

Index

- Aaron, David, 198, 220–221, 224, 225–226, 239–240
- ABM. *See* anti-ballistic missile
- accidental escalation, 25
- ACDA. *See* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- acquisition policy, 68–69, 78, 83–84, 193
- Carter, J., and, 193, 227–228
- military preferences for, 155
- of Nixon, 90–91, 115
- policymakers and, 97–100, 130–133
- AEC. *See* Atomic Energy Commission
- Afghanistan, 81, 191–192
- aggressive revisionist states, 53
- aggressor, 13, 23–24
- Agnew, Spiro, 109–110, 117–118
- air defenses, 35, 122, 157
- Air Force, 117, 148–149, 151, 239, 241–242, 245–246, 250–251, 261
- counterforce acceleration and, 151–152
- cruise missiles and, 183–184
- MX ICBM and, 240–241
- White House and, 151
- Air Force Ballistic Missile Office, 150–151
- Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), 160, 177–178, 183, 189, 211, 261
- Ford and, 178
- Kissinger and, 178, 179
- SALT II and, 178–179
- airborne early warning and control (AWAC), 93
- aircraft, 34–36
- ALCMs. *See* Air Launched Cruise Missiles
- alliance benefits, 138–139, 173–174, 228–231
- alliance cohesion, 51, 100–103, 192
- Allison, Graham, 16
- anarchy, 11, 262
- Angola, 190
- anti-ballistic missile (ABM), 3–4, 83, 95, 115–116, 250
- area defense ABM, 99
- ban on, 109–110, 198–199
- Congress and, 119
- Ford and, 128–129
- limits on, 108
- military preferences in favor of, 112, 119–120
- Nixon and, 89–90, 94, 97
- population protection opportunities and, 88, 102
- restrictions on, 83–84
- strategic, 209
- anti-communism, 190
- anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 37, 50, 128–129, 154
- peacetime ASW capabilities, 38
- US capabilities of, 35–36, 38, 126–127, 145–146
- arms control, 19, 48, 57, 193, 245, 249
- agreements, 17
- bargaining and enforcement of, 62
- bargaining of, 62
- benefits of, 143–148, 174–178
- Carter, J., and, 193–194
- Cold War, 64–65
- Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 103–105, 108–112, 140–141, 174–178, 257–258
- competitive, 58–59, 73, 159
- for competitive advantage, 223–226

- arms control (cont.)
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 133–135
 - détente and, 147–148
 - domestic politics and, 78
 - enforcement of, 62, 63
 - Ford and, 143–145
 - liberalism and, 103–105
 - Moscow and, 45
 - Nixon and, 108–109, 112, 115, 119, 143–145
 - nuclear balance and, 90
 - opportunity cost of, 52
 - policy, 3–4, 68–69
 - outcomes of, 188–189
 - polymakers and, 143–148, 174–178
 - Pure MAD and, 70–71
 - for qualitative stability, 201–203, 249
 - qualitative stability arms control, 59
 - Russia and, 63
 - stability, 58
 - US disadvantages for, 154
 - unfavorable arms control bargain, 51
 - weakness for, 245
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 99–100, 198, 222
- arms race, 19, 49
 - acceleration of, 191–192
 - Carter, J., and, 243
 - incentives, 124
 - losing, 51
 - stability, 201
- Art, Robert J., 183
- assured destruction, 69, 99, 199–200, 204
- ASW. *See* anti-submarine warfare
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 137
- authority to launch nuclear weapons, 40
- autonomy, 15–16, 62–63, 72
 - offensive strategies and, 15–16
- AWAC. *See* airborne early warning and control
- B-1, 193, 194, 203–204, 240–241, 261
- B-52, 177–178
- Backfire, 174, 177, 185–186, 260–261
 - Kissinger on, 178
- balance of resolve, 12–13, 22
- ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 28–29, 34–35, 40, 50, 85–86, 127–128, 244
 - invulnerability of, 96
 - map showing location of all deployed Soviet SSBNs, 209
 - Moscow and, 144
 - Soviet Union and, 34, 36
 - survivability, 37–39
 - Typhoon, 128
 - US acoustic and geographic advantages of, 39
- Battle of the Atlantic, 95
- Beijing, 139, 255–256, 257–258
- Berlin, 50
- Bernard, Brodie, 10–11
- Blair, Bruce, 40
- bomber force, 99, 126
 - longevity of, 189
 - modernization, 133
 - second-strike, 123
 - of Soviet Union, 36
- bomber survivability, 34–36, 126–127
- Bonn, 213–214
- Brezhnev, Leonid, 61, 145–146, 177
 - Kissinger and, 146, 161
 - Vance and, 202
- Brooke, Edward, 112
- Brooks, Stephen, 5
- Brown, Harold, 103, 106–107, 109, 171, 174–175, 182, 183, 195–196, 198–199, 206, 209, 219, 239–240
 - Congress and, 233
 - Schlesinger and, 184–185
 - structure of SALT and, 223–224
 - warfighting and, 221–222
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 195–196, 200, 201, 203–204, 211, 214–215, 219, 220, 221, 225–226, 227, 241
 - MX ICBM and, 235–236
 - SALT and, 234
- Bundy, McGeorge, 10–11, 14, 19, 29, 240
- Buzan, Barry, 16–17
- C³. *See* command, control, and communications
- Carter, Ashton, 40
- Carter, Jimmy, 18, 81–82, 171, 190, 199, 218, 242, 244–246
 - Aaron and, 239–240
 - acceleration of arms race and, 191–192
 - acquisition policy and, 193, 227–228
 - arms control and, 193–194
 - arms race and, 243
 - assured destruction and, 204
 - Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 205
 - counterforce and, 200
 - crisis bargaining and, 226–227
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 192
 - Dobrynin and, 201

Index

267

- Gromyko and, 225
- long-term competition and, 231
- military preferences and, 241–243
- Minuteman and, 238
- modernization and, 199–200, 207, 220–223
- MX ICBM and, 207, 228, 241–242
- NATO and, 228–231
- nuclear balance and, 191, 195–196
- nuclear competition and, 203
- nuclear force posture and, 193, 206–208, 218, 231–232
- nuclear revolution and, 248
- nuclear stalemate and, 208–210
- resource diversion and, 227–228
- SALT and, 195
- SALT II and, 85–86, 230
- Soviet civil defense and, 198
- Soviet nuclear doctrine and, 197–198
- technological shock and, 196–197
- victory of, 190
- case selection, 80–83
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 79, 129, 161–162, 163–164, 211, 212
- challenger, 22
- Charman, Andrew, 77
- China, 6, 56, 83–84, 252–253, 259
 - deterrence and, 257–258
 - Kissinger and, 136
 - MAD and, 255–256
 - triangular diplomacy with, 139
- CIA. *See* Central Intelligence Agency
- cities, 30–31
- civil defense, 44, 165–166, 168, 170, 172–173, 198, 216–218, 227
- civil-military relations, 45, 49, 59–60, 63
- clandestine capabilities, 254
- Clary, Christopher, 256
- Clements, William, 127–128, 134, 178–179
 - on cruise missiles, 175, 180–181, 183–184
- CNA-78. *See* Comparative Net Assessment-78
- coalitional politics, 17–19, 79, 186–188
- Colby, William, 135, 161–162, 174–175, 178–179
- Cold War, 1, 29, 39, 247–249, 260–262
 - arms control, 64–65
 - ASW and, 35–36
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 259–260
 - domestic features during, 59–60
 - end of, 5–6
 - Great Crises in, 21
 - nuclear competition, 2, 6, 263
 - perceptual delicacy of nuclear balance
 - during, 44–46
 - policymakers and, 259, 262
 - Russia after, 259
 - SALT and, 263–264
 - technological delicacy of nuclear balance
 - during, 31
 - United States, and, 4, 262
 - US highly competitive nuclear policy during, 47, 64
 - warfighting doctrines, 254
- command, control, and communications (C³), 3, 25, 159, 206–207, 215–216, 218, 244–245
- degraded, 31
- hardening of, 198
- Kissinger and, 94
- nuclear, 39–42
- Soviet Union and, 40–41, 214
- Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 238–239
- Comparative Constitutional Fitness, 20–21, 49, 55–59, 67, 72–76, 153–155, 157, 188–189, 244–246, 247–248, 249, 250–251, 260
- arms control and, 103–105, 108–112, 140–141, 174–178, 257–258
- Carter, J., and, 205
- constant factor, 82–83
- Ford and, 123
- military competition and, 57
- Nixon and, 84, 88, 119, 123
- Parochial MAD and, 67, 74, 78, 205–206, 235
- policymakers and, 103, 108–112
 - arms control, 143–148, 174–178
- qualitative competition and, 106–108, 142–143
- quantitative competition and, 105–106, 141–142
- SALT and, 191
- of Soviet Union, 59–64
- of United States, 59–64, 231–235
- Comparative Net Assessment-78 (CNA-78), 214–216, 228
- Congress, US, 61, 110–111, 119, 124–125
- Brown and, 233
- counterforce and, 236–237
- defense spending by, 106
- hard target kill and, 235–236
- influence of, 113–114, 149–150, 235, 237–239

- Congress, US (cont.)
 - Kissinger and, 114
 - left-wing faction in, 149–150
 - MIRVs and, 90–91, 119
 - MX ICBM and, 238
 - nuclear force posture and, 112–113
 - SALT and, 176
 - SALT I and, 149
- conventional battlefield, 52–53, 168
- conventional war, 24–25, 180–181
 - NATO and, 163–164
- cooperative tasks, 55
- Copeland, Dale, 5
- Coté, Owen, 37–38
- counterforce, 30–31, 131, 248–249, 250
 - capabilities, 124, 132, 146–147
 - Carter, J., and, 200
 - coalitional pressures against, 236
 - Congress and, 236–237
 - Kissinger and, 133
 - modernization of, 136, 220–223
 - 1976 acceleration, 136–137, 151–152, 193
 - SALT and, 137–138, 154
 - targeting, 117
- countervailing strategy, 191–192
- CPD. *See* Committee on the Present Danger
- Craig, Campbell, 17, 18–19
- crisis bargaining, 172–173, 226–227, 251
 - LNOs and, 248
- crisis stability, 54
 - goal of, 19, 54–55
 - qualitative, 58
- cruise missiles, 157, 182, 188–189, 230.
 - See also specific missiles*
 - Air Force and, 183–184
 - Clements on, 175, 180–181, 183–184
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 178–182
 - Kissinger and, 194
 - Navy and, 183–184
 - SALT I and, 158–159
 - Schlesinger on, 180, 182
 - uncontrolled competition in, 175
 - Vladivostok accords and, 174–175
- Cuba, 21–22
- Cunningham, Fiona, 255–256
- cyber intelligence, 254
- damage expectancy (DE), 222–223
- damage limitation, 200, 209, 222
- DCI. *See* Director of Central Intelligence
- DE. *See* damage expectancy
- De Gaulle, Charles, 96–97
- decentralization, 73
- defection, 51, 56, 118–119
- defender, 13, 22
 - nuclear weapons used by, 23–24
- “The Delicate Balance of Terror” (Wohlstetter), 28
- Delicate Nuclear Balance, 67, 82, 88, 91–92, 122, 153–155, 188–189, 231, 244–246, 248–249
 - alliance benefits and, 138–139
 - arms control and, 133–135
 - Carter, J., and, 192
 - Cold War and, 259–260
 - cruise missiles and, 178–182
 - employment policy and, 168–172
 - expectations of, 191
 - nuclear stalemate, perceptual uncertainty about, 210
 - nuclear stalemate, technical uncertainty about, 208–210
 - nuclear stalemate and, 71, 160–161
 - policymakers and, 79, 123–124
 - nuclear force posture, 218
 - policymakers on acquisition policy and, 97–100, 130–133
 - political adjustment and, 137–138
 - predictions of, 78
 - Pure MAD and, 70, 251–252
 - resource diversion and, 136–137
 - Soviet Union and, 157
- Delta SSBN program, 127
- Deng Xiaoping, 148
- Department of Defense (DoD), 92–93, 96–97, 107–108, 114, 128–129, 170
- depressed trajectory threat, 92, 93–94
- détente, 2–3, 83–84, 87, 118, 122, 153, 177, 185–186
 - arms control and, 147–148
 - changes wrought by, 121–122
 - optimism about, 190
 - Parochial MAD and, 182
 - political value of maintaining, 147
 - ritual superpower consultations characterizing, 121
 - SALT and, 148
- deterrence, 28, 63
 - China and, 257–258
 - extended, 51
 - general, 54
- Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 106–107, 161
- D’Lugo, David, 55

Index

269

- Dobrynin, Anatoly, 179, 201, 204–205
 doctrinal evolution, 190
 DoD. *See* Department of Defense
 domestic constraint, 205–206
 domestic politics, 4, 8, 10, 112
 arms control and, 78
 crosscutting domestic political constraints
 and opportunities, 73
 nuclear force posture and, 20–21, 235
 Parochial MAD and, 47, 49, 64, 251–252
 policymakers and, 72
 SALT and, 88–89
 Drew, Christopher, 95
 Duckett, Carl, 127, 128, 163–164, 179
 Dueck, Colin, 62
- East-West Planning Group, 216, 228, 229, 234
 SALT and, 234–235
 economic production, 55–56
 economic surplus, 58
 Edwards, John, 150–151
 efficient competition, 48
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 60–61
 employment policy, 68–70, 71, 84, 188, 193
 competitive, 159, 171–172
 military influence on, 185
 policymakers and, 168–171
 warfighting and, 191
 equal MIRVed throw-weight (EMTW), 125,
 145, 146–147
 era of negotiations, 121
 Ermarth, Fritz, 162, 164–165, 223, 228, 229
 MX ICBM and, 228, 229–230
 on nuclear doctrine, 231–232
 escalation
 accidental, 25
 escalatory military environment, 54
 explosive, 24, 25
 inadvertent, 25
 LNOs and, 184–185
 Evangelista, Matthew, 16–17, 60, 62
 evidence, inferential value of, 76
 extractive weaknesses, 49, 233
- factional influence, 113–114, 149–150,
 237–239
 factional preferences, 112–113, 149, 185–186,
 235–237, 250
 Fairfield, Tasha, 77
 FBS. *See* Forward Based Systems
 FEBA. *See* Forward Edge of the Battle Area
 first strike, 31, 43–44, 127, 210
 credible, 101–102
 fixed nuclear targets, 253–254
 fog of war, 24
 Ford, Gerald, 81–82, 83–84, 124, 143, 170,
 205–206
 ABM and, 128–129
 ALCMs and, 178
 arms control and, 143–145
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 123
 counterforce capabilities and, 132
 counterforce modernization and, 136
 employment policy and, 168–171
 FY 1977 and, 152–153
 Kissinger and, 123, 174, 177–178, 187,
 188–189
 LNOs and, 158–159
 Minuteman vulnerability and, 135
 nuclear competition and, 176
 nuclear modernization and, 130
 nuclear stalemate and, 126
 policymakers and, 127
 quantitative competition and, 157
 Reagan and, 149, 150, 156–158, 185–186,
 187–188, 189
 Rumsfeld and, 129–130
 SALT and, 160
 SALT II and, 123
 Scowcroft and, 172–173
 Soviet Union warfighting and, 188
 technological shocks and, 129
 Vladivostok accords and, 84, 125–126
 foreign policy ideology, 16, 17, 264
 Forward Based Systems (FBS), 125–126, 138,
 181, 260–261
 Moscow and, 138–139
 NATO and, 166
 Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), 168
 Foster, John S., 73, 115–116
 Foster Panel, 159, 169–170, 184
 Fravel, Taylor, 255–256
 Friedberg, Aaron, 60
 on liberalism, 61
 future vulnerability, 126–129
- general nuclear war, 11–12, 159–160, 168, 218
 targeting goals of, 169–170
 Germany, 50–51, 55–56, 213–214, 228–229
 Glaser, Charles, 9, 10–11, 12, 14, 16, 19
 assured destruction nuclear policies, 17
 on cities, 30–31
 on crisis stability, 54
 on MAD, 28–29

- GLCMS. *See* Ground Launched Cruise Missiles
 Goddard, Stacie, 56
 Goldwater, Barry, 152–153
 Great Britain, 50–51, 55–56
 Great Crises, 21
 Greenwood, Ted, 117
 Gromyko, Andrei, 195, 203, 212, 225
 ground alert, 34
 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMS), 193–194
- Haig, Alexander, 132
 Haldeman, H. R., 104, 112
 hard target kill, 116, 119–120, 152, 191, 200, 220, 222, 244–246
 Congress and, 235–236
 development of, 194
 Trident II SLBM and, 225
- Harlow, Bryce, 113
 heavy bombers, 206
 Helms, Richard, 106–107, 117–118
 Herring, Eric, 16–17
 high-intensity cooperation, 73
 Hitler, Adolf, 56
 Holloway, James, 184, 186
 Hoover Institution archives, 79
 hydrophones, 37
 Hyland, William, 170–171
 Hymans, Jacques, 55–56
 Hyten, John, 255
- IAP. *See* Improved Accuracy Program
 IC. *See* intelligence community
 ICBM. *See* intercontinental ballistic missile
 IIM. *See* Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
 IISS. *See* International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Ikenberry, John, 5
 Ikle, Fred, 176
The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Jervis), 9
 Improved Accuracy Program (IAP), 132, 153
 inadvertent escalation, 25
 India, 252–253, 258
 Indochina, 50
 INF. *See* Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
 innovation, 60, 62
 Trident I SLBM and, 153
 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 3
 intelligence community (IC), 216–218
 intelligence shocks, 31, 42
- Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM), 165, 216–218
 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 18, 50. *See also specific missiles*
 development programs, 121–122, 201–202
 fixed, 43, 237
 fixed ICBM survivability, 32–33
 freeze on “new types” of ICBMs, 194–195, 202
 mobile, 129
 silo protected, 28–29
 from Soviet Union, 32–33, 87
 sublimits on MIRVed ICBMs, 194
 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 56
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 228
 international institutions, 5
 international law, 62
 international system, 1
 invulnerability, 195–196, 244
 ISR. *See* intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Jackson, Scoop, 236, 239
 JCS. *See* Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Jeremiah, David, 38–39
 Jervis, Robert, 9, 10–11, 13, 27
 on MAD, 28–29
 Johnson, U. Alexis, 138, 161–162, 179
 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 93–94, 116, 135, 221, 228
 SALT and, 241
 Jones, David, 215, 229–230
- Kahn, Herman, 191–192
 Keeny, Spurgeon, 28–29
 Kennedy, John F., 18
 Kennedy, Ted, 238
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 208–209
 Kissinger, Henry, 87, 88, 92, 93–94, 109, 117–118, 139, 145, 175–176
 ALCMs and, 178, 179
 on Backfire, 178
 bomber force and, 99
 Brezhnev and, 146, 161
 on C³, 94
 China and, 136
 Congress and, 114
 counterforce and, 133
 cruise missiles and, 194
 Delta program and, 127

Index

271

- Ford and, 123, 174, 177–178, 187, 188–189
 LNOs and, 168–169, 172
 on Minuteman, 94–95
 MIRV and, 98–99, 134
 on nuclear competition, 100
 quantitative competition and, 157
 Richardson and, 126
 Safeguard and, 99, 115–116
 SALT and, 179–180, 187
 Schlesinger and, 133, 137, 142–143
 Korea, 50, 149–150, 169
 Kydd, Andrew, 4
- Laird, Melvin, 97–98, 107, 109–110, 114, 143
 launch codes, 40
 Leber, Georg, 166–167
 Lee (Admiral), 116
 LeMay, Curtis, 191–192
 liberalism, 61, 62, 73
 arms control and, 103–105
 Library of Congress, 79
 Lieber, Keir, 256
 limited nuclear options (LNOs), 12, 69–71,
 156–157, 158–159, 182, 184, 256
 crisis bargaining and, 248
 development of, 159–160
 escalation and, 184–185
 Foster Panel and, 159
 Kissinger and, 168–169, 172
 Schlesinger and, 168
 SIOP and, 185
 Welch and, 185
 LNOs. *See* limited nuclear options
 Lodal, Jan, 149–150
 Logevall, Fredrik, 17, 18–19
 Long, Austin, 37–38, 50
- MAD. *See* Mutually Assured Destruction
 Major Attack Options (MAOs), 159–160
 Maritime Strategy, 38–39, 210
 mass production, 73
 massive nuclear strike, 23
 massive pre-emption, 25
 massive retaliation, 13
 May 20 missile freeze, 121
 McGovern, George, 238
 McNamara, Robert, 18
 Medeiros, Evan, 255–256
 Meyer, Stephen, 40–41
 Middle East, 169
 military balance spirals, 52–53
 military buildups, 23
 military bureaucracies, 15–16, 79
 military competition, 2, 47
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 57
 peacetime, 47, 48, 50–52
 cost of, 52–55
 Waltz on, 11
 military cooperation, 72
 military influence, 24–25, 115–118, 151–153,
 185, 241–243
 military interventions, 81
 military preferences, 112, 114–115, 119–120,
 150–151, 155, 182–185, 239–241
 military risk, 24
 military stability, 1, 7, 10, 21, 27
 Minuteman, 83–84, 90–91, 133
 accuracy of, 107
 Carter, J., and, 238
 Kissinger on, 94–95
 NS-20 guidance system, 201–202
 vulnerability of, 92, 133–135, 136, 237, 240
 Minuteman III, 124–125, 138, 200, 201–202
 MIRV. *See* multiple independently targetable
 reentry vehicle
 missile accuracy, 134
 MK 12A, 124–125, 193, 200, 201–202, 204,
 240–241, 244–245
 Mk 17 RVs, 19–20
 Modern Large Ballistic Missile (MLBM),
 194–195, 206
 Mondale, Walter, 209–210
 Monteiro, Nuno, 4
 Moorer, Thomas (CNO), 95, 96, 97–98, 107,
 134, 135, 140–141
 SLBMs and, 143
 Morrison, Frederic, 16
 multiple independently targetable reentry
 vehicle (MIRV), 33, 41, 83, 157
 Congress and, 90–91, 119
 counterforce targeting and, 117
 EMTW and, 125
 Kissinger and, 98–99, 134
 limits on, 145–146
 military preferences in favor of, 112,
 119–120
 moratorium on, 108, 109–110,
 112–114, 115
 Nixon and, 97–98
 population protection opportunities and, 88
 qualitative advantages in, 154
 SALT and, 89
 SS-9 ICBMs and, 92
 sublimits on MIRVed ICBMs, 194

- Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 1–8,
 212, 247
 achievement of, 80–81
 advocates of, 45
 arms control and, 70–71
 China and, 255–256
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 67,
 74, 78, 205–206, 235
 critique of, 19–26, 47
 Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 70, 251–252
 détente and, 182
 domestic politics and, 47, 49, 64, 251–252
 expectations of, 160–161
 full-blooded defense of, 214
 Glaser on, 28–29
 Jervis on, 28–29
 LNOs and, 156–157
 logic of, 9
 military preferences and, 114–115
 Nixon and, 91–92
 nuclear balance and, 67
 nuclear competition and, 191–192
 nuclear force posture and, 88, 235
 nuclear policy and, 68
 nuclear stability and, 203–205
 nuclear stalemate and, 29–31
 policymakers and, 140, 148–149
 predictions of, 78, 112, 191, 237, 248–250
 Soviet Union and, 167–168
 Waltz on, 14
 Washington, D. C. and, 254
- MX ICBM, 18, 33, 137–138, 150–152, 193,
 199–200, 204, 207, 221, 261
 Air Force and, 240–241
 Brzezinski and, 235–236
 Carter, J., and, 207, 228, 241–242
 Congress and, 238
 Ermarth and, 228, 229–230
 MAP system, 207–208, 220–221, 225–226,
 237–239
 SALT and, 242
 MX-MPS, 221, 241–242, 244–245
 Trident I SLBM and, 245–246
 slower development of, 152, 194
 survivable MX basing, 237
 Trident II and, 235
- Nagasaki, 1–2
 Narang, Vipin, 80–81, 256, 258
 Narwhal Submarine, 137–138
 National Command Authorities (NCA), 90, 91
 short-warning decapitation of, 126–127
- National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 33, 165
 National Security Council (NSC), 96, 110,
 196, 236
 Nixon and, 147–148
 nationalism, 16, 17
 NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty
 Organization
 naval competition, 55–56
 Navy, 148–149, 151, 186–187
 cruise missiles and, 183–184
 Trident II SLBM and, 153
 White House and, 151
- NCA. *See* National Command Authorities
 neutralism, 51, 118–119
 NIE. *See* National Intelligence Estimate
 Nitze, Paul, 134, 136, 145
 Nixon, Richard, 20, 81–82, 110–111, 124,
 205–206
 ABM and, 89–90, 94, 97
 acquisition policy of, 90–91, 115
 arms control and, 108–109, 112, 115, 119,
 143–145
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 84,
 88, 119, 123
 counterforce capabilities and, 132
 counterforce modernization and, 136
 employment policy and, 168–171
 Kissinger and, 88, 93–94
 LNOs and, 158–159
 Minuteman vulnerability and, 135
 MIRV and, 97–98
 NSC and, 147–148
 on nuclear balance, 95
 on nuclear competition, 100
 nuclear force posture and, 113–114
 nuclear modernization and, 130
 on nuclear parity, 87–88
 nuclear policy of, 112
 nuclear stalemate and, 103, 118, 126
 Pure MAD and, 91–92
 SALT and, 105, 111, 146
 SALT I and, 141, 142–143
 SALT II and, 123, 141–142
 on Soviet Union, 96–97
 Soviet Union warfighting and, 188
 technological shocks and, 129
 Vietnam War and, 87, 121
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
 37–38, 56, 83–84, 138, 157,
 171–172, 218
 Carter, J., and, 228–231
 cohesion of, 173–174, 245

Index

273

- conventional war and, 163–164
- FBS and, 166
- SALT and, 212–213
- Schlesinger and, 173–174
- warfighting and, 167
- NPG. *See* Nuclear Planning Group
- NSC. *See* National Security Council
- NSDM 242, 159–160, 168, 169, 206–207
- NSSM 169, 159, 168, 169–170
- NSSM 246, 171, 173
- nuclear attack, threat of, 11–12
- nuclear balance, 46, 261
 - arms control and, 90
 - Carter, J., and, 191, 195–196
 - Nixon on, 95
 - perceptual delicacy of, 44–46
 - Pure MAD and, 67
 - technological delicacy of, 31, 42–44
- nuclear competition, 259
 - Carter, J., and, 203
 - Cold War, 2, 6, 263
 - domestic hurdles to, 263–264
 - Ford and, 176
 - future of, 252–253
 - intensity of, 48
 - limits on, 108
 - Nixon and Kissinger on, 100
 - policymakers and, 54–55
 - Pure MAD and, 191–192
- nuclear force posture, 68–69, 82, 190
 - Carter, J., and, 193, 206–208, 218, 231–232
 - Congress and, 112–113
 - domestic politics and, 20–21, 235
 - military preferences on, 239–241
 - Nixon and, 113–114
 - outcomes, 90–91, 112, 124–126, 159–160, 182, 194–195, 206–208
 - Parochial MAD and, 88, 235
 - policymakers and, 199
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance, 218
 - stable, 16
- nuclear modernization, 69, 124, 130, 239, 245–246, 263
- nuclear parity, 87–88, 100–101
- Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 166–167
- nuclear policy, 2, 68, 259–264
 - alternatives, 89–90, 124, 158–159, 193–194
 - benefits of, 69
 - competitive, 23, 26
 - domestic interests and, 8
 - of Nixon, 112
 - nuclear revolution and, 9
 - overly competitive, 15–16, 47, 64
 - Parochial MAD and, 68
- nuclear revolution, 1–2, 5, 67–68, 247–248, 251–252
 - aberrant behavior and, 15–19
 - abstract theoretical tensions of, 27
 - advocates of, 10, 14
 - assumptions of, 26
 - Carter, J., and, 248
 - common wisdom surrounding, 7
 - nuclear policy and, 9
 - Pure MAD and, 10–15
 - theorists of, 17–18
 - Washington, D. C. and, 64
- nuclear stability, 163, 191
 - modernization for, 199–200
 - Pure MAD and, 203–205
- nuclear stalemate, 1, 2, 13, 79–80, 164, 212–214
 - adversary perceptions of, 23–26
 - allied beliefs about, 166–167
 - arrival of, 247
 - Carter, J., and, 208–210
 - Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 71, 160–161
 - empirical realities of, 47
 - empirically obvious character of, 2
 - entrenched, 195
 - escape from, 54, 222
 - extended deterrence and, 51
 - Moscow and, 30, 178
 - Nixon and, 103, 118, 126
 - perceptual uncertainty about, 210
 - permanence of, 82
 - policymakers and, 53–54
 - Pure MAD and, 29–31
 - restoration of, 54
 - Russia and, 45–46
 - SALT I and, 166
 - Soviet Union and, 46–47, 166–167, 180, 181, 219–220
 - states trying to escape, 22–23
 - status quo and, 252
 - technical uncertainty about, 91–92, 126, 208–210
 - United States attempts to erode, 44
 - warfighting and, 162
- Nuclear Targeting Policy, 206–207
- nuclear war, 52, 251
- nuclear warfighting doctrine, 160–161, 166–167, 192, 218–220, 245, 248–249, 254
- Brown and, 221–222

- nuclear warfighting doctrine (cont.)
 damage limitation and, 200
 employment policy and, 191
 Ermarth and, 164–165
 NATO and, 167
 new warfighting policies, 173–174
 nuclear stalemate and, 162
 options, 158
 protracted nuclear war, 159–160, 206–207
 Soviet Union and, 84–85, 157, 171, 172, 179, 188
 United States and, 157, 165
 Nunn, Sam, 239
- Ockenden, Stephen E., 183
 Odeen, Phil, 134–135, 137
 Odom, William, 208, 214–215, 232
 offensive strategies, 15–16
 Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 221
 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 93, 151–152, 157–158, 186–187, 206, 221
 OMT. *See* other military targets
 organization theory, 15–16
 OSD. *See* Office of the Secretary of Defense
 OSTP. *See* Office of Science and Technology Policy
 other military targets (OMT), 116
- Packard, David, 92, 94–95, 97–98, 102
 on Safeguard, 111
 on Soviet Union, 105–106, 126–127
 Pakistan, 252–253, 256, 258
 Panofsky, Wolfgang, 28–29
 Parochial MAD, 10, 15–19, 26–27, 72, 118, 119, 122, 153–155, 188–189, 244–246, 250–251
 PD-18, 200
 PD-41, 207
 PD-59, 18–19
 peace, 1, 23, 25–26, 38
 military competition in peacetime, 47, 48, 50–52
 cost of, 52–55
 peacetime bargaining benefits, 102
 policymakers and, 258–259
 perceptual certainty, 197
 perceptual uncertainty, 210, 254–256
 Pincus, Walter, 209
 Polaris missiles, 18
 Polaris program, 117
- policymaker preferences
 acquisition policy and, 97–100, 130–133
 arms control and, 143–148, 174–178
 assured destruction and, 69
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 103, 108–112
 arms control, 143–148, 174–178
 competitive acquisition policies and, 71
 competitive arms control and, 73
 Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 79, 123–124
 acquisition policy, 130–133
 arms control and, 133–135
 nuclear force posture, 218
 domestic politics and, 72
 employment policy and, 168–171
 nuclear competition and, 54–55
 nuclear force posture and, 199
 nuclear stalemate and, 53–54
 Parochial MAD and, 140, 148–149
 political adjustment, 51, 137–138, 173
 political dispute, 253
 political institutions, 49, 61
 political risk, 23–24
 political stability, 1, 7, 14–15, 21, 27
 population protection opportunities, 170–171
 ABM and, 88, 102
 Soviet Union and, 217
 Poseidon class boats, 122, 124–125, 130–131
 potential for war, 22
 preemptive strike, 13
 Press, Daryl, 256
 prewar bargaining outcomes, 11
 PRM-10, 200
 process tracing, 76, 77
 protracted nuclear war, 45, 159–160, 206–207, 218–220
 Proxmire, William, 131–132, 238
 public opinion, 49, 59–60
 resource extraction and, 61–62
 Pure MAD, 10–15, 26–27, 42–44, 69–71, 118, 122, 153–155, 188–189, 244–246, 247–248, 261–262
- qualitative competition, 107, 119, 189, 231
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 106–108, 142–143
 Vladivostok accords and, 147
 qualitative force modernization, 88–89
 qualitative stability, 201–203, 244, 249

Index

275

- quantitative competition, 105–106, 141–142
 limiting, 157
- rationalist background assumptions, 11
- rationality, 67
- Reagan, Ronald, 81–82, 157–158, 189, 260
 Ford and, 149, 150, 156–158, 185–186, 187–188, 189
 maritime strategy of, 210
- realist background assumptions, 11
- Red Army, 157, 162
- regional security dilemmas, 262
- Republican Party, 186
- resolve spirals, 53
- resource constraints, 51
- resource direction, 60–61
- resource diversion, 136–137, 154, 192, 227–228
- resource extraction, 49, 57, 59, 143, 245
 legitimizing, 63–64
 public opinion and, 61–62
 SALT and, 106
 Soviet Union and, 62
 United States and, 59, 61, 154
- retaliation, 30–31, 39, 41, 71, 255–256
 conditions for successful retaliation, 40
 cost-effectiveness of, 42–43
 massive, 13
 prompt, 41–42
- Rhodes, Richard, 15, 18
- Richardson, Elliott, 103, 117–118, 126
- risk tolerance, 54
- Rockefeller, Nelson, 176–177
- Rogowski, Ronald, 55
- Rostow, Eugene, 239
- Rovner, Joshua, 251
- Rowny, Edward (General), 175–176
- Rumsfeld, Donald, 129–130, 136–137, 166, 172–173
- Rusk, Dean, 19
- SAC. *See* Strategic Air Command
- Safeguard, 90–91, 103
 expansion of, 114
 Kissinger and, 99, 115–116
 military support for, 114–115
 Packard on, 111
- Sagan, Scott, 45
- SALT. *See* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
- SAOs. *See* Selected Attack Options
- Schelling, Thomas, 10–12, 23–24
 on military risk, 24
- Schlesinger, James, 126, 129, 146–147, 161, 174–175
 on Backfire, 177
 Brown and, 184–185
 on cruise missiles, 180, 182
 Ermarth and, 164–165
 IAP and, 153
 Kissinger and, 133, 137, 142–143
 LNOs and, 168
 NATO and, 173–174
 targeting goals of general war and, 169–170
- Schmidt, Helmut, 212–213, 228
- Scowcroft, Brent, 129–130, 172–173, 175, 186–187
- Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM), 160, 178, 186–187, 261
- Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), 38
- second-strike bomber force, 123
- secure second strike forces, 4, 10
 massive retaliation and, 13
 security dilemma and, 22
- security dilemma, 4, 26
 secure second strike forces and, 22
- Selected Attack Options (SAOs), 159–160
- self-help, 11, 23, 26–27
- Semenov, Vladimir, 226
- shell game, 207, 238–239
- Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), 158, 206–207
 capabilities, 184
 damage expectancy of, 222–223
 degrading, 182, 184
 LNOs and, 185
 MAOs and, 159
- single shot kill probability (SSKP), 32–33
- SIOP. *See* Single Integrated Operational Plan
- SLBMs. *See* Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
- SLCM. *See* Sea Launched Cruise Missiles
- Slocumbe, Walter, 206
- SLOCs. *See* Sea Lines of Communication
- Smith, Gerard, 99–100, 108
- Smith, Levering, 132
- SNIE. *See* Special National Intelligence Estimate
- Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 107, 137, 138–139, 181
- Sontag, Sherry, 95
- SOSUS, 37, 209
- Southeast Asia, 101

- Soviet Union, 5–6, 18–19, 21, 30, 37, 38, 73,
 100–101, 121, 160–161, 163, 171–172,
 204–205, 210, 223–224, 226, 244–245,
 254–255, 257–258
 Afghanistan and, 81, 191–192
 air defenses of, 35
 alert levels, 208
 Angola and, 190
 arms control and, 45, 63
 bomber force of, 36
 Brown on, 109
 C³ and, 40–41, 214
 civil defense and, 44, 165–166, 198, 216–218
 civil-military relations in, 63
 after Cold War, 259
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness of,
 59–64
 competitive policies of, 44
 Delicate Nuclear Balance and, 157
 Delta program, 127
 FBS and, 138–139
 ICBMs, 32–33, 87
 MAD and, 167–168
 map showing location of all deployed Soviet
 SSBNs, 209
 NIE and, 165
 Nixon and, 83
 Nixon on, 96–97
 nuclear doctrine of, 163–165, 197–198,
 214–216
 nuclear stalemate and, 30, 45–47, 166–167,
 178, 180, 181, 219–220
 Packard on, 105–106, 126–127
 population protection opportunities and, 217
 resource diversion and, 154
 resource extraction and, 62
 SALT, Russian diplomacy in, 44
 SALT and, 79, 103, 138, 161–163, 198–199,
 210–212
 sea-based strategic force of, 121–122
 SSBNs and, 34, 36, 144
 technology in, 60
 Vladivostok accords and, 148
 vulnerabilities of, 95, 208
 warfighting and, 84–85, 157, 171, 172, 188
 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE),
 106–107
 Special Projects Office (SPO), 19–20
 spiral model, 52
 SPO. *See* Special Projects Office
 spying, 38
 SS-9 ICBMs, 32–33, 92, 121
 SS-11 ICBMs, 32–33
 SSBNs. *See* ballistic missile submarines
 SSKP. *See* single shot kill probability
 SSPO. *See* Strategic Systems Programs Office
 Staniland, Paul, 258
 Star Wars system, 260
 state death, 14
 status quo, 53
 ambiguity of, 21–23, 26–27, 53, 81
 balance of resolve and, 12–13
 challenges to, 14–15, 53
 nuclear stalemate and, 252
 stellar-inertial guidance, 19–20
 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 34–35, 152
 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 2–3,
 18, 64–65, 83–84, 91
 Brzezinski and, 234
 Carter, J., and, 195
 coalitional politics and, 186–188
 Cold War and, 263–264
 Comparative Constitutional Fitness and, 191
 Congress and, 176
 counterforce and, 137–138, 154
 cruise missiles and, 176–177
 détente and, 148
 domestic politics and, 88–89
 East-West Planning Group and, 234–235
 Ford and, 160
 goals of, 198–199
 JCS and, 241
 Kissinger and, 179–180, 187
 MAP system and, 242
 MIRV and, 89
 Moscow and, 79, 138
 NATO and, 212–213
 Nixon and, 105, 111, 146
 qualitative stability and, 201–202
 ratification of, 237, 239
 resource extraction and, 106
 Russian diplomacy in, 44
 SALT I, 33, 122, 124, 140–141, 144
 Congress and, 149
 cruise missiles and, 158–159
 Nixon and, 141, 142–143
 nuclear stalemate and, 166
 SALT II, 122, 124, 133–134, 140–141, 144,
 147, 190, 205, 250
 ALCMs and, 178–179
 Carter, J., and, 85–86, 230
 failure of, 189

Index

277

- Jackson and, 236
- New Types proposal, 194–195, 202, 204, 205–206, 207–208, 224, 225, 234, 235–236, 238, 245
- Nixon and, 123, 141–142
- ratification of, 236–237
- Republican Party and, 186
- United States and, 125
- SALT III, 202–203, 207–208, 215, 220, 223–224, 230–231, 242–243, 245
- Soviet Union and, 103, 161–163, 198–199, 210–212
- structure of, 223–224
- strategic defenses, 39–42
- Strategic Systems Programs Office (SSPO), 151
- Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), 19–20, 50. *See also* Trident I; Trident II
- depressed trajectory SLBM attacks, 92
- Moorer and, 143
- tests, 224
- survivability of weapons systems, 29–30, 42, 69
- returns from enhancing, 43
- technological shocks, 31, 42
- resilience to, 196–197
- uncertainty from, 96–97, 129–130, 253–254
- training, 55
- Trident I SLBM, 124–125, 190
- innovation and, 153
- Laird and, 143
- MX-MPS and, 245–246
- Trident II SLBM, 33, 124–125, 130–132, 137–138, 207, 221, 241–243, 261
- full-scale development of, 193
- hard target kill and, 225
- MX ICBM and, 235
- Navy and, 153
- Turner, Stansfield, 211
- Typhoon (SSBN), 128
- US *See* United States
- Underwater Long-range Missile System (ULMS), 130–131
- unipolarity, 4
- United States (US), 3, 43, 73, 125, 138–139, 257
- acoustic and geographic advantages of SSBNs of, 39
- arms control and, 154
- ASW capabilities of, 35–36, 38, 126–127, 145–146
- China and, 6, 252–253
- civil defense and, 168, 170
- civil-military relations in, 45
- Cold War and, 4, 262
- Comparative Constitutional Fitness of, 59–64, 231–235
- constitutional fitness incentives and, 49
- highly competitive Cold War nuclear policy of, 47, 64
- MAD and, 254
- military advantage of, 50
- nuclear policy, past and present, 259–264
- nuclear revolution, 64
- nuclear stalemate, attempts to erode, 44
- regional orders supported by, 262–263
- resource extraction and, 59, 61, 154
- SALT II and, 125
- technological strengths of, 232
- warfighting and, 157, 165
- weakness following Vietnam War, 147–148
- Utteroff, Victor, 223, 232
- Van Evera, Stephen, 10–11, 13, 76–77
- Vance, Cyrus, 194, 196–197, 202, 203, 210–211, 224
- verification measures, 56
- Versailles settlement, 56
- Vienna summit, 240
- Vietnam War, 61–62, 81
- Nixon and, 87, 121
- US weakness following, 147–148
- vital interests, 53
- Vladivostok accords, 83–84, 136, 146–147, 154, 194, 230, 244, 260–261
- cruise missiles and, 174–175
- Ford and, 84, 125–126
- gains of, 174, 177–178
- Moscow and, 148
- policymakers and, 199
- qualitative competition and, 147
- White House and, 177
- Walker spy ring, 38
- Waltz, Kenneth, 9, 10–11, 29
- on MAD, 14
- on military competition, 11
- on nuclear stalemate, 13
- Warnke, Paul, 196–197, 203
- Warsaw Pact, 212–213

278

Index

- Weinel, John (Admiral), 169–170
Weiss, Seymour, 101–102, 134
Welch, Jasper (General), 184, 185
Wheeler, Earle, 97, 101–102, 108–109
White House, 151, 189
 Vladivostok accords and, 177
Wilson, Thomas, 38–39
Wilson, Woodrow, 62–63
- Wohlforth, William, 5
Wohlstetter, Albert, 28, 29–30,
 46
World War II, 62

Yankee class SSBN, 34

Zumwalt, Elmo (CNO), 126