Introduction

During the past 50 years, analytic philosophers have been busy exploring new ways to approach the perennially popular topic of determinism, especially as it relates to free will. Even more recently, some of these same philosophers have taken a much closer look at whether the acceptance of theism should change both how one views the prospects of determinism and how one views the relationship between determinism and free will.[1] Central to such discussion is the question of whether divine determinism should be accepted. Divine determinism might be understood loosely to be the view that everything that occurs is a consequence of God's will – a will both complete and irresistible, such that the entire history of the universe is settled by what God ordains. Different philosophers will provide different definitions of divine determinism; I discuss these and settle on one to guide this investigation in the next chapter. We might begin, though, by taking a look at some claims that seem to be paradigmatic of this view.

In the history of philosophy and theology, the best way to interpret past authors is often a matter of some debate. This present matter does not constitute an exception. It has seemed to some that many of the major philosophers and theologians of the Western canon were divine determinists, including Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, and Gottfried Leibniz.[2] We might begin by focusing on John Calvin, who seems to offer straightforward endorsements of divine determinism. He writes:

> [W]e ought undoubtedly to hold that whatever changes are discerned in the world are produced from the secret stirring of God's hand. But what God has determined must necessarily so take place. (Calvin 1960, 1.16.9)[3]

[1] For recent explorations of this topic, see the essays in McCann (2017) and Timpe and Speak (2016).
[2] For discussion of Descartes, see Chapter 1, Section 2, of this book. For the claim that each of the others seems to endorse divine determinism (at least at times), see Vicens (2014).
[3] Calvin goes on to note that this divine decree imposes conditional – and not natural – necessity. Nevertheless, he indicates that given God's decree, particular changes in the world are certain to come to pass.

Calvin notes that many things in our experience seem to be merely random, but this is because the "necessity of those things which happen for the most part lie[s] hidden in God's purpose" (1960, 1.16.9) He illustrates:

> Let us imagine, for example, a merchant who, entering a wood with a company of faithful men, unwisely wanders away from his companions, and in his wandering comes upon a robber's den, among thieves, and is slain. His death was not only foreseen by God's eye, but also determined by his decree (1960, 1.16.9).

This view has also been a matter of intense religious discussion, and sometimes finds its way into official religious statements. *The Westminster Confession of Faith* (3.1–2), for example, seems clear on this matter. It declares:

> God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass. . . . Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet has He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.

Jonathan Edwards agrees, arguing that such a conclusion rests on a philosophical, rather than merely religious, basis. He summarizes his argument as follows:

> For, as the being of the world is from God, so the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances, must be ordered by him. And God's active and positive interpositions, after the world was created, and the consequences of these interpositions; also every instance of his forbearing to interpose, and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of anything whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstances, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be ordered of God; either by a designing efficiency and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. But, as has been proved, all events whatsoever, are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. It follows, therefore, that the whole series of events is thus connected with something in the state of things either positive or negative, which is original in the series; i.e. something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God designedly orders his own conduct, and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he designedly orders all things. (2009b, 432)

This view is defended by some contemporary philosophers as well. In his defense of divine determinism, Heath White writes:

> [Divine determinism says], roughly, that God's will determines, settles, or fixes every other fact about the world that could have been other than it is. This means that there is no detail of the universe that is undetermined by God's will. In particular, contingent facts about human wills, or about what humans would freely choose in such-and-such circumstances, or about other events in the creation like coin flips or gamma rays, are not ultimately or brutely contingent, in that they can be explained, completely, as the results of what God willed. (2016, 79)

Even if we put to the side questions about whether particular figures – Augustine or Aquinas, for example – are divine determinists or not, it is clear that this position has been attractive to philosophers in the past and continues to find support in the philosophical community today. Moreover, this position has played an important role in religious discussions, and indeed in religious movements. Most notable in this regard is the acceptance of divine determinism by a number of churches influenced by Calvin, and the arguments between Calvinists and Armenians on how to understand the extent of divine decrees, especially divine decrees about which humans will be saved.[4]

This book is a philosophical investigation of the challenges of divine determinism: It is an exploration of the problems that advocates of this position seem to face and a search for successful replies. Thus, this book is not merely a survey: I do not intend to present various positions in the detached manner of a historian of ideas. Instead, I plan to wade knee-deep into the problems that divine determinists must face. With each problem, I intend to turn common and often vague worries into nuanced objections and explore possible responses. One way to think of this project is as an exploration of philosophical topography. This work is not a defense of a single picture of the world, but instead a map of the logical landscape. Although the highly detailed proposals and spirited defenses of philosophers assured of their own idiosyncratic views can be enjoyable and thought provoking, there is also value – in some cases, more value – in projects like this one, which aim to break new ground by exploring varieties of some position in a critical way.[5]

[4] Some may also see the debate within Catholicism between Thomists and Molinists as a debate over whether a certain sort of divine determinism should be accepted. For the claim that at least some Thomist positions should count as divine determinism, see Vicens (2014), who thinks it is important to define this category in a way that includes some Thomist positions.

[5] Much of the voluminous work of Alfred Mele, which explores both libertarian and compatibilist accounts of free will without committing to either (although committing to many other positions

The viability of divine determinism is important for a number of reasons, even for those who have not adopted this position. The first is that many philosophers of religion are interested in exploring great-making features. For theists, at least, there is a worry about how investigations into such features should be conducted. Should theists, for example, presuppose that divine determinism must be false, and so be confident in rejecting any proposed great-making feature (or combination of such features) that suggests the truth of divine determinism? This question is most obviously pertinent to the issue of divine foreknowledge, more than one proposed account of which is motivated by a desire to sidestep divine determinism, but similar comments might be made about divine providence, aseity, and sovereignty. A related but distinct value of investigating the problems of divine determinism is that it can be an aid to theologians and religious believers in formulating and selecting particular versions of doctrines. Many religious doctrines come in deterministic and indeterministic flavors, and the choice between them might turn upon philosophical rather than theological considerations.

Investigating the challenges of divine determinism also aids in ascertaining whether it is reasonable for theists to be compatibilists about free will and physical determinism. We will have occasion to look at physical determinism with more precision in Chapter 1, but we can loosely state that physical determinism is the view that past physical states necessitate all future physical states. I take a compatibilist to be someone who holds that the existence of free will is compatible with (some variety of) determinism. Nevertheless, unless otherwise noted, I will speak in a more restricted way, understanding a compatibilist to be someone who holds that free will is compatible with physical determinism in particular, and an incompatibilist to hold that compatibilism (in this sense) is false. Many philosophers use "free will" to stand in for the sort of control required for moral responsibility, and I will here follow this usage.[6] According to this formulation, compatibilism takes no stand on the question of whether determinism (either physical or divine) is true. There is no contradiction, then, in a philosopher denying both divine and physical determinism but accepting compatibilism. Nevertheless, it might be uncomfortable for a theist to categorically deny divine determinism and accept compatibilism. If

and argumentative moves), offers a nice example of the virtues of such an approach. See, for example, Mele (2006).

[6] Some philosophers, most notably Peter van Inwagen(2008, 2017b), argue that we should understand free will in another fashion.

physical determinism is compatible with free will, then it is curious that God would create a world that is not divinely determined. Almost universally, theists who deny divine determinism rely on incompatibilist claims in explaining God's motive in giving up some control over creation. If compatibilism is true, then it seems that there was no need for a trade-off in creation between divine and creaturely control; thus, it is odd that God decided to create a world that is not divinely determined. Whether a theist should be a compatibilist, then, turns out to be tied up with the issue of divine determinism.

Another reason to investigate the challenges of divine determinism comes from John Martin Fischer. He has repeatedly noted that one particularly worrisome aspect of ordinary libertarianism (that is, the conjunction of the claims that we are free and that free will is incompatible with physical determinism) is that on such a view free will "hangs by a thread" (2016b). What Fischer means is that according to such a view, the very existence of free will depends upon the falsity of physical determinism. If the laws of nature turn out to be probabilistic – even if in virtue of such laws, together with past states, each of our choices is overwhelmingly likely to occur in particular ways – then it is possible that we are free.[7] Conversely, if it turns out that the natural laws governing the universe are not probabilistic but deterministic, as many physicists have thought, then we would be forced to conclude that we are not free. Our own self-image, it seems, is hostage to the possible discoveries of physicists. That this should be the case is not only worrying, but, Fischer maintains, implausible. Although some will contend that there is nothing implausible about such a claim, many seem willing to accept that it is worrying.[8] This worry, Fischer has explained, provides the impetus not for believing compatibilism, but at least for examining compatibilism very closely in an attempt to discover whether it might be true.[9]

[7] Some have called into question whether incompatibilists should allow free choices to have probabilities governing their occurrence at all. For discussion, see Furlong (2017b), O'Connor (2016), Pereboom (2014), and Vicens (2016).

[8] There is, of course, debate about how much our own self-image would suffer if we were forced to conclude that free will is an illusion. Pereboom(2014), for example, argues that much of what we care about can survive even if belief in free will is abandoned.

[9] At times, Fischer seems to suggest that this worry does, in fact, provide reasons for believing in compatibilism. He writes: "I believe that theory choice is based on a holistic methodology in which one weighs pros and cons" (2016a, 57). He admits that some arguments for incompatibilism have some force, but claims that the force of such arguments "must be put on the scales with the many pros of compatibilism, which include the fact that our moral responsibility status need not hang on a thread" (57). The fact that this consideration counts in favor of compatibilism, one that can be put on the scales to help outweigh arguments against compatibilism, suggests that at times Fischer

Fischer claims that theists face an additional worry: Given ordinary incompatibilism (and some common theistic claims), theism hangs by a thread. He writes:

> Given that theism requires freedom, and that flip-flopping is not an acceptable option, it would seem that a libertarian theist would have to give up her belief in God, if she were to learn that determinism holds. But then one of the libertarian theist's most central and fundamental beliefs will be held hostage to whether the natural laws have associated with them 100 percent probabilities or something less. And this seems uncomfortable. (Fischer 2016b, 59)

Such a worry does not provide theists with a positive reason for accepting physical determinism, but it does give them a reason to look very carefully at whether it at least *might* be compatible with their other views. Moreover, if theists are open to at least the possibility of physical determinism, then they should take a closer look at the possibility of divine determinism, since, if the universe is governed by deterministic laws, then there is some reason for thinking that God has so determined it. Suppose we discover that each physical state (other than the first) is determined by the one that came before it (together with the laws of nature). Suppose we then add that the universe was created by God. It seems that in creating the first instant, God has brought about a divinely determined world – a world completely governed by divine ordination in virtue of God's having set up the initial conditions that necessitate all future states.

There are ways for theists to avoid this line of reasoning, but they are unlikely to satisfy everyone. In particular, they might follow van Inwagen's (1988, 47) suggestion that God might be able to issue indeterminate decrees, such as "Let either *X* or *Y* be." If this is possible, then the theist could maintain that a physically determined universe might be created but nonetheless not be determined by God. That is, God could create a deterministic world by decreeing "Let there be either deterministic universe A or deterministic universe B," without determining which of the two was to come into existence. Other ways of avoiding the preceding line of reasoning might be explored, but given a finite past combined with the claim that God creates the first physical state, physical determinism seems to naturally suggest divine determinism. Thus, worries about hanging theism on a thread may give theists reason to take an especially close look at the prospects of divine determinism.

does take the "hanging by a thread" worry to be more than a motivation for exploring compatibilism, but as a partial reason for adopting it.

This work investigates the challenges of divine determinism, focusing on creating arguments against the view and exploring ways to avoid such arguments. It attempts to bring to light the costs of this view, not the benefits. The reader may wonder why I have refrained from discussing the entire matter – why I have not simply added a few more chapters that assess the reasons weighing in favor of divine determinism and offer a verdict on whether the benefits justify accepting the costs. This is a fair question, and the honest reader may be forgiven for being dissatisfied with "that is beyond the scope of the present work." Nevertheless, it is. Here is why: Addressing the question of whether we have reasons to endorse divine determinism would require addressing a vast field of issues. It would require investigating certain divine attributes, establishing whether the most philosophically plausible accounts of these attributes rule out, require, or are neutral on the issue of divine determinism. Additionally, some of the virtues of divine determinism relate to its power in making sense of particular religious views – for example, the doctrine of grace within Christianity or divine governance within Islam. Reaching a final verdict on divine determinism would require singling out a particular religious tradition and then exploring both the requirements and desiderata of specific doctrines within that tradition. Not all Muslims agree on the minimal requirements for an account of divine governance, let alone desiderata for selecting among minimally acceptable accounts, and the situation is similar when we look at Christians on the issue of grace. Of course, the doctrines of grace and divine governance represent two of many such doctrines that would need to be explored. Investigating these issues thoroughly would not take a few chapters, but rather many volumes.

In fact, even more complications must be considered. We may discover that physical determinism is true. Although we are far from a consensus on whether the fundamental laws of physics are deterministic or probabilistic, there are scientifically respectable deterministic models of quantum phenomena.[10] Suppose that we discover that physical determinism is true. At that point, the question of divine determinism will take on a new urgency since, as noted earlier, some theists might think that physical determinism provides a reason for accepting divine determinism. Of course, it is not clear that determinism is true, but if it is possibly true, then any discussion of whether divine determinism should be accepted would require an investigation of the reasons for accepting theism in the first place, as well as an exploration of whether physical determinism should lead us to

[10] For a philosophically oriented investigation of the current state of this question, see Lewis (2016).

believe in divine determinism, and, if it should, whether we should believe that physical determinism is true. This last investigation would likely take us out of the realms of philosophy and theology and require delving into arguments in physics.[11]

I beg the reader's understanding, then, when I honestly plead that an investigation of the virtues of divine determinism is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, some might think that there is no need for such an investigation to reach a verdict on whether divine determinism ought to be accepted. Some of the problems of divine determinism might be decisive; the costs of the view might be so high that no benefits could outweigh them. This is an important consideration. I once thought that more than one of the problems of divine determinism was decisive and that jointly the problems were obviously so. Today, although I am not unsympathetic to such a conclusion, I no longer accept it. In each chapter, I will explore one or more challenges, attempting to reach a conclusion on precisely what it will cost determinists to hold on to their view in face of the challenge, and each reader may consider whether the cost is so high that it could not possibly be accepted. In the conclusion, I will turn briefly to my own views of the relative values of each cost that divine determinism brings with it. In the end, it seems to me that although this view carries numerous non-negligible costs, none of the problems is obviously decisive (which, of course, is not to say that they are obviously not decisive).

This book is best read from the first page to the last because some of the discussions in early chapters will be referenced in later ones. More importantly, some of the discussions of earlier problems inform the way that later ones are considered, even when this isn't always explicitly noted. Nevertheless, the reader solely interested in one or more problems may navigate to the chapters focusing on those problems. To such readers, I suggest beginning with the first chapter, and, in light of the following overview, moving on to those chapters that are of most interest.

In Chapter 1, I introduce a stipulated definition of divine determinism and address some worries about this definition. I then explore two distinct sorts of divine determinism, based upon the causal mechanism that explains the deterministic nature of our universe. In one of these accounts,

[11] Some philosophers think that determinism should be considered a philosophical rather than scientific issue. If this is so, then perhaps the issues in physics could be sidestepped; see Steward (2012). Alternatively, some might think that there are theological reasons for rejecting determinism, such that questions of physics can be safely avoided.

God creates the initial state of the universe governed by deterministic laws. Thus, God puts in place the first link of a deterministic chain, thereby determining the entire chain. In the second account, God is actively involved in each creaturely event by a more direct intervention. As this view has it, God ordains the actions of creatures not in virtue of having created an initial state of the world that will inevitably lead to creatures acting in particular ways, but instead by creating them in their acting, or by moving them to act, by a divinely caused motion. This view is sometimes illustrated by an analogy. God determines the history of the world not in the way that someone sets off a chain reaction, but instead in the way that an author writes a novel. Authors deliberately and directly act so as to create each element of the stories they pen; according to this view, God, too, is directly active in each and every element of the history of the universe, crafting every detail to match the divine plan, leaving no element unspecified, with the result that the finished product – the universe – is exactly as God had ordained. After outlining the differences between these two approaches, I turn to an overview of some of the reasons divine determinism has been proposed in the past. I refrain from critically assessing these purported benefits, instead merely introducing the reader to each, and thereby providing some context for the following chapters that investigate problems for this view.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I explore the relationship between divine determinism and human free will. Many of those who have argued against divine determinism have thought that if God determines all human actions, then no humans are morally responsible for anything they do. This problem has tended to be tied up with what we might call the compatibilist question: Is moral responsibility compatible with physical determinism? Many have thought not. Furthermore, many have thought that divine determinism (of either variety) is relevantly similar to physical determinism, and so have concluded that it, too, would undermine human moral responsibility.

Divine determinists have utilized two different strategies in responding to such attacks. First, some have borrowed defenses developed by ordinary compatibilists or developed their own perfectly general defenses for ordinary compatibilism, and then extended these defenses to what we might call theistic compatibilism – that is, the compatibility of divine determinism and human free will.[12] Others have argued that divine determinism – at

[12] See, for example, Baker (2003) and Edwards (2009b).

least in some of its varieties – is relevantly different from physical determinism, and so avoids the problems the latter faces.[13]

The quest to settle the general compatibilism/incompatibilism debate in a few chapters would not merely be ambitious; it would be foolhardy. I will not take up this task. Instead, in Chapters 2 and 3, I investigate whether divine determinists are in a better or worse position than physical determinists in responding to popular incompatibilist arguments.

I will begin by investigating the Consequence Argument. According to this argument, if physical determinism is true, truths about the past and the laws of nature entail truths about what we will do in the future; thus, since we have no control over the past or the laws of nature, we should conclude that our own future actions are not up to us.[14] Some have maintained that similar arguments cannot be used to show that divine determinism is equally problematic. In particular, they have suggested that those divine determinists who embrace the distinction between primary and secondary causality need not fear the worries that are embodied in the Consequence Argument. In Chapter 2, I investigate this claim.

In Chapter 3, I turn to manipulation arguments against compatibilism. According to such arguments, agents who are manipulated by powerful neuroscientists, and thus determined to act in particular ways, are not morally responsible for acting in accord with their manipulators' wishes.[15] But, defenders of such arguments maintain, physical determinism is relevantly similar to the action of manipulators, so by parity of reasoning we should conclude that physical determinism undermines human moral responsibility as well. Thus, if physical determinism is true, then nobody is morally responsible for anything. Some have suggested that these arguments may be augmented with divine determinism (even if merely considered as a robust hypothetical consideration) to further strengthen them.[16] It may seem that divine determinists are in a worse position to respond to such arguments than physical determinists, since they take this as more than a mere hypothetical possibility. Additionally, some common responses to manipulation arguments attempt to show that manipulation cases are not relevantly similar to physical determinism, at least in part because physical determinism does not posit an agent who determines all events. Since divine determinism does posit such an agent, it seems unable to utilize such responses. In Chapter 3, I examine both the worry that manipulation arguments are more powerful in themselves if we replace

[13] See, for example, McCann (2012) and Tanner (1994)
[14] See van Inwagen (1983).
[15] See, for example, Pereboom (2014).
[16] See Rogers (2012).

determinism with a determining God and the worry that some ordinary responses to manipulation arguments will be unavailable to the divine determinist. Finally, I consider whether divine determinism is endangered by direct appeals to intuition concerning a manipulating God.

In Chapter 4, I address the charge that divine determinists must admit that God is the cause of sin. It is not hard to see why some might think this is so: According to divine determinism, God ordains all that occurs, and, obviously, humans quite often perform morally evil acts. It is also not hard to see why this might be a worry: Theists often wish to keep God firmly removed from evil of any kind. Indeed, Satan is sometimes called the father of lies – but, if divine determinists are correct, it is not a demonic force that is ultimately responsible for human acts of lying, but rather God. In Chapter 4, I assess a response to this objection – the privation solution – that tries to avoid the undesirable conclusion that God causes sin. I also investigate a new twist on this old maneuver, which suggests that the evil of sin is not the sort of thing that can be caused, and so no position should lead one to think that God is its cause. I also evaluate whether the theist may reasonably bite the bullet, admitting that God is the cause of sin, while claiming that this assertion should not be thought to be especially damaging to theism.

In Chapter 5, I turn to the question of whether God would be blameworthy for determining human wrongdoing. Would God act wrongly in determining a human agent to commit murder, for example? Once again, the basic problem is easy to see: It at least seems that human agents would act wrongly if they somehow managed to determine other agents to commit murder – perhaps even if the manipulating agents had perfectly laudatory reasons for acting as they did – and so it seems that God, too, must do something wrong in determining all the evils of human history. In Chapter 5, I investigate how this objection is best formulated and outline possible replies to it.

In Chapter 6, I turn to the general problem of evil. Many philosophers, both theists and atheists, seem to think that the problem of evil constitutes the single most persuasive argument against theism. The problem, in short, is that the presence of the evil in this world seems to constitute evidence against the existence of God, at least given certain characterizations of the divine nature. Accepting divine determinism appears to make this problem even more daunting because it removes what is sometimes considered the most powerful rebuttal to (at least some forms of) this problem: the Free Will Defense. Some philosophers, however, think that the Free Will Defense is available to all divine determinists, or at least to

those who are willing to adopt particular accounts of free will. If this is so, then divine deterministsneed not worry as much about this problem as is sometimes supposed. In Chapter 6, I investigate such claims, determining how much comfort they might provide for the divine determinist.

In Chapter 7, I turn to the question of whether divine determinism poses problems for making sense of God's love for humans and humans' love for God. Theists often see God as a perfectly loving being, sometimes as a supernatural model of parental love. Divine determinism seems to undermine this picture, however, since it claims that God determines all the pains each human endures, and, perhaps more alarmingly, all the evil actions that scar each person's character. Worst of all, many theists have claimed that at least some humans will eventually suffer eternal torment for their evil actions. We might reasonably wonder whether a perfectly loving God would dictate a personal history that unfailingly leads to such a painful fate. Although some aspects of worldly experience (and perhaps of religious belief, too) might make divine love difficult to comprehend, adding divine determinism to the mix seems to make it unbelievable.

Divine determinists also face a problem concerning human love for God. According to many theists, humans should strive for a loving union with God. In such a union, lovers begin to identify with the beloved, accepting the cares, concerns, and values of the beloved as their own. Such a union seems to involve a sacrifice of the lover's autonomy, and it seems important that this sacrifice of autonomy is itself an autonomous act. But if divine determinism is true, then humans can sacrifice this autonomy to God only if God causes them to do so. Because such causation seems to undermine the autonomy of humans, divine determinism seems to threaten the authenticity of union love.

In Chapter 7, I address both of these worries, first sharpening them, then constructing and exploring a number of ways for determinists to respond. As with the other worries canvassed, I argue that determinists do have some options available to them, but many theists will find them less than ideal.

In Chapter 8, I take up problems associated with divine commands, the divine will, and divine judgment. The first such problem is that it is reasonable to think that in giving commands, God is revealing the divine will. If God forbids killing, then God does not want humans to kill. But if divine determinism is true, then God sometimes does want humans to kill, as is clear from the obvious fact that humans sometimes do kill. This suggests that if divine determinism is true, then divine commands are deceptive.

Additionally, two related but distinct worries stem from human responses to the divine will. The first concerns human deliberation. To see this worry, consider an agent faced with the options of fulfilling a divine command and breaking it. Ordinarily, we would think it is easy to see what the agent ought to do: The agent ought to obey the divine command and acts wrongly in controverting it. If divine determinism is true, however, some odd cases will put pressure on this conclusion. Suppose, for example, that the agent has a true, justified belief that God wills this command to be broken in this instance. Given divine determinism, it is easy to see how such a belief could be true, and it could be justified just in case agents can be justified in having beliefs about their future behavior. In such a case, it seems that intending to obey divine commands and intending to fulfil the divine will are in tension with each other. If agents are aware of this tension, ordinary theistic modes of deliberation are called into question.

This first worry is forward-looking: Divine determinism leads to oddities concerning how agents should think about future actions. A second, related worry is backward-looking: If divine determinism is true, then sorrow for past sins seems to involve a wish that the divine will had not been fulfilled. Ordinarily, theists tend to think that contrition involves both a wish that a sin had not been committed and a wish that God's will had been done. It seems that divine deterministsmust choose between these wishes.

The final worry I investigate in Chapter 8 concerns a determining God's standing to blame human agents. Suppose that agents are morally responsible for their behavior, even if God determines their every action. Even so, we may question whether God would be in a position to blame these agents. God is clearly in a position to know whether these agents have acted wrongly, and we might admit that God is in a position of authority over these agents. Nonetheless, there seems to be something perverse in one agent first determining another agent on a path to act wrongly, then passing judgment and punishing the agent for these determined actions. In Chapter 8, I suggest some options by which deterministsmight respond to this worry.

Finally, I close the book with a brief conclusion, discussing which of the challenges of divine determinism I find the most worrisome, or, in other words, which of the costs of divine determinism I see as particularly high.