Introduction

Charles Cyril Ammons was eighteen years old when the First World War broke out in July 1914. A self-proclaimed intellectual with socialist and pacifist political leanings, he was, at first, unsure what to make of the war. On the one hand, Ammons had read Bernard Shaw’s sensational pamphlet, *Common Sense About the War*. Shaw’s pamphlet managed to convince him that the conflict was a struggle between capitalist and imperialist empires over market control. Germany, Ammons reasoned, had acted like other ‘Western Imperialists’ in the nineteenth century by forcing its way into the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The only difference in 1914 was that the Kaiser had arrived late to the party. For Britain to punish Germany was ‘hypocritical’, he thought. On the other hand, Ammons couldn’t shake the feeling that there was something different, something more mendacious and troublesome, about Germany’s behaviour on the world’s stage. As much as he wanted to believe that Shaw was right, that the working classes of Britain and its empire would only be serving the interests of industrial tycoons and high society if they enlisted, his position on the war slowly changed. After months of gloomy winter weather, continuing news stories about atrocities in Belgium, and a number of close friends joining the colours, Ammons decided to enlist in May 1915. After failed attempts to enlist in the Royal Naval Air Service, a field company in the 47th (2nd London) Division, and the Royal Engineers, he was finally accepted into the London Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance.

As much as he had hoped to and expected to take part in the liberation of German-occupied France and Belgium, Ammons instead boarded a troopship destined for the Mediterranean Sea. Writing in his unpublished memoir fifty-five years after the war ended, he remembered that as the troopship chugged eastward, the sun beating down on the ship’s deck and the splashing water noticeably warming, he realized that he was heading neither to France nor to the Dardanelles. Alexandria was the ship’s port of call. The thought of spending the rest of the war in Egypt, far from the fighting on the Western Front, was ‘somewhat saddening’, he
recalled, ‘the Orient seemed alien and hostile while Malta’, the final place the troopship was anchored, was ‘the last of Europe’ he saw for some time.\(^1\)

Ammons’ story would have been relatable to most British and Dominion soldiers: scepticism about the war turning into a worldwide conflict, perhaps even a personal conviction against the usefulness of war, the sudden realization that Germany posed a grave threat to the international order after its invasion of Belgium, and the conclusion that each and every man in the British Empire had to do his part to stop the march of the Kaiser and the German Army.\(^2\) Where Ammons’ story differs is that he did not end up in the trenches of France and Flanders with German soldiers opposite him. Instead, he was sent away from the Western Front and away from the war he had signed up to fight. Ammons found himself first in Macedonia fighting the Bulgarian Army and later in Palestine fighting the Ottoman Army.

This book is about the experience and memory of the nearly two million British and Dominion soldiers, men like Ammons, primarily from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, who spent most or all of their war outside the Western Front. They fought in the Middle East, in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, and in southeastern Europe, in Macedonia; the ‘side-shows’ of the war, as Lloyd George had called them.\(^3\) The fact that so many British and Dominion soldiers saw little or none of the fighting in France and Flanders is far more important than has been previously recognized. Belgium and France were foremost in the minds of mostly young British and Dominion men when they rushed to enlist in August and September 1914 or afterwards.\(^4\) Germany’s invasion and occupation of Belgium and northeastern France was the main way that the war was understood and given meaning throughout the British Empire. Belgium and France were lands that had to be liberated from German occupation to preserve international law and, in the words of historian Sophie de Schaepdrijver, Belgium was the ‘living embodiment

\(^{1}\) Papers of Charles Cyril Ammons, unpublished memoir, Museum of Military Medicine, Corps Archives, RAMC/1599.

\(^{2}\) Ammons’ motivation to enlist broadly fits the reasons Adrian Gregory has described, although he joined much later than what Gregory has identified as the first wave of enlistment in Britain in August and September 1914. See Adrian Gregory, *The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 32.


of the right-against-might values that the West was ostensibly fighting for.\textsuperscript{5} Belgium and France, according to clergy, were where a cataclysmic struggle between good and evil was being fought.\textsuperscript{6} Belgium and France were places where British and Dominion men, in an effort to protect their own homes and families, and to prevent the ‘rape of Belgium’ from becoming the ‘rape of England’ or the ‘rape of Wales’ or the ‘rape of Australia’, were to make a stand and stop the march of militarism.\textsuperscript{7}

Not only was the British Empire’s motivation for fighting the war dominated by the Western Front and Germany’s bid for continental supremacy, but also the brutal conditions of the war in France and Flanders became some of the war’s defining features. Muddied, rat-infested, waterlogged trenches, most notably at Ypres, and vicious, relentless artillery shelling were thought to represent a new kind of twentieth-century, industrialized warfare. Daniel Todman has even suggested that mud became symbolic of the war’s futility in Britain.\textsuperscript{8}

Casualties also mattered. That men had fought, been wounded, and/or died was paramount both during and after the conflict. For British society, the war’s ‘greatness’, as Todman has explained, went hand in hand with a ‘morbid revelling in mass fatality’ and an ‘amazement with vast catastrophe’.\textsuperscript{9} Scale and numbers were significant, and by most measures the war in the Middle East and Macedonia fell far behind the Western Front. The peripheral campaigns did not seem ‘great’ at all.

In other ways, too, the Western Front dominated interwar society. As Jay Winter has argued, as the war moved in-between history and memory, society no longer remembered the defeat of the Central Powers as a worthwhile achievement of British, Dominion, and Allied arms. The cost of the war and a determination not to repeat the foolishness of global armed conflict, not the war’s victorious outcome, preoccupied the


\textsuperscript{8} Dan Todman, \textit{The Great War: Myth and Memory} (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2010 [2005]), 1–41.

\textsuperscript{9} Todman, \textit{Great War}, 67.
thoughts and convictions of most men and women. While some representations of the war in popular culture, such as in films, fiction, and juvenile literature, continued to depict the war as a heroic clash of arms, the war’s victories, including the Hundred Days Offensive, as Gary Sheffield has explained, seemed in retrospect more like losses.

Two decades after the start of the war, the experience of fighting on the Western Front had also eclipsed all other wartime experiences. The ‘popular definition of culturally legitimate war experience’, as Janet Watson has pointed out, ‘had narrowed to that of the soldier in the trenches: young junior officers or possibly men in the ranks, preferably serving in France or Belgium, and almost certainly disillusioned’. From that point onwards, the brooding, hypersensitive war poets of the Western Front reigned supreme. They continue to do so to this day.

The central place of the Western Front both during and after the war raises a serious question: How did the millions of British and Dominion soldiers who only briefly or never set foot in France or Flanders, but instead fought in the Middle East and Macedonia experience and remember the First World War? Their battlegrounds were not the trenches of Ypres or Loos, but the rippling sands and punishing heat of Sinai, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, and the rock-strewn, desolate, and malaria-infested valleys of Macedonia. Diseases and illnesses, from malaria and sandfly fever to dysentery and sunstroke, wounded and killed them in large numbers, not artillery shelling or handheld explosives. Instead of taking occasional leave home — more of an option for British and Irish soldiers than ANZACs — or billeting in the estaminets of France, they took leave to a number of fabled cities such as Cairo, Jerusalem, and Baghdad, as well as more modern, cosmopolitan metropolises such as Alexandria and Salonika. For the most part they didn’t fight Germans. They fought...

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10 Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
12 Watson, Fighting Different Wars, 186.
13 I have not included British soldiers who fought on the Italian Front, although I’m certain that many of the same arguments could apply. While the fighting conditions along the Italian-Austrian border presented their own challenges and were different from those on the Western Front, the Italian Front was so close to the main battlefront of the war, British soldiers were fighting mostly Austrians, and Italy was as European in character, although markedly different visually and culturally from Britain, as France and Belgium. In short, Italy was familiar and close enough to the Western Front, whereas the other, non-western battlefronts were not.
the Ottoman Army in Sinai, Palestine, and Mesopotamia and the Bulgarian Army in Macedonia.

The campaigns in Sinai and Palestine, Macedonia, and Mesopotamia were all part of the British Empire’s global war effort. To save the remnants of the retreating Serbian Army and following Bulgaria’s decision to enter the conflict on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915, with Greece and its pro-German king thought to be nearing the same decision, a combined British and French force landed at and occupied the Greek port city of Salonika. The British Salonika Force (BSF) and the French Armée d’Orient remained in Salonika and along the Greek-Bulgarian border until September 1918, when the two forces, combined with the Serbs and smaller forces of Italians, Russians, and Greeks, broke through the line and routed the Bulgarians and their German allies.

One day after Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, a detachment of Indian soldiers landed at Fao in southern Mesopotamia to safeguard the oil refineries at Abadan. Between 1915 and the end of the war, British and Indian soldiers steadily advanced through Mesopotamia, capturing Basra and Baghdad (although not without setbacks), until the Ottoman Empire’s capitulation in October 1918. Regarding the war in Sinai and Palestine, the protection of the Suez Canal, through which troops from India and the antipodes travelled to the Western Front or Gallipoli, was vital. By 1916, British war strategy, partly motivated by two failed Ottoman raids on the Canal in January and February 1915, sought to protect the Canal by pushing the line deeper into Sinai. After David Lloyd George became prime minister in December 1916, Palestine along with the campaigns in Macedonia and Mesopotamia were given new prominence in British war strategy.

The clear defeat of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire stood out against the failures and pyrrhic victories on the Western Front. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire were the first two of the Central Powers to withdraw from the conflict. The Allied breakthrough in Macedonia in September 1918 had unlocked the road to Sofia and threatened Istanbul.14 The Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s (EEF) victory at Megiddo and its march towards Aleppo in September and October 1918, alongside the British-Indian Army’s consolidation of the area surrounding Baghdad, opened up the possibility of an offensive into eastern Anatolia.

To be sure, the intensity of combat in Sinai and Palestine, Macedonia, and Mesopotamia ebbed and flowed between periods of fierce, almost relentless fighting, and weeks, if not months, spent on infrastructural improvements, garrison duty, and behind-the-lines training exercises. Casualties in Palestine, especially the two failed attempts to capture Gaza in March and April 1917, were as devastating as combat on the Western Front. At Kajmakčalan and Dobro Pole in Macedonia, Allied and Bulgarian casualties numbered in the tens of thousands. The nearly five-month-long siege and surrender of the 6th (Poona) Division at Kut al-Amara in Mesopotamia ended on 29 April 1916 with 23,000 British and Indian casualties; it was the largest surrender of British arms since Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781 and would not be matched until Arthur Percival’s Malay Command in Singapore was overrun by Japan in 1942. But these numbers, while appalling in their own right, pale in comparison to the losses on the Western Front. The German Spring Offensive resulted in over 200,000 casualties; the final Allied Hundred Days Offensive ended with nearly 300,000 British casualties; while by the end of the four-month-long Battle of the Somme, British and Dominion forces had suffered 400,000 casualties.

Nor had the campaigns in the Middle East and Macedonia, excepting the calamitous surrender of Kut al-Amara and perhaps the Second Battle of Gaza, suffered from the bungling ‘donkeys’ and ‘butchers’ of the Western Front. Edmund Allenby, the commander in chief of the EEF from July 1917 onwards, and Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude, who commanded the British-Indian Army in Mesopotamia from August 1916 onwards, were lionized both during and after the war, Allenby as ‘The Deliverer of Jerusalem’ and Maude as ‘The Liberator of Bagdad’. Like Allenby and Maude, Lieutenant General George Milne, commander in chief of the BSF, was highly popular with ex-servicemen.

Carving out a place for the war outside the Western Front was a difficult task for other reasons, too. After the war, the question of who could and could not claim to have sacrificed during the war was met by a multitude of voices. Disfigurement and dismemberment produced

16 Richard C. Hall, Balkan Breakthrough: The Battle of Dobro Pole 1918 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 75, 137.
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a mass of ex-servicemen who laid claim to a special place in interwar society.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, soldiering had changed notions of citizenship and civic participation.\textsuperscript{21} Regional pride also resulted in distinct, local identities.\textsuperscript{22} Especially in mourning, interwar Britain revealed the divisive nature of remembrance. Armistice Day activities between 1919 and 1946, as Adrian Gregory has shown, highlighted the contesting visions of honouring the war dead, which were fed by differences in class, gender, religion, and combatant status.\textsuperscript{23}

Over the past two decades, the British Empire’s wars outside the Western Front have received increased scholarly attention. Military histories have narrated the campaigns.\textsuperscript{24} Studies have focused on the experience of soldiering in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, and Macedonia.\textsuperscript{25} Other works have told the story of the wars in the Middle East in chronological fashion and with extracts from soldier diaries, letters, and memoirs to lend a voice from below to the narrative.\textsuperscript{26} Works on grand strategy, politics, logistics, and the wartime need for natural resources, such as oil, have also considered the Middle East.\textsuperscript{27} Works on soldiers and religion have considered Palestine, both from the perspective of personal patterns of worship and references to the campaign as a twentieth-century crusade.\textsuperscript{28} Works on wartime medicine and the colossal efforts taken to


\textsuperscript{21} Gullace, ‘The Blood of Our Sons’.


\textsuperscript{26} David R. Woodward, \textit{Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East} (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006).


eradicate illnesses such as malaria and other tropical diseases have also considered the war’s non-western spaces, as have studies of cross-cultural interactions in the Balkans.  

Yet none of these works have fulfilled the potential of looking at the wars outside the Western Front alongside each other. This book is the first full-length study to consider the experience of soldiers outside the Western Front comparatively, and the first, to this author’s knowledge, to explore the memory of the campaigns through the eyes of ex-servicemen and, once again, in comparison to the other peripheral fronts. And it makes sense to compare them and not treat them separately. Contemporaries certainly did. Lloyd George pushed for offensives in Macedonia, Mesopotamia, and Palestine to relieve the British Empire’s commitment to the Western Front and to find an indirect path to victory, one which did not compel Britain to defeat the German Army in France and Flanders. Other diplomats, politicians, and advisors, such as Leo Amery, Sir Henry Wilson, and Herbert Samuel, concerned with the war’s global implications, considered Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia central to the British Empire’s lines of communications and the protection of India. All of the peripheral fronts were at the heart of the debate between a western, direct approach to the war and an eastern, indirect approach to the war, that historians have characterized as a strategic and policy battle between ‘easterners’ and ‘westerners’. Even military commanders in charge of the peripheral campaigns, such as General Sir Archibald Murray, the commander-in-chief of the EEF from March 1916 to June 1917, weighed the importance of all of the British Empire’s peripheral campaigns on the war’s outcome. Murray wrote that ‘Palestine, Egypt, Tanganyika, West Africa, and Mesopotamia mattered not’ if the war was lost in France and


31 Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy*, 23–42.

Flanders. The conditions of soldiering were similar, motivations were imperially minded, and all were secondary or worse to the Western Front.

Sources and Structure

In comparing both the experience and memory of the British Empire’s wars in the Middle East and Macedonia, this book uses a range of sources, almost all of which were written by soldiers themselves, from archives in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. It makes use of wartime diaries, correspondence, poems, songs, soldier-produced newspapers, articles penned by soldiers in popular journals, periodicals, and the press, as well as unpublished and published memoirs. This book also uses visual sources, such as regimental emblems and soldier photography, to help explain experience, and post-war, commemorative scrapbooks to help explain memory. Admittedly, most of my sources are British rather than Australian or from New Zealand, and the war in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, and Macedonia features more prominently than the war in Mesopotamia. Furthermore, I should make clear that this book is explicitly and exclusively about the experience and memory of British and Dominion soldiers. It does not deal with how the British and Dominion publics viewed these campaigns, except when necessary to make sense of a soldier’s comments or to enhance my argument, or how the British and Dominion publics remembered these campaigns.

This book covers the period between 1914 and 1939. It is divided into two parts. Part I looks at the experience of war outside the Western Front, focusing on soldiering, touring, how British and Dominion soldiers found meaning in being away from the Western Front, and the fear of soldiers that the home front had either forgotten that they were fighting, suffering, and dying away from France and Flanders, or that their wars were ‘picnics’ and a lesser form of wartime sacrifice compared to fighting the German Army on the Western Front. Part II turns to the memory of the campaigns outside the Western Front and shows how ex-servicemen were ‘agents of memory’, as Jay Winter and Antoine Prost have labelled soldier memoirists, who were keen to overturn any negative opinion of the part they played in the war. As we will see, how ex-servicemen remembered the war in public and in print, in the form of memoirs, differed considerably from how ex-servicemen remembered the war in private and in photographs and memorabilia, in the form of commemorative scrapbooks.

33 Quoted in Johnson, The Great War and the Middle East, 59.
In Part I, Chapter 1 explores the experience of soldiering in the Middle East and Macedonia. Fighting outside the Western Front presented many unique hardships, including fierce combat that could, on occasion, rival the slaughter on the Western Front, such as at Gaza or Ctesiphon, harsh climatic and environmental conditions, geographic isolation, the threat of insects and tropical diseases such as malaria and sandfly fever, and fractured links to home, as mail took much longer to arrive, if it arrived at all, and leave home was rarely granted. The main point of this chapter is twofold. First, in addition to cataloguing the hardships of soldiering in the words of those who fought, this chapter reveals that soldiers in the Middle East and Macedonia constantly, almost obsessively, looked to the Western Front when considering their lot in the war and judging whether they had it ‘soft’ or ‘hard’. Second, by comparing their campaigns to the war on the Western Front, soldiers were trying to prove both to themselves and to those at home that fighting outside the Western Front was not a lesser sacrifice, that they had suffered as much or worse than their comrades in France and Flanders, and that, in turn, they had done their ‘bit’.

Chapter 2 presents the other side of soldiering outside the Western Front: tourism. In particular, this chapter argues that perhaps no other British Empire soldiers during the war embodied the dual identity of soldier-tourist more than the men who fought outside the Western Front. This was especially true of soldiers in Egypt, Palestine, and Macedonia, who dealt with long stretches of inactivity and whose soldiering involved more work on infrastructural improvements and other general labouring than their counterparts on the Western Front. Soldiers were keen to visit and tour the sites of both Old and New Testament Christianity, ancient Egypt, Islam, and the non-western world’s cosmopolitan, multicultural cities, such as Alexandria, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and Salonika. Yet, almost to a man, they were left disappointed by what they saw. Incorporating historian Gabriel Liulevicius’s idea of the ‘imperial mindscape’, which he used to explain how German soldiers encountered and interacted with Eastern Europe on the Eastern Front, this chapter argues that British and Dominion soldiers did much the same, particularly in the Middle East and Macedonia. And further like German soldiers in the east, British and Dominion soldiers also offered a ‘prescription’, a fix, for the problems of poor civil infrastructure, shoddy architecture, filth and squalor, and immoral commercial practices that seemed to them to dominate everywhere from Alexandria to Salonika; that fix was some form of British imperial rule or influence. As this chapter explains, what soldiers saw while touring the Middle East and Macedonia...