

DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES

In the warped world of prescription drug pricing, generic drugs can cost more than branded ones, old drugs can be relaunched at astronomical prices, and low-cost options are shut out of the market. In *Drugs, Money and Secret Handshakes*, Robin Feldman shines a light into the dark corners of the pharmaceutical industry to expose a web of shadowy deals in which higher-priced drugs receive favorable treatment and patients are channeled toward the most expensive medicines. At the center of this web are the highly secretive middle players who establish coverage levels for patients and negotiate with drug companies. By offering lucrative payments to these middle players (as well as to doctors and hospitals), drug companies ensure that inexpensive drugs never gain traction. This system of perverse incentives has delivered the kind of exorbitant drug prices - and profits - that everyone loves except for those who pay the bills.

ROBIN FELDMAN is the Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California Hastings. She is an award-winning scholar whose work has been called ‘absolutely remarkable’ and a ‘must read’. Feldman has published four books and more than fifty articles, and she has been cited by the White House and members of Congress. In 2017, she participated in the GAO’s report to Congress on Artificial Intelligence and in an Army Cyber Institute threatcasting exercise on weaponization of data.

Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes

THE UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES

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To my husband Boris, with whom I have shared
32 wonderful years, and to the children we have
been blessed to receive, Natalie, Talya, Eli, Sam,
and Adam.

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In accordance with the protocols outlined in the *Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Open Letter on Ethical Norms*, all of the data from Chapter 5 is publicly available for future use by other academics through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/; see Robin

Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 *Harvard J.L. & Tech.* 339, 350–52 (2016) (signed by dozens of professors). In further accordance with these protocols, funding information for the UC Hastings Institute for Innovation Law can be found at <http://innovation.uchastings.edu/about/funding/>.