The expectation of reciprocity continues to be an important factor when states consider their legal obligations in armed conflicts. In this monograph, Peeler looks at the text and negotiations around the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions from 1977 to demonstrate the many places where international humanitarian law maintains expectations of reciprocity. This complements an examination of US policy regarding its Prisoner of War obligations in both the Vietnam War and the Global War on Terror, demonstrating how states make use of the expectation of reciprocity found in international humanitarian law to respond to continued non-compliance by an enemy.

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THE PERSISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

BRYAN PEELER

University of Manitoba, Canada
For Leigh – For all her love and support.
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<td>AP I</td>
<td>Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP II</td>
<td>Protocol (II) Additional to the Geneva Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRV</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EITs</td>
<td>Enhanced interrogation techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front of Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC I</td>
<td>Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC II</td>
<td>Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC III</td>
<td>Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>GC IV</td>
<td>Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global war on terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILM</td>
<td>International Legal Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILR</td>
<td>International Law Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCPOA</td>
<td>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLC</td>
<td>Office of Legal Counsel</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCIJ</td>
<td>Permanent Court of International Justice</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of war</td>
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<td>RIAA</td>
<td>Reports of International Arbitral Awards</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFT</td>
<td>TFT-FOR-TAT</td>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTS</td>
<td>United Nations Treaty Series</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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