

Introduction

Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray

Culture has an enormous influence on military organizations and institutions and their success or failure in the ultimate arbitration of war. One can broadly define organizational culture as the assumptions, ideas, norms, and beliefs, expressed or reflected in symbols, rituals, myths, and practices, that shape how an organization functions and adapts to external stimuli and that give meaning to its members.¹ Isabel Hull, who has written one of the clearest historical works to date on military culture, defines it as the “habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions, and unreflected cognitive frames” that underpin how an organization functions.² Except in unique circumstances – in the initial founding of an organization or when it undergoes severe trauma – culture grows slowly over time, embedding itself so deeply into its processes that members often act unconsciously according to its dictates.³ This may have positive benefits. American service members, for instance, are imbued with the cultural ethic to leave no soldier behind on the battlefield, which undoubtedly enhances morale and willingness to fight rather than flee, knowing that one’s comrades will be at one’s side if the worst occurs. But culture may also have negative consequences, especially when it locks an organization into dated and inappropriate ways of operating, as occurred with the Royal Navy in the period leading up to the Battle of Jutland in World War I.⁴ Culture can also act as a catalyst to increase the brutality of war, and in other cases to decrease it.⁵ Because culture lies hidden under more visible organizational doctrine and symbols, one can easily overlook its power. “Nevertheless,” writes Hull,

¹ For an excellent discussion of organizational culture, see Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, NY, 1995), 19–25, and Mats Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture* (London, 2002), 3–4.

² Isabel V. Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 2.

³ For a discussion of the impact of trauma-learning, see *ibid.*, 96.

⁴ For an example of how culture influenced the poor performance of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, see Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (London, 1996).

⁵ For an example of culture influencing the ferocity of war, see John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986); for examples of culture making war more humane, see Legro, *Cooperation under Fire*.

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“organizational culture is more likely to determine action than is explicit policy or ideology.”⁶

Culture has two major impacts on an organization. First, it creates organizational identity, that is, the distinctive attributes that make the organization different from others. The US Marine Corps, for instance, prides itself on being a flexible expeditionary force capable of rapid deployment at the orders of the president. The US Army has a few units with this same ethos, but the organization as a whole is “America’s army” designed to fight and win the nation’s wars. Marine leaders expect short, sharp engagements, while Army leaders aim to fight over the long haul. The two cultures sometimes collide, as occurred in the invasion of Saipan in June 1944, when Marine Lt. Gen. Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith relieved US Army Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith over the latter’s perceived lack of aggressiveness in fighting through the mountainous interior of the island.⁷ Second, culture establishes expectations of how group members will act in a given situation. The German Army’s emphasis on operational maneuver in both world wars, for instance, led senior leaders to ignore more salient aspects of strategy, in particular economic mobilization and logistics. Germany’s senior military leaders, imbued with a culture of tactical and operational excellence, believed that maneuver would achieve quick victories over major powers, thus enabling Germany to overcome Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States despite the vast latent industrial power of the Allies.⁸ This culture ultimately resulted in the destruction of the Wehrmacht as Allied forces overran Germany in the spring of 1945.

The problem for senior military leaders is not just the difficulty in understanding culture, but in using it to further the goals of the organization. Even harder is changing culture when it becomes antithetical to organizational needs. A highly respected Marine general once commented to one of the editors that “changing culture [is] like trying to turn a large cruise liner” – it can only occur slowly.⁹ These problems exist despite the best intentions of leaders and managers to “get” culture. One authority on organizational culture writes, “However, even in those cases where top managers have a strong awareness of the significance of culture, there is often a lack of a deeper understanding of how people and organizations function in terms of culture. Culture is as significant and complex as it is difficult to understand and ‘use’ in a thoughtful

⁶ Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, 92.

⁷ For the most part, US Army and Marine commanders cooperated with one another during the Pacific War against Japan. For an analysis of the “Smith vs. Smith” controversy, see Sharon Tosi Lacey, *Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific* (Denton, TX, 2013), chapter 4.

⁸ For the evolution of German military culture emphasizing operational maneuver and quick victories, see Robert Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence, KS, 2005).

⁹ Lt. Gen. Paul van Riper to Williamson Murray, conversation 1996.

way.”¹⁰ One of the purposes of this book is to help military leaders understand how organizational culture forms; the influence culture has on organizational functioning and the development of strategy, operations, and tactics; and how culture changes.

Culture is clearly a crucial determinant to the effectiveness of military organizations. It may come as a surprise, then, that perhaps the best study in this genre left out culture as a determinant of military effectiveness. In the three volumes of *Military Effectiveness*, focused on World War I, the interwar period, and World War II, editors Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (also the coeditor of this volume) posited a number of factors influencing military effectiveness, defined as “the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power.”¹¹ Among these factors are the ability of an armed force to operate within the political milieu to obtain manpower and resources, the fashioning of strategies to achieve political goals, the matching of ways and means to the ends of strategy, the ability to operate within the context of an alliance, the development of doctrine to maximize the capabilities of various arms and services, the willingness of the officer corps to realistically examine the problems confronting an armed force, the reasonable integration of available technology, a coequal emphasis on support elements such as intelligence and logistics, and tactical flexibility and adaptability.¹² To be fair the editors warned that “one must include in the analysis non-quantifiable organizational attitudes, behaviors, and relationships that span a military organization’s full activities at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”¹³ But organizational culture was not an explicit element of the study and chapter authors for the most part did not address it. The intention of this volume, then, is to revise and expand the discussion of military effectiveness by focusing on the role played by organizational and strategic culture in its development.

Of all the factors involved in military effectiveness, culture is perhaps the most important. Yet it also remains the most difficult to describe and understand, because it involves so many external factors that impinge, warp, and distort its formation and continuities, even in different military organizations within the same nation. These factors explain why it is so difficult for military organizations to change their fundamental, underlying culture.

Thus, even catastrophic military defeat can have relatively little impact on an organization’s underlying culture. The performance of the Italian-Piedmontese military in losing or performing badly in a series of wars from the mid-nineteenth century through to its dismal performance during World War II underlines the

¹⁰ Alvesson, *Understanding Organizational Culture*, 1.

¹¹ Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 1, *The First World War* (Boston, 1988), 2.

¹² *Ibid.*, 4–27. ¹³ *Ibid.*, 27.

point that military organizations do not necessarily learn from their defeats. As Professor MacGregor Knox has pointed out about the culture of the Italian Army senior leadership, “The fundamental problem was the Italian general staff tradition: Custoza, Lissa, Adua, Caporetto. On those occasions the military ... distinguished itself by the absence of the study, planning, and attention to detail that characterized the Germans, and by a tendency to intrigue and confuse responsibilities among senior officers.”¹⁴ In fact, history suggests that largely because of underlying and systemic factors, it has proven extraordinarily difficult to change the basic culture of military organizations.¹⁵

Despite the foregoing discussion, all too many historians and other commentators argue that military defeat can have a profound impact on the culture of military organizations.¹⁶ More often than not, they cite the example of the German Army in the interwar period as having reacted effectively in response to its disastrous defeat in World War I and thus created modern armored warfare.¹⁷ In fact, the Germans did develop impressive ground forces in the interwar period that had a significant impact in the first two years of World War II. However, those successes rested entirely on the tactical revolution that the Germans had initiated in the last two years of World War I.¹⁸ Moreover, in the larger sense, the German military, and not just the army, failed to learn the more important strategic lessons of the war.¹⁹ Having taken on effectively all of the great powers outside Central Europe between 1914 and 1918, it managed to repeat this same strategic mistake in the next conflict – creating a strategic situation where the Germans to all intents and purposes ended up fighting all of the other major powers in Europe, with the United States again thrown in for good measure.

Yet military cultures do change over time. Horatio Nelson’s mantra at Trafalgar summed up the Royal Navy’s culture from 1757 to 1815: “No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy.”²⁰ It was a culture that demanded initiative, independent decision-making, and leadership

¹⁴ MacGregor Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War* (Cambridge, 1984), 16.

¹⁵ There are, of course, exceptions, as the chapters in this volume on the Army of Northern Virginia (Chapter 4) and the Army of the Tennessee (Chapter 3) point out.

¹⁶ Among others see Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the Wars* (Ithaca, NY, 1986).

¹⁷ In fact, what the Germans created was not modern armored warfare, but rather combined-arms tactics into which they folded the tank, which added an element of rapid exploitation to elements already intrinsic in German doctrine.

¹⁸ For the German innovations in armored warfare, see particularly Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge, 1996), chapter 1.

¹⁹ The German Kriegsmarine, having brought the United States into the war in 1917 with disastrous consequences for the Reich, nevertheless was arguing strongly in July 1941 for Hitler to declare war on the United States.

²⁰ Nelson’s memorandum to his captains immediately before the Battle of Trafalgar, October 9, 1805, www.bl.uk/learning/timeline/item106127.html.

at least down to the level of its captains. A century-plus later at Jutland, the captains of Lord Jellicoe's battle fleet exhibited none of these qualities. Over that period, the organizational culture of the Royal Navy had shifted 180 degrees.²¹ Significantly, the leaders of the Royal Navy were so humiliated by their performance in 1916 that they instigated major changes in the Navy's culture, so that the performance of the organization improved drastically by the onset of World War II, both in its surface battles in the Mediterranean and in the adaptability of its surface forces to the U-boat threat.²²

Three important external factors impact military culture: geography, history, and the nature of the environment in which navies, armies, and air forces exist. Geography forms the basic context within which the past has influenced and determined the framework within which armed forces and their leaders view the world. As in real estate, geography is a matter of location, location, location. The events that transpired at Dunkirk in late May and early June 1940 were to a great extent influenced by the fact that the British viewed land's end very differently from the Germans – and the French, for that matter. To the continental militaries, the end of solid ground represented the termination of military operations. To the British, the ocean represented a great highway, an avenue of escape from the vicissitudes of the ground operations that had turned out so badly for them in northern France. Thus the Germans, largely for cultural reasons, bungled the last stages of their campaign that destroyed the French Army, but not that of Great Britain.²³

Significantly, that sense of the ocean as a great highway has been the basis of British strategy and Britain's military culture since the end of the seventeenth century.²⁴ Nevertheless, naval power by itself could not win or even influence to a considerable degree the wars of the great continental powers.²⁵ But

²¹ For how this drastic change in culture took place, see particularly Gordon, *The Rules of the Game*.

²² See Chapter 14 of this volume.

²³ The British had a long history of escapes from impossible military situations that had turned out badly. The most famous of these were the abandonment of Boston in 1776 during the American Revolution, after the Americans had seized and emplaced artillery on Dorchester Heights overlooking the city, and Coruna in Spain in 1808, when the British Army withdrew in the face of Marshal Massena's overwhelming superiority. On the other hand, the failure of British forces to escape from Yorktown in 1781 sealed their fate and with it the outcome of the American Revolutionary War.

²⁴ That was not B. H. Liddell Hart's argument that the British in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had followed a course of minimum support to the continental wars and maximum support to a blue-water strategy aimed at seizing French colonies. For a rejoinder to this argument, see Williamson Murray, "Grand Strategy, Alliances, and the Anglo-American Way of War," in Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., *Grand Strategy and Military Alliances* (Cambridge, 2016), chapter 2.

²⁵ That has not prevented a significant number of British commentators from early in the eighteenth century onward from arguing in favor of a blue-water school of strategy, in which Britain would not support continental allies, but rather would focus entirely on the naval and mercantile struggle. In this regard, see particularly Jonathan Swift's pamphlet *On the Conduct of the Allies*, a ferocious attack on Marlborough's strategy in the War of Spanish Succession.

Britain's relative invulnerability that resulted from its geography as an island allowed that nation eventually to control the world's oceans.²⁶ British strategists also provided significant financial and military aid to Britain's allies on the continent to keep them in the fight. Particularly in the wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon, this twofold strategy of providing substantial military aid and financial support to Britain's allies, while dominating the world's oceans, allowed the British to overcome opponents with substantially greater resources. In the great emperor's case, the British confronted a France in control of nearly the entire European continent.²⁷ This strategy was made possible by a Royal Navy imbued with a culture of independent initiative and aggressiveness that made it feasible for Britain to blockade the continent, ferry British forces to distant battlefields, and keep the British trading economy going even as its continental adversaries controlled much of Europe.

During the Seven Year's War, British Prime Minister William Pitt's strategy of controlling the world's oceans allowed the British to conduct major operations for the control of Canada and the Caribbean islands, while they were at the same time providing substantial ground forces and subsidies to assist Frederick the Great in repelling the combined assaults of France, Austria, and Russia.²⁸ The one time during the eighteenth century that the British failed to secure firm alliances on the continent, namely during the war against the American revolutionaries, they suffered a major defeat and lost the American colonies in the process.

We should also note that the fact that France, one of Europe's greatest powers, lies immediately across the English Channel has had a profound effect on how the English and then the British have viewed the world. During the Age of Sail, the Low Countries represented a major invasion threat to those directing strategy in London. Elizabeth I took a major risk in supporting the Dutch against the overweening power of Philip II's Spain, because Spanish control of the Low Countries represented an enormous strategic threat to the British Isles. Similarly, the support rendered by English and then British governments to the Second Hundred Years' War against the French from 1688 through 1815 represented a strategic vision that largely determined British strategic culture – a vision rooted in the geography of the English Channel and the North Sea.

In many respects, the strategy followed in the twentieth century by American leaders has reflected the same geographic realities that enabled Britain to succeed in earlier centuries. To all intents and purposes the United States is

²⁶ There were, of course, other significant factors in Britain's rise.

²⁷ What Liddell Hart entirely ignored was the reality that the British supported a major ground effort on the Iberian Peninsula under the Duke of Wellington that kept the flame of resistance alive and that led Napoleon to describe the war in Spain as his "Iberian ulcer."

²⁸ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Year's War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2001).

an island; its neighbors to the north and south since the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War of 1847 have never represented a significant threat. Thus, throughout the twentieth century, the Americans have used North America as an economic and military springboard to project military power across the great oceans that separate them from the rest of the world. In World War I, their economic strength kept the Allies in the war, and in 1918, the arrival of great masses of American infantry in France helped to tip the military balance against the Germans and finally made the blockade of the Central Powers effective.²⁹ In World War II, the United States was truly the “arsenal of democracy,” but its success rested on a strategic culture that understood the importance of logistics, economic realities, and the difficulties involved in the projection of power over immense distances.³⁰ While the Cold War never became hot, the presence of American troops, air forces, and naval power in Europe and Korea kept the balance relatively stable and prevented the disaster of a nuclear war.

For continental powers, the influence of geography on strategic culture is obviously quite different.³¹ For the French, the fact that they have always bordered on a major power has had a profound impact on their history. Thus, their efforts against the Spanish in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries reflected deep fears about the security of a nation confronted on three sides by Spanish military forces – in the Pyrenees, Italy, and Flanders. And, of course, there was the problem posed by English and later British sea power, which forced the French to divide their military strength between sea power and land power, neither of which they mastered, except when they were led by a Corsican military genius, Napoleon.³²

The Germans are an interesting case, because for most of their history the Reich was nothing more than a collection of mini-states with no ability to craft anything resembling a common strategy. Prussia emerged in the eighteenth century to provide something resembling a German state, but Prussia’s existence depended very much not only on the strength of its army but also on the strategic wisdom of its leadership. The military disaster of 1806 underlined its geographic limitations and was to have a profound impact on the military culture that evolved in the nineteenth century. The Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, through his brilliant understanding of the weaknesses of Germany’s

²⁹ For the extraordinary weakness of the blockade of the Central Powers from 1914 to 1917, see Nicholas Lambert, *Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).

³⁰ For the role of economic factors in the American mobilization of its industrial resources, see James Lacey, *Keep from All Thoughtful Men: How U.S. Economists Won World War II* (Annapolis, MD, 2011).

³¹ We should note that strategic culture is not the same as organizational culture, although the former exercises considerable influence over the latter, as we point out throughout the book.

³² Napoleon spoke French with a Corsican-Italian accent.

strategic competitors as well as the milieu in which he was operating, was able to create a unified Germany. But after the “War in Sight Crisis” of 1875, he understood how vulnerable Germany was, surrounded as it was on three sides by great powers.³³

Despite Bismarck’s admonitions, the culture that dominated the German military at the end of the nineteenth century paid no attention to the Reich’s strategic position, or to the fact that the only resource that Germany would control in substantial amounts was coal.³⁴ Thus, Kaiser Wilhelm II disregarded virtually all of Bismarck’s policies and in addition created the High Seas Fleet, an explicit threat to the British, thereby driving the British into the arms of the French and their Russian allies. The German nation in the twentieth century would pay a terrible price for ignoring the dictates of geography by embracing a culture that instead emphasized operational, tactical, and technical effectiveness at the expense of sound strategy.

Equally important and to the detriment of German military culture is the fact that the Reich’s position in Europe has meant that it has always been located near the center of major wars; consequently, the German military in the wars of German unification had to pay relatively little attention to logistics in its conduct of military operations. By 1914, the development of operational plans ignored any factors that impeded maneuver and the attempt to destroy enemy armies in great *kesselschlachten*, or battles of encirclement. The Schlieffen Plan in 1914 was not just an operational failure but also a logistical one. By the time the Germans approached Paris and the Marne, they were almost out of ammunition, while their food situation had reached such dire straits that officers were issuing the troops wine to keep them going – with obvious results.³⁵ In World War II, the extraordinary distances over which the Wehrmacht operated – from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Volga to the Atlantic Ocean – meant that logistics was a crucial factor in military operations. And here the Germans proved disastrously inept. The failure of Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, was above all a failure of logistics. Even after the war was over, Gen. Franz Halder, the chief of the *Oberkommando des Heeres* (Army) staff from 1938 to 1942, commented that “quartermaster [logisticians] must never hamper operational concepts,” a

³³ For Bismarck’s strategic policies after the “War in Sight Crisis,” see Marcus Jones, “Bismarckian Strategy Policy, 1871–1890,” in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., *Successful Strategies: Triumphant in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge, 2014), chapter 8.

³⁴ For Germany’s strategic weaknesses in raw materials, see Williamson Murray, *The Change in the European Balance of Power: The Path to Ruin* (Princeton, NJ, 1984), chapter 1.

³⁵ For the logistical mess that the Germans had gotten themselves into by early September 1914, see Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914–1918* (London, 1997), 100–101.

statement that flew in the face of every major campaign in World War II, with the exception perhaps of the 1940 German campaign against France.³⁶

The United States makes an interesting contrast to other nations. The first great conflict that the Americans waged as a major power came with the American Civil War. The problem that the North confronted was not just in mobilizing vast military power from a tiny garrison force whose mission had been to keep settlers and Indians separated, but also in fighting a war over continental distances, which would require logistical capabilities unheard of thus far in military history.³⁷ The vast area of the Confederacy, some 780,000 square miles, was equivalent to the combined territories of Britain, France, the Low Countries, Spain, Germany, and Italy.

The problem for the North then was not just to raise vast armies and mobilize its industry, which was almost completely unprepared to support the needs of a major war, but also to project military power over continental distances — distances that the Europeans had only confronted with Napoleon's invasion of Russia (and then none too successfully). The result was an emphasis on logistics, which has been at the center of US military culture ever since. But then it has to be, because the capabilities of the American military depend on the ability to project power over continental and oceanic distances. Victory in the Pacific and in Europe represented the triumph of American military culture, in which an understanding of logistics was deeply imbedded in its military approach to strategy as well as operations.

If geography is important to the formation of the culture of military organizations, so too are the influences of past military experiences. In some cases, geography and the past are intimately intertwined. In this regard, the experience of Russia is instrumental. It has the greatest land expanse of any major nation, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, unlike the United States, which has no major powers on its borders and has suffered invasions only when it had no significant navy, Russia, despite its vast spaces, has confronted a series of significant invasions beginning with the Mongols in the thirteenth century, whose devastating conquest set Russian civilization far behind that of the rest of Europe. A number of major invasions from the west followed that disaster: the Poles in the seventeenth century, the Swedes in the eighteenth century, Napoleon and the Grand Army in 1812, and finally the Germans in World Wars I and II. The German invasion was the most terrible of all. By the time the Red Army had driven the Wehrmacht off the territory of the Soviet Union, some 27 million Soviet citizens had died. Not surprising, that historical experience has

³⁶ Quoted in Dennis Showalter, *Instruments of War: The German Army 1914–1918* (London, 2016), 188.

³⁷ For a discussion of the geography of the Confederacy, see Williamson Murray and Wayne Wai-siang Hsieh, *A Savage War: A Military History of the United States* (Princeton, NJ, 2016), 60–62.

given the Russians a strategic culture driven by fear and suspicion of the outsider and an expansionist mentality aiming to incorporate buffer states that lay along its borders, along with a deep suspicion of its neighbors that verges on the paranoid.³⁸

For a specific historical example that underlines the impact of the past on military culture, there are few better examples than the disastrous defeat that the Prussian Army suffered at the hands of Napoleon and his marshals in October 1806 at the double battles of Jena-Auerstadt. In one day, given grossly inept handling at the tactical and operational levels, the Prussian Army collapsed before the Grand Army's onslaught. The collapse of the Prussian state followed soon thereafter. The result was that from the Napoleonic wars onward the Prussian officer corps focused heavily on tactics and military operations. It also developed a military culture that was profoundly anti-intellectual. By 1900, German military writers, largely influenced by the traditions of the Prussian Army, were dismissing concepts of strategy – and even Clausewitz with his emphasis on war as a continuation of politics by other means – as outmoded concepts not worthy of study. As Gen. Geyer von Schweppenburg wrote to Liddell Hart after World War II, “You will be horrified to hear that I have never read Clausewitz or Delbrück or Haushofer. The opinion on Clausewitz in our general staff was that [he was] a theoretician to be read by professors.”³⁹

The emphasis was now on what the Germans termed “military necessity.”⁴⁰ In such a strategic culture, the German general staff found it easy to dismiss the consequences of the fact that a violation of Belgium's neutrality during an invasion of France would bring Britain into the war. Similarly, military necessity overrode strategic and political concerns in the German decision to use poison gas in April 1915. Even more disastrous was the decision to resume submarine warfare against the British in January 1917, despite the fact that the Germans knew that doing so would bring the United States into the war. And indeed the Americans did declare war in April 1917 with a strategic impact that sealed the Reich's fate. Underlining the overweening emphasis the Germans placed on tactics is the fact that in developing the plans for the Michael offensive in March 1918, Ludendorff established no operational goals. As he told the army group commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who was to command the offensive, “I object to the word ‘operation.’ We will punch a

³⁸ In dealing with the Russians, it is well to remember that they often talk about the great victories of 1944 and 1945 but rarely of the catastrophic defeats of 1941. But it is the history of 1941 that is burned into their memory.

³⁹ Geyer von Schweppenburg attended the *Kriegsakademie* immediately before the outbreak of World War I. Letter from Geyer von Schweppenburg to Basil Liddell Hart, 1948, BHLH Archives, King's College Archives, London, 9/24.V/61, 32.

⁴⁰ On this see particularly Hull, *Absolute Destruction*.