Justice is unwilling to be captured in a formula. Nevertheless, it somehow remains a word of magic evocation.

—Cahn 1949: 13

Everyday Justice aims to expand our understanding of justice and the multifarious and interpenetrating ways in which the category 'justice' operates – justice, that is, as a category of both analysis and of practice. In bringing together a range of ethnographic accounts – from street graffiti in Montreal to a village court in Papua New Guinea – this volume eschews any essentializing construals of ideas or practices of justice. It does not envisage justice solely as a descriptive category; indeed, it does not seek to fix it in any single category.

Although no single narrative or reference exhausts what is meant by 'justice', it remains central as a non-derivative term. Law is a dominant frame of reference for justice – in that justice is shaped by its relation to law. But justice also stands in close relationship with morality, ethics, cultural norms, religious principles, and kinship in ways that are constitutive of justice. Scholars, of course, treat all these relations in different ways.

Justice may be treated analytically as a moral virtue (Rawls 1971), or as political capability and freedom (Sen 1999), or as recognition and redistribution (Fraser and Honneth 2003), or as a matter of right actions (Kim 2015). Justice may lie outside the law or legal edicts. Or it may be embodied in material or non-material terms. Political
philosophy – possibly the dominant scholarly tradition within which justice has been conceptualized – treats it mostly as an analytical category.\(^2\)

As a category of social, political, or legal practice, justice may be invoked in the context of both institutionalized (e.g. juridical) and non-institutionalized (e.g. as a mobilizing ideal) discourses, and in the multiple ways in which non-institutionalized discourses of justice are invoked in institutionalized settings. In these terms, justice may represent both a starting point and an (imagined) end point. Justice, then, is a motive and purpose in and of itself; but, as Carol Greenhouse puts it in the Afterword to this volume, an ‘outcome may be just, but justice is not an outcome’. This formulation envisages justice as a process; whatever is recognized as just will contrast with, or occur in a state of tension with its social, political, legal, and moral implications, against which it will be judged. Disciplinary interests dispose anthropologists to attend to justice as a category of practice as a starting point. This allows them to ask different sets of questions, such as: how is justice understood, sought, and rejected by people; and how does it contrast or endure in a state of tension within particular social, political, and legal settings? The category of ‘justice’ may then subsequently, for instance, be excavated and elaborated analytically as intractably relational and contextual (Rosen 2000), or as an ideological value-concept (Nader and Sursock 1986).

Each category – analysis and practice – has its possibilities and limits. A broader question regarding categorical framework is: to what extent is focusing on categories – whether of analysis or practice – helpful at all? On the one hand, it may be productive to look carefully at the separation or distinction between justice as a category of practice and of analysis, in the sense that it may open up new spaces for discussion. This may help illuminate the manifold, and even conflicting, ways in which the category of ‘justice’ is put to work or used. At the same time, we should neither consign justice too hastily to systematic categorical binaries (practice or analysis) nor easily conflate these categories (Ferguson 2007: 383; Brubaker 2012). Understandings of justice are further complicated because of the ways in which social actors reflectively and discursively invoke these categories (Ferguson 2007). Categories of analysis and practice are not mutually exclusive. Rather, it is possible to acquire critical purchase by treating this apparent duality reflexively (Ferguson 2007: 383).
This kind of ethnographic enquiry (and thus reflexive approaches to justice) can throw new light on these categories of practice and analysis, making it possible to see more clearly the complexity of these categorical frameworks and, at the same time, tease out their pervasive-ness. The broader aim of this volume is to point to slippages, entanglements, and frictions between justice as it is theoretically abstracted and as it is enacted, actualized, reworked, and represented (see Clarke and Goodale 2010). Justice needs to be seen as a textured object of analysis; it needs, in other words, to be interrogated, excavated, or exposed, rather than to be used simply as a ready-made instrument of analysis or measure to be eventually worn out (Brubacker 2012: 6). This volume takes stock of the interpenetrating and transformative ways in which justice works, as both a category of analysis and a category of practice. In this way, it addresses contemporary conceptual muddles about justice.

Anthropology and related disciplines have in the recent past shown surprisingly little analytical interest in the concept of justice, while also displaying a sense of urgency in the search for fresh empirical and ethnographic analyses related to justice (see Brunnegger and Faulk 2016; Salamanca Villamizar and Astudillo Pizarro 2016; Merry 2017; Sieder 2017). This is neither to provincialize a long history of work in the anthropology or sociology of law, nor to discount much current work in, for instance, the multidisciplinary scholarship on transitional justice. Our contention seeks, rather, to draw attention to how anthropology has tended to eschew attempts to explore justice in the recent past (i.e. more widely) as a central category. Anthropology's failure, or maybe even its refusal, to theorize justice, or to give it adequate foundational theoretical consideration, may in fact derive from the vagueness or polyvalence of justice itself as a concept (see Rosen 1989; Goodale 2017). Teubner testifies to the recent inattention of scholarship to embodied or grounded forms and kinds of justice, which has contributed to a distinct lack of theorizing: 'There is no socio-legal theory of justice' (Teubner 2009: 2).

This volume strives to come to grips with contemporary confusions about justice. Ethnography is important in facilitating fresh analytical re-conceptualizations of justice, in alignment with an emerging body of scholarship that attends to the concept of justice through ethnographic lenses. In this way, the authors in this volume join a handful of recent scholars who are seeking to rescue justice both as an analytical category and as object of enquiry for anthropology and beyond. We aim to shape and advance an underdeveloped theoretical field: the anthropology of
justice (e.g. Rosen 1989; Borneman 1999; Clarke and Goodale 2010; Sapignoli 2018). More than this, we strive for a multicentric outlook, and do not privilege any particular epistemological or ontological tradition or starting point. By doing this, we hope to forge fresh anthropologies of justice. This also recognizes that diverse global/regional anthropologies are shaped by their many different traditions of justice as categories of analysis. The suggestion coming from this volume, and other recent scholarship, is clear: multiple, often competing, and even incommensurable meanings of justice operate at different scales and in distinctive forms and interfaces, and different regimes of justice – both parallel and overlapping – exist within the same cultural context. Notions of justice whose meanings are contingent on context and the specific ways in which justice is practised and imagined can fester as an ‘implicit idea’ (Rosen 1989: 38) or be an artefact or result of political contestation (Clarke 2009). Or notions can emerge from negotiations within a ‘market for justice’ (Besky 2014: 17), further highlighting justice’s malleable character.

Everyday Justice engages with justice with a view to generate fresh theorizations.

First, from the outset, this book grapples with the category of justice broadly and reflexively to elicit such fresh understandings. On the one hand, it pays attention to how and why different people invoke, enact, or depict different ideas of, and about, justice (Brunnegger and Faulk 2016: 5). On the other hand, it asks: what does justice, as an idea or a practice, do? What is at stake and what are the possible ramifications? The authors in this volume recognize that in some cultural contexts, justice may not be expressed, identified, or characterized as such, and that justice as an idea or idiom may be taken by some as simply a political or legal trope or an ideological – and mainly – Western concern. In this regard, justice is not a neutral, still less a natural, category – although, of course, people may claim it as such. If we aspire towards an ontological understanding, we may encounter different kinds of justice that may be incommensurable (see Chapters 3 and 5). This volume thus serves as a resource for further critiques of narrower views of justice. Its goal is to ensure that justice as a category remains an object of analysis (keeping in view ‘object multiple’), rather than designating the category as an analytical instrument of inchoate or unexamined definition (Brubacker 2012). In other words, scholarship needs to consider reflexively how ethnographic categories are shaped and held in place by a theoretical object – in this case, justice – and how far one can or
should be responsive to ‘local’ and lived conceptualizations. *Everyday Justice* removes at least some of the muddle.

Second, the chapters generate new theoretical readings by locating the question of justice within particular textures of everyday life, within particular social relations and places, and at particular times. The contributions evoke the elusive nature of justice as a feature of ordinary life, suggesting that it may be usefully perceived through the ‘everyday’. This notion admits complexity and contingency (e.g. to changes in practices) and heterogeneous understandings, both in the same place and across different locations. The contributors to this volume, whose ethnographic studies in different settings occur across the globe, take up the everyday in many of its various registers, with different enactments and manifestations as their points of departure as they seek to elucidate justice. The authors’ examples show that the everyday is marked by possibilities, limits, and ruptures, and that justice remains the context for people’s aspirations, and manifestations, as well as unexpected appropriations by various actors. These studies cover diverse contexts, from a mass claims transitional justice mechanism in post-war Kosovo (Chapter 4) to the selection of lay participants in trial procedures in Argentina (Chapter 7). These ethnographies excavate fresh material to illuminate the category of justice in ‘thick’, or textured, terms and thus in its social, political, economic, and cultural specificities and realities. This affirms the importance of grounding justice in ethnography on its own terms to understand it more productively. The book’s guiding intuition is consonant with Goodale and Clarke’s (2010: 18) sense of ‘the constitution of everyday justice’ as an integral feature of how actors experience and imagine their world. More broadly, *Everyday Justice* shows the potential value of bringing back the theme of justice to ethnography.

Third, and finally, in yoking the everyday to the category of justice, this volume hopes to provoke fresh theorizations and prompt further reflection. It offers a theoretical account of the everyday in the context of readings of justice and injustice, justice and law, and relational justice – domains that emerge as the conceptual grounds of the individual chapters. *Everyday Justice* reveals dynamic and asymmetrical entanglements, and opens up the sometimes paradoxical nature of interactions between justice and injustice and between justice and law. *Everyday Justice* also addresses justice as a mode of relations. Above all, *Everyday Justice* marks out a fresh research agenda concerned with unpacking in new ways how everyday conceptions of justice circulate.
and change, and how they are imagined, legitimized, and negotiated within particular spatial settings and temporal regimes. *Everyday Justice* shows that justice needs to be explored in spatially and temporally specific conjunctures because it is expressed – and often condensed – in both time and space.

This introduction elaborates these perspectives in more detail. It first deals with the dialectical nature of spaces and temporalities and (everyday) justice. It then turns to three axes of analysis: relational justice, justice and law (including moving away from seeing justice solely in relation to legal realms), and justice and injustice. As we will see, these domains usually overlap, transform, and impinge on each other; and they are often shaped by multiple disjunctive or conflicting imaginings, modalities, or logics of space, and temporality.

‘JUSTICESCAPES’: TEMPORALITY AND SPATIALITY OF (EVERYDAY) JUSTICE

The everyday is the fundamental context of social space. Greenhouse (1996: 1) makes the critical point that time is a culturally specific concept, not a universal one; her emphasis is on ‘the ways people talk about and use representations of time in social life, ideas that developed independently of whatever “real time” might be’. In this sense, she warns that anthropologists need to take care not to get caught in the trap of re-inscribing a hegemonic linear conception of time. In understanding space and time, and relating temporality to and with spatiality, this volume takes as central the idea that these categories are assembled, fabricated, reproduced, manipulated, and/or negotiated by social actors (e.g. Munn 1990; Boyarin 1994; Weszkalyns 2010). It also holds that temporal and spatial logics rest in people’s situations; in their deliberate, non-deliberate, or tacit acts; and in shifting and altering ways that may conflict. Hence, temporality and spatiality are seen as entangled ‘qualities’ – or conditions, virtues, or conjectural modes – of social relations’ (Weszkalyns 2010: 16). Both spatial and temporal relations are experienced within the everyday of actors’ lives, making people particular kinds of subjects in their everyday actualities.

Justice necessarily has coordinates or vectors in time and space; it is not cut off from temporal and spatial frames but located in space and time. Justice is at once polytemporal and polyspatial in character, which necessitates that it be reckoned with in all of its spatiotemporal dimensions, horizons, and matrices. ‘Time’, as Bakhtin (1981: 84) said
in reference to time–space relations (in his seminal theory of the chronotope), ‘thickens, takes on flesh’, and ‘likewise space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history’. Justice, with its multifarious nature, is constantly in motion and flows through time and space, and across multiscalar registers of meanings within social, political, and legal discourses, which are then experienced and understood in multiple social realities. The complexity and multiplicity of the dialectical nature of spaces, temporalities, and justice can be framed, this volume suggests, by the metaphor of ‘justicescapes’. The coinage is intended to point to the dynamic nature of ideas; to their particular and entrenched social, political, and legal character; and to the ever-present possibility and potential of rendering present and future in alternative ways.

Temporalities of Everyday Justice
In both time and space, justice can be framed within the domain of the everyday. Justice can be excavated, for instance, as an everyday site in which the future is brought into being. In these terms, justice funds an administration or management of time and space by tacitly or deliberately contributing to social and political imaginaries. Time is an integral component of everyday encounters, interfaces, representations, and practices; temporal affairs both transform and are transformed by everyday lived experiences; and varying concepts of time and temporality engender corollaries, significances, and effects in everyday life. The chapters of this book locate the matter of justice within particular social relations, places, and times to demonstrate how justice is woven into the fabric and texture of the everyday at different scales and in manifold ways.

In the vast scholarship that takes stock of the everyday – in different theoretical traditions and with extensive theoretical refinements – the everyday is elusively defined and intensely argued, and thus remains cunningly unclear. The work that takes the everyday as its object constructs it in different ways. *Everyday Justice* is concerned, in the first instance, with the social spheres in which a vocabulary of everyday justice emerges, and in which the agency of the everyday becomes apparent. It recovers the everyday meanings of justice by looking at the everyday as a site that discloses the different meanings attached to justice. It also attends to different cultural literacies in the production and reception of justice by showing that the ‘everyday’ is fuelled by possibilities while also being marked by ruptures. Our conception of the
everyday also opens up an ontological position: the everyday is
dynamic, contingent, and multiple.

‘Whose everyday? Whose place?’ are the questions posed by Kath-leen Sullivan in Chapter 6, on the case of the Drakes Estero estuary and Drakes Bay Oyster Company, in Northern California. It hints at an epistemological, even ontological, starting point for any study of the entanglement of justice in its temporal dimension with regimes of spatialization (see Valverde 2015). These questions – Whose everyday? Whose place? – are also pertinent in highlighting how there will always be competing notions of justice and injustice. This case study features different stakeholders and constituents (i.e. oyster company campaign-ers, First Peoples, and environmentalists) with a range of views on the future of the estuary, its nature, and its potential as a place, which determine their stances in a legal process concerning the local oyster production business. (The company has now been dissolved by court decision.) For Sullivan, competing notions of justice and injustice in the conflict are moored in contending ‘notions of a coupled “everyday”’ and a sense of place as ‘each constellation … mobilizes an illusion of a coherent, common-sense everyday place as its own starting point and end point’. Different constituents invoke place in terms of their own temporal–historical schemes, from the First Peoples claim of sover-eignty over the land on which the oyster farm was located, to the oyster company itself that situated itself within a lengthy history of human occupation. This occupation includes a long history of indigen-ous settlement, which purportedly rebuts ideas that the location should be designated as a wilderness. The complexity of the disputes over place ‘explode[s] the everyday as [a] situated sense-making essence of social order’ (Marcus 1993: 244). Sullivan suggests that with Drakes Estero estuary, it became impossible to conceive of a single ‘everyday’ equal in import for each participant or stakeholder. Law, she argues further, cannot appeal to such an essentialized everyday as a source in shaping a social order. Sullivan draws on George Marcus’s (1993) critique of the dogma of the everyday as that which is pitched against the law and is categorically distinct from formal procedures, rules, codes, systems, and so on (see also Valverde 2003: 95). As Marcus (1993: 237, 244n9) said:

In both social theory and legal discourse, the everyday occupies the space of the moral, the pragmatic, the accessible, and the commonsen-sical and is the last bastion of simple coherence and order. … In such studies, the order in everyday life takes on a certain virtue and politics
that finds hope in the quotidian against fears . . . of a ‘totally administered and commodified world’. . . . [E]veryday life is where the most abstractly conceived issues can seemingly be resolved in concreteness and the virtues of simple, unreflected upon existence.

Santiago Amietta, in Chapter 7, writing on the lay participants in Argentina’s criminal trials, also draws on Marcus’s and Valverde’s insights. Amietta problematizes the boundaries between everyday justice and its institutional counterparts as justice operates in legal spaces. A discourse of the everyday arises from a ‘negative constitution’ (Valverde 2003), or construction, of how ordinary citizens serve as jurors and have a measure of juridical power vested in them within the law’s own working. These people, conceived as legal subjects or arbiters par excellence, are entirely separated from their ordinary lives while at the courthouse. Amietta, however, neither poses an opposition amongst the everyday and institutions’ legal spaces, times, or persons, nor resorts to the binary of formal–informal ‘as epitomic of ontologically discrete realms’. Instead, he suggests a juxtaposition of the formal and the informal within judicial proceedings as a ‘heuristic device’, turning these very boundaries into part of what is studied ethnographically.

Amietta’s main conceptual claim is that boundaries between the everyday and formally legal may be appropriately conceived as ‘power-laden attempts at governing the very formal–informal, legal–extra-legal divide in discrete contexts’. His ethnographic vignettes show that jurors – positioned by authorized legal discourse as bearers of the everyday – do not always behave as expected and as their casting as ‘ordinary persons’ might suppose. Uncertain of the nuances of legal processes, jurors make considerable efforts to observe formalities during proceedings. When they make a mistake, however, it is sometimes not acknowledged as authenticating or ‘ordinary’ but called out as transgressive of legal processes. Amietta argues that this dynamic has related effects: it re-inscribes an othering, even as it serves jurors’ self-identification with the everyday and facilitates the portrayal of legal professionals as ‘guardians of the law’.

These accounts underline – and make it worth re-emphasizing – the salience of bringing an ethnographic gaze to the enactments of justice in generating penetrating accounts of the everyday life of justice. Ethnography has always studied the contingent practices of everyday life as expressed in interactions, articulations, and transformations; this includes enabling to reveal multiple ‘time/space-specific structuration.
of relations’ or encounters amongst actors, institutional agencies, and ‘wider socio-spatial structures’ (Paasi and Zimmerbauer 2011: 167). Temporality can be a window into a society’s political dynamics, differentials, and forces. Exploring the articulations of distinctive – sometimes conflicting – temporalities may reveal the political economy of certain ‘time representations’ (Greenhouse 1996). Sari Wastell, in Chapter 5, draws on Greenhouse’s (1996) ‘time politics’ in describing the post-conflict period in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a ‘transition without end’, a formulation intended to contrast with a conventional understanding of peace-building as ‘linear and progressive’. International institutions have spoken of BiH as being involved in a transition, or linear movement – from ‘affective’, ‘primordial’, and ‘ethnic’ allegiances, said to dominate during a ‘time of conflict’, to an ‘order of the Rule of Law, market capitalism, and democracy’. According to Wastell, the war continues indefinitely in BiH by other means. Many of the operations that should have brought peace led instead to a ‘temporal stalemate’ or ‘void’. As she shows, in implementing transitional justice arrangements, the international community has been unexpectedly complicit with the infighting of ethno-nationalist politicians and their plans and intentions; that is, with the shoring-up of local politicians’ power bases and their unjust enrichment. A ‘time politics’ emerges in which there are, at minimum, three versions of the conflict’s history, which allows ethno-nationalist politicians and the international community to ‘legitimize the enduring transition on the grounds of an intransient tripartite ethnic divide . . . What is shared is a politics of nostalgia that feeds the temporal void of the present.’ Ethnic distinctions have been established in nearly every sphere of post-conflict life in BiH. In fashioning and sustaining an ‘enduring transition’, politicians and community representatives organize memory and trauma so as to exclude any rupture of the ‘boundaries of ethnic affect’. Justice, as invoked by ordinary persons, ‘gets lost in translation’ from their everyday lives to institutions that might fairly represent them. Transitional arrangements fail in terms of socioeconomic justice – for example, in the badly regulated disposal of factories in which leftover wealth is carved up amongst ethnic placeholders. As Wastell tells us, the actions of the international community in BiH continue to turn ‘on an ahistorical dyad of the time of affect versus the time of order. . . . In so doing, it helps to complete the work of the conflict and plays into the hands of ethno-nationalist politicians who benefit tremendously from a transition without end.’ Justice remains to be done, because it