It does not bother me that external enemies lurk and seek to obstruct the contemporary Islamic Revival (al-ṣahwa al-islāmiyya al-muʿāṣira), as this is a logical matter dictated by the principles of mutual opposition between Truth and Falsehood ... Rather, what bothers, haunts, and afflicts my heart is the sorrow of the Revival’s internal conflict (taʿadd al-ṣahwa naṣṣubā), as its enemy resides within it.

-Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 1989

Needless to say, we must connect the “return of the hijab” (ʿawdat al-ḥijāb) on the faces of Muslim women to the Islamic Revival that has arisen (al-ṣahwa al-islāmiyya al-nāḥiḍa) and whose light has illuminated many Islamic countries, including Egypt.

-Muhammad b. Ismaʿil al-Muqaddam, 2002

Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Muhammad b. Ismaʿil al-Muqaddam are two of Egypt’s most prominent religious scholars, the former a longtime Muslim Brother and pioneer of the Centrist approach (known as al-wasāṭiyya) and the latter the founder of the Salafi Call (al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya), an Islamist–Salafi movement that forms the basis of Egypt’s leading Salafi party, Hizb al-Nur. While al-Qaradawi summons the “objectives of the shariʿa” (maqāṣid al-shariʿa) to argue for women’s participation in public life, al-Muqaddam argues that women must cover their faces and avoid appearing in public whenever possible.


Divided by policy positions, these two intellectual giants of contemporary Egypt are united by a belief that Egypt has been living through an Islamic Revival (ṣahwa islāmiyya) since the 1970s.

Despite widespread agreement that an Islamic Revival has arisen in Egypt, however, we know little about how this religious shift came to exist as a concept defined by particular practices. Put differently, when and why did Statist and Islamist elites embrace the assumption that Egyptians were living in a time of religious transformation, and how did this diagnosis come to be paired with particular social practices? While subsequent chapters will trace the genesis of the practices that have driven religious change in Egypt over the past forty years, the following pages examine the process by which leading voices within Islamist organizations and state institutions came to conceive of themselves as enmeshed in a period of religious change, variously termed ṣahwa, yaqazā, baʿth, and al-mudd al-islāmi. Far from being a latent force that suddenly arose, the intellectual project of Islamic change was driven by a vanguard of religious elites, the ideological tumult of two wars, the emergence of global piety movements over the course of the 1970s, and particular projects of religious mobilization within Egypt. This shift, in turn, reveals the intellectual architecture that has undergirded a reconfiguration of the relationship between religion and politics in Egypt over the past four decades.

Historiographies of Islamic Change

What are the intellectual roots of Islamic change in Egypt? Contemporary academic studies refer to an “Islamic Revival” that

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For purposes of clarity, I will translate ṣahwa and baʿth as “revival,” while rendering yaqazā as “awakening,” and al-mudd al-islāmi as “the Islamic wave.” As Samuli Schielke explains regarding the “free translation” of ṣahwa as revival rather than awakening, “there is a dynamic and creative moment implied in revival, and the Islamic revival is best understood as a historic event characterized by a turn to a specific kind of religiosity associated with strong hopes and anxieties, intimately linked to a shift in the shape of the world at large” (Samuli Schielke, *Egypt in the Future Tense: Hope, Frustration and Ambivalence before and after 2011* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015], loc. 399). Furthermore, I will capitalize these terms in English when they refer specifically to a project of Islamic revival in 1970s Egypt, but not when they are used to refer to religious change more broadly.
arose during the 1970s, yet do not specify whether they are using it as an endogenous term that reflects the self-conception of Egyptians during this period or as an exogenous analytical construct. Nor is this ambiguity regarding endogenous origins unique to the study of religious change in Egypt during this period, extending to studies of Syria, the Indian subcontinent, and West Africa. Yet, without establishing the internal origins of concepts of revival, one cannot chronicle its roots or process of emergence.

This question of conceptual origins intersects with a broader debate over the value of revival as an analytic category in the study of the Islamic past and present. Historians of Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have argued that claims to ḥiṣlaḥ (reform), tajdid (renewal), and ʾibyā (revival) reveal the intellectual unity of Islamic visions across time and place. In conjunction, leading scholars of

5 A particularly striking example of this slippage is Charles Hirschkind’s statement that “the centripetal consolidation of religious authority and knowledge by the Egyptian state from the 1950s onward occurred simultaneously with a vast centrifugal movement, what both observers and participants often refer to as the Islamic Revival movement, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya” (Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape, 55). Also see Mittermaier, Dreams That Matter, 4; Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 136; Mahmood, The Politics of Piety, 3; and Yvonne Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening,” Middle East Journal, 46:2 (1992), 266–85, at 266.


7 For examples that span the Arab world, South Asia, and Africa, see Line Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Baʿthist Secularism (New York: Routledge, 2011), 6; Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism; Ali Rahnema (ed.), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 1994); Adeline Masquelier, Women and Islamic Revival in a West African Town (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Daniel W. Brown, Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 108–32. By contrast, Ahmed Dallal surveys five cases of “the fundamentalist tradition” and finds little

modern Islam, including of the Islamic Revival in 1970s Egypt, argue that one must consider twentieth-century practices of Revival as part of a diachronic tradition capable of offering distinctly Islamic responses to changing external conditions.  

Collectively, these scholars use revival primarily as a means of denoting either an intellectual methodology employed by scholars or a set of ethical practices employed by laymen and women to adapt Islam to new challenges. In competition with an open-ended temporal vision of Secular Nationalist fulfillment inspired by Romantic German nationalism, both proponents and scholars of Egypt’s Islamic Revival implicitly offer an alternative temporality: every century a renewer (mujaddid) will return the Islamic community to its core foundations, and the religious changes in late twentieth-century Egypt are but one manifestation of this cyclical process.  

At the core of this methodological approach is the assumption that twentieth-century religious change is most fundamentally understood with reference to an Islamic tradition (inclusive of its distinct temporal and intellectual assumptions) rather than to a non-Islamic present.

Conceptual history offers the tools to trace the formation of the distinct understanding of Islamic Revival in post-1952 Egypt. While the remainder of this book will examine particular practices that undergirded a changing relationship between religion and politics and reveal the ties that bind projects of Statism and Islamism, respectively, this chapter explores how increasingly well-defined concepts of religious change in Egypt both created the “conditions of possibility” for alternative religious projects and were then used to “signify” developments on the ground. Put differently, religious elites offered the Islamic


A significant exception to this trend is McLarney’s study of women’s role in Egypt’s Islamic Revival, which situates ideas of *sahwa* and *yaqaza* within locally mediated contestations over political and cultural reform, specifically the early twentieth-century *nahda* (renaissance) and the mid-twentieth-century secular-nationalist *baʿth* (awakening) movements. See McLarney, *Soft Force*, 13–14.

Revival as an apparent *fait accompli* and then used this frame both to spearhead new projects and to incorporate local developments that, in a previous period, would have been seen as a matter of individual religiosity. At first, though, this was a limited undertaking, as early calls for revival came from an intellectually diverse religious vanguard that had yet to set forth key projects to shape society.

A narrow focus on how concepts of religious change emerged in post-1952 Egypt cuts to the heart of the “big idea” that altered Egypt’s religio-political trajectory. The process by which the frame of revival became the norm rather than the exception in Egyptian religious debate, in turn, reveals that the Islamic Revival in Egypt differed from its premodern and modern predecessors for three central reasons: it oriented its participants to an open-ended rather than a cyclical future; it foregrounded embodied social practice over intellectual methodology; and its self-definition was shaped directly by the perception of parallel religious revivals, both Islamic and non-Islamic. In contrast to scholarship that foregrounds the centrality of diachronic Islamic intellectual and ethical traditions to religious change in Muslim-majority countries, this chapter argues that, in Egypt, the concept of the Islamic Revival emerged secondarily out of a diachronic Islamic tradition and primarily out of local and global contestations of communal identity and piety over the course of the 1970s.

A conceptual history of Egypt’s Islamic Revival also enables us to examine how it emerged as a mass project. A focus on the ideological bases of mobilization – rather than on textual methodology or ethical cultivation – reveals the process by which the Islamic Revival came to be defined by particular practices and was then trumpeted not only by its Islamist pioneers, but also by their Statist competitors. Just as importantly, this approach facilitates a distinction between the particular ruptures of this period and those ideas and practices that preceded it and persisted throughout the 1970s. At the intersection of

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12 In the European context, Reinhart Koselleck argues that since the 1770s “old words such as *democracy*, *freedom*, and *the state* have indicated a new horizon of the future, which delimits the concepts in a different way; traditional *topoi* gained an anticipatory content that they did not have before” (Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practices of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner et al. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002], 5). Also see Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 75–92.
a particular idea and specific social practices, a “big tent” of Islamic Revival arose.

This chapter begins by examining when and how ṣāḥwa, yaqāza, baʿth, and al-mudd al-islāmī came to be used as catchall phrases for religious change in Egypt. By establishing the specific usage of these terms prior to and during the 1952 rise of the Free Officers, it identifies both precursors to later visions of revival and the temporal assumptions employed by state-aligned and Islamist religious elites alike to describe the prospect of mass religious change. The next section, in turn, examines the interval between 1967 and 1978, during which religious elites across the political spectrum sought to pinpoint the causes of defeat and success in the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars, respectively. Charting perceptions of crisis and stirrings of renewal alike, it shows that both Islamist and Statist elites first saw a religious void, and that claims to revival only began to emerge tentatively following the 1973 war.

What such a revival entailed, and whom it involved, however, was still unclear. As they searched for ways to define themselves and their project between 1978 and 1981, leading figures within the Brotherhood and Jamʿīyya Sharʿīyya looked abroad, not only at sister movements throughout the Middle East and South Asia, but also at parallel stirrings in Israel and the United States. At the intersection of local activism, regional Islamist movements, and a new awareness of ideological competitors around the world, Islamist elites constructed a future-oriented vision that would sway their state-aligned competitors and shape Egypt’s religious trajectory.

The Roots of Islamic Revival

In June 1952 a group within the military, known as the Free Officers, toppled the British-backed Egyptian monarchy. Led by Muhammad Najib and Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, they soon faced a different challenge: how to mobilize Egyptian society in the service of a nationalist vision of

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13 The centrality of these terms stands in contrast to Haddad’s argument for the prominence of the concept of tajdid until the late 1970s. See Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’,” 272.

14 While Haddad argues that the 1967 war catalyzed Jewish, Christian, and Muslim “fundamentalists,” she does not prove this connection, nor does she demonstrate its periodization. See Haddad, “Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’,” 271.
political, economic, and ideological independence. These men, however, were career army officers rather than politicians or social activists, and knew little about enlisting millions of Egyptians to their cause. The Free Officers, though, did not have to look far to spot a potential ally: leading figures within this faction, including the future Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (r. 1970–81) and a high-ranking army officer, Muhammad Labib, had maintained contact with the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) during the 1940s, and knew that the Muslim Brotherhood could effectively play this role. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boasted millions of members throughout Egypt, was thus an ideal partner as Egypt’s new rulers sought to navigate the transition from monarchical to nationalist rule.

In turn, leading Brothers had supported the Free Officers’ revolution, working in the days that followed it to maintain public order. Indeed, only three days after the toppling of King Faruk, Hasan al-Banna’s father, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Banna (d. 1957), declared to his fellow Islamists: “O ye Brothers, this day your message has come forth . . . This is a new dawn for you . . . and a new day for the nation . . . embrace Neguib [Najib] and help him with your hearts, your blood, and your wealth.”

The Brotherhood thus supported the new regime, working with the Free Officer-aligned Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) while they continued previous efforts to spread a vision of Islam that saw it as an all-encompassing antidote to the ills of the modern age. ʿAbd al-Nasir, on the other hand, knew little about Islam and had scant reason to quarrel with the Brotherhood’s approach in particular. As the senior al-Banna had indicated, a new era had arrived, and ʿAbd al-Nasir would lead the charge to national destiny.

Prior to ʿAbd al-Nasir’s rise, discourses of Islamic revival had occupied a decidedly marginal position within broader political debate. Majallat al-Manar, the Islamic journal edited and published by religious reformer and political activist Rashid Rida between 1898 and 1935, contained no reference to sabwa, yaqaza, or baʿth. This assertion is based on keyword searches, carried out through the Maktabat al-Shamela program, of a .bok file of this periodical. References in al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun are derived from a survey of the titles of this periodical’s issues during the 1930s (1933–37) and 1940s (1943–46). Al-Manar and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun are representative of an elite project of Islamic reform and a key local movement of such reform, respectively.
The Roots of Islamic Revival

Brotherhood’s flagship periodical, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, during the 1930s: while editors and writers periodically discussed the prospect of religious change, they did so with reference to a renaissance (*nahḍa*), a concept then dominant in Egyptian reformist circles.\(^\text{17}\)

As the 1940s arrived, Islamist writers began to adopt a discourse of nationalist, yet not religious, awakening. By way of example, a 22 March 1946 article in *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* asserted that “the Arabs have awoken in solidarity” (*faqad istayqaz al-ʿarab mutadāmmīn*) with one another.\(^\text{18}\) While visions of change could be applied to a religious project – most notably, a 25 May 1946 article in *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* noted the “the revival of the Islamic shariʿa” (*baʿth al-shariʿa al-islāmiyya*) – this denoted a specific legal development rather than a broad social shift.\(^\text{19}\) By 1948, however, self-consciously Islamic projects of open-ended change had grown more common, and a 28 February 1948 article by Dr. Muhammad al-Hussayni, head of the Brotherhood’s Italian branch, noted:

The world’s awakening (*yaqazat al-ʿālam*) has spread to 300 million [Muslim] souls . . . [it is] a new revival (*baʿth jadīd*) for a high, authentic, and deeply rooted civilization . . . in the Islamic world generally and in the region of the Mediterranean Sea in particular . . . the driver of this Islamic renaissance (*bāʾth bāḍhibī al-nahḍa*) is a political movement inspired by Islam . . . [by] the Muslim Brotherhood.\(^\text{20}\)

While the author’s definition of revival was coterminous with the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood, his description underscores a turn toward adopting discourses of temporally open-ended religious revival.

\(^{17}\) For example, see Hasan al-Banna, “La Budda li-Kull Umma Turid al-Nuhud,” *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, 28 February 1934/14 Dhu al-Qa da 1352, 1–3. As Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski note, “The concept of ‘revival’ [*nahḍa*] suffused all varieties of Egyptian Arab nationalist thought.” See Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 133. While *nahḍa* was hardly a stand-alone concept – it was often joined by invocations of both *iḥyāʾ* and *baʿth* – these concepts were not yet dominant. See Gershoni and Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation*, 68.


Back in Egypt, however, other Brothers envisioned a revival that transcended this Islamist movement to embrace the national community. In September 1952 an article in the Brotherhood’s new magazine, *al-Daʿwa*, entitled “Dam al-Baʿth Yanbaʿ iṯth min al-Dama” (The Blood of Awakening Emerges from Tears), noted that “the Egyptian people … do not accept corruption and tyranny (*al-fasād wa-l-ṭughyaṇ*) … the Free Officers are an armed symbol (*ramz musallah*) of this fact … a human symbol of the hand of God (*yad allah*).”

Hopes were high: the previous May another Brotherhood writer had declared his anticipation that “the Islamic wave” (*al-mudd al-islāmi*) would be seen in Egypt once again. In the face of this support for the ruling regime – itself based on a combination of political pragmatism and optimism regarding the religious status quo – it was little surprise that a January 1953 ban on existing political parties specifically excluded Egypt’s leading Islamist organization.

Indeed, a revival appeared to be imminent to the Brotherhood’s leading voices. In July 1954 a literary-critic-turned-Islamist-thinker by the name of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) penned an article in *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* entitled “A Revival (*sahwa*) Which Will Not Be Followed by Lethargy.” Qutb, who had not yet fully embraced a Manichean worldview that depended on a Purist vanguard (*tālīʿa*) to effect change, expressed his faith in the capacity of the Egyptian masses to turn to Islam:

Colonialism has done everything that it could [to stamp out Islam], to the point that people believed it had succeeded … [They believed] that this creed had gone to sleep and would not awaken (*ḥāḍiḥi al-ʿaqīda qad nāmat ilā ghayr yaqaza*) … but it will arise in a revival free of lethargy (*fa-idha biha ṭanta fī ṭawāḥa wa ila ḡayr subāʿ*). Indeed, the day of salvation is near … light will shine on the horizon … and this Islamic world won’t sleep after its awakening (*baʿda baʿthiḥi*).

As Qutb surveyed the religious landscape, he did not see a revival as having yet occurred; such a movement was merely an anticipated future

event. The hypothetical nature of religious change in Egypt was mirrored by the inchoate vocabulary used to describe it: while șahwa was prominent, so too were yaqaṣa and baṭh, the latter associated with the transnational secular nationalist party whose Iraqi and Syrian branches later took power. As both writers in al-Da’wa and al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun chronicled the position of Muslims globally during this period, they saw change on the horizon in a manner that mirrored, consciously or unconsciously, Secular Nationalism’s vision of future-oriented progress.25

This new philosophy of open-ended Islamic history was not exclusively Islamist. In September 1954 scholars within al-Azhar’s Grand Shaykh’s Office (Mashyakhat al-Azhar) remarked on the need for “Islamic awakening” (al-baṭh al-islāmī) based on morality (ʿalā usṣus al-akblāq) and guided by the Islamic Conference at al-Azhar. As the prominent Islamic publicist Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib26 noted in the early days of October 1954: “Today, we have begun to awaken from a long sleep (bāḍaʾanā nastayqīz min naʿw mīntāla ʿalaynā laylūḥu) . . . this Islamic Conference will be one of the Islamic bodies that can teach about the affairs of Muslims and their esteemed heritage . . . and about their points of weakness and the causes for [such weakness].”27 The revival envisioned by Qutb and al-Khatib, however, had no public manifestation. Indeed, the coming years, far from witnessing an outpouring of religiosity, would see a massive project of religious repression in Egypt following an assassination attempt by members of the Brotherhood’s Secret Apparatus (al-jiḥāz al-sīrī) against Ṭābīn Notices on 26 October 1954.28 Whether in direct response to the assassination, or merely as a pretext to eliminate a political opponent, the Free Officers brought the might of the

25 Leading theorists of Arab nationalism, most notably the Ottoman–Syrian writer Sātī’ al-Husri (d. 1968), envisioned an Arab nation that directly paralleled the German Volk. Forged through shared blood and soil, the nation would move to the future to fulfill its national destiny. See Roel Meijer, Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East (London: Curzon Press, 1999), 125–38, 146–47.
26 Al-Khatib (1886–1969) was a premier Islamic publicist and most famously edited al-Fath, which published roughly 800 issues between 1926 and 1943.
28 It has never been established whether this assassination attempt was approved by Hudaybi or whether it was a decision made independently by individual members of the Brotherhood. See Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 150–51.