Introduction

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) was a philosopher of extraordinarily wide interests and varied activities: a theologian by training and a practicing minister, a teacher, school principal, and education minister, he wrote works in these areas, as well as in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and more. He is probably best known for his pioneering work in the philosophy of history and culture. In his early *Fragments on Recent German Literature* (1767–8), a commentary on the *Letters Concerning the Most Recent German Literature* (written by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, and others), Herder investigates the characters of different languages, the ways in which they are reflected in literary production and themselves reflect broader cultural practices and values. In his two major works in the philosophy of history, *This Too a Philosophy of History* (1774) and *Ideas towards the Philosophy of History of Humanity* (1784–91), Herder attempts to characterize the complex interdependence of religion, economic practices, traditions, arts, political structures, and so on that constitute a particular culture, differentiate cultures from one another, and are transformed historically. Herder has thus been an important resource in political philosophy for thinking about cultural identity and diversity, and is seen, generally, as an originator of historicism and philosophical anthropology, indeed of the modern discipline of anthropology itself.¹

¹ Including Thomas Abbt, Friedrich Nicolai, F. G. Resewitz, and F. Grillo.

Among Herder’s many interests, aesthetics also looms large, however, particularly in his early writings. He composed poetry, and was among the first to collect folk songs in order to preserve this art form, which he feared was on the verge of extinction. His first independent theoretical work was the unfinished *Treatise on the Ode* (1764–5), and, as noted, his early *Fragments* treats topics in the philosophy of literature. In this period, Herder also wrote four monographs in aesthetics – the *Critical Forests* (1769, though the fourth and most important, CF4, was not published in Herder’s lifetime) – as well as *Sculpture* (1778), which was to be the first volume of a never-completed systematic aesthetics. He wrote numerous essays in aesthetics as well – on taste and on the role of the arts in moral education, for example, and on specific authors and works, such as Homer, Òssian, Shakespeare (the last two in his collaboration with Goethe, *On German Art and Kind* [1773]) – as well as *Calligone* (1800), a polemic against Kant’s *Critique of Judgment*, his final published monograph.3

In part because of Herder’s extensive knowledge of the arts, his philosophical work in aesthetics has a richness and sensitivity, detail and breadth, at least equal to that of any of his contemporaries and possibly any theorist before or since. He not only discusses long-standing questions in aesthetics such as the nature of genius or the relationship between aesthetics and morality, but also formulates new questions concerning specific art forms, works, periods, or artists. Radically for his time (and for ours), Herder proposes an aesthetic value pluralism, emphasizing the diversity of aesthetic values and modes of aesthetic appreciation, and so also aims of works in different art forms. He is arguably the earliest theorist of artistic expression, which is for him intimately connected to the consideration of art as located within social and historical contexts.4

Despite the richness of Herder’s work in aesthetics, however, it has not been much considered either as part of the history of philosophical aesthetics or as a resource in ongoing discussion in aesthetics, particularly

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3 Robert Clark, in *Herder: Life and Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), chapter 3, contends that Herder abandoned aesthetics after finishing the *Critical Forests*, to focus on historical, political, or religious topics. But Herder in fact continued to work on CF4 and *Sculpture*, and wrote numerous essays in aesthetics as well as *Calligone* in the later period of his career.

4 I would contend that many of Herder’s most recognized views concerning culture and history arise out of his aesthetics, and shall note below some cases of this fundamental aesthetic orientation of his thinking.
in Anglophone scholarship. Many works have only recently been translated into English; many remain untranslated, notably Calligone. Herder’s aesthetics has been the subject of only two monographs in English: Joseph Fugate’s The Psychological Basis of Herder’s Aesthetics (1966), a now outdated work, and Robert Norton’s Herder’s Aesthetics and the European Enlightenment (1991). The latter is excellent, but focused solely on Herder’s first and fourth Critical Forests. Herder’s aesthetic theory is also rarely treated in surveys of the historical tradition in philosophical aesthetics, whether in English or in German.

The most basic aim of the present work is, consequently, to provide an overview of Herder’s rich aesthetic theory in order to introduce it to an Anglophone readership and to indicate its significance within the European tradition of philosophical aesthetics. Attention to Herder’s work as part of the tradition in aesthetics may also, however, enrich and somewhat reorient the consideration of Herder in existing scholarly discussion. In much German-language literary scholarship, Herder has been treated as a founding contributor to modern German literature, who, together with figures such as Lessing, Mendelssohn, Goethe, and Schiller, self-consciously attempted to generate a modern German literary culture. (His works are often found in the literature rather than philosophy sections in German libraries and bookstores.) In this scholarship, Herder’s relationship to the Enlightenment – or, better, given recent scholarly recognition of the complexity of this eighteenth-century intellectual movement, the Enlightenment – has been a dominant focus of discussion. Herder’s stance as critic or contributor to Enlightenment projects has also been a central theme in much Anglophone scholarship,

1 In M (2006), Sculpture (2002), and some essays in F (2002).
6 John K. Noyes, Herder: Aesthetics against Imperialism (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2015), also engages with Herder’s works in aesthetics, but more as political-philosophical interventions than as works in aesthetic theory.
7 Though there is more and very fine German-language scholarship on Herder’s aesthetics, it is often quite focused as well; e.g., Hans Adler, Die Prägnanz des Dunklen. Ginoeologie, Ästhetik, Geschichtphilosophie bei Johann Gottfried Herder (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990); Ulrike Zasch, Umkehr der Sinnesarchite. Herder und die Aufwertung des Tastsinns seit der frühen Neuzeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000). Hans Dietrich Irmscher provides nice overview chapters on Herder’s aesthetics and literary criticism in Herder (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001).
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following or opposing Isaiah Berlin’s influential treatment of Herder as a counter-Enlightenment figure. Both approaches are amply justified. Herder’s interest in and influence on the development of modern German literature can hardly be overestimated, and his relationship to the Enlightenment is charged and complex, for example, combining forceful criticism of Voltaire’s progressivist conception of history and celebration of modern reason (in TT) with a broadly Spinozist or German Enlightenment rationalist approach to religion (in GSC). Herder’s “pluralistic cosmopolitanism” likewise rejects Enlightenment rational universalism while endorsing central normative aims of the Enlightenment such as tolerance.

If one considers Herder in the context of the tradition in philosophical aesthetics, as I shall, these points are deemphasized, however. For Herder participated not only in the national project of building a modern German artistic culture but also in a cross-European philosophical discussion. He engages extensively with the aesthetics of prominent German philosophers – notably Alexander Baumgarten, Moses Mendelssohn, and Immanuel Kant – but also with the British tradition in philosophical aesthetics, as well as (to a lesser degree) French philosophers Denis Diderot and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In responding to these thinkers, Herder not only treats historically concrete questions concerning the interpretation and production of works in his own cultural setting, but also questions concerning appropriate philosophical method or the nature of artistic value as such. The latter questions are at the center of my account, which sees Herder’s works in aesthetics through a philosophical interpretive and methodological lens.


10 I take the quoted phrase from Forster, After Herder, p. 43.

11 Adler, Pragnanz, and Irmscher, Herder, are two examples of the tendency within German scholarship to treat Herder nearly exclusively (and so I think falsifyingly) within the context of German philosophy. One might mention here too the important work of Marion Heinz, e.g., Sensualistischer Idealismus. Untersuchungen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik des jungen Herder (1765–1778) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1994), as well as Rudolf Haym’s earlier, monumental Herder (Berlin: Aufbau, 1954).
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Seen in the context of eighteenth-century discussion in philosophical aesthetics, moreover, some of Herder’s most characteristic claims, including those which have been taken to be most “counter-Enlightenment” – such as his celebration of the senses and of the importance of feeling in human life – may be seen not as resistant to dominant intellectual trends but as participating in a widely shared philosophical project. For aesthetics was understood – by empiricists and rationalists alike, by figures taken to be central to the Enlightenments, such as Mendelssohn, Kant, Diderot, and David Hume – precisely as the philosophical investigation of the senses and of feeling, identifying their value and place within a good human life. This investigation, both in general and for Herder, may in turn be understood as part of Enlightenment projects such as the Scottish Enlightenment “science of man” (to include an understanding of human sensibility) or the German Enlightenment project of understanding the education of mankind toward rationally determined, moral behavior, carried out in part through aesthetic appreciation. Indeed in the context of discussions in aesthetics, Herder appears not at all as the anti-rational Counter-Enlightenment figure he is sometimes portrayed to be. More than many of his interlocutors, he takes up stances typical of the “Enlightenment” as usually understood: he insists on the role of reason and reasons in aesthetic appreciation and on the objectivity of aesthetic value.

Within this shared eighteenth-century project, I shall argue, Herder’s aesthetics is nonetheless distinctive. It is rich, compelling, understudied work. It also encapsulates a crucial, revelatory moment of transition in modern philosophical aesthetics: from the approach dominant in eighteenth-century discussion to that, strikingly different, characteristic of nineteenth-century philosophical aesthetics, from the philosophy of taste to the systematic philosophy of art. This will be a major theme of the present study. As I shall also suggest – the second major theme of this book – Herder’s aesthetic theory comprises a largely neglected alternative in philosophical aesthetics: unlike most of his predecessors, contemporaries, or successors, Herder is a naturalist in aesthetics. I now develop further these two themes, in turn.

I.1 “Hinge Point” between Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Philosophical Aesthetics

Though philosophers had of course previously discussed beauty and art, these phenomena first receive intense, sustained philosophical attention in Europe in the eighteenth century, often taken therefore to be the
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birthplace of philosophical aesthetics, the “century of taste.” Beginning with the works of Jean-Baptiste (Abbé) Dubos in France (1719), Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Joseph Addison in England (both circa 1711), and Alexander Baumgarten in Germany (1735), philosophical questions concerning taste, beauty, and art are discussed by nearly all major (and minor) European philosophers of the period. As just mentioned, this project is understood, generally, as the philosophical investigation of sensibility: of sensation, imagination, and feeling. These philosophers do propose theories of genius (artistic creativity) and discuss art. But the central topic of their inquiry is aesthetic experience or, in their terms, “taste,” the capacity to appreciate the beautiful (or the sublime, picturesque, etc.). The problem of the standard of taste, or of the universal validity of judgments of taste – if judgments of taste are based in pleasure, is there such a thing as correct taste, a rightful demand on others to agree with one’s judgments? – is both sharply formulated (particularly by Hume and Kant) and answered in multiple ways. These thinkers also consider the broader significance of aesthetic sensibility, suggesting, for example, that responsiveness to the beautiful is educational for moral sensibility or for rational understanding and knowledge.

Interest in matters aesthetic does not wane in the nineteenth century. Indeed, if the eighteenth century is the “century of taste” in philosophy, the nineteenth century might be called the “century of art.” Again nearly all the major European philosophers of this period – for example, Friedrich Schlegel,12 Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, John Stuart Mill – take aesthetics as central to philosophy. They argue that art is revelatory of human nature and ideals, a paradigmatic human accomplishment, even a distinctively admirable sort of entity. Many attempt to articulate an ontology of art and to place art within larger metaphysical projects, seeing artworks as, for example, organic wholes or instances of realized self-consciousness. Hegel, Schelling, and Schopenhauer develop grand, systematic theories of art, attempting to understand not just art as such, but also the specific natures of the particular art forms. Nearly all of them attempt to understand art both as a social practice and as historically changing, perhaps as revealing the trend of human history as such. All see art as providing ideals, worldviews, and guiding principles for fulfilling ways of life, and thus as rivaling or surpassing philosophy as a guide to the deepest truths about ourselves and our place in the natural, social, and historical

12 Schlegel publishes his major works at the end of the eighteenth century, but thematically is closer to nineteenth-century thinkers such as Hegel or Schopenhauer.
world. Art is indeed taken as a key source of human self-understanding, or as the site of its complex failure or refusal, as in Romantic irony.

There are, of course, continuities between eighteenth-century philosophical aesthetics and these nineteenth-century philosophies of art, whether acknowledged – as in Schopenhauer’s debt to Kant – or not – as in Nietzsche’s reworking of the eighteenth-century dichotomy between the beautiful and the sublime in his distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian artistic drives. Nevertheless, the dissimilarity in philosophical discussion across the two centuries is remarkable: philosophical aesthetics turns from attending to the psychology of aesthetic response (taste) to propounding systematic ontologies of art, from attempts to formulate a conception of the beautiful as accessible to and valuable for all individuals to a focus on the differences among the arts, the cultural specificity of artworks, and historical transformations in artistic production.

This transition is, moreover, not much explained or justified by nineteenth-century aestheticians themselves. Hegel’s and Schelling’s brief comments that questions about taste are “too subjective,” and therefore irrelevant to the real value of art, may be the most explicit reasons given for the nineteenth-century rejection of the approach of their eighteenth-century predecessors;13 perhaps one could add Tolstoy’s fulminations against his predecessors’ elitist and trivializing conception of art as beautiful.14 Such comments are, however, more dismissive of their predecessors than explanatory of a dramatic change in approach.

There are doubtless many historical – social, political, artistic – factors that might be adduced to explain this change, and many philosophical reasons for deeper and different consideration of aesthetics as the European philosophical tradition progresses.15 Yet Herder’s aesthetics provides, I shall argue, significant insight into this transformation. Adapting Charles Taylor’s characterization of Herder, I propose that Herder’s theory functions as a “hinge point” between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetics.16 Taylor’s term, “hinge,” is particularly apt, in suggesting that

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15 One powerful philosophical impulse is the systematic place Kant allocates to aesthetics in his Critique of Judgment. Among many others, I have discussed this Kantian influence on his successors in the conclusion to Kant on Beauty and Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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Herder’s views ought to be seen as both a link and a transition. As noted, Herder endorses and takes himself to be contributing to the investigation of human sensibility undertaken in eighteenth-century aesthetics. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter 2, Herder (like Kant, his teacher) aspires to synthesize the approaches of his rationalist and empiricist predecessors. Yet Herder also emphasizes many of the major themes of nineteenth-century aesthetics: expression, the diversity of the art forms, the meaning of historical change in the arts, the role of art in social self-understanding.17

Herder’s aesthetics thus links the dominant approach and themes of his contemporaries with those of his successors. It does so, moreover, in a way that gives reasons for a transition from the one to the other.18 Unlike Hegel or Schelling, Herder does not simply reject the “subjective” or (in Herder’s terms) “psychological” approach of his predecessors, to replace it with a different enterprise. Rather, he argues that that approach fails to accomplish its own aims, unless supplemented by other methods and considerations. Herder contends, first, and as a matter of philosophical method, that the character of aesthetic sensibility can be best discovered through investigating the objects designed to elicit aesthetic responses, that is, through investigating art. Second, he argues, as a thesis of philosophy of mind, that such psychology is itself constituted as responsive to objects, its nature therefore interdependent with the nature of those objects. More broadly, human psychology is constituted by its relationship to the external world, including its formation by social practices or historical tradition. Aesthetic psychology cannot, then, be considered on its own, through introspection or phenomenological description, as eighteenth-century.


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Aestheticians had attempted to do, but must be considered as formed by and responsive to external influences. In order to understand human sensibility, then, one must investigate artworks and their varying, culturally specific, and historically changing contexts. Indeed, prefiguring Hegel’s and Schelling’s imposing systematic aesthetics, Herder proposes that philosophical aesthetics must take the form of a system of the arts. For, he argues, only a philosophical system of the arts – not a general theory of art or the aesthetic – can accommodate the diversity of aesthetic values and of modes of responsive sensibility; such a system will likewise attend to the social and historical differentiation of art forms and works.¹⁹

Herder’s aesthetic theory may, then, be understood as the seed from which much later aesthetics grows (to use one of his own favorite metaphors). This is not to say that Herder’s aesthetic theory contains all elements of later aesthetics. In particular, absent from Herder’s aesthetics are metaphysical claims of the sort proposed by his Romantic and Idealist successors, concerning art as manifestation of the Absolute. Herder’s aesthetics is informed by a different global philosophical approach, namely naturalism.

I.2 Naturalism

In terming Herder’s aesthetics “naturalist,” I mean most basically that Herder’s accounts of beauty and sublimity, of art, and so forth are grounded in a conception of human beings – those who recognize aesthetic value and engage in artistic production – as biological organisms.²⁰ Specifically, human beings are on Herder’s view material beings furnished with a multiplicity of powers (capacities) that develop themselves and are fully active in harmony with one another in the flourishing organism. The organism is in turn understood so to flourish in the context of an empirically given, contingently formed environment, comprising geographical and climatic conditions as well as other organisms, to which it responds and adapts.

This conception of the human being deeply informs Herder’s aesthetics, I argue. It is used to explain human affective evaluative responses,

¹⁹ One might say, therefore, that Herder’s aesthetic theory is both “earlier” and “later” than Kant’s: many of his writings predate Kant’s influential Critique of Judgment, yet his thought is also “later” because he rejects the eighteenth-century focus on taste and anticipates more emphatically nineteenth-century concerns.

²⁰ I here adhere to a widely (but not universally) shared interpretive approach to Herder, especially as articulated by John Zammito; for a good overview, see Zammito, “Meta-Narrative.” This approach has not heretofore been used to interpret Herder’s aesthetics, however.
including aesthetic responses: when all is going well, these responses are part of and promote the human organism’s flourishing; they reflect the ways in which objects, or the broader given environment, address its desires or needs and allow it to exercise its capacities. Herder’s naturalist conception of human beings is also meant to justify those evaluative responses: the full, harmonious functioning of organic capacities – the organism’s flourishing – is objectively good, as is the fit of the organism to its environment. Thus if an object promotes a human agent’s flourishing within the environment, it too is objectively valuable. Aesthetic values, including the value of artistic expression, are instances of such objective values. The aesthetic appreciator is on Herder’s view in a state of flourishing – her sensible capacities are vibrantly and harmoniously engaged, as fitted to a suitable object (paradigmatically an artwork) – and she feels such flourishing and fit in the form of aesthetic pleasure. Herder likewise understands artistic activity naturalistically: it is an instance of the human organism’s transformation of the environment to render it amenable to her own flourishing. Specifically, artistic production is a form of expression, the condensed, clarified manifestation of the agent’s feelings, thoughts, ideals, and so forth. Thus, in expression, the artist transforms the environment into something that reflects her, in which she reveals herself, in which her desires, thoughts, or ideals are embodied, in which she can recognize herself. (Herder indeed often refers to art as a “magic mirror.”)

By contrast to the majority of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European philosophers, who account for aesthetic value and artistic production in mentalist (representational) terms, then, Herder understands aesthetic appreciators and artists as emphatically embodied beings motivated by needs and desires, who evaluate objects in light of the overarching aim of flourishing within the environment. Herder is correspondingly an early opponent of suggestions (prevalent in the tradition) that aesthetic appreciation is disinterested or that art is autonomous, distinct from other purportedly more pragmatic activities. He is an emphatic – literal – proponent of the aesthetic as life-promoting, as a locus and source of human vitality.

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To be clear, and to speak to the terms of a long-standing debate between universalist and relativist interpretations of Herder, I read Herder as putting forth universal claims: aesthetic value is always based in human flourishing and/or adaptation to environment, and in principle can be seen by all to be thus valuable. But such value nonetheless takes different forms in particular contexts.