



Secrets in Global Governance

Scholars have long argued that transparency makes international rule violations more visible and improves outcomes. *Secrets in Global Governance* revises this claim to show how equipping international organizations (IOs) with secrecy can be a critical tool for eliciting sensitive information and increasing cooperation. States are often deterred from disclosing information about violations of international rules by concerns of revealing commercially sensitive economic information or the sources and methods used to collect intelligence. IOs equipped with effective confidentiality systems can analyze and act on sensitive information while preventing its wide release. Carnegie and Carson use statistical analyses of new data, elite interviews, and archival research to test this argument in domains across international relations, including nuclear proliferation, international trade, justice for war crimes, and foreign direct investment. *Secrets in Global Governance* brings a groundbreaking new perspective to the literature of international relations.

ALLISON CARNEGIE is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. She is the author of *Power Plays: How International Institutions Reshape Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

AUSTIN CARSON is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2018).

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Secrets in Global Governance

Disclosure Dilemmas and the Challenge of
International Cooperation

ALLISON CARNEGIE

Columbia University

AUSTIN CARSON

University of Chicago



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