Introduction

In the sixteenth century, Muslim rulers of the largest empires of West and South Asia all embraced a new vocabulary of sovereignty that supplemented traditional Perso-Islamic titles and concepts of rule. To be sure, the traditional nomenclature remained. The Ottoman sultan, the Safavid shah, and the Mughal padishah still frequently referred to themselves by titles with long histories in Islamic lands. In all cases, these titles were mutually intelligible across these empires and to a large extent interchangeable in Ottoman Istanbul, Safavid Qazvin or Isfahan, and Mughal Delhi or Fatehpur Sikri. That is to say, on the basis of a long-established and shared cultural heritage, sultan, shah, and padishah were all recognized and accepted markers of sovereignty across a wide expanse between the Balkans and Bengal. Yet, in addition to these traditional titles of sovereign authority, alternative claims emerged prominently in the sixteenth century within these three Muslim polities. Such claims powerfully enhanced the older designations. They also often suggested a rationale for rule on a sacral or cosmic universal scale. These emperors were not just preeminent in their own domains, but became sahib-qiran (lord of the auspicious astral conjunction), mujaddid (centennial renewer of the faith), khalifa-yi ilahi (Vicegerent of God), and occasionally mahdi-yi akhir-i zaman (Harbinger of the End Time).

1 Shahab Ahmed proposes the Balkans-to-Bengal complex to describe the common paradigm of Islamic life and thought that animated the eastern Islamic lands between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries (Shahab Ahmed, What Is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016], 73–85).
To explain the preponderance of this vocabulary, modern historians have pointed to the significant cosmic, sacral, or millenarian overtones of these titles and set them in relation to broader processes of heightened apocalyptic foreboding in the sixteenth century. In most cases the new titles grounded their claims to authority in cosmological doctrines that anticipated the ordination of one individual to usher in a new era of universal justice, order, and peace. The claims were potent because they effectively articulated the aspirations of the three universal empires and they were plausible because, in the approach of the Hijri year 1000 (1591–2 CE), Muslim societies were primed and charged for great changes in the near future. At different moments and in response to varying, more immediate political concerns, rulers of all of these empires necessarily addressed apocalyptic anxieties, engaged millenarian discourses, and embraced radical expansive conceptions of their rule in the grandest of historical and cosmological terms. Beyond these specific anxieties of the tenth Hijri century, Ottoman, Safavid, Mughal, and, to a lesser extent, Uzbek pretensions to universal empire reflected the confidence of these Muslim polities in the sixteenth century. For much of this period, these empires, although frequently immersed in intense political competition and military confrontation with one another, offered a degree of stability in governance and relative peace within their own domains afforded through a continuity of administration over large territories throughout the century. In this regard, the justice and peace provided through their rule indicated plausibly the initiation of a new millennial political and spiritual dispensation in the approach of the year 1000.


THE CRISIS OF KINGSHIP IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

This new dispensation for these four polities was, no doubt, enhanced by the stark contrast they presented with the turbulent political realities of the preceding century. The fifteenth century was the last of several centuries dominated by Turco-Mongol pastoralist politics and its uneasy tension with sedentary Islamic identities and modes of social organization. Such domination and tension in the central lands of Islam was initially precipitated by the invasions of the Seljuks from Central Asia in the eleventh century and exacerbated by the irruption of the Mongols in the thirteenth and the vast conquests of Timur (r. 1370–1405). Indeed, the life and career of Timur remained the primary point of ideological reference for all subsequent rulers of the fifteenth century, perhaps especially because the extent and impact of his conquests remained unparalleled over the course of the century. The fragile and ultimately fractured territory he bequeathed to his descendants was subjected to conquests, counter-conquests, and the rapid succession of rulers that seemed to perpetuate a state of instability in Iran and adjacent lands. Even in the last decades of the century, stability within and among the four principal sultanates of West Asia remained fleeting. Of these four powers – the Ottomans of the Balkans and Anatolia, the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt, the Aqquyunlu of western and central Iran, and Timur’s descendants in eastern Iran and Transoxiana – only the Ottomans would survive and thrive beyond the second decade of the sixteenth century.

How, then, did this confident and expansive vision of kingship emerge in the sixteenth century? What were the conditions prevailing in this politically tumultuous, fractured world of the fifteenth century that made possible the emergence of territorially defined and ideologically assertive Muslim empires in the sixteenth century? In order to address these questions, we must immerse ourselves in the political, social, religious, and cultural contexts of the fifteenth century. Such contexts are challenging, not least, because they do not fit neatly into the historiographical categories in which historians most frequently work. These categories are informed by the legacies of the early modern Muslim empires and therefore focus upon modern notions of linguistic, religious, cultural, and national boundaries. Yet the fifteenth century was more than a period of messy transition to the more orderly and coherent geopolitical landscape of the sixteenth century.

Several of its features bear directly upon a new model of kingship articulated in the fifteenth century and more expansively realized in the
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sixteenth. Many of these related to the social, intellectual, and religious developments attendant with the continuing growth of Islamic religious movements, especially those with a militant messianic cast, that prospered equally among urban, rural, and tribal elements of society across Islamic lands. Such movements included the far-flung Sufi networks that coalesced around nascent confraternities, such as the Mawlawiya, Naqshbandiya, and Khalwatiya.4 They also encompassed much more radical millenarian movements and included most prominently the insurrection of Shaykh Bedreddin in the Balkans and Anatolia, the Safavis in Azerbaijan and Anatolia, the Musha’sha’ in Iraq and southern Iran, the Nurbakshshiya in northern and western Iran, and the Hurufis across much of West Asia.5 To varying degrees, both the emerging Sufi orders and the more radical millenarian movements drew upon the thought of the theosophical Sufi Ibn al-ʿArabi (d. 1240). With few exceptions, they espoused a reverence for ʿAli ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad and his first successor within Shiʿi tradition, that promoted extreme concepts within some circles and, more generally, produced a confessional fluidity or ambiguity that blurred distinctions


between Sunnis and Shiʿis. Insofar as these movements embraced an overt political agenda, they constituted a threat to prevailing authorities. Equally, their intellectual production offered fertile material for new discourses on sovereignty, especially since they so frequently concerned how theosophical cosmologies came to bear upon the ordering of humankind and the world.

In the central lands of Islam – roughly the lands between the Nile and Oxus rivers – such intellectual production was frequently expressed in Persian. To be sure, Arabic still predominated as the universal language of scholarship – especially pertaining to religious learning – but Persian was used extensively or even preferred in other learned and literary forms, including Sufism, poetry, and history writing. Indeed, the prestige of Persian is evident within court culture, even among rulers whose native tongue was Turkish or whose subjects spoke Arabic. Throughout the fifteenth century, this court culture, including outside Iran, bore the imprint of the aesthetic and cultural sensibilities of Timurid courts, which, notwithstanding their political volatility, patronized art, architecture, poetry, and prose in brilliant fashion. These cultural products, in turn, circulated and shaped the aspirations and expectations of courts across a wide expanse. In this sense, the prestige of Persianate cultural products acted as an important binding agent for the broader, fractured political terrain of the period and facilitated the movement of religious and political ideas.

In these respects, the socioreligious and cultural features of Islamic lands in the fifteenth century constituted a challenge to the existing political order, yet offered it the appropriate conditions for a wide-ranging response or synthesis. This challenge and response renders the fifteenth century, in the estimation of John Woods, “an era of great experimentation and innovation in political thought and practice.” Such experimentation and innovation was undertaken in administrative and ideological spheres and ultimately informed the political context and intellectual basis for the innovative, yet widely deployed vocabulary of the sixteenth century.

The practice of politics in the fifteenth century was particularly fragile because sultanic courts with centralizing ambitions contended with entrenched societal elements that frequently opposed them. These

\[\text{6} \text{ John E. Woods, } \textit{The Aqquyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire}, \text{ revised and expanded edition (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999), 3–4.}
\[\text{7} \text{ Ibid.}
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elements, whether of the Turkic military or urban notable classes, were key to sultanic governance since they constituted the traditional backbone of sultanic authority in its military or fiscal-administrative forms. Generally, sultanic reliance on these classes was acknowledged and expressed through the complex arrangements by which sultans offered extensive financial privileges to these leading elements in exchange for military, administrative, and ideological support. The accumulation and consolidation of these privileges, which frequently assumed the form of significant tax exemptions on land, precipitated a reduction in the sources of revenue and in this manner undermined the ability of these polities to govern. In the latter half of the fifteenth century, all four of the major sultanates operated under the fiscal constraints imposed by these arrangements even as they sought ways to centralize their authority and administration. The tension, therefore, between these centralizing courts and the broader societal elements upon which they relied produced a number of political crises between the late 1460s and early 1490s within each of these sultanates, precipitated most immediately by their concerted efforts to undertake land tenure reforms and reappropriate the usufruct grants and religious endowments belonging to the military and urban notable classes. In all cases, the protests of the effected privileged parties prevailed—often with violent repercussions—and the central administrative reforms of the four sultanates stalled.

Equally, all polities in the fifteenth century strove to formulate a basis for political authority in the absence of any widely agreed-upon parameters for articulating legitimacy. This crisis of kingship, in fact, harkened back to the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258 and intensified after the dissolution of the Chinggisid Ilkhanate in the fourteenth century. Before these monumental events, universal political authority was derived largely from juridical and genealogical discourses that effectively buttressed the claims of Abbasid or Chinggisid royal claimants to universal rule. Since at least the eleventh century, Muslim jurists widely agreed that the office of caliph should remain the prerogative of a member of the Quraysh tribe of the prophet Muhammad. For as long as an Abbasid caliph lived, such a view posed no problems, and indeed, effectively buttressed the Abbasid caliph’s claim to represent the Sunni community. The obliteration of the

8 There was, however, debate among jurists about whether such a prerogative was indispensable, see Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 224–25.
Abbasid Caliphate with the advent of the Mongols in the thirteenth century prompted a crisis among Muslim jurists, yet posed little concern for the Turko-Mongol military elites who dominated the central Islamic lands. For these elites, descent from the world-conqueror Chinggis Khan constituted the principal attribute of an effective claim to universal rule. Yet, by the middle of the fourteenth century, such prestige began to erode and with the dissolution of the Ilkhanid dynasty, no descendant of Chinggis Khan offered a viable bid for de facto rule. To be sure, in the post-Abbasid, post-Chinggisid world of the latter fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Muslim jurists attempted to modify the legal arguments of their predecessors, yet no single argument was advanced to establish any broad consensus on the matter. Similarly, an alternative genealogical tradition emerged, especially among Ottoman and Aqquyunlu Turkmen rulers, rooted in Oğuz Turkic genealogical traditions, yet, here too, such discourses failed to resurrect the universal prestige that had accrued to members of the Quraysh in the era of the Abbasids or the offspring of Chinggis Khan during the heyday of the Ilkhanate in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Crucially, none of the principal rulers of the central Islamic lands, including the Ottomans, could claim credibly descent from the Quraysh or Chinggis Khan. For these reasons, the fifteenth century, perhaps especially with respect to political thought, constituted an extremely fluid period, one, in which, as Evrim Binbaş suggests, “established discursive forms and taxonomies lost their powers of persuasion” and rulers and ruled alike actively sought out and developed alternatives.

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OTTOMAN SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE EMPIRE

Despite its isolated position at the margins of Islamic lands, the Ottoman Sultanate of this period was equally susceptible to these broader currents. Indeed, it is a central contention of this book that the Ottoman Sultanate, rather than being insulated from the principal anxieties of other fifteenth-century Muslim polities, necessarily operated within these same socio-religious and political constraints. For this reason then, the Ottoman adaptation and development of this vocabulary constitutes an illuminating expression of the broader phenomenon. Throughout the fifteenth century, and especially in its latter decades, by which point Ottoman sultans were increasingly drawn into political and military entanglements in Anatolia, the ramifications of the crisis of kingship played out increasingly within the Ottoman court and helped establish a new ideological trajectory for the sultanate into the sixteenth century.

To be sure, such a trajectory contrasted markedly with the salient and animating features of Ottoman sovereignty in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. During this period, the sultan and his sultanate’s legitimacy was frequently construed in response to the geopolitical concerns of the more narrowly bounded territory of the sultanate in the Balkans and Anatolia. Over the first two hundred years of its existence, Ottoman sultans had personally led raids, campaigns, and conquests of non-Muslim territory in these lands that contributed to the greatest expansion of Islamic lands in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Such activities, referred to alternatively as ghaza or jihad, accrued significant esteem for the sultans, who frequently proclaimed their status as preeminent warriors of the faith (sultan-i ghaziyan, sultan-i mujahidin). In this regard, in 1453, when the Ottoman sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446, 1451–1481) conquered Constantinople – capital of the eastern Roman Empire and subject of apocalyptic prophecy since the early days of Islam – contemporary sultanates across the Muslim world took note and in congratulatory

13 These activities and this image are reflected throughout the earliest Ottoman chronicles, see, for instance, Aşkıpaşaazade, Die Altosmanische Chronik Des Aşkıpaşaazade, ed. Friedrich Giese (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1928).
missives affirmed the Ottoman sultan’s status as a great warrior of the faith. This distinguishing attribute, therefore, can be said without exaggeration to constitute both the raison d'être of the sultanate, as well as a compelling component of its legitimating ideology.

In addition to a ghaza ideology, the Ottoman Sultanate in the fifteenth century also bolstered its claims to rule, especially through chronicles, with reference to two other discourses. These discourses, which elaborated Ottoman connections to prominent Turkic lineages or historically verifiable legal arguments, sought to defend Ottoman expansion into Anatolia. In contrast to southeastern Europe, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Anatolia was governed by a number of Turkmen principalities that had emerged as successors to the Seljuk Sultanate during and after its gradual dissolution in the latter half of the thirteenth century. In reference principally to this political geography, one of these discourses focused on an Ottoman dynastic lineage that emphasized its superior status among the Turkmen principalities of the region, all of which claimed common descent from Oğuz Han, a mythic Turkic ruler.

From the 1420s onwards, Ottoman chroniclers presented genealogies of the

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15 Mamluk diplomatic correspondence to the Ottomans frequently acknowledged the Ottoman sultan’s role in ghaza. Still, in Sultan Inal’s reply to the Ottoman victory proclamation in 1453, the Mamluk sultan added the epithet al-nasiri (the victorious) to the long list of customary attributes associated with the Ottoman sovereign (Cihan Yüksel Muslu, The Ottomans and the Mamluks: Imperial Diplomacy and Warfare in the Islamic World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 114).


17 On the details and significance of this discourse, see Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth,” 16–20; Imber, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” 149–50.
Ottoman dynasty and suggested its superiority in relation to all other Turkmen royal families. The other legitimating discourse had much the same effect. Specifically, in parallel with Ottoman claims of esteemed lineage, Ottoman chroniclers in the fifteenth century also argued for its legitimacy to rule in Anatolia in consequence of its historically demonstrable status as the rightful heirs of the Seljuk Sultanate.

Yet ultimately, these discourses proved insufficient and unsatisfactory on their own to explain and represent Ottoman sovereignty in the sixteenth century. For, in addition to expansion into Europe and Anatolia, in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans also expanded further eastward into traditionally Muslim territories. Between 1473 and 1516, the Ottomans went to war with the major powers in Arab and Persian lands four times. The last of these conflicts led to the incorporation of western Iran, Syria, Egypt, and the Hijaz into the Ottoman polity and greatly transformed the demographic and cultural profile of the sultanate. Over the course of these conflicts and in their immediate wake, a legitimating ideology of conquest based primarily upon ghaza or defended with reference to Oğuz heritage and Seljuk inheritance, was frequently irrelevant when articulated in reference to Muslim opponents and conquered subjects. For instance, in 1472 in the midst of rising tensions with the Aqquyunlu Sultanate—admittedly a polity concerned with its Oğuz identity—one unnamed Aqquyunlu commander sent a letter to the Ottoman governor-general of Rumiya that acknowledged the Ottoman reputation for ghaza and suggested such efforts would be exercised best against unbelievers and not, as he anticipated, against fellow Muslims. Moreover, for this letter writer, the relevant historical

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18 This is a feature of Ottoman historical narratives from the time of Murad II. For instance, see Yasuzcâde Ali, Tesârîh-i əl-i Selçuk: (Oğuznâme-Selçuklu tarihî): girîş, metin, dizin, ed. Abdullah. Bakr (İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2009); or Neşri from later in the fifteenth century (Neşri, Cihânnümâ: 6. Kısım: Osmanlı Tarihi [687–890/1288–1485]; Girîş, Metin, Kronoloji, Dizin, Tipkibasım, ed. Necdet Öztürk [İstanbul: Çamlıca, 2008]).
21 In an effort to broker peace between Sultan Mehmed II and the Karamanids—a percolating conflict that contributed to the war between the Ottomans and Aqquyunlu in 1473—the letter writer suggests that both parties concern themselves with ghaza. He continues: “The purpose of this wish is that no discord and chaos and opposition occur among Muslims and that the two sides engage in ghaza. Because it is a custom of that king (Mehmed II) from the time of his forebears, they have continuously been occupied with