

## Cultural Evolution

*Cultural Evolution* argues that people's values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which survival is secure; it was precarious for most of history, which encouraged heavy emphasis on group solidarity, rejection of outsiders and obedience to strong leaders. For under extreme scarcity, xenophobia is realistic: if there is just enough land to support one tribe and another tribe tries to claim it, survival may literally be a choice between Us and Them. Conversely, high levels of existential security encourage openness to change, diversity and new ideas. The unprecedented prosperity and security of the postwar era brought cultural change, the environmentalist movement and the spread of democracy. But in recent decades, diminishing job security and rising inequality have led to an authoritarian reaction. Evidence from more than 100 countries demonstrates that people's motivations and behavior reflect the extent to which they take survival for granted – and that modernization changes them in roughly predictable ways. This book explains the rise of environmentalist parties, gender equality and same-sex marriage – and the current reaction producing Trump, Brexit and France's National Front, through a new, empirically tested version of modernization theory.

**Ronald F. Inglehart** is the Lowenstein Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. He holds honorary doctorates from Uppsala University, Sweden, the Free University of Brussels, Belgium, and the University of Lueneburg, Germany. Inglehart helped found the Euro-Barometer surveys and is founding president of the World Values Survey Association, which has surveyed representative national samples of the publics of 105 countries containing over 90 percent of the world's population. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. In 2011, he won the Johan Skytte prize in Political Science, often considered the highest prize awarded in the field.

# Cultural Evolution

People's Motivations Are Changing,  
and Reshaping the World

Ronald F. Inglehart  
*University of Michigan*



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*This book is dedicated to my wife, Marita, and my children,  
Sylvia, Elizabeth, Rachel, Ronald and Milo, with love.*

## CONTENTS

*List of Figures* page ix

*List of Tables* xiv

*Acknowledgments* xv

Introduction: An Overview of This Book 1

**1** Evolutionary Modernization and Cultural Change 8

**2** The Rise of Postmaterialist Values in the West and the World 25

**3** Global Cultural Patterns 36

**4** The End of Secularization? 60

**5** Cultural Change, Slow and Fast: The Distinctive Trajectory of Norms Governing Gender Equality and Sexual Orientation 77

**6** The Feminization of Society and Declining Willingness to Fight for One's Country: The Individual-Level Component of the Long Peace 102

**7** Development and Democracy 114

viii / Contents

- 8 The Changing Roots of Happiness 140
- 9 *The Silent Revolution* in Reverse: The Rise of Trump and the  
Authoritarian Populist Parties 173
- 10 The Coming of Artificial Intelligence Society 200
- Appendices* 217  
*Notes* 231  
*References* 252  
*Index* 270

## FIGURES

- 1.1 Countries that have been surveyed at least once in the Values Surveys are darkly shaded. *page 6*
- 2.1 Value type by age group, among the publics of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands in 1970. 26
- 2.2 Cohort analysis: Percentage of Postmaterialists minus percentage of Materialists in six West European countries (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands), 1971–2009. 28
- 2.3 Materialist vs. Postmaterialist values by birth cohort, in 11 ex-communist countries now in the European Union (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), 2008–2012. 31
- 2.4 Materialist vs. Postmaterialist values by birth cohort, in eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay), 2005–2012. 32
- 2.5 Materialist vs. Postmaterialist values by birth cohort in nine Muslim-majority countries. 33
- 3.1 Mean scores of 75 countries on two major value dimensions, by level of development. 41
- 3.2 Locations of 43 societies on global cultural map, 1990–1991. 45

x / List of Figures

- 3.3 Locations of 94 societies on global cultural map, 2008–2014 (median year of survey is 2011). 46
- 3.4 Age-related differences on Survival/Self-expression values, in three types of societies. 56
- 3.5 Net change on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation from earliest to latest available survey (1981–2014) in ten types of societies. 57
- 4.1 Percentage of societies with a belief in a creator God concerned with human moral conduct. 63
- 4.2 Economic development and the changing importance of major aspects of life. 66
- 4.3 Change in percentage saying God is very important in their life, from earliest to latest survey. 70
- 4.4 Changes in importance of religion, as measured by the question “How important is God in your life?” due to intergenerational population replacement, and due to within-cohort changes, in 14 high-income societies. 73
- 4.5 Changes in religious practice, as measured by the question “How often do you attend religious services these days?” due to intergenerational population replacement, and due to within-cohort changes, in 14 high-income societies. 74
- 5.1 Six aspects of tolerance, by level of economic development. Percentage expressing tolerant views on given topic. 86
- 5.2 Changes in Individual-choice norms from earliest available survey to latest available survey in all countries having time series of at least ten years. 90
- 5.3 Impact of a country’s level of Existential Security at various time points on adherence to Pro-fertility norms vs. Individual-choice norms around 2009. 90
- 5.4 The impact of Existential Security measured at various time points, on religiosity and on Materialist/Postmaterialist values as measured in latest available survey. 92
- 5.5 Changes in Individual-choice norms due to intergenerational population replacement, and to within-cohort changes, in 14 high-income societies. 96
- 5.6 National legislation concerning homosexuality in 2012, by public acceptance of gender equality, divorce, abortion and homosexuality ( $r = .79$ ). 97



## xi / List of Figures

- 5.7 Societal levels of gender empowerment, by mass support for individual-choice norms. 99
- 6.1a Individual-choice and willingness to fight for country (with former Axis and Nordic countries). 109
- 6.1b Individual-choice and willingness to fight for country (without former Axis and Nordic countries). 110
- 6.2 Change in people's willingness to fight for their country in war. 112
- 7.1 Effective democracy around 2000 by a country's mean level of self-expression values in mid 1990s. 122
- 7.2 Change in level of effective democracy from early 1980s to late 1990s, by unmet demand for (or surplus supply of) democracy in early 1980s. 127
- 7.3 Mean percentage of college-age population enrolled in higher education in the USA, Germany and Japan, 1960–2010. 132
- 8.1 Economic development leads to a shift in survival strategies. 144
- 8.2 Life satisfaction by economic development. 148
- 8.3 Life satisfaction by economic development, identifying two distinctive groups: (1) former communist countries and (2) Latin American societies. 151
- 8.4 Change in percentage saying they are “very happy” taking all things together, from earliest to latest available survey. 154
- 8.5 Change in life satisfaction mean score, from earliest to latest available survey. 155
- 8.6 Life satisfaction and happiness trends in 12 countries, 1981–2012. 156
- 8.7 The collapse of communism and changing levels of life satisfaction, 1981–2011. 162
- 8.8 Changing levels of life satisfaction, Russia, USA, Sweden, 1982–2011. 164
- 8.9 Correlation between religiosity and life satisfaction. 165
- 8.10 Factors contributing to *increase* in subjective well-being from earliest available survey to most recent survey, in 56 countries. 168
- 9.1 Intent to vote for environmentalist political parties, by Postmaterialist values in four countries having such parties. 177

xii / List of Figures

- 9.2 The social class-based Left–Right dimension and the Postmodern politics dimension in Germany. 178
- 9.3 Support for giving preference to one’s own nationality over immigrants when jobs are scarce – in the USA, Britain, France, West Germany and Sweden. 180
- 9.4 (a) Support for Trump by age in 2017. (b) Support for Trump by income in 2017. 182
- 9.5 Model cohort analysis. 184
- 9.6 Changing salience of economic vs. non-economic issues in the party manifestos of 13 Western democracies, 1950–2010. 189
- 9.7 The trend in social class voting in five Western democracies, 1947–2012. 190
- 9.8 The top decile’s share of total income in Europe and the USA, 1900–2010. 191
- 9.9 Relative gain in real per capita income by global income level, 1988–2008. 194
- 10.1 Median real income of US employed people in 2013 dollars, by educational level, 1991–2015. 202
- 10.2 Percentage of US workforce employed in agriculture and industry, 1860–2012, in service sector, 1900–2012 and high-technology sector since 1986. 204
- 10.3 Changes in structure of US workforce: 1979–1999 vs. 1999–2012. 208
- 10.4 Changing attitudes toward income inequality. 213
- A2.1 Global cultural map from 1995. 221
- A2.2 Global cultural map from 2000. 222
- A2.3 Age-related differences on Survival/Self-expression values, in three types of societies. 223
- A2.4 Net change on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation from earliest to latest available survey (1981–2014) in ten types of societies. 225
- A3.1 Six aspects of tolerance, by level of economic development. 226
- A4.1 Xenophobia and intergenerational change. “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants” (percent agreeing by year of birth in 26 high-income countries). 228

xiii / List of Figures

- A5.1 Net household income inequality trends: Russia, China and the West, 1981–2007. 229
- A5.2 Percentage of total employment in information and communication technology sector in five advanced economies, 1995–2011. 230

## TABLES

- 3.1 Orientations linked with Survival vs. Self-expression values. *page* 38
- 3.2 The Self-expression/Individualism/Autonomy factor. 51
- 5.1 Pro-fertility norms vs. individual-choice norms. 88
- A5.1 How Zakharov (2016) coded given issues as economic or non-economic from the categories used in the Comparative Party Manifestos dataset. 230

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