If asked when 7,080 prisoners were detained without trial in a camp at Neuengamme or 2,841 at Dachau or 9,783 at Buchenwald, most people would probably answer some time in the 1930s or early 1940s. These are, after all, the names of some of the most notorious Nazi concentration camps. But these figures in fact come from May 1946, January 1948, and January 1950, months and years after the defeat and collapse of Nazi Germany. At these points in time, the camps were operating under the aegis of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR, respectively.

The detainees were thus not prisoners of Nazi Germany but were among the large number of Germans (and some foreigners) arrested by the victorious Allied powers that occupied Germany at the end of the Second World War. In total, more than 400,000 Germans were interned without trial: as many as 170,000 by the Americans; approximately 130,000 by the Soviets; at least 91,000 by the British; and around 21,500 by the French.

A tiny minority of internees were suspected of war crimes, but most were detained because the occupiers deemed them ‘dangerous’ enough to be taken into what the western powers called ‘automatic arrest’. The
primary targets were members and officials of Nazi organizations, who were interned precisely on the grounds of their membership, rank, or position therein. Senior Nazi leaders were among the internees, but so were many public servants, teachers, farmers, and tradespeople who had held various positions in Nazi Germany, as well as some people rather arbitrarily detained by Allied forces. Internees were held in scores of camps, many of which were established on the sites of former German prisoner-of-war (POW) or concentration camps or former military barracks or prisons, while others were located at more improvised sites. Not surprisingly given the general chaos across the country at the end of the war, detention conditions were tough everywhere in 1945, but over time they became adequate, even generous, in the occupation zones run by the three western powers. In contrast, they remained totally inadequate in the Soviet ‘Special Camps’, leading to the death of approximately one-third of the inmates. The last internment camps in each zone closed in 1949–50.

How should one make sense of this transnational chapter of German history, which is neither completely unknown nor well understood? Internment raises a host of questions about ‘regime change’, occupation, and transitional justice in the wake of the ‘Third Reich’. Was internment a logical step towards the Allied goal of eradicating Nazism? Or was it an irreconcilable contradiction to use mass extrajudicial detention to that end? Were the occupying powers more concerned with exacting punishment and revenge than with promoting justice and democracy? If numerous Nazi concentration camps were ‘liberated’ only to be reused after a change of personnel, were the Allied camps also ‘concentration camps’? Were the Allies perhaps not so different from the Nazis after all? Does internment indicate that the occupation was more coercive, and that denazification was more rigorous than is commonly believed? Why did all four occupying powers make use of internment but to such varying extents? Why did it take a more lethal path in the Soviet zone than in the western zones? What does internment ultimately reveal about Germany’s postwar transition? And what does it say about the history of camps more broadly? This book – the first detailed, systematic, comparative study of the subject – aims to answer such questions and thus to contribute to a number of recent and long-standing scholarly and public debates.

The History of Camps

In recent years, there has been much discussion of the camp as the ‘nomos of the modern’ and of the twentieth century as the ‘century of
The History of Camps

3 While Nazi concentration camps and the Soviet GULAG (Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements) still dominate the discussion, the global history of camps has been recognized and other instances of encampment in diverse contexts have received increasing attention. Cases of nineteenth-century encampment, especially in colonial settings, have helped shift the focus away from an exclusive preoccupation with totalitarian regimes. Con-siderable attention has been paid to the internment during the two world wars of ‘enemy aliens’, that is, civilians who were citizens of, or ethnically related to, enemy states, whether by Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Japan, or the United States, among others. POW camps are also well researched but are far from central to the broader discussion. Diverse camps in post–Second World War Germany and Austria are the focus of recent and ongoing research: those for ‘displaced persons’ (DPs), including both Jews who had survived German occupation, slave


labour, and genocide and non-Jewish Eastern Europeans who had fled to Germany to evade the advancing Red Army; those for ethnic German refugees and expellees from Central and Eastern Europe; and those for refugees from the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) founded in East Germany in 1949. Twenty-first-century camps associated with the ‘war on terror’ and with western states’ efforts to contain and deter unwanted migrants and refugees have also prompted debate and consternation. In light of this diversity of camps, it is increasingly recognized, as Dan Stone put it recently, that ‘Concentration camps are not only products of “mad” dictators but have a global history that belongs to the liberal West as well.’ This is an important point, even if it begs the question of whether every camp that holds civilians against their will constitutes a ‘concentration camp’. Considerable care and precise criteria are needed to distinguish different types of camps.

Allied internment camps in occupied Germany, especially those of the western powers, are largely missing from this discussion but can add productively to the field, where there is room for more even-handedness, rigour, and nuance. Even recent works that self-consciously address camps run by dictatorships and democracies either gloss over or entirely fail to mention the western powers’ internment camps in Germany, while paying the Soviet camps some attention. Remarkably, too, in his excellent study of the internment of Germans in the United Kingdom during the First World War, Panikos Panayi claims that ‘In the British case mass internment comes to a close with the Second World War.’ He notes the detention of people suspected of links with Irish Republican Army terrorism in the 1970s or with Islamicist terrorism more recently but is

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8 Stone, Concentration Camps, 10.

completely oblivious to Britain’s mass internment of civilians in occupied Germany.10

The present book aims to include Allied internment in the global history of encampment and to promote a more comprehensive and critical comparative discussion of various camp forms. The book demonstrates that Britain and other major democratic powers have resorted to the use of camps more extensively and recently than is widely understood, that they have done so beyond the geographical confines of overseas empires and outside wartime, that they have defined groups to be targeted not just in ethnic and military but also in political-ideological categories, and that they have not always treated their prisoners in accordance with international norms. Guantanamo Bay and even Abu Ghraib are thus perhaps historically less exceptional than is sometimes assumed. Recognizing this, however, should not obscure important distinctions between different types and experiences of incarceration and encampment in different contexts or even within the same context, such as postwar Germany.

The History of Occupied and Postwar Germany

The book also aims to promote internment’s integration into the history of Germany’s occupation at the end of the Second World War. Internment was a major component of the occupation experience that warrants greater attention than it often receives. To be sure, civilian internees were less numerous than other prototypical characters of postwar German history such as DPs, POWs, returned soldiers, expellees and refugees, and the ‘rubble women’, who cleared away debris in many German cities. Yet being interned was one of several ‘collective fates’ in occupied Germany.11 Historians neglected it for a long time. Until the 2000s,

11 If the first groups all numbered in the millions, the number of ‘rubble women’ was smaller than their iconic status would suggest. See Leonie Treber, Mythos Trümmerfrauen: Von der Trümmerbeseitigung in der Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit und der Entstehung eines deutschen Erinnerungsraumes (Essen: KlarTEXT Verlag, 2014). On the other groups, see Patt and Berkowitz (eds.), ‘We Are Here’, Anna Hollan, Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Gerhard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); David Rock and Stefan Wolff (eds.), Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002); Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Birgit Schwelling, Heimkehr – Erinnerung – Integration: Der Verband der Heimkehrer, die ehemaligen
historical surveys often did not go beyond citing Lutz Niethammer’s characterization of the results of early American denazification measures as being ‘full internment camps and empty offices’ and failed to ask what happened to internees. Internment has become more prominent in the new millennium, but general histories still often mention it only briefly and sometimes not at all. Meaningful recognition as a significant element of the history of the occupation and the transition from the Nazi to the postwar eras is rare. Yet internment played an important role in facilitating an exchange of elites and establishing a new political order. It also contributed to a widespread sense of uncertainty, helplessness, and existential insecurity for significant sections of the population as well as to broader social phenomena such as the absence of men, especially husbands and fathers, to a perceived crisis of the family, and to the politicization of the food question. In short, histories of occupied Germany and of the transition from the Nazi to the postwar era are incomplete without internment.

Moreover, as is the case in the literature on camps, there is scope for greater balance and for more, and more precise, comparisons between the eastern and western parts of the story. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, the dichotomous western master narrative – according to which the Soviets raped, pillaged, murdered, arrested, and deported Germans en masse, while the western occupying forces, especially the Americans, behaved as ‘friendly enemies’ – still needs to be overcome. On both sides, the reality was more complicated. Recent work demonstrates that the reality of the American occupation does not match the


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‘good occupation’ of popular myth and much history writing and that the extent of theft and other forms of criminality and exploitation by American personnel was greater than often assumed. The historian’s challenge is to acknowledge the western powers’ brutality and illiberality without blowing them out of proportion or suggesting they were the equivalent of the much more severe and lethal Soviet brutality and illiberality. For instance, in the occupation’s early phases, distrust, nervousness, hatred, and revenge led soldiers of all Allied armies to kill German captives and civilians, but the number of victims of the western Allies was dwarfed by the more than 120,000 German civilians killed by the Red Army in German territories east of the Oder–Neisse rivers that would become the new German-Polish border. Similarly, Allied soldiers in the West – including American forces to a larger degree than often recognized – raped considerable numbers of German women; yet the scale and violence of rape by Soviet troops were vastly higher.

In addition to mass rape, however, there were also cases of genuinely amorous relations between German women and Soviet men.

In this vein, a balanced, comparative history of internment can contribute to a more nuanced and complex understanding of the occupation. Like numerous histories of camps, many accounts of the occupation refer to Soviet but not western internment. A less extreme variant of this tendency is to focus a discussion largely, but not completely, on the Soviet case. Both the asymmetrical attention devoted to western and Soviet internment and their inconsistent evaluation perpetuate black-and-white depictions of wicked Soviets and virtuous westerners. It is time to acknowledge shades of grey. One does not need to exaggerate the virtues of the western occupiers to see the sins of the USSR. Although


the western powers intended eventually to reestablish German democracy, they ran what Niethammer called a ‘liberal occupation dictatorship’ in which civil rights and the rule of law were circumscribed. This is overlooked by scholars of Soviet internment such as Bettina Greiner, who suggests that western internment reflected the western powers’ determination to ‘counter state-sanctioned injustice with the democratic rule of law – an intention that the Soviet occupying power did not honour’. Such an assessment applies to western and Soviet policy towards Germany over the longer term but misrepresents the early western occupation in general and internment in particular. Liberal western powers have resorted to illiberal methods in other contexts and it is increasingly recognized that democracies are not immune from abusing their prisoners. The coercive and problematic aspects of their occupation of Germany should no longer be overlooked. By the same token, not every coercive measure taken by the Soviets can be characterized exclusively as, or attributed solely to, wicked Stalinization.

The History of Transitional Justice in Germany

The fate of Nazis after 1945 has long sparked interest. This book builds upon, and contributes to, a reassessment of the conventional and still influential view that Allied and German efforts at ‘transitional justice’ in the early postwar years were an inadequate failure and that all but a handful of Nazis and war criminals avoided serious consequences for their roles and actions. Recent research has demonstrated that more criminals were investigated and prosecuted in Germany and across Europe than previously thought. It has also shown that the massive whitewash described by Niethammer in his pioneering and still influential study of denazification in Bavaria – first published in 1972 and republished in 1982 with the catchy and paradigmatic title ‘The

19 Niethammer, Mitläuferfabrik, 653; Bettina Greiner, Suppressed Terror: History and Perception of Soviet Special Camps in Germany (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 348.


Follower Factory’ – cannot simply be extrapolated to other parts of the country. In sum, as Paul Hoser puts it, ‘if the older research generally saw denazification ... as a failure, the more recent research emphasizes the palpable sanction that it meant for those affected’. 22

Internment can and should play an important part in any comprehensive reassessment, but studies and accounts of ‘transitional justice’, denazification, and the handling of the Nazi past in postwar Germany long paid it surprisingly little attention. The literature was preoccupied instead with criminal trials, dismissals from employment, questionnaires, various categorization procedures, discussion of the ‘guilt question’, and efforts at ‘reeducation’. Numerous early studies did not mention arrests and internment at all, while others did so only in passing. 23 To be sure, some early explorations of denazification referred to internment, but it was far from central. Niethammer, for instance, briefly discussed American arrest policies and internment, but still effectively reduced denazification to ‘the experience of the work of the Spruchkammern’, that is, the denazification panels established in 1946, at internment’s expense. 24 This was true of many other works through to the 1990s, which focused on procedures for removing Nazis from the public service, the economy, and the professions, and where internment merited at best brief discussion. 25 Internment has received more attention in recent years. It is perhaps most prominent in studies of the American occupation zone, where the camps were most thoroughly integrated – institutionally and procedurally – into the zonal denazification system in 1946. Yet even here internment is often relegated to an excursus and does not feature in the wider analysis. 26


24 Niethammer, Miläufervfabrik, esp. 12, 27 (quotation), 255–9, 455–67.


This relative marginality is partly due to the Allies’ failure to develop a dedicated directive on arrest and internment, as discussed in Chapter 1. Yet it is also due to terminological problems. The term ‘denazification’ is used both expansively and more narrowly. Sometimes it describes all measures taken to destroy Nazism and achieve transitional justice, including the prosecution of Nazi criminals. Henceforth, the ‘eradication of Nazism’ is generally used for this broad understanding. More commonly, however, criminal prosecutions are regarded as separate from ‘denazification’, which on this understanding covers a range of non-judicial political, legal, and administrative measures aimed at removing Nazi influence from German public life, including one-off steps such as abrogating Nazi law and removing Nazi names and symbols from public space as well as the more difficult and controversial process of vetting and purging Nazi personnel. Frequently, however, the term is understood more narrowly still as referring only to the purge of Nazis, including both their removal or exclusion from positions of influence and their arrest and internment. In a further narrowing, it is often equated with removal and exclusion from office or with the vetting work of denazification committees, especially the Spruchkammern in the American zone, as per Niethammer’s approach as already mentioned. The prevalence of this narrowest understanding – the only one that effectively excludes internment – has contributed to internment’s neglect in many discussions of ‘denazification’. Indeed, as discussed further in subsequent chapters, it has contributed to confusion about whether Soviet internment in particular had anything to do with eradicating Nazism.

In giving internment due consideration within the broader context of post-Nazi transitional justice, this book makes several points. The first is that the effort to eradicate Nazism was more severe than is often suggested. As recognized by almost every author who takes it seriously, internment constituted the toughest official Allied sanction against a