

CHAPTER I

*From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive
 Problem of Happiness*

1.1 Introduction

How should we live? Aristotle's answer is, in broadest outline, that we do not have to choose between what is best, noblest, and most pleasant to do (*EE* 1.1, 1214^a7–8, *NE* 1.8, 1099^a24–25). We need not worry that in eschewing the pastimes of the voluptuary, for example, we are missing out on anything genuinely worthwhile. Plato had offered similar reassurance, but in contrast to him Aristotle argues, for reasons that will become clear, that if what is best, what is noblest, and what is most pleasant for humans are to coincide, they must converge on a characteristic *activity* of human beings. Such an activity, he thinks, is what is designated by the word 'happiness' ('*eudaimonia*').¹ But Aristotle's theory of happiness, particularly as it is developed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, faces a well-known problem: It is not obvious how his remarks at different points in the treatise about how to understand that theory are supposed to fit together. Interpreters have proposed various types of solutions to this problem. But in this chapter I will argue that we should distinguish between two versions of the problem. I will begin by describing the traditional Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness and how existing views address it. Next, I will argue that the main strategies for addressing the Dilemmatic Problem feature mutually incompatible central commitments about the kind of activity that happiness is, and for this reason these strategies have remained dialectically resilient, their proponents steadfastly unpersuaded by the others' arguments. A dialectically satisfactory interpretation of Aristotle's theory

¹ Today we can ask: What kind of thing is happiness? Is it a feeling, a condition, something we do...? Ancient Greek philosophers raised such questions about *eudaimonia* and gave a variety of answers. Similar questions can be asked about well-being, flourishing, or other terms that one might employ as translations of '*eudaimonia*.'

2 From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive Problem

of happiness must accommodate these central commitments despite their apparent incompatibility. This is, in outline, the Conjunctive Problem of Happiness. No existing interpretation solves it, or even attempts to solve it. This is not to say, preposterously, that no existing interpretation is aimed at persuading another interpretation's proponents, but rather that none attempts to take the position on the kind of activity that happiness is that a solution to the Conjunctive Problem would require. In fact, I will argue in Chapters 2–4 that three commitments common among proponents of each of the main strategies for responding to the Dilemmatic Problem make it impossible for them to solve the Conjunctive Problem. Those commitments, though, unlike the ones that figure in the Conjunctive Problem, are ones that they can, and should, give up.

1.2 The Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness

Aristotle advertises from the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the work will concern the nature of happiness. The fact that most of the work discusses such things as courage, temperance, justice, generosity, magnanimity, and friendship, and *NE* 6 treats of intellectual virtues and their relationship to ethical virtues,² encourages the idea that happiness consists in ethically and intellectually virtuous activities, which make a far more central contribution than do such prepossessing candidates as wealth, honor, favorable circumstances, or bodily pleasure (see, e.g., 10.6, 1176^a35–^b9, 1177^a9–11). But readers tend to be surprised upon being informed that happiness is contemplation (*theôria*), the manifestation of theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) in active reflection on a systematic grasp that one already has of the first principles of reality, such as the divine prime mover (10.7, 1177^a12–^b26).³ We are liable to feel bewildered: In pursuit of what end(s) are we to live? What activities are we to choose? In the terms that have characterized much of the literature for roughly the past half-century, does Aristotle think that the happy life features an inclusive end or a dominant end?⁴

² I use 'ethical virtue' and 'practical virtue' synonymously.

³ I will discuss the nature of contemplation later in this chapter and even more extensively in subsequent ones.

⁴ Hardie (1965, 279) is the one who puts this last question squarely on the agenda, but his formulation of it, and therefore the agenda, grows out of Austin's (1979) responses in the late 1930s and 1940s to Prichard (1935) about the distinction between analysis and specification of 'happiness' in the *NE*, as pointed out by Irwin (2012, 496 n. 4). Inwood (2014, 10) thinks that some of Aristotle's key ideas in his ethical works, including about happiness, exhibit "indeterminacy" and "basic tension" that allow subsequent ancient writers space to explore innovative and divergent ways of interpreting him.

1.2 *The Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness*

3

Ackrill (1974, 339) gives a succinct and influential statement of the problem:

Most of the *Ethics* implies that good action is – or is a major element in – man’s best life, but eventually, in book x, purely contemplative activity is said to be perfect *eudaimonia*; and Aristotle does not tell us how to combine or relate these two ideas.

Numerous scholars, especially Hardie (1965), Ackrill (1974), Cooper (1975), and others of their generation and the following one, have maintained that two genuinely incompatible theories of happiness are presented in the *NE*: one in most of the work and the other in 10.7–8.⁵ Most subsequent interpreters, though, have taken the position that while the two theories are genuinely incompatible, Aristotle merely *seems* to offer evidence for both in the *NE*.⁶ In fact, they maintain, he subscribes to one or the other of the two incompatible theories and our interpretive problem is that of determining which one he favors and explaining away the apparent evidence that he holds the other. This is the Dilemmatic Problem.⁷

Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness

We must determine which of the following incompatible propositions about happiness Aristotle believes and explain away the apparent evidence that he believes the other:

- A) Happiness (the activity) is virtuous activity, a composite that includes not only contemplative activity, but also ethically virtuous activities as parts.⁸

⁵ Bostock (2000, 200–203) and Wilkes (1978, 566) think that Aristotle’s account of happiness is outright incoherent. Nagel (1972, 252), more gently, says that Aristotle “exhibits indecision between two accounts.” Moline (1983) regards the account of happiness as contemplation in *NE* 10.7–8 as so un-Aristotelian that it must be an expression of Anaxagoras’s view meant as a joke at the latter’s expense. Annas (1993, 216 n. 9), Barnes (1997, 58–59), and Nussbaum (2001, 375–377) contend that the text of the *NE* as we now have it contains two inconsistent theories, but they were never intended to coexist in one treatise by one author. Their allegation of textual disunity has been met with substantial counterevidence presented by, for example, Aufderheide (2020, 164), Natali (1989, 282), Roche (1988a, 193 n. 38), and Whiting (1986, 89). Such counterevidence includes various back-references from *NE* 10.7–8 to the other *NE* books and forward-references from other books to those chapters.

⁶ This is the position of Kraut (1989, 4), for example: “Of course, if Aristotle says in one place that happiness consists in contemplation alone, and says elsewhere that it consists in other goods as well, then he has contradicted himself. One of my main concerns will be to argue that the *NE* does not contain this internal conflict.”

⁷ I am grateful to David Charles, Gabriel Richardson Lear, and a referee for Cambridge University Press for especially helpful suggestions about how best to formulate the Dilemmatic Problem and the problem that I introduce later, the Conjunctive Problem.

⁸ Ackrill (1974, 343) cites the relation between putting and golfing as an instance of the relevant relation between part and whole where the part and whole are both activities and to be engaged in the part is to be engaged in the whole, though there is more to the whole than that part.

4 From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive Problem

- B) Happiness (the activity) is contemplative activity, which does not include ethically virtuous activities as parts.

Various ways of addressing this problem have been explored. These are helpfully divided into the following groups, though other systems of categorization could be implemented:

Monism

Happiness (the activity) *is* contemplation. A life made happy in virtue of it is derivatively devoted to ethically virtuous activities insofar as they are for the sake of contemplation.⁹

Pluralism

Ethically virtuous activities and contemplation are parts of the composite essence of happiness (the activity). A life made happy in virtue of such happiness is devoted most of all to contemplation in the sense that special attention should be given to contemplation when reasonable.¹⁰

Relativism

Perfect happiness (the activity) is contemplation and the happiest life is devoted to that. Ethically virtuous activities are parts of another kind of happiness and another, inferior kind of happy life is devoted to that. Neither kind of happiness sets the standard for the kind of life characterized by the other kind of happiness, so there is no split devotion in any happy life.¹¹

⁹ Monists differ primarily over the nature of the *for-the-sake-of* relation that holds between ethically virtuous activity and contemplation and grounds the inclusion of ethically virtuous activities in happy lives. Proposals include, for example: instrumentality/causality (Cleemput, 2006), (Jirsa, 2017), (Kraut, 1989), (Reeve, 1992); centralizing relations, for example, approximation (Lear, 2004, 2014, 2015) or focality (Tuozzo, 1995); and being regulated/governed by (Aufderheide, 2015), (Cooper, 2004), (Meyer, 2011). Some monists are principally concerned to argue that Aristotle endorses pluralism in the *Eudemian Ethics* and/or in at least some parts of the *NE*, but endorses monism as the *NE*'s final and official view (Cooper, 1975), (Hardie, 1965), (Kenny, 1978, 1992). Others focus more on the startling nature of a monist account of happiness (Adkins, 1978), (Lear, 1988, 309–320), (Nagel, 1972).

¹⁰ Pluralist interpreters have often derived inspiration from Ackrill (1974), who, though like Hardie (1965) and others believes that Aristotle offers us genuinely inconsistent evidence, finds the pluralist conception more plausible in its own right and argues forcefully for a pluralist interpretation of *NE* 1–9. Pluralist interpreters include Broadie (1991), Cooper (1987), Crisp (1994), Dahl (2011), Herzberg (2016), Irwin (1978, 1980, 1985, 1991, 2012) and (1988, 608 n. 40 and 616–617 n. 24), Keyt (1983), Natali (1989), Pakaluk (2005), Price (1980, 2011, 2014), Roche (1988a, 2014a,b, 2019), Urmson (1988), Walker (2011, 2018), White (1992), and Whiting (1986, 1988). For my purposes it will be unnecessary to distinguish between versions of pluralism according to which goods other than ethically and intellectually virtuous activities (e.g., honor, money, good looks) count directly as parts of happiness and those according to which they do not.

¹¹ Relativists include Bush (2008), Cooper (2013, ch. 3), Curzer (1990, 1991, 2012), Devereux (1981, 2014), Heinaman (1988), Lawrence (1993, 2005), Long (2011), Scott (1999), and Thorsrud (2015). The view of Charles (1999, 2014) resists categorization as monist, pluralist, or relativist as I have

1.2 *The Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness*

5

Debates rage on about whether the passages relied upon by each group have been correctly interpreted. Monists think that the happy life is devoted most of all to contemplation in a straightforward way: The activities that figure in the happy person's life are devoted to contemplation because they are performed for its sake. Other goods are not directly included in the activity of happiness, but are choice-worthy within a happy life because they are for the sake of happiness, contemplation. These other goods, including ethically virtuous activities, are choice-worthy as parts of the happy life only to the extent that they are related to contemplation as being for its sake, even if they are choice-worthy in their own right. This way of including ethically virtuous activities makes pluralists suspect it of reflecting too dimly Aristotle's enthusiasm about ethically virtuous activities.¹²

Pluralists, who think that ethically and intellectually virtuous activities are parts of a composite activity, happiness, say that the happy life is devoted to such activities because they are parts of what makes such a life happy. They can add that among the virtuous activities that happiness comprises, the one to which special attention, for example, celebration (Broadie, 1991, 413–414), should be given, when reasonable,

described those positions, but I think that this taxonomy is still useful for revealing points at which I and others differ from Charles. His account resembles the monism of Lear (2004, 2014, 2015) insofar as it appeals to a centralizing relation between contemplation and other virtuous activities. Whereas in Lear's case this is the relation of approximation, in Charles's it is analogy. But Charles's appeal to a centralizing relation does different work from what Lear's does. Charles thinks that virtuous activity is made a case of happy activity by instantiating fineness in the particular way that it does, and that fineness is paradigmatically instantiated in contemplation, to which paradigmatic instantiation the fineness of other virtuous activities is analogically related. He would thus affirm only a weakened version of (B), according to which happiness is *paradigmatically* contemplation. As later arguments will indicate, I think that this would be too weak to do justice to the evidence for (B). Charles differs from pluralists in denying that virtuous activities are parts of happiness and from relativists in denying that virtuous activities are parts of any separately available kind of happiness. I am grateful to him for clarification about the relationship of his view to others. Baker (2021), who distinguishes between the human good and *eudaimonia* for beings more generally, gives an account of the latter that is similar in certain respects to Charles's account of the former. Baker thinks that divine *eudaimonia* is the paradigm case of *eudaimonia* and other cases of it, such as human contemplation or general justice, are gradably related to the paradigm case. When it comes to the human good specifically, Baker favors monism. I thank him for helpful conversations about his account.

¹² For such expressions of pluralists' suspicions, see, for example, Irwin (1991, 385), Keyt (1983, 364–366), Natali (1989, 281), and Whiting (1986, 92 n. 48), who argue that if ethical activities are for the sake of contemplation, then they will not satisfy the criteria for fully virtuous activity as expounded in *NE* 2.4 or the description of fine activity (*eupraxia*) in 6.5. Whiting argues, more specifically, that even if ethical activities are performed for their own sake as well as for the sake of contemplation, they will fail to conform to the stricture in 2.4 that fully virtuous activities be performed reliably.

6 From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive Problem

is contemplation, though monists will accuse them of attenuating the devotion to contemplation on which Aristotle insists.¹³

The third type of interpretation, relativism, has arisen as a reaction to pluralists' and monists' attempts to address the Dilemmatic Problem. Relativists claim that the apparently discrepant bits of textual evidence that correspond to (A) and (B) apply to two different kinds of happiness that are separately achievable, depending on one's circumstances or endowments. Happiness consisting in contemplation is open to those who are especially well-situated, while happiness consisting in ethically virtuous activity is the best achievable by those who are less fortunate. Relativists typically think that it is possible to be happy without ethically virtuous activity or without contemplation, but not if one lacks both. This possibility would be denied by monists and pluralists. Relativist interpretations aim to accommodate the textual evidence that has seemed problematic for monists, on the one hand, and pluralists, on the other, by sorting it into two boxes: Aristotle's two incompatible theories of happiness are not both meant to be true of any one agent; rather, one theory, that encapsulated by (B), is about the kind of happiness that is possible for agents with certain circumstances or endowments, the other, that encapsulated by (A), about another.

Several features of the dialectic between these groups of interpreters are important to mention at this point. The first is that pluralists and monists have been persistently dissatisfied with relativism for good reasons. Relativists think that the two sets of textual evidence (viz., that for happiness comprising virtuous activities generally and that for happiness consisting in contemplation) apply to two different kinds of happiness that are separately achievable, depending on one's circumstances or endowments. This of course requires that Aristotle countenance two kinds of happiness to which the two sets of evidence corresponding to (A) and (B) can be relativized *and* that he relativizes precisely one of them to each kind. There are several reasons why this claim does not gain dialectical traction. First, pluralists think that the best kind of happiness that an agent can enjoy must consist in intellectually and ethically virtuous activities. Relativists, though, must deny precisely this if they are to pursue the strategy of relativizing the evidence corresponding to (B) to the best kind of happiness, which in

¹³ For criticisms of pluralists along these lines, see, for example, Charles (1999, 209–211) and Lear (2004, 25–46). Urmson (1988, 125), a pluralist, certainly invites such responses: “There is surely no solution to all these difficulties. We must agree that Aristotle has let his enthusiasm get the better of him in his discussion of the theoretical life and replace his extreme claims with the more moderate view that the life of the scholar is the most choiceworthy, only in the sense that it is the best career to choose, not as the sole constituent in the good life.”

turn they must do on pain of their view being immediately unacceptable to monists. In short, pluralists have no more reason to accept relativism than they do to accept monism, so from their point of view relativism offers no dialectical advantage.¹⁴ In the absence of any new hope offered by relativism for convincing pluralist opponents, monists in their turn see no reason to retreat to relativism.

Second, pluralists and monists, unlike relativists, maintain that Aristotle gives several reasons to suggest that his claims are true of one and the same kind of happiness: Prior to *NE* 10.8, and indeed after 10.8 and even in the *Politics*, Aristotle offers no hint that there are two kinds of happiness. His introduction to the inquiry in book 1 strongly suggests that there should be a unique answer to the question of what happiness is. After all, his stated objective is to discover *the highest* good for human beings achievable in action (1.2, 1094^a18–26, 1.4, 1095^a14–17), and it is this highest good that he takes himself to have given “in outline” in the *ergon* (function) argument of 1.7 (1098^a20–21). The first line of 10.7, as well as back-references at 10.5, 1176^a3–4 and 10.6, 1176^a30–32, indicate that he intends his remarks on happiness in book 10 as a resumption of the outline account of happiness from 1.7, a resumption that he foreshadowed in 1.7.¹⁵ The immediately ensuing lines of 10.7 argue that happiness, as he here twice explicitly says he described it before and as he now describes it, is highest, most continuous, most pleasant, most self-sufficient, most perfect, and most leisurely. Pluralists and monists find it scarcely credible that there could be more than one kind of happiness with these properties, most of which were announced in book 1 as properties that the correct theory of happiness must show to belong to happiness.¹⁶

¹⁴ Charles (1999, 209) offers a series of arguments that relativism fails to avoid problems typically associated with monism. He also contends that relativism’s key distinction is ungrounded in the text.

¹⁵ Various forward and backward references linking books 1 and 10 are enumerated by Aufderheide (2020, 164), Bostock (2000, 190–191), Natali (1989, 282), Roche (1988a, 193 n. 38), and Whiting (1986, 89).

¹⁶ Irwin (2012, 519–520) thinks that 6.12, 1144^a29–36 gives evidence against two kinds of happiness, though his specific reasons for thinking so are contested by monists. Pakaluk (2005, 322) and Whiting (1986, 93–94 n. 50) argue that if there are the two possibilities for happiness upon which relativists insist, then at least one of them will not meet Aristotle’s stated criteria for anything that could count as happiness: perfection and self-sufficiency. Lear (2004, 195) alleges that relativism encounters an obstacle at 10.8, 1178^b20–32: “One might suggest that we read Aristotle as saying here that contemplation is responsible for the happiness of only the philosophical life. But this cannot be correct either. The utter failure of the beasts to participate in contemplation in any way is supposed to explain why they cannot be happy. If the presence of contemplation is just one way to grasp happiness, his claim that the beasts do not participate in contemplation would be insufficient to rule out the possibility of their happiness.”

8 From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive Problem

It is no accident that upon first exposure to the *NE* many have reacted with bewildered astonishment to the suggestion that the life in accordance with theoretical intellect is happiest and “the life in accord with the other kind of virtue (i.e., the kind concerned with action) (is happiest) in a secondary way” (10.8, 1178^a9, Irwin 2019 trans.). This is the passage that relativists claim as evidence that Aristotle delivers two kinds of happiness to readers who had been led by the entirety of what had preceded to expect only one. Irwin’s translation makes clear that ‘(is happiest)’ is a proposal for an elided predicate. The Greek indicates only that the practical life is secondary in some respect, but does not specify the respect.¹⁷ Irwin proposes ‘happiest’ merely because it occurs in the previous line. But, as I will argue in Chapter 3,¹⁸ understanding the elided predicate as ‘proper to a human being’¹⁹ from the line preceding the one to which Irwin looks makes better sense of Aristotle’s argument in the immediate context. Doing so also exhibits him following up on a related claim with which he ended 10.5 (with very similar wording) rather than committing him to an unanticipated announcement in 10.8 that there are two kinds of happiness. This proposal also renders intelligible the fact that he resumes speaking, for the rest of the *NE* and throughout its sequel, the *Politics*, as if there is only one kind of happiness. Indeed, Aristotle says on the next Bekker page (10.8, 1179^a29–30) that the person who manifests theoretical wisdom (*sophia*), the one who relativists think enjoys the superior kind of happiness, is most of all (*malista*) such as to act rightly (*orthôs*) and nobly (*kalôs*). But one who is most of all such as to act rightly and nobly is, according to relativists, the one who exemplifies the secondary kind of happiness. So, this passage gives us reason to doubt that Aristotle is, as relativists allege, relativizing the two sets of evidence to two kinds of happiness. There is, then, plenty of standardly recognized textual evidence against relativism, and even the one line alleged to support it is most conservatively interpreted as doing no such thing. But even if there were good evidence that Aristotle countenances two kinds of happiness (the activity), we could not safely say that the two sets of evidence, those corresponding to (A) and (B) of the Dilemmatic Problem, are true of precisely one kind of happiness each. While relativists have made important contributions to understanding Aristotle’s theory of happiness, often sharpening the terms of the debate or offering

¹⁷ Δευτέρως δ’ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν

¹⁸ This argument has its origin in Reece (2020a). Aufderheide (2020, 194–198) offers additional commentary on how the argument that follows 1178^a9 should be viewed in light of that proposal.

¹⁹ (οἰκεῖος) τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ

1.2 *The Dilemmatic Problem of Happiness*

9

formidable arguments with which all parties must contend, relativism is not a strategy for addressing Aristotle's claims in a way that can satisfy pluralists or monists. Neither does it feature any textually motivated fundamental commitment that pluralists or monists should feel any dialectical pressure to accept. If a way of accounting for the evidence were to emerge that respected the fundamental commitments of pluralists and monists alike, relativists should be prepared to accept it.

The second feature of the dialectical landscape that we should observe is that pluralists and monists are most charitably interpreted as having a genuine disagreement with each other, that is to say, disagreeing about the same thing rather than talking past each other. This is why I have formulated the Dilemmatic Problem not in terms of the happy *life*, but rather of happiness, which Aristotle thinks is an activity.²⁰ (From now on when I use 'happiness' unmodified I refer to the activity unless otherwise specified and I use 'happy life' to refer to the life made happy by happiness.) On his view, happiness is what makes a life a happy one. If pluralists thought that ethically virtuous activities were parts of the happy life, but not of happiness, then they would not continue to raise the objections to monists that they in fact raise. Put another way, a real disagreement between pluralists and monists requires that they be pluralists or monists *about the same thing*. Both groups tend to be pluralists about the happy *life*, so a real disagreement between them cannot be about what that consists in.

Reece (1992, 158–159) is a prominent early adopter of the distinction between happiness and the happy life who leverages it in an effort to soften the blow of monism for pluralists. Many others have subsequently appealed to the distinction. However, pluralists hold their view not because Aristotle lists ethically virtuous activities as parts of the happy *life* (along with external goods, etc.), but because they think that he discusses ethically virtuous activities for much of the *NE* as an elaboration of the conclusion of the *ergon* argument in *NE* 1.7.²¹ Pluralists and monists tend to agree that the conclusion of the *ergon* argument is about happiness rather than the happy life. That is because the argument explicitly excludes as candidates for the human *ergon* (work, function, characteristic activity) elements that the life includes, such as perception and nutrition. Put another way, whatever the *ergon* argument identifies as the human *ergon*, even

²⁰ Thanks to David Charles for discussion about the relationship between the happy life and the activities that it includes.

²¹ Ackrill (1974, 353–354) cites 1.9, 1100^a4–5 and 1.13, 1102^a5–6 as evidence for this, and Irwin (2012, 519) adds 2.6, 1106^a15–24.

10 From the Dilemmatic Problem to the Conjunctive Problem

merely in outline, it excludes elements that pluralists and monists would agree are included in the happy life. The *ergon* argument is not meant to identify the components of the happy human life, but rather to identify, at least in outline, what happiness is.

Another indication that the conclusion of the *ergon* argument is about happiness rather than the happy life is that Aristotle intends his statement of the human *ergon* to be an answer to the same question to which he ruled out virtue (the state) as an answer. He ruled out virtue (the state) for the reason that a state is not an activity. One might retort that a happy life is an activity. The problem then would be that we would have eliminated much of the motivation for distinguishing between the happy life and happiness (the activity).

Further evidence that the conclusion of the *ergon* argument is about happiness rather than the happy life is that otherwise his way of situating that conclusion among the reputable opinions in *NE* 1.8 would make little sense. For one thing, happiness is a good of the soul, comprising action(s) rather than external goods. Since external goods are part of a happy life, this restriction would be unmotivated if Aristotle means to be saying that the conclusion of the *ergon* argument was about a happy life. For another, why take the trouble of stressing at this stage that happiness, as it has just been specified, is not a virtuous state, but rather a virtuous activity? Also, why add ‘in a complete life’ (1.7, 1098^a18) if the excellent performance of our *ergon* is already a life?

The persistent disagreement between pluralists and monists is best interpreted as a genuine disagreement. They genuinely disagree about that in which happiness (the activity) consists, but need not disagree about what the happy life includes. So, I have stated the Dilemmatic Problem in terms of happiness rather than of the happy life.

The third feature of the dialectical situation will motivate the rest of the present chapter: Pluralists and monists have been persistently dissatisfied with each other’s approach, but each has strong, principled reasons to resist the other’s attempts to explain away the apparent evidence for (A) or (B). That is what has prevented solving the Dilemmatic Problem in a dialectically satisfactory way.

1.3 The Conjunctive Problem of Happiness

I will begin this section by identifying the factors that explain the dialectical resilience of pluralism and monism. Pluralists are reluctant to accept the monist account for several reasons. I will focus on the ones that I think