Introduction

In December 1905, British police officers from Shanghai's foreign-run International Settlement arrested a native of Guangdong province on charges of "kidnapping," or what twenty-first-century observers might label as human trafficking. Madame Li Wangzhi, who was traveling through Shanghai en route to her home county, had aroused suspicions over the large group of young women traveling with her. She failed to convince the police officers that the fifteen women were "servant girls," provided by her father-in-law, an official in Sichuan province, to assist her on the journey home, following the recent death of her husband. At a hearing before the Mixed Court, the tribunal of foreign and Chinese officials who administered justice in the International Settlement, a custody battle quickly ensued. The Chinese magistrate ordered his staff of "runners" to take Madame Li to the Mixed Court jail, while the British representative ordered her to be remanded to the International Settlement's newly built wing for female prisoners in its municipal jail. The detention of female Chinese prisoners had been a subject of debate throughout the previous two years, as foreign consuls deemed the Mixed Court jail, run by the Chinese magistrate, unfit for the incarceration of female prisoners. Fisticuffs ensued when International Settlement police officers seized Madame Li and the servant girls from the magistrate's runners, wounding several staff members as well as one of the magistrate's deputies. Madame Li and her entourage were then incarcerated in the International Settlement's municipal jail.

The case quickly escalated into a consular dispute. The native place association of residents hailing from the city of Guangzhou and the prefecture of Zhaoqing (both in Guangdong province) led rallies and protests to call for Madame Li's release and for Chinese sovereignty to be honored. The International Settlement authorities soon relented, and Madame Li was turned over to the Guangzhou–Zhaoqing Native Place Association a week later on December 15. But her release did not dampen the outrage over the International Settlement authorities' handling of the case. Groups of students and merchants assembled to call for boycotts of foreign goods, the abolition of taxes imposed on Chinese residents and merchants living and operating businesses in the International Settlement, and the inclusion of Chinese

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representatives on the International Settlement's governing councils. Three days later, as protest organizers sought to enforce a commercial strike involving the closure of shops in the International Settlement, mobs set upon buildings that housed various agencies of the foreign-run Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and burned down one of its police stations. In the ensuing crackdown, the Shanghai Municipal Police (SMP) opened fire on the crowds, resulting in the deaths of fifteen people.[1] The Mixed Court Riots of 1905, as the incident came to be known, was in many ways a preview – both in terms of claims and in terms of protest repertoires – of the subsequent and more widely heralded protests in Shanghai in 1919 and 1925.

Now consider an episode more than a century later, far smaller in scale and scope, and broadly representative of popular protests that occurred in Shanghai during the first decades of the twenty-first century. On a Saturday evening in June 2017, a crowd of several hundred demonstrators proceeded down the city's main pedestrian shopping street, East Nanjing Road. The marchers represented a distinct subset of Shanghai's property-owning class. They were residents without urban registration (*hukou*) and were thus "outsiders" (*waidi ren*) who were ineligible to purchase formal housing without first meeting several requirements, including five years of payments into the city's social insurance fund and proof of marriage. They had instead bought housing in buildings that had originally been designated for commercial use only. Savvy developers sold the commercial spaces (which were in abundance and oversupplied) after installing makeshift gas lines, wiring for household appliances, and bathrooms into spaces intended for use as offices, as hotel rooms, and for other commercial purposes.

But in late May, the Shanghai municipal government stopped its practice of condoning the illegal conversions and announced that service providers should shut off gas and water to the buildings and their residents. The vulnerable homeowners in Shanghai's commercial use buildings stood to lose not only their homes but also their investments, since the properties would be virtually impossible to sell as housing under the new (or newly enforced) regulations. Using social media and video uploads, the protestors stated in a comment attached to one of their videos:

> We understand that there could be transgressions on the part of the developers, but we'd also like to ask the rule makers to take into consideration our great predicament as the buyers of such houses: most of the buyers are just beguiled ordinary people who spent generations of family savings just to have a place to live in the great city [of] Shanghai, and the newly issued rules would absolutely devastate their hope.[2]

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[1] The preceding account is drawn from Kotenev 1925, 127–9; Goodman 1995a, 399–401.

[2] Ren and Li 2017. This passage appeared in the comments section (in English) in several video uploads of the protest. A seven-minute video clip of the protest can be found at www .youtube.com/watch?v=EPOveRg24vE.

Police quickly broke up the peaceful rally, arresting one participant. The protest dissipated rapidly, but the Shanghai authorities were quick to respond. Two days later, they reversed course and gave tacit consent to the continued conversion of commercial spaces into residential properties.[3] Some observers in Shanghai speculated that Party Secretary Han Zheng, a contender for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee at the fall 2017 Nineteenth Party Congress, had blundered in approving the crackdown on commercial use housing, and quickly reversed course to dampen any continued protests.[4]

In Bombay, another historically contentious port city tracing its origins to British imperialism, an arrest by authorities in the first decade of the twentieth century also produced unseen levels of rioting and the use of lethal police violence. The occasion was the 1908 trial and conviction of political activist and polemicist Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who in 1905 had taken up the *swadeshi* (self-reliance) movement. Originating in Bengal, the movement called for the promotion of Indian industry and the boycott of foreign-made products. Tilak recruited some of Bombay's leading capitalists and also attempted to draw in the city's textile mill workers, as rivals to confront the British textile industry. Part of Tilak's appeal was his fusing of Hindu myths, legends, and religious practices with modern idioms. For example, in the nearby city of Pune he organized a bonfire ceremony in which he ignited foreign (largely British or Western) consumer goods and clothing and had witnesses swear to consume only Indian-made goods. Bombay authorities arrested Tilak in 1908 and put him on trial for sedition, based on articles he published in which he appeared to support violent revolution, or at least to condone recent bombings in the subcontinent directed against British targets. Tilak's trial from July 13 to July 22 was held under a tense security cordon at Bombay's High Court. After his conviction and sentencing to six years in prison, at which court records state that he gave a twenty-one-hour-long rebuttal of the charges (over six days), he was whisked away to the city of Ahmedabad in Gujarat.[5]

Bombay soon erupted in protests, boycotts, and violence. For the next week, most of the city's eighty-five mills employing about 100,000 workers shut down as workers went on strike over the sentencing. Businesses closed their storefronts in support of Tilak, and his portrait appeared in many store windows. Some streets were lined with black bunting. Roving bands of mill workers set upon stores that remained open, and they showered stones on police detachments as they confronted them in the streets. Workers also sought to disrupt traffic by attacking railway stations and blocking tramway tracks

[3] Wang and Pan 2017.
[4] Author's conversations and interviews in Shanghai, June 9–17, 2017. Han was indeed appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee that fall.
[5] The proceeding account is drawn from Government of Bombay 1958, Vol. 2, 255–70; Upadhyay 2004, 154–8; Cashman 1975.

with boulders. Police quickly learned that they could not handle the situation on their own, and drew reinforcements of cavalry and infantry from the local garrison to break up the rioters with lethal force. (Police reports do not offer a tally of the dead and injured but note several incidents in which gunfire led to one or two deaths and several injuries.) After a week the city had returned to normal, but the spontaneity of the boycotts, strikes, and riots sent investigators looking for answers as to how such a broad mobilization could have occurred in the seeming absence of any coordination by leaders or organizations. The report by the Commissioner of Police of Bombay, filed in late August 1908, expressed a sense of bewilderment as to why the mill workers were involved and why their participation was so broad: "In the recent disturbances the mill hands were the chief instruments used for disorder. But they had no organization, no leader, no common object and no weapons, other than stones."[6] The report went on to confess that there were no clear answers as to why the business and shop owners had fallen in line to stage a commercial shutdown of the city, except to note that the decision to deploy police detachments to compel shop owners to reopen had backfired and had led only to longer closures. Hindu–Muslim tensions, which had shaken the city with lethal riots in 1893 and 1904, never materialized.

In their report, the British authorities overlooked a lingering and rather recent source of discontent among mill workers: the introduction of electric lighting. This technology, which had been introduced to a few mills in the late 1890s, was used to extend work shifts, and by 1905, it was reported that thirty-two mills were running for fifteen hours per day, from 5:00 AM to 8:00 PM. The longer shifts offered more pay to workers but were a constant source of discontent, and disputes over the length of the workday led to numerous walkouts. In a pattern that would be repeated across the twentieth century, mill hands storming out of one factory would set on another, pelting its windows with stones until that mill's workers had joined them. Strikes over the electricity-induced sixteen-hour workday led to riots in 1905 and continued almost yearly until a twelve-hour workday was brought into legislation in 1911. The Tilak trial and conviction in 1908 was, in some respects, another occasion to walk off the job to protest the excessively long working hours.[7]

A little more than a century later, Bombay's textile mill workers took to the streets again, this time peacefully and under coordination from unions and political parties. In late July 2011, an estimated 50,000 mill workers embarked on what they termed the "Long March" from the textile district of Byculla to Azad ("Freedom") Maidan, a distance of about ten kilometers. The march snarled traffic in the city's commercial and administrative centers but otherwise saw no outbreaks of violence or police actions to arrest march participants.

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[6] Government of Bombay 1958, 270.   [7] Cashman 1975, 182; Upadhyay 2004, 47–8.

The march was remarkable in two respects. The media's attention centered on the fact that the workers had the support of otherwise heated rivals across multiple political parties: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies, the Shiv Sena, had joined the Communist Party of India (CPI) and its left-wing partners in supporting the marchers. But the extraordinary feature of the march was the act itself. By 2011, it was very rare to see large-scale labor protests in Mumbai. The "Long March" was, as one commentator put it, "a throwback to the last century when south Mumbai with its administrative buildings and corporate offices would witness frequent demonstrations."[8] As an account from the *Times of India* described it, "The scene was straight out of the 1960s when Mumbai was seen as the center of [the] labor movement."[9]

The march had been organized by a group of labor unions, led by the Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS), which stood at the forefront of a campaign to provide housing for the city's laid-off textile workers, who numbered 145,000.[10] Promises of free housing for all the city's poor and low income, including slum residents and ex-mill workers, stretched back to 1995 when a Shiv Sena–backed coalition came to power in the state government. Housing for mill workers, and land on which to locate it, had been a source of contention over municipal development plans and court cases that followed, as mill companies sought to convert the land for high-end commercial and retail functions. As the wife of a mill worker who addressed the rally ending the march declared, "*Chawls* (worker tenements) in central Mumbai have been replaced by malls. The state government should provide us with a roof over our heads."[11] The Shiv Sena leader Uddhav Thackeray demanded that the state government quickly come up with a specific plan for free housing within three days, or else he would hold a citywide *bandh* or general shutdown on August 1, which as he noted was the ninety-first anniversary of the esteemed Bal Gangadhar Tilak's death in 1920.[12] The chief minister of the state government responded by setting up a committee to identify scarce land resources on which worker housing could be built. The general shutdown was called off. By 2017, 15,000 workers and their families had received 225-square foot housing units, much of them situated on former land occupied by mill compounds. The other 130,000 workers waited their turn, and the GKSS held occasional demonstrations to call for the pace of building to proceed without further delays. Meanwhile, the value of the dwellings that had been constructed and delivered to the workers had soared between 2011 and 2017, from an estimated Rs 500,000 to Rs 5,000,000 (about US$83,000). The five-year term over which the units had to be held was expiring, and many families were cashing in by selling at the market price.[13]

[8] Upadhyay 2011.   [9] Mishra 2011.   [10] Menon 2012.   [11] Mishra 2011.
[12] Mishra 2011.   [13] Site visit to MHADA Rental Housing Scheme unit, January 19, 2017.

Juxtaposing these four episodes of popular protest more than a century apart in Shanghai and Bombay highlights important ways in which social relations, inequalities, and political power were inflected through what urbanists refer to as "urban forms" – the civic spaces, commercial districts, courtrooms, factories, roads, and even housing types that are the settings in which urban residents experience abstractions such as imperialism, capitalism, gentrification, or neoliberalism. These urban geographies do not define or determine social relations and political power, but how do they influence the outlooks and experiences of urban residents, the grievances of those who decide to protest, and the possibilities for broader social movements to occur? And how do changes over time in the political geographies of the city influence changes in grievances, claims, and strategies of popular protest?

The ways in which urban geographies shape patterns of popular protest have attracted considerable scholarly attention after civic spaces and public squares served as stages for opposition forces to rally large numbers of protestors during the Arab Spring and on other occasions in which opponents occupied public spaces to challenge incumbent regimes.[14] In some respects these studies are following William Sewell Jr.'s call nearly two decades ago for scholars to pay closer attention to "the ways that spatial constraints are turned to advantage in political and social struggles and the ways that such struggles can restructure the meanings, uses, and strategic valence of space."[15] But public squares make up only one part of the broader landscape of urban political geography, and forms of contentious politics extend far beyond opposition rallies to confront incumbent regimes. Scholars of social movements and contentious politics have long addressed the possible connections between the ordinary grievances of lived experience (in factory or farm, city or village) and broader mobilizations in the form of social movements, insurgencies, revolutions, and so forth.[16] General theories of contentious politics (including but not limited to social movements) seek to examine the interactions among political opportunities (events, environments), mobilizing structures (organizations, networks), collective action frames (discourses, cultures), and repertoires of contention (practices or routines of expressing grievances) that make up the "dynamics of contention." In their comprehensive work on contentious politics, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly acknowledged the significance of spatial features in contentious politics when they referred to "environmental mechanisms" as "externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life."[17] But in their empirical chapters, environmental mechanisms operated at a broad level to include anything from national-level demographic shifts to

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[14] Batuman 2015; Kohn 2013; Nicholls, Miller, and Beaumont 2016; Said 2015.
[15] Sewell 2001, 55.
[16] Tilly 1986, 1995, 2006; Tarrow 1998; Scott 1985; Wood 2003; Moore 1978.
[17] McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 25.

resource scarcities or abundance. While a number of studies, including those on student protests in Beijing in 1919 and 1989,[18] examined the connections between social movements and their spatial environments, the interactions among forms of political geography (including but not limited to civic space) with identities and claims of protestors have been examined only rarely.[19] The work of Asef Bayat on "street politics" in the Middle East, from which scholars of urban China and India have drawn inspiration in recent studies, highlights the manner in which urban spatial forms (e.g., street markets, public space, and housing projects) can serve as mobilizing structures by connecting participants otherwise unknown to each other, without social networks or organizations that are conventionally viewed as necessary conditions for mobilization.[20] Tilly, in a coauthored article published in the early stages of his project on contentious politics in late eighteenth-, early nineteenth-century Britain, discussed the connections between changes in the "urban structure" of London and the emergence of new forms of contentious politics, including marches and strikes.[21] These and other studies raise important questions about the influence of urban spatial forms on contentious politics, but they also leave open the question of how ideology, organizations, leadership, and other forces that facilitate popular protests interact with urban geographies, across time and place.

For addressing these questions of how the political geography of the city and urban contentious politics are mutually constituted and mutually transformative over time, and the roles of ideology, organizations, and leadership in contentious episodes, the rich history of popular protest in Shanghai and Mumbai over the twentieth century offers revealing insights. On numerous occasions during the twentieth century, riots, strikes, marches, commercial boycotts, and other forms of popular protest, sometimes involving more than 100,000 participants, broke out in the streets of Shanghai and Bombay.[22] In Shanghai, besides the Mixed Court Riots of 1905, a partial but incomplete list of such episodes includes: the May Fourth Movement (1919), the May

[18] On Beijing protests and public space in 1919, see Lee 2009. For 1989, see Zhao 2004. Zhao uses the term "political ecology" to analyze the locational and spatial features of university campuses in Beijing. Zhao 2004, 240.

[19] An important exception, while not framed in terms of political geography, is Katznelson's (1981) study of the interaction among ethnicity, neighborhood, and political activism in northern Manhattan from the 1930s to the 1970s.

[20] Bayat 1997a, 1997b, 2013. Hanser (2016) and Fu (2017) analyze individual acts of resistance from the perspective of Bayat's conception of atomized individuals connected by location and work within urban spaces (e.g., street vendors, migrant workers). Anjaria's study of street vendors in Mumbai references Bayat's concept of "quiet encroachment" (Anjaria 2016, 105).

[21] Tilly and Schweitzer 1982, 68–9.

[22] This book uses the names interchangeably, depending on the period in which the city is being discussed. The name change from Bombay to Mumbai took place in November 1995. See Chapter 6.

Thirtieth Movement (1925), the Three Armed Workers' Uprisings (1926–7), nationalist protests against a government reluctant to confront Japan (1931–6), followed by extensive protests over Nationalist Party (GMD) misrule after the Japanese occupation ended in 1945. After Shanghai came under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, officials actively sought to mobilize residents in mass campaigns during the 1950s, some of which led to contentious claims against the grassroots cadres who led the campaigns. Meanwhile, a series of strike waves swept the city in 1949–50 and 1956–7. During the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai workers were at the forefront of the January Revolution (1967) that toppled the city's incumbent CCP leadership. During the tumultuous events of late 1966 and early 1967, disaffected workers and residents also pursued the successful redress of grievances related to the workplace, housing, and the right to return to Shanghai after having been forcibly exiled from it. In 1978, young Shanghainese who had been "sent down" to the rural villages surrounding Shanghai staged occupations of public spaces demanding that they be allowed to reestablish residence in the city. University students famously protested against the CCP leadership in 1986 and 1989. All of these events are well known and chronicled in separate studies, but each in its own way was manifested in spatial politics – the city's political geography shaped the strategies and patterns of contentious politics.

Bombay's record of contentious politics is equally impressive. The strikes and boycotts over Tilak's conviction in 1908 were in many ways reprised in 1919, in the context of the Rowlatt Satyagraha protests over the resumption of wartime restrictions on public gatherings imposed during the First World War. These citywide mobilizations were followed soon by the Non-Cooperation Movement in 1920–2. Bombay's textile workers staged industrywide strikes in 1919, 1924, and 1928–9. Large-scale marches and other protests took place in Bombay during the Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930–1, including boycotts of foreign goods and ceremonies held in the city's broad public lawns, or *maidans*. More textile strikes continued in 1934 and 1938. The nationwide Quit India Campaign was launched in 1942 from one of Bombay's *maidans*, and the Naval Ratings Mutiny (1946) brought the city to a standstill for several days. After independence, a movement for a linguistic-based state fueled the "Battle for Bombay," a series of fatal clashes between protestors and police in the mid-1950s. The ethnolinguistic mobilization continued in 1966 with the launch of the Shiv Sena, a movement deriding the alleged exclusion of the Marathi-speaking majority from salaried jobs and other urban resources by nonnative elites. One of the largest riots in the city took place when the Shiv Sena leadership attempted to disrupt a visit by the Indian deputy prime minister in 1969. The longest citywide textile strike in Bombay took place in 1981–2, and the industry never recovered. And in 1992 and 1993, riots associated with the destruction of a mosque in northern India triggered mass violence in the

streets and in the slums of Bombay. Like the case of Shanghai, Bombay's well-known and extensively chronicled episodes of popular protest offer promising insights for connecting spatial politics and contentious politics across time.

By century's end – and as suggested by the twenty-first-century episodes described earlier in this introduction – popular mobilization in both cities had given way to fragmented protests, largely against residential relocation and redevelopment projects. Protests more often than not were characterized by a "politics of compensation,"[23] in which payouts to those affected by urban development projects (evictees, for example) formed the locus of grievances and claims against city officials. As Lisa Björkman noted of frequent protests over public service provision, "in contemporary Mumbai crowds [of protestors] are generally paid – with food, cash, or both – to amass." Both politicians and nongovernmental organizations commonly provide these incentives to protestors to show up.[24] In Shanghai, with far greater risks for protest organizers and participants, the few scattered episodes of protest are more often than not connected with housing: victims of developer scams, those threatened by infrastructure such as a proposed maglev train in 2008, and generally any public action that could harm the interests of a given group of property owners. In both cities, the new forms of contention arose in the context of soaring income inequalities, widespread scarcities in affordable housing, and the departure of manufacturing jobs. Given the prominence of citywide mobilizations in response to inequalities at certain moments in the twentieth century, what explains the narrower scope of popular protest by the end of the century? Mumbai and Shanghai were hardly the only cities to see such rapid increases in income inequality at this time, and in this sense the answer to this question may shed light on contentious politics patterns in other twenty-first-century "global cities," a grouping that commonly includes Shanghai and Mumbai. They share with most other contemporary global cities the processes of gentrification, forcible relocation, land-led finance and capital accumulation, and replacement of manufacturing industries with financial and other globally connected service sector firms and forms of employment.[25] Civic and commercial consumption spaces in twenty-first-century Mumbai and Shanghai can also be analyzed as efforts by political and commercial elites to shape citizenship through the production of "landscapes of power."[26]

[23] Roy 2009.   [24] Björkman 2015, 214, 263, n. 16.
[25] Smith 2002; Sassen 2001; Florida 2005.
[26] Thornton 2010. While Thornton's article focuses on two prominent sites in Beijing where the Chinese Communist Party has sought to shape citizenship (Tiananmen Square and a luxury consumer shopping plaza a few blocks from the Square), the concept of "landscapes of power" could be extended beyond the Chinese case to other states that seek to engage in citizenship formation through the transformation of urban space.

During the twentieth century, the large-scale protests in Bombay and
Shanghai were examples of transgressive contentious politics, characterized
in the words of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly as "episodic, public, collective
interaction among makers of claims and their objects" in which the participants
are either "newly self-identified political actors" or they "employ innovative
collective action," or both. Innovation in this context includes taking steps that
are "either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question."[27]
Municipal authorities in Shanghai and Bombay were often the objects of
protesters' claims, and the public nature of the interaction between the makers
of claims and city authorities meant that streets and civic spaces were the
venues in which such claims were voiced. Especially in the early twentieth
century, the protestors were "newly self-identified" participants in politics, and
for much of the twentieth century, their tactics and claims were innovative and
of questionable legality in the eyes of the authorities. An important question for
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is how transgressive forms of
contention have seemingly become contained (institutionalized, routinized), or
even contained *and* transgressive.[28]

One possible explanation for the more contained nature of contentious
politics in late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Shanghai and
Mumbai – such as those connected to residence, property, and public
space disputes (e.g., hawkers) – is that rapid growth and infrastructure
development brought about better living standards for most city residents,
even as inequalities of income and wealth grew dramatically. Some of the
earlier protests in the twentieth century, especially in 1919 and in the 1960s,
arose in part in reaction to economic conditions, including inflation, reces-
sions, job losses, or housing scarcities. But as the chapters that follow show,
these episodes of contentious politics were not reducible to simple economic
grievances.

This paired comparison of Mumbai and Shanghai is based on the logic that
despite the obvious contrasts in political institutions, national historical trajec-
tories, religious practices, and political cultures, among much else, one can find
observable similarities in the ways that contentious claims over the distribution
of urban resources and calls for recognition as citizens intersected with trans-
formations in each city's built environment and with broader ideological
currents at the national and global levels. The relatively long temporal scope
reveals how patterns of contention (including broad and narrow forms) arose
from complex legacies of earlier decades of city-building and patterns of
contentious politics.

[27] McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 7–8.
[28] Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li (2006) found the same for episodes of "rightful resistance" in
rural China of the 1990s.