw a direct line from democracy to security and other values, all of which may, depending on the context, be anything but mutually reinforcing. Despite their initial argument in favour of an analytical separation of politics and economics and their view of democratic values as independent from the socio-economic sphere, Diamond et al. in the very same book already quoted also insisted that democracy is reinforced by capitalist and free markets.⁴⁸ Above all, what this indicates is that any conceptualisation of democracy is a deeply political project full of implicit ideological assumptions and biases. While democracy was first isolated from all socio-economic matters, scholars now effectively constructed a link between procedural democracy, free market economies and pro-Western security arrangements. The most important effect of this embrace of a 'unity of goodness', however, was the resulting possibility of reframing US and Western foreign policies at large as part of 'democracy promotion'. By taming democracy and depriving it of its emancipatory potential – as illustrated by Abrahamsen among others⁴⁹ – the initial conceptual de-contestation of democracy had thus paved the way for the ensuing use of 'democracy promotion' as an overarching moral rationale.

In order not to construct the same self-sealing system criticised above, in this book the meaning of democracy is largely considered to be contingent upon context and interpretation. Democracy can consequently not be an outcome, but always remains a process or, as Almond states, is in a continuous 'state of becoming'.⁵⁰ Based on such an understanding, a universally valid democratic ideal end goal cannot be neatly defined or achieved, as neutral definitions or constructions of democracy do not exist in practice.⁵¹ This brings up the question of what democracy actually means in Jordan. While I deliberately refrain from clearly defining the latter, my critique of narrow procedural understandings and my insistence on also discussing the notions of political economy and security that underlie attempts to promote procedural democracy implicitly mean that I argue in favour of an understanding of democracy that goes beyond ideals of individual freedom and participation to also encompass ideals of social equality.

⁴⁸ Diamond, Linz and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, pp. 44–47.

⁴⁹ Abrahamsen, R., *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 67.

⁵⁰ Almond, G.A., quoted in: Diamond, L., 'Introduction: political culture and democracy', in: Diamond, L. (ed.), *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 4.

⁵¹ Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy*, p. 67.