Part I
Foundations of Political Psychology

1 Political Psychology

Advancing an International Perspective on the Psychology of Political Behaviour

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At its core, political psychology is an inherently interdisciplinary field of study that seeks to explain political phenomena with insights from psychology, political science, sociology, and related disciplines. Although first appearing in American-based academic writings in the 1920s with foundational works from Lippmann (1922), Merriam (1925), and Lasswell (1927) who each took integrative approaches to respectively assess public opinion, introduce behaviourism to politics, and use psychology to increase the efficacy of political propaganda, political psychology's origins date as far back as the 19th century with works including Le Bon's (1896) study of crowd behaviour and Bastian's (1860) introduction of the term *political psychology*. In each of these works, the field's founders integrated psychology and politics with an aim to explain the challenges of the zeitgeist, while providing solutions for the future – hallmarks of the field that later appeared in influential works including *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960), *News That Matters* (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), *The Rational Public* (Page & Shapiro, 1992), and *Get Out the Vote* (Green & Gerber, 2008), to name but a few excellent examples that have had a lasting impact on political psychology.

With this commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship, the field has blossomed into a dominant force in the social sciences as evidenced by the field's high-impact journal outlets (*Political Psychology* and *Advances in Political Psychology*; see Mintz & Mograbi, 2015) and its thriving international society (International Society of Political Psychology; ISPP). Although initially dominated by men mostly from America and (Western) Europe, ISPP has increased the representation of women and global scholars over the years. Whereas 15% of presenters at ISPP in 1978 were women, 49% were women in 2016 (Reynolds, 2018). The geographical representation of ISPP has also increased, with presenters from all six (populated) continents attending recent annual conferences (Reynolds & Yeow, 2018). Yet much more work needs to be done to improve the representation of the Global South in terms of both membership (see Reynolds & Yeow, 2018) and scholarship (Rivera Pichardo et al., 2022).

Recognising this underrepresentation of the global community, there is a growing call to increase the diversity of the field (Arnett, 2008; Osborne, Sengupta, & Sibley, 2019). Although international collaborations are becoming more frequent (particularly through presentations at ISPP; Quayle et al., 2020), more must be done to foster scholarship that integrates across both disciplinary and national boundaries and that extends our focus beyond Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD; see Henrich et al., 2010) societies. We hope that *The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology* furthers these key goals by highlighting the excellence

of political psychology scholarship through chapters written by world-renowned experts from over 15 countries.

Overview of *The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology*

In the years since the publication of the excellent *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* (Huddy et al., 2013), the topics addressed by political psychologists have transformed from important issues to contemporary threats to our way of life. Issues ranging from authoritarianism, declining democracies, and hate groups seemed like embers from a nearly extinguished fire a mere 10 years ago yet have reignited with an alarming vengeance in the years since. New (unforeseen) challenges have also arisen including cyberterrorism, social media, and the rapid spread of conspiracy beliefs. These – and other – changes to our ever-evolving zeitgeist require a new set of cutting-edge chapters that extend the foundations so brilliantly laid by the *Oxford Handbook* in order to continue the rich tradition of *problem-focused* interdisciplinary scholarship envisioned by political psychology's founders.

The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology meets these needs by providing a comprehensive overview of political psychology. By ambitiously covering 40 content-based chapters, we provide the traditional topics needed to understand both the foundations of the field (Part I) and the enduring challenges to democratic ideals (Part II), as well as the contemporary issues facing the international community (Part III) including the need to further diversify the field's methodological and geographical focus (Part IV). Yet the core themes that tie the field together are reflected in the connections the chapters make with each other throughout the handbook: chapter authors have initiated important dialogues across subject areas by referencing each other's chapters (where appropriate) and highlighting the interconnections between sub-areas. Thus, *The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology* helps the reader navigate through the diverse field of political psychology, while illustrating a theme that unifies the field: political psychology is an inherently multidisciplinary field that increases understanding of how people shape and are shaped by the political world around them. To these ends, we begin this important dialogue by providing a brief overview of the handbook's four thematic sections and associated chapters below.

1.1 Part I: Foundations of Political Psychology

As an inherently interdisciplinary field, political psychology transcends disciplinary boundaries and spans across levels of analysis to explain variability in political phenomena. Yet a universal framework for organising and making sense of political behaviour has been lacking for some time. Claessens and colleagues (2022) address this oversight in Chapter 2 by explaining the evolutionary foundations of political ideology. The authors argue that contemporary ideological differences in social and economic conservatism originate from the evolutionary needs to facilitate group conformity and encourage cooperation within groups, respectively. Claessens and colleagues contend that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) reflect contemporary manifestations of these challenges. They further explain that variability in SDO and RWA arises from the cost-benefit trade-offs of adopting these strategies and the phenotypic plasticity that enables organisms to respond to their environment. The authors conclude by challenging researchers to investigate the socioecological factors

that influence the expression of political ideologies in different contexts, as well as the proximate mechanisms of sociopolitical phenomena.

Given Claessens and colleagues' (2022) position that evolutionary pressures shaped contemporary political beliefs, political phenomena should be heritable. McDermott (2022) advances this argument in Chapter 3 by explicating the complex ways in which genes impact politics, noting that genes and biology help to answer core questions unaddressed by sociodemographic approaches to political psychology. She further notes that, although genes have a large impact on ideological identification, their effects on specific political views like party affiliation are relatively small. McDermott then illustrates how assortative mating can produce partisan-based genetic and biological differences, noting that mate choices play arguably the largest role in shaping a child's political ideology and may contribute to political polarisation. McDermott concludes with a thoughtful discussion of how a genetically informed political psychology can advance the field, noting that the complexities of this discipline necessitate interdisciplinary work – a hallmark of political psychology.

Harris and colleagues (2022) further examine the biological basis of political attitudes in Chapter 4 by highlighting the neuroscience of partisanship. They begin by drawing upon classic social psychological research (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971) to illustrate the ease with which people form group attachments, and by covering recent fMRI studies demonstrating that this fundamental proclivity to identify with an in-group elicits distinct forms of neural activation when interacting with co-partisans. Harris and colleagues then discuss multiple brain regions that facilitate partisan biases, including the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (involved in self-referential processes) and the orbitofrontal cortex (used in regulating goals). The authors end by discussing the myriad ways in which partisanship shapes political cognition, including belief perseverance, motivated social cognition, susceptibility to misinformation, conspiracy thinking, and vote choice. Ultimately, this chapter provides a compelling example of how social neuroscience can expand our understanding of political psychology.

Given that evolution, genes, and neuropsychology contribute to political phenomena, certain political ideas should resonate with some more than others. Federico (2022) pursues this position in Chapter 5 by giving a comprehensive overview of the individual differences underlying political preferences. Federico begins by contrasting top-down approaches that examine the macro forces shaping citizens' views (e.g., political elites) with bottom-up approaches that identify voters' predispositions to specific political issues. In making this distinction, Federico notes that personality traits associated with rigid thinking often align with right-wing political preferences. This literature is, however, more nuanced than it seems at first blush. Accordingly, Federico identifies myriad factors that moderate the link between personality and political preferences including culture, political engagement, and the type of personality measure used to capture individual differences. Federico concludes by revisiting the literature on the rigidity of the right, noting that, while traits that capture rigid thinking are held disproportionately by right-wing voters, rigidity is nevertheless present among both the left and the right.

Whereas Federico (2022) focuses on how aspects of an individual influence their receptivity to specific policy positions, Bakker and Lelkes (2022) examine the *content* of these beliefs. Chapter 6 begins by noting that ideologies are a set of interrelated beliefs that interpret political phenomena, yet their

measurement suffers from three key problems: self-reports of ideology may reflect symbolic attachments (rather than a coherent belief system), the scale's meaning may vary across time and context, and ideology may be multidimensional. Research that addresses these concerns reveals that ideology is comprised of attitudes towards economic and cultural issues and that the correlation between dimensions varies across context. Bakker and Lelkes then note that the long tradition of finding a public 'innocent of ideology' (Converse, 1964, p. 241) is wanning as polarisation among the elite helps voters to identify which issues 'go together'. The authors explain how both top-down (i.e., political elites and social networks) and bottom-up (i.e., citizens' values, traits, and biology) forces shape ideology, and conclude by encouraging researchers to examine the reciprocal associations between top-down and bottom-up processes, unpack the causal association between personality and ideology, and improve methodological rigour via preregistration and Open Science practices.

Howe and Krosnick (2022) expand beyond the focus on a coherent set of interrelated beliefs to 'opinions on matters of public debate that have significant implications for society' (i.e., public opinion). Chapter 7 begins with a discussion of the antecedents to public opinion and identifies both individual differences and sociodemographic factors that influence both the number of opinions people hold and the likelihood they report them. Howe and Krosnick then draw upon studies on genetics, classical and operant conditioning, and social psychology to explain how people develop valanced views, noting that both underlying dispositions and the larger sociostructural context shape public opinion. Next, the authors discuss the impact public opinion has on policy- and candidate-based voting, civic activism, and the reciprocal association between public opinion and public policy. Howe and Krosnick conclude by challenging researchers to examine how citizens misperceive public opinion, identify the motivations shaping how people process political information, and develop new ways to measure public opinion.

Given Howe and Krosnick's (2022) exposition of the complexities of public opinion, how do voters decide which issues to support? Chong and Mullinix (2022) answer this key question in Chapter 8 by noting that, in the absence of perfect rationality, voters often use heuristics and motivated reasoning to guide their decisions. Although experimental studies demonstrate that heuristics can misdirect voters, the authors reveal that knowledge, personal relevance, and the availability of unbiased information can decrease the likelihood that this occurs. Moreover, accuracy and directional goals motivate people to respectively seek out multiple views on an issue and information that confirms a pre-existing belief. Yet Chong and Mullinix highlight that it may be rational to retain pre-existing beliefs, as a constrained belief system can efficiently navigate the political environment. Exposure to non-partisan news and incentivising accuracy can also decrease directionally motivated reasoning. The authors conclude by noting that, rather than illustrating the foibles of the public, framing effects occur because they provide new information and alter people's perceptions of the given issue. In short, although people utilise heuristics and engage in motivated reasoning, voters often process information rationally particularly when they are incentivised and it is supported by the social context.

Whereas Chong and Mullinix (2022) highlight the cognitive factors that shape voters' decisions, Redlawsk and Mattes (2022) examine the role of emotions in politics in Chapter 9. The authors begin by noting that distinct appraisals elicit discrete emotions that

activate a disposition or surveillance affective subsystem. Whereas the disposition subsystem elicits enthusiasm through reflexive habits and beliefs, the surveillance system is activated by threat that fuels anxiety and the search for information. Redlawsk and Mattes also note that anger is a reflexive emotion that arises in response to perceived injustices and contributes to political polarisation, political mobilisation, social media usage, populist support, and even violence. Conversely, threat appraisals that give rise to anxiety and fear – emotions that decrease risk-taking – increase conservatism and intergroup hostility. The authors then examine the appetitive emotions of hope and enthusiasm. Because these emotions originate from feelings of control and goal pursuit, they motivate political engagement, increase social media usage, and mobilise the public, yet can also foster populism by encouraging citizens to take control of their future. Redlawsk and Mattes then discuss contempt and disgust – rejection emotions that create distance between one's self and a 'contaminated' target, respectively. The authors conclude by examining moral and collective emotions. Whereas the former connects moral standards with behaviour, the latter links the individual to the wider group's experience and can foster group identity.

In this section's final chapter, Brown and Bigler (2022) discuss the developmental roots of political beliefs. Chapter 10 begins by highlighting the inherent connections between developmental science and political attitudes, explicating the need to integrate developmental insights into our understanding of politics across the lifespan, as questions about change and continuity are central to both fields. Brown and Bigler then discuss the practical reasons for advancing a developmentally informed political psychology, noting that understanding how political beliefs develop can promote civic engagement and competence. Brown and Bigler then identify factors that influence the development of political attitudes, including culture, within-family dynamics, and aspects of the child. Throughout the chapter, the authors use the 2016 US presidential election to highlight these themes and conclude by emphasising the role that educational institutions can play in instilling democratic values in the next generation of voters.

1.2 Part II: The Politics of Intergroup Attitudes

Having laid the foundations to the field in the previous section, Part II examines one of the most central topics in political psychology: intergroup attitudes. Duckitt (2022) begins this journey in Chapter 11 with a comprehensive overview of authoritarianism that covers its various conceptualisations. Though diverse in both their content and ideological implications, Duckitt argues that the core thread tying these various traditions together is a focus on individual differences in people's intolerance and willingness to impose their beliefs onto others. Duckitt then identifies both the dispositional (i.e., genes, personality, motives, morals, and thinking styles) and situational (i.e., familial, social, and cultural influences, as well as environmental threats) antecedents to authoritarianism. Next, Duckitt discusses the societal consequences of authoritarianism, noting that it can undermine democratic values, make way for authoritarian leadership, foster prejudice, and increase political extremism. Duckitt concludes by summarising new directions for research, including the need to clarify right- versus left-wing authoritarianism and to examine the possibility that authoritarianism on the left and right has overlapping antecedents and consequences.

Bizumic and Sheppard (2022) continue the theme of this section by discussing the long history of ethnocentrism in Chapter 12. First

coined by Ludwig Gumplowicz in the late 1800s, the authors define ethnocentrism as 'a strong sense of ethnic group self-centredness and self-importance' (p. 200) that entails both an intragroup component (i.e., devotion to the in-group and group cohesion) and an intergroup component consisting of in-group (a) preference, (b) superiority, (c) purity, and (d) exploitativeness. Next, Bizumic and Sheppard discuss ethnocentrism's evolutionary origins by noting that it is a human universal and that pressures to develop strong, powerful, and resilient groups fostered it. Although essential for survival in ancestral times, ethnocentrism now mediates relationships between the need for ethnic group strength and myriad outcomes including support for the (former) US President Donald Trump and Brexit. Ethnocentrism also correlates with nationalism, anti-immigration policies, hawkish views on military intervention, and support for far-right political leaders. Thus, Bizumic and Sheppard make a strong case for incorporating ethnocentrism into political psychologists' toolbox.

Eker and colleagues (2022) further examine the contours of in-group favouritism in Chapter 13 by focusing on collective narcissism – an 'unrealistic belief in the greatness of an in-group that requires external recognition' (p. 215). Notably, collective narcissism originates from people's *dissatisfaction* with their personal circumstances including low feelings of personal control, as well as extrinsic goals to identify with the in-group and the perception that the in-group is threatened. Eker and colleagues then examine the consequences of collective narcissism, noting that grandiose and entitled views of the in-group negatively affect intragroup and intergroup processes. Next, the authors illustrate the effects of collective narcissism by showing that collective narcissism predicts populism support and can produce short-sighted decisions that temporarily benefit the in-group, but have dire long-term effects (e.g., support for anti-environmental policies). Eker and colleagues conclude by reassuring the reader that not all forms of in-group identification foster collective narcissism, as a secure group attachment originates from high (rather than low) feelings of control and intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) motives.

Although the first three chapters in Part II focus on groups in general, Chapter 14 examines the enduring prominence of race in politics. Collingwood and colleagues (2022) begin by discussing the impact of white racism on politics, noting that the days of yore when politicians openly catered to white voters with blatant old-fashioned racism have given way to covert messages that disguise racial animus with appeals to hard work and personal effort. After clarifying the effects of these forms of modern racism on vote choice, Collingwood and colleagues contend that changing demographics in the USA have fostered a 'most-racial' era of public opinion with distinct implications for whites and people of colour. On the one hand, the diversification of the USA increases electoral opportunities for racial minorities and can boost voter turnout among underrepresented people eager to vote for co-ethnic candidates. On the other hand, anti-minority policies cloaked in a colour-blind ideology appeal to whites' feelings of status insecurity and racial resentment. Collingwood and colleagues conclude with an insightful discussion of cross-racial mobilisation, noting that the future of political parties will depend on their ability to establish coalitions across racial groups.

Christ and colleagues (2022) examine the implications of the changing demographics raised by Collingwood and colleagues (2022) by investigating the impact of macro-level diversity on intergroup attitudes. Chapter 15 begins by noting that the literature on macro-level diversity and intergroup outcomes is

inconclusive given the large variability in effect sizes across studies. Recent work, however, shows that diversity increases both perceived competition over resources and contact opportunities. In turn, these two factors undermine and improve intergroup relations, respectively. Christ and colleagues then identify the individual and contextual moderators of these associations, noting that macro-level diversity may exacerbate intergroup hostility for those high on RWA because diversity is particularly threatening to in-group cohesion. Conversely, contextual factors like the economic conditions and social norms about diversity can heighten or attenuate the negative effects of diversity on intergroup relations, respectively. Residential segregation can also weaken the impact macro-level diversity has on intergroup contact and, in turn, the effects of contact on intergroup relations. Thus, Christ and colleagues help to resolve the inconsistencies in the literature by identifying the countervailing effects of macro-level diversity on intergroup outcomes and by discussing the moderators of these effects.

Moving to another central topic in the political psychology of intergroup relations, Rogers and Sanbonmatsu (2022) examine the persistent disparity in women's representation in politics in Chapter 16 and argue that gendered social roles shape voters' evaluations of candidates. Because the division of labour segregates men and women in the workplace and home, respectively, people assume that men and women have traits consistent with the roles they occupy. Accordingly, men are seen as more capable leaders than women, and women are punished for displaying agentic behaviour by running for office. Rogers and Sanbonmatsu then highlight the need to acknowledge intersectional identities by explicating the unique challenges – and potential advantages – that accompany ethnic, racial, and sexual minority women who run for office. Next, the authors examine sexism and violence towards women in politics, acknowledging that sexism can play a decisive factor in elections between male and female candidates. Rogers and Sanbonmatsu conclude by explaining how gender influences campaigns, noting that, although female candidates often tailor their campaign to gendered expectations, women can run successful campaigns that counter these stereotypes.

Expanding on Rogers and Sanbonmatsu's (2022) examination of gender in politics, Sutton and colleagues (2022) discuss the politics of abortion, pregnancy, and motherhood in Chapter 17. They begin by noting that women's fertility has been both revered and used to oppress them throughout history. Although the situation has improved recently, restrictions on women's reproductive rights persist across the globe. Accordingly, Sutton and colleagues examine the correlates of abortion attitudes, focusing on the negative associations benevolent and hostile sexism has on abortion support. The authors extend this discussion by noting that the idealisation of motherhood fostered by benevolent sexism also predicts willingness to restrict pregnant women's behaviours. These results help to explain gender inequality and the 'motherhood penalty' in which women's economic standing drops after becoming a mother. Sutton and colleagues contend that the factors that contribute to this penalty ultimately lead back to the value that societies place on motherhood and the assumption that women *should* be the primary caregivers. The authors conclude by acknowledging that attitudes towards abortion, pregnancy, and motherhood are deeply partisan issues in which the left and right advocate for more and less freedom, respectively.

In addition to race, ethnicity, and gender, religion and politics are often intimately intertwined. Accordingly, Malka (2022) examines the potential for religion to foster support for

authoritarian governance in Chapter 18. He begins by positing that, at its core, religion structures people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviours through belief in a supernatural power. Because religious beliefs are often held as inalienable moral convictions, democratic values that confer equal rights to opposing viewpoints may conflict with religiosity. Religions also often exalt deference to authority, which may predispose believers to anti-democratic values. Yet surprisingly, religiosity often correlates positively with civic engagement and support for the democratic process. Accordingly, Malka makes a critical distinction between belief and behaviour; support for democratic values correlates negatively with religious belief, but positively with religious behaviour. Malka then examines variability in these associations, noting that religious affiliation alone fails to predict views towards democracy. Rather, the desire to blend politics and religion predicts anti-democratic views. Malka concludes by encouraging researchers to pursue more cross-national work, refine measures of democratic attitudes, differentiate between support and behaviour, use multidimensional measures of religiosity, and distil the causal pathways with panel data and experimental methods.

Hanson and colleagues (2022) expand the focus on religion and morality in Chapter 19 by examining the impact of moral convictions – core and unmalleable beliefs about right and wrong – in politics. The authors begin by noting that moral convictions entail beliefs about right and wrong, but can have normatively good or bad consequences. As for the bad, moral convictions can foster an unwillingness to compromise, affective polarisation, and a Machiavellian approach to achieving a desired goal. Yet moral convictions can also increase civic engagement across both the left and the right. Hanson and colleagues then explain the negativity bias in research on moral convictions, noting that (a) moral convictions may just yield more negative than positive outcomes and (b) researchers may focus more on negative consequences. The authors conclude by challenging researchers to (a) identify how consensus on an issue shapes the positive or negative implications of a moral conviction, (b) investigate the boundary conditions of moral convictions, and (c) adopt experimental approaches to identify causal effects.

Yogeeswaran and Verkuyten (2022) change direction in Chapter 20 by providing a detailed discussion of national identity and its implications for political psychology. As the authors emphasise, it is critical to distinguish between two broad aspects of national identity: the first relates to feelings of pride, belongingness, and attachment to the nation; the second refers to how people define the national category (and, hence, who belongs). Accordingly, Yogeeswaran and Verkuyten review founding work and recent advances unpackaging the distinction between patriotism (pride or love of one's nation) and nationalism (the belief that one's country is better and should have more influence than others). They then discuss research on the national identity of minority groups within nations, the links between aspects of national identity and attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration, and the implications of how the core aspects of national identity and citizenship are defined for politics and intergroup relations. Yogeeswaran and Verkuyten close with suggestions for future research that are sure to influence the field for years to come.

Once in-groups are formed and national identities are established, questions over who belongs inevitably arise. Valentino and Kim (2022) address this challenging topic in Chapter 21 by reviewing the burgeoning literature on immigration attitudes. They begin by dispelling the notions that immigration

increases crime, competition for jobs, and exploitation of social services. Nonetheless, many Americans still oppose immigration. Accordingly, Valentino and Kim examine potential explanations for these views, focusing on contact and perceptions of both economic and cultural threat. They also argue that, by framing immigration as a threat, the media fosters anxiety and undermines immigration support. The authors then identify disgust sensitivity, threat sensitivity, and intolerance of uncertainty as important correlates of opposition to immigration. Valentino and Kim also demonstrate that symbolic predispositions including out-group hostility, ethnocentrism, and racial animus predict anti-immigration views better than measures of self-interest. The authors end on an optimistic note by suggesting that out-group empathy and humanitarian concerns – two tendencies nurtured by education – can increase support for immigration.

Building off of Valentino and Kim's (2022) optimism that humanitarian concerns can foster positive attitudes towards immigrants, McFarland (2022) examines variability in human rights support across nations and individuals in Chapter 22. He begins by noting that, despite the myriad challenges associated with examining international differences in human rights support, people in most countries support human rights. There is, however, variability in support for specific issues, as well as the correlation between support for different human rights. McFarland then discusses the predictors of human rights support, noting that human rights support correlates negatively with generalised prejudice, ethnocentrism, RWA, SDO, conservatism, and the binding moral foundations, but positively with identification with all humanity, universalism, globalism, and the individualising moral foundations. Other weaker correlates of human rights support include the values of benevolence and self-direction (as well as empathy, principled moral reasoning, optimism, education/knowledge, Openness to Experience, and Extroversion), whereas blind patriotism, nationalism, Conscientiousness, and the need for structure, as well as the values of security, power, and hedonism, correlate negatively with human rights support.

1.3 Part III: Contemporary Challenges to Democracy

Whereas Part II examines topics long at the heart of political psychology, Part III focuses on new and emerging challenges to the field. Arguably one of the most important issues facing contemporary democracy is the rising rates of inequality seen over the last 30–40 years. Whereas much research examines the effects of inequality on society, Osborne and colleagues (2022) explain *why* inequality is so impactful in Chapter 23. They first review the distinct measures of inequality and show that, despite underestimating the divide between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', many believe that inequality is a 'necessary evil'. Nevertheless, inequality undermines people's mental and physical health, as well as social cohesion and democratic values. To explain these effects, Osborne and colleagues argue that inequality undermines well-being and social cohesion by increasing the salience of boundaries between the wealthy and the poor and by fostering feelings of relative deprivation – even among the wealthy (see also Osborne, García-Sánchez, & Sibley, 2019; Osborne et al., 2015). Osborne and colleagues conclude by noting that, although the COVID-19 pandemic has brought inequality to the fore, various psychological and structural barriers undermine support for the policies needed to reduce inequality.

After Osborne and colleagues (2022) explain *why* inequality matters, Evans and Opacic