Introduction

Aims and Approaches

One principal motive for writing this book is to take advantage of what many, though not all, in the field of International Relations (IR) will take to be the centenary of the discipline in 2019. It is the longstanding founding 'myth' of IR, widely taught in introductory courses, that it came into being as a formal field of study in 1919 in response to the catastrophe of the First World War. That 'myth' sets IR up as being a response to the urgent problem of how to understand the whole problem of peace and war in the society of states (we review this 'myth' and the debate around it more fully in Chapter 2). Big anniversaries like this one are good opportunities to pause, take stock, review what has been accomplished, and what not, and think about where to go from here.

Another motive, no less important, is to reflect on the growing debates about the nature and scope of IR coming from those who feel that the field has remained too parochially Eurocentric for too long, and needs to show greater inclusiveness. While such writings have been around for some time, they have intensified during the past decade. Yet there is no single, consolidated study that puts IR thinking outside the West into the larger context of IR's evolution and directions. Ours is such an attempt, though in this book we cannot do much more than sketch in some of the missing or neglected aspects of Non-Western IR thinking that would lend IR a more universal flavour. Compared to that for the United Kingdom or the United States, there is very little literature or information on the origins and evolution of IR outside the West in the English language. Most work on the historiography of IR as a discipline outside the West starts after the Second World War (e.g. Tickner and Wæver, 2009a). Information is especially sketchy on the universities and centres of learning, syllabi and textbooks in IR outside of Europe and the United States. To offer a comprehensive account of the emergence of IR beyond the West is not our goal. What we aim for is to offer a broad-brush overview of some of

the key themes and where possible institutional centres of IR in regions outside of Europe and North America.

This book is designed to be part of IR's centennial reflection, and to contribute to the debate in three main ways:

(1) Deepening the existing questioning of the 1919 founding story and providing an alternative, layered framing for the development of IR.
(2) Linking the development of IR to the actual practice of international relations (ir) from the nineteenth century onwards, to show how closely IR has reflected the existing order through time.[1]
(3) Opening up the neglected story of thinking about IR that took place outside the West throughout the period under study.

The book also provides a one-stop introductory text to the history and evolution of IR as a discipline.

Summary of the Argument

Our overall story is that the development of IR actually tracks quite closely the nature and practices of ir. Given that IR has always had strong connections to current events and foreign-policy making, this link is not, in itself, particularly surprising.[2] Its utility for our purposes is that it enables us to develop a nuanced insight into when, how and why IR acquired its notoriously West-centric structure. Although an oversimplification, it remains broadly true that contemporary mainstream IR theory is not much more than an abstraction of Western history interwoven with Western political theory. Realism is an abstraction from eighteenth-century European balance-of-power, behaviour combined with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century, and indeed ancient Greek, political theory. Liberalism is an abstraction from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and theories of political economy. Marxism is an abstraction from another branch of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European theories of political economy and historical sociology. The English School (ES) is an abstraction from nineteenth-century European diplomatic behaviour and a long European tradition of legal theory resting on the assumption that all law, including international law, presupposes the existence of a society. Constructivism

[1] Our approach thus differs from, but we hope is complementary to, that of Schmidt (1998a, b) and others who explore the origins and roots of the discipline by examining the discourses of those scholars within it.
[2] For detailed argument on how IR theory and World History are co-constitutive, see: Lawson (2012) and Buzan and Lawson (2018). For another work taking a similar approach to relating the practice of ir to the thinking about it, see Knutsen (2016).

is not so obviously abstracted from Western practice, but is drawn from Western philosophy of knowledge. IR has been largely built on the assumption that Western history and Western political theory *are* world history and world political theory.

The fallacy of this assumption is easily exposed by asking what IR theory would look like had the discipline been developed elsewhere than in the West. China, for example, has a radically different history and political theory from that of the West. Whereas Western thinking and practice have been drawn more towards sovereignty, territoriality, international anarchy, war and international society, Chinese theory and practice have been drawn more towards unity, hierarchy, *Tianxia* (all under heaven) and tribute system relations.[3] In the Chinese system, war, diplomacy and trade all embodied quite different practices and understandings from those in the West, and what is now called soft power played a much larger role. China's claim to be the 'Middle Kingdom' was an assertion of cultural as much as material superiority, and Chinese practice and thinking do not fit all that comfortably with Western concepts such as great power, empire and suzerainty. Had IR come out of Islamic history and political theory, it might well have been much more focused on world society rather than on a system of sovereign, territorial states. As the fourteenth-century travels of Ibn Battutah show, an Islamic world society stretched from Spain to China – within which an individual could travel more or less safely, and have his standing and credentials recognised along the way (Mackintosh-Smith, 2002).

Further evidence that Western history and political theory do not adequately represent the rest of the world has arisen during the past few decades, as the study of IR has gained popularity around the world. IR scholarship in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia is showing a growing disconnect between the dominant IR concepts developed in the West – including the nation state, power, institutions and norms – and the realities that local scholars perceive and analyse in these different regions.

Given that IR should be the most global of the social sciences, how did this lopsided structure happen? The answer to that question, and a sense of how the discipline of IR might rebalance itself, can both be found in the linkage between ir and IR over the past two centuries.

During the nineteenth century and up to the First World War, the nature and practices of ir were structured by an intensely unequal relationship between a relatively small, but very powerful core, and a large,

[3] For an excellent review of how and why the Chinese system behaved and thought as it did, see Pines (2012).

but relatively weak periphery. The core was mainly Western, plus Japan, and its practice was to make a sharp distinction between 'civilised' states, who composed international society, and 'barbaric' or 'savage' societies, mostly dealt with by degrees of colonial subordination and not counted as part of international society. The development of IR during this period was much more substantial than is implied by the 1919 founding myth. Most of the foundations of modern IR were developed before 1914, and this 'IR before IR' mirrored ir in its concerns and definitions, being almost entirely a view from the core. Despite the trauma of the First World War in the core, the highly unequal colonial structure of core–periphery carried over largely unaltered into the interwar period. Indeed, the trauma of the war put the question of great power peace and war at the centre of concern in both ir and IR. From 1919, IR went through its first formal founding and naming, and reflected both the marginalisation of the periphery, and, as its 1919 founding myth suggests, the obsession with great power war. It remained almost entirely focused on the war/peace concerns and divided ideological perspectives of the Western core, with the periphery remaining marginalised inside Western and Japanese empires. Throughout this time of extreme core dominance, views about ir/IR were developing in the periphery. But since many of them were motivated by anti-colonialism, they were largely ignored or marginalised in the West-centric discourses of IR. The colonies were largely excluded from international society in their own right, and they were not much part of IR concerns during this period either.

During the Cold War/decolonisation era up to 1989, this extreme core–periphery construction of both ir and IR began to change. After the Second World War, between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s, decolonisation brought almost the entire periphery into formal membership of international society as sovereign equals. At the same time, IR underwent what was in effect a second foundation, with massive increases in the size and institutionalisation of the field. The delegitimation of colonialism and human inequality were major transformations in ir, and to some extent this was reflected in IR. The Third World and Development Studies became part of IR's curriculum, and thinking from the Third World, such as Dependency Theory and Postcolonialism, began to register on the margins of mainstream IR. But IR, and to a considerable extent ir, nevertheless remained largely focused on the concerns and perspectives of the Western core. This happened partly because, after 1947, the obsession with great power war that dominated the interwar period was sustained and amplified by the risk of nuclear war between the two rival superpowers. Global nuclear war might destroy not only civilisation, but humankind as a whole, so it was a justified priority.

It was also the case that the periphery, while formally liberated politically, remained weak, and economically subordinated to the core powers, mainly the West and Japan. Although the Third World had some independent play in world politics, it was heavily penetrated by the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. So, although IR did incorporate the periphery into its concerns, it did so mainly from the perspective of the core, seeing the Third World and its events largely through the lenses of superpower rivalry and manipulation. This orientation also reflected the singular dominance of the United States within IR in terms not just of sheer numbers, but also in control over finance, journals, academic associations and the theoretical debates at the core of the field. American IR not surprisingly reflected American ir: US concerns and interests about the Cold War, the global economy and the ideological alignment of the Third World.

It is not until we get to the world after 1989, both post-Cold War and post-decolonisation, that this imbalance between core and periphery in both ir and IR begins to break down. During the 1990s the imbalance was briefly maintained while both ir and IR tried to figure out the consequences of a seeming unipolarity of the United States and globalisation of the world. But this broke down quickly under several different pressures. The rise of China, and to a lesser extent India and others, exemplified what Fareed Zakaria (2009) calls 'the rise of the rest'. By the early twenty-first century, the wealth and power gap between core and periphery that was the legacy of the uneven and combined development triggered by the revolutions of modernity during the nineteenth century was visibly eroding. The United States shifted its security concerns first towards a group of Third World 'rogue states', and after 2001 towards global terrorism that mostly had its roots in the Islamic part of the Third World. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and especially after the economic crisis that started in 2008, China loomed increasingly large as the main challenger to US dominance in ir. At the same time, IR expanded and became institutionalised in more and more countries. The United States retained more dominance in IR than in ir, but was being challenged by Europe and Asia both in terms of IR theory and institutions from academic associations to journals (Acharya and Buzan, 2007a, b, 2017; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Western IR, with its core perspective, remained dominant. But increasingly others were trying to get their own histories and political philosophies in play to widen the historical and philosophical foundations of IR. By 2017 it was increasingly apparent in both ir and IR that the global dominance of the West was winding down. A post-Western world order was emerging in which the West was no longer the only, or the dominant, centre of wealth,

power and cultural legitimacy. Yet especially in IR, the legacy of Western dominance hung on longer than it was doing in real-world ir.

To capture the unfolding of global international society (GIS) over the last two centuries we use a broad periodisation developed by Buzan and Schouenborg (2018): version 1.0 GIS, the first founding of modern ir taking Western-colonial form (from the nineteenth century up to 1945); version 1.1 GIS, the first major revision ending colonialism but still core-dominated and taking Western-global form (1945–2008); and the emergence of version 1.2 GIS after 2008, in which Western dominance increasingly gives way to a deep pluralist form in which there are many centres of wealth, power and cultural legitimacy. We use this historical trajectory of ir, in terms of the changing relationship between core and periphery, as a springboard to think about how IR now needs to become more global in order to reflect 'the rise of the rest'. Among other things, this means paying more attention to local histories additional to the Western one, and to world history told from a global perspective. Thinking about ir from other cultures and histories needs to be brought into both historical accounts and the process of theorising. And account needs to be taken of the historical grievances against the old core that still exist in much of the old periphery, and which continue both to poison contemporary ir and distort IR.

In order to capture the global evolution of IR as a discipline, we adopt the same broad view of what counts as 'thinking about IR' as in our earlier work (Acharya and Buzan, 2007a, b, 2010). In its early phases, thinking about international relations was as much an activity of political leaders and public intellectuals as it was of academics. Indeed IR did not become a primarily academic activity even in the West until after 1945, and rather later than that in the Third World. We take this non-academic thinking about IR seriously as part of the discipline's history, and show how it shaped subsequent academic developments in both core and periphery. Within the more academic IR that has evolved since the Second World War, we also take a broad view of what counts as 'theory'. The detailed discussion of this is in Chapter 2.

All of this has consequences for how the discipline is taught and institutionalised. We hope this book will open a debate for the whole discipline of IR about how and why it needs to make the transition from being mainly West- and indeed Anglosphere-centric, to being truly global, hence our term Global IR (Acharya, 2014a).

The argument sketched out above is organised around five pairs of chapters, each covering one time period: nineteenth century to 1919, 1919–45, 1945–89, 1989–2017 and looking forward from 2017. The first chapter of each pair sketches out the international history (ir) of the

period, and the second sketches out the evolution of IR as a discipline, and how that evolution relates to the history of its time. As noted above, our argument is that the events of world history set much of the agenda for what IR thinks about: IR is to some extent a slave to current events. But it is also a two-way street. IR tries to capture this shifting reality, prioritises some things over others, and adds labels and concepts such as bipolarity, globalisation and international society, that in turn influence how people understand the world they are in and therefore shapes how they act.