Extreme Reactions

Focusing on the rising support for the populist right in Eastern Europe, this book examines how anger and resentment toward minorities is being utilized in politics. Bustikova details the process by which the acquisition of political power and demand for rights by ascendant minority groups precipitates a backlash of mobilization from the radical right. However, this book also argues that prejudice against minorities is not a sentiment exclusive to right-wing voters and is not the root cause of increasing support for the radical right. Rather, this study reveals, variation in how minorities are accommodated by the government explains the electoral successes and failures of radical right parties. By examining their capitalization on these feelings of discontent toward politically assertive minorities and with the governmental policies that yield to their demands, Bustikova exposes volatile, Zeitgeist-dependent conditions under which once fringe right-wing parties have risen to prominent but precarious positions of power.

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Extreme Reactions

Radical Right Mobilization in Eastern Europe

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Arizona State University
For David and Miriam
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Acknowledgments

This book has been a long time in the making. It started as my dissertation at Duke University in North Carolina when radical right mobilization in post-communist Eastern Europe was an anemic phenomenon. I recall a conversation with Herbert Kitschelt, as we returned from a conference at New York University organized by Michael Minkenberg, about whether such a fringe topic deserved sustained academic attention. The conversation was stimulated by a comment that Cas Mudde had raised at the conference. The radical right in Eastern Europe, he predicted, would always pale in comparison with Western Europe. Indeed, until today, the average vote share for radical right parties in Eastern Europe is lower than in the West. However, their impact on democratic institutions is arguably much larger, since they operate in under-institutionalized environments with weak norms governing public discourse and party competition. As the project has progressed, it is now abundantly obvious that identity politics is a political force to be reckoned with in both Eastern and Western European democracies.

It would not have been possible to write this book without the inspiration, encouragement and nudging from many individuals. John Aldrich, Judith Kelley, Herbert Kitschelt, Milada Vachudova and Jeremy Reiter were indispensable and incredibly helpful members of my dissertation committee at Duke University. As a graduate student, I tested the waters with my argument at various conferences, where Bonnie Meguid, David Art and Anna Grzymała-Busse were instrumental in moving the project forward. I received fantastic comments at my book conference from Anna Grzymała-Busse, Bonnie Meguid and Herbert Kitschelt as well as from colleagues at Arizona State University, especially Carolyn Warner, Michael Hechter, Sarah Shair-Rosenfeld, Mark von Hagen and David Siroky. I also presented a portion of the manuscript at a workshop of the Nationalist and ethno-religious dynamics working group at the School of Politics and...
Global Studies, where I received additional valuable feedback from Yoshiko Herrera, Jeffrey Kopstein, William Mishler, Joshua Tucker, A. Kadir Yildirim, Sean Kates, Magda Hinojosa, Miki Kittilson, Mark Ramirez and Will H. Moore. Special thanks go to Carolyn Forbes from the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict for her kindness and assistance since I arrived at ASU.

The Czech Institute of Sociology in Prague has graciously served as my academic home in Europe. I thank Zdenka Mansfeldová, Simona Pátková, Jindřich Krejčí, Máša Čermáková, Tomáš Kostelecký, Zdenka Vajdová and Michal Illner for their unrelenting support and for the opportunity to discuss ideas. Kai Arzheimer kindly provided me with a temporary home at the University of Mainz in Germany and facilitated a fellowship at the Zentrum für Interkulturelle Studien. In Slovakia, I am indebted to Olga Gyarfasová, Marek Rybář and Zuzana Kusá. In Ukraine, I am truly grateful to Yaroslav Hrytsak, Alina Polyakova and especially Andreas Umland, and thankful for financial support from IARO-IREX.

Many people have seen parts of this manuscript over the years and offered welcome encouragement and feedback. My thanks go to Nancy Bermeo, Pepper Culpepper, Jennifer Cyr, Rafaela Dancygier, Sarah de Lange, Venelin Ganev, John Ishiyama, Cynthia Kaplan, Paulette Kurzer, Amy Liu, Nikolay Marinov, Michael Minkenberg, Connor O’Dwyer, Andrea Pirro, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Maria Popova, Bartek Pytlas, Marek Rybář, Viktoria Sereda, Ostap Sereda, Maria Snegovaya and Sofia Tipaldou. At Cambridge University Press, John Haslam unwearingly answered my stream of questions.

Finally, this book would not have been completed without the love of those closest to me. Special thanks go to my sisters, my father Miloslav and my mother, Anna, for everything and especially for time spent over the years with our daughter, Miriam; to Petra Guasti for her friendship and frequent conversations about politics; and to my husband David for inspiration and affection.