INTRODUCTION

"Almost Enough to Make Cowards of the Bravest Men"

On June 20, 1863, William Lovelace Foster, the regimental chaplain for the 35th Mississippi Infantry Regiment, wrote a long letter to his wife, Sarah, offering a detailed and firsthand account of the Vicksburg siege. By mid-June, Confederates were huddled in trench lines, knowing that time was not on their side; soldiers and civilians were growing desperate with little fresh water, food, or other basic supplies. Union forces inched closer, tightening their hold on the city, and seeking to wrest control of what was once considered the "Gibraltar of the Confederacy." Rifle and artillery fire was incessant, raging all day and into the night, for days and then weeks. Chaplain Foster reflected on the dire condition of the men as they tried to withstand the enemy's deadly fire but had to hold back from returning fire due to the scarcity of ammunition. It was a grueling and deadly waiting game. "Nothing is more painful – nothing is more demoralizing," he contended, "than to lie under a galling fire without the power of replying. It is enough to strike terror in the bravest heart – almost enough to make cowards of the bravest men!" Instead, he told his wife that when soldiers were "rushing to the charge or engaged in active conflict with the enemy, the stimulus of action & the engagedness of the mind hide from view the dread danger that returns." Having to lie and wait, however, exposed to such constant peril, and "at the mercy of those most terrible engines of destruction, the mind contemplates the danger without any stimulus of counteracting influence whatever." This wretched condition "was almost unbearable."[1]

[1] "William Lovelace Foster's Letter," June 20, 1863, in Kenneth Trist Urquhart, ed., *Vicksburg: Southern City under Siege: William Lovelace Foster's Letter Describing the*

Foster contemplated how the terror and trauma of battle could make even the bravest men cowards. For the Mississippi chaplain, it was the waiting and worrying and feeling defenseless that was so demoralizing. As a noncombatant, he no doubt spoke for himself as a white southern man as much as the soldiers he served. The label "coward" was freely applied to enemies, but also to one's own troops. The epithet shamed soldiers as much as it inspired action. It was a disgraceful insult to be sure, and a serious military crime according to both Confederate and US Articles of War, potentially punishable by death.[2] But beyond its military significance, it had greater impact. An 1863 letter to *The New York Times* explained: "The world has always specially honored courage and stigmatized cowardice. To be brave is as essential for a man as to be chaste is for a woman, and a coward among men is in as poor repute as a prostitute among women."[3]

"SECRET HISTORY OF THE FIGHT"

Civil War soldiers themselves certainly thought a good deal about what makes a man a coward, a skulker, or a croaker – all common

Defense and Surrender of the Confederate Fortress on the Mississippi (New Orleans, LA: The Historic New Orleans Collection, 1980), 10. At Vicksburg, the 35th Mississippi Infantry Regiment served alongside the 2nd Texas Infantry Regiment – one of the two units focused on in this book. Foster's letter begins on June 20, 1863, but then combines diary entries prior to that date, extending until the Confederate surrender on July 4, 1863.

[2] The US and Confederate *Articles of War* specified that misbehavior "before the enemy" could include a soldier or officer running away, "shamefully" abandoning one's post, or inducing others to do the same. The punishment, if found guilty, was death, "or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a general court martial." See Section I, Article 52, Confederate States of America War Department, *Articles of War for the Government of the Army of the Confederate States* (Montgomery, AL: Barrett, Wimbish, Printers and Binders, 1861), 11. The same language appears in the US version. In 1863, the US War Department extended the punishment of "commissioned officers" "cashiered for cowardice" stipulating that "the crime, name, and place of abode, and punishment of the delinquent be published in the newspapers in and about the camp, and of the particular State from which the offender came, or where he usually resides; after which it shall be deemed scandalous for an officer to associate with him." See Appendix, Article 85, United States War Department, *Revised United States Army Regulations, 1861. With an Appendix Containing the Changes and Laws Affecting Army Regulations and Articles of War to June 25, 1863* (Washington; Government Printing Office. 1863), 498; see also Section I, Article 52, 493.

[3] "The Crime of Cowardice," "EBH" to the Editor, *The New York Times*, March 13, 1863. See also Lesley J. Gordon, "'Deeds of Brave Suffering and Lofty Heroism': Martialised Rhetoric and Kentucky Soldiers," *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* Vol. 117, No. 2 (Spring 2019): 179–195.

contemporary synonyms for the term – and what makes a hero. They worried about it incessantly, not just green troops, but hardened veterans. As James McPherson observes in *For Cause and Comrades*: "Civil War soldiers wrote much about courage, bravery and valor – the three words meant the same thing." Yet he admitted that they "wrote even more about cowardice – the mark of dishonor."[4] Civil War soldiers, most historians affirm, subscribed to the mantra "Death before dishonor."[5] In his seminal book *Embattled Courage*, Gerald Linderman argues that there was a prevalent belief, especially early in the war, that "the brave would live and the cowardly would die."[6]

But relatively little has been published about the topic of cowardice in combat. Scholars who have examined the subject in any depth contend that nineteenth-century Americans grappled with the concept, struggling to differentiate it from lapses in moral character, physiological failings, or psychological weakness. As Chris Walsh explains, "a man who was a coward in war would be a coward everywhere else."[7] While the ignominy of being called a coward seemed nearly impossible to escape, definitions and understandings of this concept were clearly in flux. Central, too, to shifting definitions of manly courage and cowardice were acts of violence: withstanding them, performing them, and stoically witnessing them. Civil War soldiers could best vanquish allegations of cowardice through violent behavior. The notion of redemption through violence was a powerful one to mid-nineteenth-century Americans affected so deeply by the Christian revivalism of the Second Great Awakening. Many believed that suffering could be sublime and bring them purity, peace, and redemption from sin. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that units (or individuals) accused of cowardice sought redemption through violence – displaying their fighting mettle in the field.[8]

[4] James McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades*: *Why Civil War Soldiers Fought in the Civil War* (New York: Oxford, 1997), 77.

[5] McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades*, 77.

[6] Gerald F. Linderman, *Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 61.

[7] Chris Walsh, "'Cowardice Weakness or Infirmity, Whichever It May Be termed': A Shadow History of the Civil War," *Civil War History* Vol. 59, No. 4 (December 2013), 501. In 2015, Joseph Cook similarly observed that the "causes and effects of breakdowns in courage have rarely been explored" by Civil War scholars. See Joseph Cook, "The Future of Civil War Soldier Studies: The Failure of Courage," *Saber and Scroll* Vol. 3, Issue 4 (Fall 2014), 26.

[8] Walsh notes the direct tie between violence and redemption, in "Cowardice Weakness or Infirmity," 501; 500. Carole Emberton explores the implications of W.E.B. Du Bois' observation that for Black men to prove their manhood and bravery, they had to commit

Manly bravery manifested itself in ways other than the act of combat. It was also in soldiers' battle scars. Tattered flags, depleted ranks, and visible wounds: these were all concrete ways to quiet suspicions of skulking. Regiments with higher casualty numbers proudly proclaimed themselves "heroes." As William Fox explains in his *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War*: "Wars and battles are considered great in proportion to the loss of life resulting from them." "Bloodless battles," he writes, "excite no interest."[9]

Studying cowardice in any depth has just not proven to be satisfying or interesting to most Civil War historians. Bell Wiley wrote in 1943: "Cowardice under fire, being a less gratifying subject than heroism has not received much attention from those who have written or talked of the Confederate Army."[10] Chris Walsh, who in 2014 published the first monograph-length study on cowardice in American history and culture, bemoaned that "cowardice remains starkly underrepresented and under analyzed."[11] It is not that some occasional attention to the issue is entirely absent in the scholarship. Joseph Glatthaar in his 2008 study of General Lee's Army describes "large portions or entire regiments" of Confederates who broke and ran, for example, during the Seven Days Campaign. But Glatthaar, who admits to the shock and disaffection such behavior wrought, rather quickly dismisses instances of it. He concludes that cowardice was most upsetting to the men "who remained behind" and did "their duty."[12] Nonetheless, Glatthaar's book provides revealing insight. At one point, he quotes Col. Alfred H. Colquitt in a letter to a friend: "I witnessed acts of cowardice that is [*sic*] disgraceful to Southern character." Colquitt felt "discouraged and demoralized." He admitted, though, that few would ever learn about it publicly: "This is the secret history of the fight," he predicted, "which you will not see published."[13]

violence. See Carole Emberton, "'Only Murder Makes Men': Reconsidering the Black Military Experience," *Journal of the Civil War Era* Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 2012): 369–393.

[9] William F. Fox, *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861–1865: A Treatise on the Extent and Nature of the Mortuary Losses in the Union Regiments, with Full and Exhaustive Statistics Compiled from the Official Records on File in the State Military Bureaus and at Washington* (Albany, NY: Albany Publishing, 1889), 1.

[10] Bell I. Wiley, *The Life Of Johnny Reb, The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943), 83.

[11] Chris Walsh, *Cowardice: A Brief History*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 14.

[12] Joseph T. Glatthaar, *General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse* (New York: The Free Press, 2008), 141.

[13] Quoted in Glatthaar, *General Lee's Army*, 142.

Colquitt's prediction proved prescient. To be sure, historians dating as far back as Bell Wiley have *acknowledged* the shirker, the croaker, and the skulk; but most, including Wiley, as well as Earl Hess, Joseph Glatthaar, and Aaron Sheehan-Dean, among others, have insisted that these instances encompassed a minority of soldiers, and thus do not merit serious extended discussion.[14] Hess contends that even something that looked like shirking really was not that at all: soldiers routinely "made a show of charging then stopped after their bravery could be verified by their commanders," erasing any hint that men felt fear or panic. This was a "common phenomenon in warfare," he argues, "the insistence by

[14] The general consensus among historians is that the majority of all Civil War soldiers fought well and behaved heroically in battle. For example, see James I. Robertson, Jr., *Soldiers Blue and Gray* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); Earl J. Hess, *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997); and McPherson, *For Cause and Comrades*. Gerald Linderman explores changing notions of courage and cowardice in *Embattled Courage*, but since his sources are mainly postwar and printed ones, it does make some of his conclusions suspect. Margaret Creighton sought to expand the definition of courage to include women, African Americans, and immigrant troops in *The Colors of Courage: Gettysburg's Forgotten History: Immigrants, Women, and African Americans in The Civil War's Defining Battle* (New York: Basic Books, 2005). Edward Ayers critiques the generalized and largely triumphant narrative accepted by scholars and the general public best in his piece "Worrying about the Civil War," in Karen Halttunen and Lewis Perry, eds., *Moral Problems in American Life: New Perspectives in Cultural History* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 145–165. Ayers notes that the popular and dominant interpretation of the war stresses the "common bravery and hardships of soldiers North and South." See Ayers, 146. Glatthaar's *General Lee's Army* argues that the select group of men in Lee's Army were uniquely courageous, proudly independent, honor-bound, and fierce fighters. While acknowledging a handful of cowards and deserters, he is impressed there was not more disaffection given the odds Confederate faced. Aaron Sheehan-Dean also insists that a core group of Virginia soldiers fought defiantly and bravely until the very end. Both studies add to the perception that Confederate soldiers were uncommonly courageous, especially compared to their Union counterparts. See Aaron Sheehan-Dean, *Why Confederates Fought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). In regard to Union soldiers faltering in battle, Earl Hess contends: "All the collateral evidence indicates the numbers were small and the incidents infrequent." see Hess, *The Union Soldier in Battle*, 82–93. Quote from 91. Mark A. Weitz acknowledges some volunteers in both armies who performed badly in battle, especially green troops, but still contends that "most Civil War soldiers performed admirably in combat." See Mark A. Weitz, "Drill, Training and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fighter," *Journal of Military History* Vol. 62, No. 2 (April 1998): 269–270. See also Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, *Heroes and Cowards: The Social Face of War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). Costa and Kahn conflate desertion broadly defined with cowardice and only focus on Union soldiers. Joseph Cook also reflects on these gaps in the historiography and the distorted portrait it produces of a triumphant, exceptional American past, in "The Future of Civil War Studies," 33–34.

common soldiers that they had a right to decide how far they could be pushed into the cauldron." There were, he suggests, self-imposed and accepted "limits" to their bravery.[15] Authors of one of the most systematic examinations of Shiloh and the erratic performance of soldiers there conclude that, although there were many examples of battlefield cowardice, these experiences had little lasting effect on the men or the armies at large. Joseph Allen Frank and George Reeves in *Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits At the Battle of Shiloh* explain soldiers' faltering in combat to be caused by their inexperience, ineffective weaponry, exposed flanks, fatigue, and paralyzing fear. Nonetheless, they insist that "no unit panicked to a man" and that in the end, "seeing the elephant" was not "such a wrenching experience that they would be forever transformed by its horrors."[16]

There are even some scholars who caution that studying this topic in any substantive way is irresponsible. Gary Gallagher and Kathryn Shively warn that cowardice is "a behavior very difficult to categorize in many ways," implying that trying to do so (and thus contributing to the supposed "dark turn" in the field of Civil War history) somehow makes soldiers helpless "victims." "The analytical risk of overemphasizing the dark side," they argue, "is that readers who do not know much about the war might infer that atypical experiences were in fact normative ones."[17] The implication from Gallagher, Shively, and other critics of the "dark turn" is that such scholarly focus somehow projects presentism and politicized agendas onto the past, distorting what actually happened.[18]

This study certainly does not contend that the majority of Civil War soldiers were cowards. Nonetheless, trepidation about the dreaded danger of mortal combat was an understandable and common

[15] Earl J. Hess, *Storming Vicksburg: Grant, Pemberton and the Battles of March 19–22, 1863* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 292; and Hess, *Union Soldiers in Battle*, 82–88.

[16] Joseph Allen Frank and George Reeves, *Seeing the Elephant: Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989), 114, 181. Larry J. Daniel mentions the allegations against the 2nd Texas at Shiloh described in this book without comment in *Shiloh: The Battle that Changed the Civil War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 273. Wiley discusses the 2nd Texas and other units at Shiloh (and other battles) as "playing the coward," but he, too, concludes that these men were a minority. See Wiley, *Johnny Reb*, 80–89, quote from 84. Thus, even when cowardice is acknowledged, readers get little sense of the repercussions or broader context of such accusations or behavior.

[17] Gary W. Gallagher and Kathyrn Shively Meier, "Coming to Terms with Civil War Military History," *Journal of the Civil War Era* Vol. 4, No. 4 (December 2014): 492.

[18] The term "dark turn" seems to originate from Michael C.C. Adams' book *Living Hell: The Dark Side of the Civil War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

psychological response to their predicament. For mid-nineteenth-century Americans, the word "coward" suggested a failure or lack of manhood, and it was frequently applied to immigrants and Black men as inherent character flaws, with the expectation that white native-born males were naturally courageous; foreign-born and African Americans were not. For southern white men there was added meaning: equating southern courage with white male honor was intrinsic to upholding the powerful social structures of a patriarchal, slaveholding society, which historians have delineated as personal, often violent, and frequently enforced by fear of shame. Diane Miller Sommerville, in her important work on suicide, notes "extreme cases," where "the burden of anxiety about manly and honorable performance under fire" caused some southern white men to consider taking their own lives, rather than risk being labeled a coward.[19]

Two Civil War Regiments

This book looks at two regiments, one Union and one Confederate, both sent to war with sky-high expectations that they would fight bravely but found themselves instead tainted with the humiliating accusations of cowardice in combat. The 11th New York Volunteer Infantry consisted of city firemen, "known for their physical prowess, reckless bravery, courage, and swaggering bravado."[20] Raised by Col. Elmer E. Ellsworth, who had gained fame for his touring Chicago Zouaves the summer prior, these Fire Zouaves seemed destined for martial success. Confidence in the 2nd Texas Infantry was equally strong. These were white southern men and Texans, including veterans from the Texas Revolution. The eldest son of Governor Sam Houston was a private in the unit. Early in their service, however, both regiments faced shameful and very public charges

Besides Gallagher and Shively, critics of this approach include Peter S. Carmichael, "Relevance, Resonance, and Historiography: Interpreting the Lives and Experiences of Civil War Soldiers," *Civil War History* Vol. 62, No. 2 (June 2016): 170–185; and Wayne Hsieh, "'Go to Your Gawd Like a Soldier': Transnational Reflections on Veteranhood," *Journal of the Civil War Era* Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2015): 551–577. See also Yael Sternhell's seminal article about a perceived anti-war shift in the field: Yael A. Sternhell, "Revisionism Reinvented? The Antiwar Turn in Civil War Scholarship," *The Journal of the Civil War Era* Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 2013): 239–256.

[19] Diane Miller Sommerville, "'A Burden Too Heavy to Bear': War Trauma, Suicide and Confederate Soldiers," *Civil War History*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December 2013), 455, 462.

[20] Brian Pohanka, "Forward," in Brian C. Pohanka and Patrick A. Schroeder, eds., *With the 11th New York Fire Zouaves in Camp, Battle, and Prison: The Narrative of Private Arthur O'Neil Alcock in the New York Atlas and Leader* (Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder, 2011), 9.

of cowardice: the Fire Zouaves at the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, and the 2nd Texas Infantry at the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862. Rather than underplaying or ignoring these allegations, I take them seriously as the men did themselves, exploring their origins and lasting impact. And unlike historians who want to disregard such episodes or claim that they do not really matter, I contend that they mattered (and still do), since these indictments directly affected their regimental effectiveness, reputation, and ultimate fate as a unit.

In many ways these regiments shared similar histories. Both were raised early in the war, during the spring, summer, and fall of 1861. Both had devoted and impassioned colonels whose lives became intertwined with their commands and whose dramatic deaths became martyrized. Elmer E. Ellsworth was shot and killed in Alexandria, Virginia, by a civilian only a few weeks after departing with his men to the front; and William P. Rogers died in combat, leading his regiment against the fortifications at Corinth, Mississippi. In each regiment, members relied on and utilized the press to advocate for them and defend their reputations. For the Fire Zouaves, the influential New York media acted as both boosters and harsh critics. For the 2nd Texas, the *Weekly Telegraph* and its outspoken editor E. H. Cushing were mostly supportive, but there were cracks in that positive coverage, too.

Their differences were equally significant. Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves lasted for just over a year, eventually "disbanding itself" in June 1862.[21] The 2nd Texas served throughout the war, but after their capture and parole at Vicksburg, they were a shell of the original unit; a small contingency of the "Bloody 2nd" surrendered in June 1865, its ranks ravaged by disease, death, and demoralization.[22] The 11th New York faced harsher political attacks than the 2nd Texas, coming under formal investigation by Congress; while the 2nd Texas had powerful political leaders eager to defend them when public censure occurred. The 11th New York also included a good number of Irish immigrants, helping to fuel the criticism

[21] Charles McKnight Leoser, (n.d), 11th New York Volunteer Infantry, Regimental Returns, Volunteer Organizations, Office of the Adjutant General, Record Group 94, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC. Hereafter referred to as RG 94, NARA. There were two New York City Fire Zouave regiments; Ellsworth's was the first, and the second (formerly designated the 73rd New York Infantry Regiment), mustered into service in July 1861, participated in active campaigning until the war's end, including fighting prominently at the Battle of Gettysburg.

[22] "Bloody 2nd" from William P. Rogers to Martha Rogers, April 18, 1862, in Eleanor Damon Pace, ed. "The Diary and Letters of William P. Rogers, 1846–1862," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* Vol. 37, No. 4 (April 1929): 286.

against it from nativists and anti-Catholic detractors. The 2nd Texas originally included immigrants too, a company of German-born soldiers, but its identity was more closely tied to what Ashbel Smith, one of the founding members of the regiment, declared the "destiny allotted to the Anglo Saxon race."[23]

By concentrating on two regiments to study broader questions of war, this work continues an assertion I made in my book *A Broken Regiment: The 16th Connecticut's Civil War*, namely that we need to re-envision regimental histories and how to use them.[24] Too many academic historians have been quick to dismiss them as an amateur genre valued only for the source material that might be mined from them. This book narrates the stories of each regiment separately but with the larger themes of cowardice and heroism in mind. With that said, this book is not meant to be a comprehensive history of either unit. Instead, I use the accusations made concerning their cowardice in combat as a starting point to construct a new narrative, recounting their histories in two parallel sections with three chapters each. I describe the regiments' origins and leadership, then first battle, and the subsequent aftermath of the allegations. Sources are wide-ranging, including unpublished manuscripts, government records, contemporary newspapers, and official reports, as well as postwar regimentals and modern histories.

Although my focus is on these two regiments, individuals are important to this study, most notably officers. As elite white men, they provide a good deal of the primary source materials for this book, and by the nature of their power and positions, they helped shape the personalities and reputations of their regiments. They also bore the brunt of the criticism. In both the 2nd Texas and 11th New York, their slain colonels became permanently associated with them. Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves went to

[23] Ashbel Smith, *An Address Delivered in the City of Galveston on the 22d of February,1848, The Anniversary of the Birth Day of Washington and the Battle of Buena Vista* (Galveston, TX: News Office, 1848), 7; 11. Emphasis from original.

[24] Lesley J. Gordon, *A Broken Regiment: The 16th Connecticut's Civil War* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2014). See also Lesley J. Gordon, "Civil War Regiments," in Jon Butler, ed., *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), accessed via oxfordre.com/americanhistory. Susannah Ural further discusses the significance of unit histories and ways to reimagine them as a genre. See Susannah J. Ural, *Hood's Texas Brigade: The Soldiers and Families of the Confederacy's Most Celebrated Unit* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2017). Another study that seeks to reconsider the unit history is Eric Michael Burke, *Soldiers from Experience: The Forging of Sherman's Fifteenth Corps, 1862–1863* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2022).

battle without their leader, yet their affiliation with him may have sealed their fate. Ellsworth was famous but he was also a polarizing figure, earning the disdain of professional army officers and New York Democrats for his avid support of and close relationship to Lincoln. His death at the hands of a civilian with a shotgun seems senseless and decidedly unsoldierly, even though he became a national martyr. His Fire Zouaves never really recovered from his loss. The 2nd Texas' original colonel, John C. Moore, was a blunt man who did not mince words when he felt his authority was challenged. But he struggled to clear his association with the shameful allegations from Shiloh. His successor, William P. Rogers, died what many called a hero's death leading a charge to atone for his regiment's soiled reputation as much as his own; yet there is also evidence of irrepressible fear and moral ambiguity in the final moments of his life.

"War Stories"

This reconsideration of two Civil War regiments allows for an exploration of the creation and dissemination of what historian Drew Gilpin Faust calls "war stories." Faust explains: "War and narrative in some sense create one another. Fighting is reconceived as war because of how humans write and speak about it; it is framed as a story with a plot that imbues its actors with both individual and shared purpose and is intended to move toward victory for one or another side. To rename violence as war is to give it teleology." Faust further observes that war "assumes a trajectory towards victory," and yet armed combat is fundamentally non-linear and chaotic; stories and histories are created to make order out of chaos. But not just any order; order that as Faust suggests leads to triumph and inspiration. This is the "highly conventionalized heroic account of combat" that remains in American popular culture and has, as Faust maintains, "shaped not just the rhetoric and assumptions of military history, but more powerfully and more dangerously, the understanding and seduction of war itself." Faust states: "Tales of glory, honor, manhood and sacrifice enhance war's attraction and mobilize men and armies."[25]

[25] Drew Gilpin Faust, "Telling War Stories: Reflections of a Civil War Historian," National Endowment for the Humanities Lecture (2011), www.neh.gov. Faust's observations, however, are not necessarily true for all times and places. Holly Furneaux, for example, in her work on British soldiers and civilians during the Crimean War argues there were competing narratives challenging the "normalized hyper-aggressive tale" of soldiers killing without reflection and describes a "very different rhetorical and narratological