Introduction

Historiography and Purpose of the Study

War and conflict often force men and women to take decisions they had never considered during peacetime. In his 1845 novel *Twenty Years After* – a sequel to *The Three Musketeers* – Alexandre Dumas describes a scene in which one of the book's main antagonists, a man known as Mordaunt, reports to Sir Oliver Cromwell after a battle with the guard regiment of King Charles I, which resulted in the King's capture:

> 'The Colonel of the regiment which served as the escort of the
>   king – I mean Charles – was slain, I believe?' said Cromwell,
>   looking straight at Mordaunt.
> 'Yes sir.'
> 'By whom?'
> 'By me.'
> 'What was his name?'
> 'Lord de Winter.'
> 'Your uncle?' exclaimed Cromwell.
> 'My uncle! Traitors to England are no relatives of mine.'
> Cromwell continued thoughtful a moment, looking at the young
>   man; then with that deep melancholy which Shakespeare
>   describes so well, he said, 'Mordaunt, you are a dreadful
>   servant.'
> 'When the Lord commands, one must not trifle with orders.
>   Abraham raised the knife over Isaac; and Isaac was his son.'
> 'Yes,' said Cromwell; but the Lord did not allow the sacrifice to
>   be accomplished.'
> 'I looked around me,' said Mordaunt; 'and I saw neither goat or
>   kid caught in the thickets of the plain.'
> Cromwell bowed.
> 'You are strong among the strong, Mordaunt,' said he . . .[1]

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[1] Alexandre Dumas, *Twenty Years After* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 512.

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Although this fictitious story takes place about three hundred years before the events discussed in this work, the interaction between Cromwell and Mordaunt still manages to address many of the themes that will be examined here. It shows how individuals redefine others within changing situations: Charles is no longer Cromwell's king, Lord de Winter no longer Mordaunt's uncle. These changes have repercussions for the actors' attitudes towards them yet it remains vague what these precisely are. Secondly, the orders Cromwell gave to Mordaunt were evidently ambiguous enough to be interpreted differently to how they were meant, a recurrent issue in warfare. Mordaunt had to make a 'judgement under uncertainty', and, as sociologists have long demonstrated, it is likely that he considered his actions to be 'representative' of the situation, and as the only workable alternative available to him at the time. What to outsiders might appear 'irrational' nevertheless developed from prior ways that actors, such as Mordaunt, had approached and solved their problems and informed their decisions.[2] Cromwell acknowledges this by professing both shock and approval, as such showing the ambivalence and duality in his understanding of Mordaunt's actions. Ultimately, Cromwell's reaction is rooted in pragmatism and utilitarianism: the mission, after all, is accomplished. Finally, it shows war's inherent hardening nature: it takes mere seconds for the traumatic and onerous issue to be put to rest.

Nazi Germany's death knell came exactly one hundred years after Dumas's examination of the different strata in military thought and the way these informed soldiers' actions and concerns. For most Germans, the first months of 1945 became synonymous with unparalleled destruction, seemingly arbitrary death from without and within, and unequivocal and total military defeat.[3] How these three notions related to each other is much less known, if only because '1945' was almost immediately appropriated. In post-war West Germany the notion of a *Stunde Null*, or 'zero hour', was introduced to represent May 1945, highlighting the break with Germany's totalitarian past. Adhering to this concept meant that all misery that had befallen the country had to be traced back to Nazism, which was readily done.[4] At the same time, East German scholars presented the violence in 1945 as proof of widespread disagreement with a regime that had pursued the 'imperialist interest of German

[2] Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 'Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases', *Science* (185) 1974, pp. 1124–31.
[3] Richard Bessel, *Germany 1945, From War to Peace* (New York: Pocket Books, 2010), pp. 4–7.
[4] Manfred Görtemaker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999), pp. 159–60. See for example: *Stunde Null und danach – Schicksale 1945–1949*. Ten volumes (Leer: Verlag Gerhard Rautenberg, 1983–7).

monopoly capital', while also playing up the role of the anti-Fascist resistance.[5] Moreover, virtually from the moment Allied troops entered their communities, Germans throughout their country drew on the terror and fear they felt in 1945 to present themselves as victims of National Socialism.[6] This study proposes a new approach towards the perception of late-war violence. Above all, it seeks to restore agency to the German armed forces, the Wehrmacht, and examines the mark it left on the German wartime community.

Both the sheer scale and the diversity of violence were unparalleled in German history, and to untangle the various strands of responsibility, culpability, and involvement, this study will restrict itself to an analysis of the events in East Prussia and its capital, Königsberg. We will return to further underlying reasons for this decision below, but first address the general narrative. In 1945, the omnipresent violence throughout Germany led to a sense of 'general hopelessness' among its population, as Allied bombardments reduced city after city to rubble, while revenge-driven Soviet troops molested tens of thousands of women in Eastern Germany.[7] The final months of the war also saw a massive increase in German-versus-German violence, or intra-ethnic violence, mainly in the form of decentralised summary courts. Since this type of violence took place against the background of the widespread racist violence that has come to define the National Socialist regime, it is generally – but inaccurately – grouped together with it. During the previous years, the Nazi regime had persecuted racial minorities and social outsiders, but within its own borders had at least sought to keep repression and mass murder from the public eye.[8] In the final months of the war the violence

[5] Hajo Dröll, 'Die Zusammenbruchskrise des faschistischen Systems in Deutschland', in Niethammer, Borsdorf, and Brandt (eds.), *Arbeiterinitiative 1945*, p. 173; Gerhard Förster and Richard Lakowski, *1945: Das Jahr der endgultigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht* (Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 1985); Wolfgang Schumann and Olaf Groehler (eds), *Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg 6: Die Zerschlagung des Hitlerfaschismus und die Befreiung des deutschen Volkes (Juni 1944 bis zum 8. Mai 1945)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985).

[6] For example: Jürgen Thorwald, *Es begann an der Weichsel. Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben 1949); Jürgen Thorwald, *Das Ende an der Elbe. Die letzten Monate des Zweiten Weltkriegs im Osten* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben 1950). See also: Saul Padover, *Lügendetektor: Vernehmungen im besiegten Deutschland 1944/45* (Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn Verlag, 1999); Bill Niven (ed.), *Germans As Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), ch. 1: 'Poor Germany'.

[7] Heinz Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–1945, Band 17* (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), p. 6734.

[8] David Bankier, *The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), chs. 4 and 7; Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich: a New History* (London: MacMillan, 2000), pp. 631–2; Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (eds.),

against these groups escalated and increasingly took place out in the open. These so-called *Endphaseverbrechen* – 'Crimes of the final phase' – have been the focus of in-depth research. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, these crimes were examined within the framework of their respective organisations such as the Gestapo, the Hitler Youth, the prison system, and the concentration camp system. Scholars convincingly demonstrated that there was not a single Nazi institution that did not resort to radical measures during the final months of the war.[9]

Further research followed shortly afterwards and placed these crimes within the context of the crumbling German community. Scholars like Sven Keller stressed that despite the Nazi regime's failure to meet most of its promises, which was clear to most Germans by the summer of 1944, it was still able to mobilise the German population for the defence of their country by means of increasingly radical laws and orders.[10] The radicalised Party official as the linchpin in the violence towards the German population was fairly readily accepted, since National Socialism and violence are inextricably linked.[11] 'Looking at the ruinous landscape left behind by National Socialism – a landscape shaped by war, racism, exclusion and murder, violence seems to be the common denominator,' Richard Bessel rightly observed, further noting that when the Third Reich broke down in 1945, violence itself was the only aspect of National Socialist system to sustain.[12]

Yet one of the biggest differences in the violence in 1945 and the violence during the years earlier was that it focused on 'regular' German Volksgenossen as well, rather than merely on the different minority groups. In rapid succession, the regime established summary courts

   Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Saul Friedlander, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939–1945* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), pp. 92–3.

[9] Daniel Blatman, *The Death Marches, the Final Phase of Nazi Genocide* (London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011); Nikolaus Wachsmann, *Hitler's Prisons, Legal Terror in Nazi Germany* (London: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 319–31; Michael Kater, *Hitler Youth* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 215–30; Gerhard Paul, ' 'Diese Erschießungen haben mich innerlich gar nicht mehr berührt': Die Kriegsendphasenverbrechen der Gestapo 1944/45', in Paul and Mallmann (eds.) *Die Gestapo im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, pp. 543–68.

[10] Sven Keller, *Volksgemeinschaft am Ende: Gesellschaft und Gewalt 1944/45* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013), pp. 419–26; Cord Arendes, Edgar Wolfrun, and Jörg Zedler (eds.), *Terror nach Innen: Verbrechen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006).

[11] On Party behaviour in Eastern Germany, see: Alastair Noble, *Nazi Rule and the Soviet Offensive in Eastern Germany, 1944–1945: the Darkest Hour* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).

[12] Richard Bessel, 'Eine "Volksgemeinschaft" der Gewalt', in Schmiechen-Ackermann (ed.), p. 359.

(15 February and 9 March), implemented the 'Nero Decree' (19 March), which called for the destruction of the German infrastructure, and the 'flag order' (3 April), which for all German men made hoisting a white flag punishable by death. These orders shared the communality that they were meant to affect the larger German public. Instigated by the Nazi elite and steeped in Nazi rhetoric, they have been considered 'the last gasp of the regime', willing to drag all Germans along with them into destruction.[13] The decentralised and disparate nature of the violence, which, moreover, seemed to flare up with little warning or rationale, further allowed scholars to draw parallels between earlier Nazi political violence, such as in 1932–3, and the violence in 1945.[14] However, the fractured state of Germany by 1945 made it significantly harder for policy decisions taken in Berlin to be implemented 'on the ground'. By confining the research to one province, this study examines how the central decision-making processes translated into intra-ethnic violence on a local level.

Within the historiography of '1945', sustained attention has also been devoted to the violence committed by Soviet troops against German refugees. The persistent narrative is that of a failing Party bureaucracy that prevented, and often forbade, the population of threatened areas from preparing for evacuation, thereby leaving them at the mercy of the Soviets.[15] This study addresses the events in the months prior to and during the East Prussian offensive, the Soviet offensive which started on 12/13 January 1945 as part of a larger strategic effort to destroy German forces east of the Oder river – the final natural barrier before Berlin. Covering the period between July 1944 and May 1945, it will focus sustained attention on the considerations that underpinned the different evacuation measures in East Prussia, expanding on the research of Heinrich Schwendemann who examined the motivations behind strategic and tactical decisions taken by Wehrmacht commanders during the final months of the war.[16] It will closely link it to the research of David Yelton, who examined the establishment and deployment of the Volkssturm

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[13] Manfred Zeidler, 'Der Zusammenbruch des NS-Staates', in Ralph Giordano (ed.), *Kriegsende in Deutschland*, pp. 42–9.

[14] Sven Keller, 'Volksgemeinschaft and Violence: Some Reflections on Interdependencies', in Steber and Gotto (eds.), *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany*, pp. 226–39.

[15] Theodor Schieder (ed.), *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neisse, Band I*, (Munich: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984). Popular history works addressing this theme are: Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966); Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin* (New York: Penguin, 2002).

[16] See: Heinrich Schwendemann, 'Der deutsche Zusammenbruch im Osten 1944/45', in Rusinek (ed.), *Kriegsende 1945*, pp. 125–50.

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militia during the final year of the war.[17] The two scholars both estab-
lished that the military was much more closely involved in decisions that
directly impacted the German civilian population.

The continuing focus on Party behaviour meant that the largest and
most violent player present in Germany in 1945 – the German
Wehrmacht – has remained underappreciated as an actor. Although
the Wehrmacht's role in the defeat of the Third Reich has been
examined, the intra-ethnic violence that took place during the final
fighting in Germany is rarely traced back to it.[18] Research into the
motivations behind the violent behaviour among the ranks of the
Wehrmacht goes back to Bartov's 1985 standard work 'The Eastern
Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare',
which not only addressed the violent interaction its members had with
an environment they perceived as hostile but also provided an insight
into   the   ideological   indoctrination   explaining   the   troops'
motivations.[19] In the decades that followed, Wehrmacht behaviour
on the Eastern Front remained the focus of in-depth studies. The
crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during the German occupation
of the Soviet Union are central in these works, and numerous scholars
convincingly demonstrated that the Wehrmacht was actively involved
in the Holocaust, while also participating in countless acts of geno-
cide against local populations. The focus on the policies in the Soviet
Union however also means that the examination 'stops' at the
German border: the summer of 1944 is generally the end-point of
these studies.[20] Whereas numerous studies address the violent behav-
ioural patterns of the Wehrmacht in the occupied cities in
Eastern Europe, so far no research exists that asks critical
questions about the relation between the Wehrmacht and its own

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[17] David Yelton, *Hitler's Volkssturm: the Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany 1944–1945*
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

[18] Andreas Kunz, *Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der
nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005)

[19] Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001).

[20] See for example: Timothy Patrick Mulligan, *The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German
Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942–1943* (New York: Praeger, 1988);
Theo Schulte, *The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia* (Oxford: Berg,
1989); Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final
Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998); Hamburg Institute for Social
Research, *Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation
1941–1944. An Outline of the Exhibition* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2004);
Dieter Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht: Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische
Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941–1944* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2008);
Jeff Rutherford, *Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front: the German Infantry's War,
1941–1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

population.[21] This study addresses this gap by applying the findings regarding Wehrmacht behavioural patterns on the Eastern Front to Germany itself by examining in detail conditions in Königsberg during the final months of the Second World War.

There is certainly scope for this avenue of research: although the breadth of the violence on the Eastern Front has been fairly well examined, the magnitude of the horror ensured that it is too often viewed as being perpetuated by inertia. Its principal actors, it sometimes appears, 'underwent' the violence, whether they were victims, bystanders, or perpetrators. It is not hard to trace back where this notion originates from. Within the scholarship into military behaviour on the Eastern Front, the first occupation years (1941–2) are examined most extensively, since during this period a string of deadly, racially motivated 'criminal orders' were implemented which were subsequently discussed in the field and elaborated on in war diaries.[22] Moreover, the unfamiliarity with the area, and the very human incapability to grasp the size of the Western Soviet Union – a thousand miles separated Leningrad from Stalingrad, over six hundred miles lie between Brest and the outskirts of Moscow – makes us glance over the fact that 'the Eastern Front' is a collective name for what was in reality hundreds of separate battlefields that all impacted their participants in different ways. The learning curve of the ordinary German soldier, the Landser, was determined by the different experiences they underwent, and these would shape their adaptability and responsiveness to the battles that lay ahead. This 'interplay between military developments and the behaviour of the combatants' was first examined by Christian Hartmann, who found that different military circumstances prompted different acts of violence.[23] By the end of 1941 most genocidal orders were in place, and we thus tend to consider the winter of 1941 as something of a 'baseline' in regard to soldiers' brutality. That troops

[21] Stephan Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation im Osten: Besatzeralltag in Warschau und Minsk 1939–1944* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).

[22] Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter, and Ulrike Jureit (eds.), *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005); Alex Kay, Jeff Rutherford, and David Stahel (eds.), *Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalisation* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012). See further: Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999); Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978); Felix Römer, '"Im alten Deutschland wäre solcher Befehl nicht möglich gewesen": Rezeption, Adaption und Umsetzung des Kriegsgerichtsbarkeitserlass im Ostheer 1941/42', *VfZ* (56) 2008, pp. 53–99.

[23] Christian Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg: Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), pp. 245, 243–423.

continued to radicalise through interaction with their environment is easily overlooked, and especially during times of military defeat the mental and physical strain led to a sharp increase in violence.[24] As soldiers kept interacting with their environment in reaction to the different wartime developments, 'barbarisation', and thus the nature of violence, evolved continuously. It seems therefore unlikely that after four years on the Eastern Front – either as occupiers or as fighters – German troops could simply leave behind their violent mindset as they crossed back into Germany.[25] Breaking the cycle of violence would, moreover, be a near-impossible task, especially for the army's veteran core groups. As the British military historian Basil Lidell-Hart asserted on the eve of the fighting in East Prussia: 'The only thing harder than getting a new idea into a military mind is to get an old idea out.'[26] Put more bluntly, 'terrorising' had become part of the Wehrmacht's arsenal: it had terrorised foreign civilians and terrorised its own men on a scale unequalled in military history.[27] The move towards the violent maltreatment of their own civilians might therefore be more unassuming to the Landser than we would care to admit.

The rationale behind radical Wehrmacht behaviour has long been sought in the ideological indoctrination of the troops, but although this is undoubtedly important, it meant that other explanations were left largely ignored.[28] Vejas Liulevicius drew attention to the German military's stay in Russia during the First World War, showing that a radicalised Nazi mindset was not at all a prerequisite for a harsh occupation and brutal behaviour towards populations.[29] Similarly, Peter Lieb examined German conduct on the Eastern Front during the First World War and its aftermath, concluding that the events that manifested themselves could not be considered precursors to the war of annihilation 25 years later.[30] Other factors, such the strain of war, are still largely left

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[24] Rutherford, *Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front*; Jürgen Kilian, 'Wehrmacht, Partisanenkrieg und Rückzugsverbrechen an der nördlichen Ostfront im Herbst und Winter 1943', *VfZ* (61) 2013, pp. 173–99.

[25] The experiences of war prompted a 'new normal', a development which, of course, was not at all limited to soldiers. See for example: Ian Buruma, *Year Zero: a History of 1945* (London: Atlantic Books, 2013), p. 7.

[26] Aimeé Fox, *Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 1.

[27] Robert Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2005), p. 273.

[28] Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 4, 'The Distortion of Reality'.

[29] Vejas Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[30] Peter Lieb, 'Der deutsche Krieg im Osten von 1914 bis 1919: Ein Vorläufer des Vernichtungskriegs?', *VfZ* (65) 2017, pp. 465–506.

unexplored. Whereas war neurosis (what is today called 'post-traumatic stress disorder') is examined in depth when it concerns the other belligerents during the Second World War, an examination of the mental state of German troops is still absent.[31] Nazi medicine itself lay at the core of this underappreciation, since troops' mental illnesses did not fit into the idea of a healthy fighting *Volk*. As German soldiers' mental traumas were equated to cowardice, or even considered as treasonous, they remained unaddressed during the National Socialist era, while also in post-war Germany the general advice was to 'trivialise, tone down, consciously forget and suppress' traumatic experiences.[32] The traumas of German soldiers and civilians alike have received little attention in the existing literature, although the topic is gaining in prominence.[33]

Only recently has a group of German scholars, led by the historian Sönke Neitzel and the social psychologist Harald Welzer, set out to assess the 'military–sociological and social–psychological' motivations of German soldiers. With war as a frame of reference, the authors found the views of German troops on 'fighting, killing and dying' to be rather similar when compared to modern-day soldiers.[34] This group also included Felix Römer, who published the landmark work 'Kameraden', using the bugged conversations of German prisoners of war recorded at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Also for Römer, the National Socialist indoctrination is merely one of the dimensions to explain the behaviour of Wehrmacht soldiers. For Römer, the 'actual combat and the dynamics of violence, the historical–cultural framework of the respective society and its military, the culture within the actual unit, and finally also the individual disposition of each combatant' were the main driving forces behind military conduct.[35] The troops' attitude towards their fellow countrymen, however, could not be included in the work, since the time of capture of the examined German POWs mostly predated the allied

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[31] See for example: Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, *Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War* (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005).

[32] Geoffrey Cocks, *Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: the Göring Institute* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997), p. 82; Hilke Lorenz, *Kriegskinder: Das Schicksal einer Generation* (Munich: List, 2003), p. 19.

[33] Svenja Goltermann, *Die Gesellschaft der Überlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Gewalterfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2009); Jörg Echternkamp, *Soldaten im Nachkrieg: Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demokratisierung 1945–1955* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2014).

[34] Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, *Soldaten, On Fighting, Killing and Dying: the Secret World War II Transcripts of German POWs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); Christian Gudehus, Sönke Neitzel, and Harald Welzer (eds.), *'Der Führer war wieder viel zu human, viel zu gefühlvoll': Der Zweite Weltkrieg aus der Sicht deutscher und italienischer Soldaten* (Frankfurt a.M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2011); Harald Welzer, *Täter: Wie aus ganz normale Menschen Massenmörder werden* (Frankfurt a.M., Fischer Verlag, 2005).

[35] Felix Römer, *Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht von innen* (Munich: Piper, 2012), p. 468.

advance into Germany. It is nevertheless noteworthy that among these men the concern for and the treatment of the German population was apparently hardly worthy of sustained conversation. The research into the role of the German armed forces during times of violent transition is currently experiencing a revival, with German military involvement increasingly sought – and found – at the centre of intense domestic violence; this study fits into this new current.[36]

We now turn to the main questions this study addresses. It argues that the violence against German civilians during the defence of their country can only be understood by restoring agency to the soldiers of retreating Wehrmacht units as active participants, thus looking beyond the traditionally viewed actors. To what extent could the arrival of military units in Germany help to explain the spike in violence in Germany in 1945? Was this violence deliberate, or was it a by-product of the fighting; was it ordered, or was it spontaneous? What explains the difference in behaviour between these units and those German troops that were already garrisoned throughout the country? Every possible answer, in turn, only prompts more questions. What could be gained by exercising violence, and who gained from it? Most importantly, why would German troops and Party officials decide to resort to violence against their fellow countrymen, and how did they justify this to themselves? Finally, this study seeks to distinguish con-tinuities and discontinuities in military behaviour as troops returned from fighting abroad to fight on the home front. Thus, its purpose is to determine to what extent the violence in 1945 can be separated from its totalitarian context. By presenting a microhistory of East Prussia and Königsberg, it presents a new view on the role of the Wehrmacht within German society. Research has so far mainly addressed the extent to which National Socialism impacted the Wehrmacht, yet it hardly examined what mark the Wehrmacht left on the German wartime community. Examining the interplay between Party and Wehrmacht bodies, this study seeks to clarify how the two actors shaped late-war German society.

Methodology and Outline

Examining events that occurred in Germany in 1945 means wading through a dense historiography. The secondary literature is virtually infinite, and some of the most highly regarded historians have recently

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[36] See particularly: Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918–1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).