A paradox of parliamentary constitutionalism is that parliaments do not control public finance.

Despite enacting gargantuan tax and appropriation statutes, the financial powers of parliaments are ceremonial and passive, while executives’ are practical and potent. Executive organs carry out all financial planning, possess a veto over all financial legislation, exercise broad delegated statutory power over public expenditure, determine when and how to issue sovereign debt, supervise the wider executive’s use of economic resources and dictate the form and content of public accounts. Parliaments ratify the financial legislation developed by executives and exercise a weak form of ex post review of public spending. Judiciaries occupy no systemic position in public finance, lacking any meaningful jurisdiction over the legality of public spending, debt or monetary finance, while only intervening sporadically in taxation disputes and not invariably in support of parliaments. Central banks have stringent public financing powers which are exercised infrequently and, usually, via coordination with treasuries. Since the mid nineteenth century, that distribution of financial power has prevailed in the nation-states which grew from the British Empire, both republics and constitutional monarchies.

Much of the foregoing chafes against orthodoxy. Since the late Victorian era, mainstream jurists have assumed that executives are subordinate to parliaments, including where finance is concerned. That public money is governed by a ‘system of parliamentary control’ has been assumed as mostly accurate, and no dedicated study has questioned parliaments’ supposed constitutional superiority. Compared to the attention given to the clash of political and judicial authority in twentieth-century constitutional

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affairs, the financial aspect of constitutionalism has been left to languish in obscurity.

This book brings public finance out from the constitutional shadows for examination. It argues that an historical and contemporary analysis of the legal practices governing public finance places the executive at the financial apex of the parliamentary tradition. That argument unfolds in the following structure.

Chapters 2–5 provide an historical account of the development of a model of parliamentary public finance which distributed the bulk of authority to executives, rather than parliaments or judiciaries, beginning in the UK, before widening to account for the imperial spread of parliamentary government. Chapters 6–8 provide a detailed case-study analysis of the contemporary operation of public finance law in varying economic circumstances: Australia and the UK between 2005 and 2016. Those case studies provide concrete examples of the complex interplay of legal authority, governmental behaviour and economic conditions, each of which contributes to the distribution of constitutional authority over public finance. Chapters 9 and 10 close the book by consolidating the ramifications of the foregoing historical and contemporary analyses for core doctrines of anglophone constitutional theory. Chapter 9 presents a detailed critique of the idea of ‘parliamentary control of public finance’ and explores alternative formulations of the balance of financial power between parliaments, executive and judiciaries. Chapter 10 moots a number of future avenues of intellectual enquiry on the topics of constitutionalism and public finance.

This introductory chapter surveys the intellectual and institutional background, clarifies critical ideas and summarises the book’s central claims. It commences by explaining how public finance has been understood through the idea of ‘parliamentary control’. Like many bedrock constitutional ideas, it traces to A. V. Dicey, and this book opens by reviewing Dicey’s influence on prevailing thinking about finance and parliamentary government. After dealing with Dicey, the background literature and institutional practice necessary to appreciate this book’s contribution are surveyed. Thereafter, the chapter introduces and explains the core concepts necessary to engage with public finance from a constitutional perspective, particularly the functions of fiscal, debt management and monetary activities. That explanation should be helpful for readers outside the financial cognoscenti. The chapter closes by summarising the book’s central claims.
Dicey’s System of Parliamentary Control

From the first edition of the *Law of the Constitution*, in his treatment of ‘[t]he Revenue’, Dicey wrote of the ‘system of parliamentary control’ which governed ‘the collection and expenditure of the revenue, and all things appertaining thereto’. Dicey’s focus was novel. Other constitutional jurists had not allocated a totalising position of control to parliament over finance but had devoted their intellectual energies to explaining the constitutional functions of the Crown (Monarch and executive), while recognising, almost as subsidiary, the role played by parliament in the annual processes of supply and taxation. Dicey swept aside the Crown’s financial role and placed Parliament in a position of predominance in relation to tax, expenditure and audit.

On taxation, Dicey counselled ‘putting the hereditary revenue out of our minds’ and restyled the ‘extraordinary’ revenue as ‘the Parliamentary revenue of the nation’. He canvassed the distinction between annual and standing taxes to make the ‘main point’ ... that all taxes are imposed by statute, and that no one can be forced to pay a single shilling ... which cannot be shown to the satisfaction of a judge to be due from him under Act of Parliament’. On expenditure, he refuted the ‘mediaeval notion’ that money ‘granted’ by Parliament was ‘the King’s property’, explaining that, ‘at the present day’, the ‘whole of the public revenue is treated ... as public income’. The ‘details of the methods according to which supplies are annually voted and appropriated’ were glossed over en route to Dicey’s salient point that ‘each item of expenditure’ is ‘directed and authorised’ by ‘some permanent Act’ or ‘by special Acts passed prior to the appropriation Act and enumerated therein’.

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2 Ibid., 171.
3 Ibid., 171–175.
4 Ibid., 171.
6 Dicey (1885), 172.
7 Ibid., 173. Chapter 3 examines some of the complications which attended that statement in 1885.
8 Ibid., 173.
9 Ibid., 174.
Dicey described the system of public audit and accounts as a 'security ... for the due appropriation of public revenue ... for its being expended in the exact manner which the law directs'. 10 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 was singled out for special mention, 11 particularly those parts which conferred powers on the Comptroller and Auditor-General as ‘comptroller’ (to permit a withdrawal of money) and ‘auditor’ (to scrutinise the accounts of departments to ensure that expenditure occurred lawfully). Both powers, Dicey wrote, completed the system of providing ‘parliament [with] complete control over the national expenditure’. 12

Dicey included the judiciary in that system of parliamentary control, but trod cautiously. Full-throated approval was given to the judiciary’s position as a protector of property rights, with Dicey stating that a public official trying to collect tax without statute would ‘expose himself to actions or prosecutions’. 13 Far more circumspect language was used to describe the judiciary’s positions vis-à-vis public expenditure: officials spending money without legislative approval ‘would find it difficult to avoid breaches of definite laws which would expose them to appear before the Courts’. 14 That delicate language was surely intentional, as Dicey knew first-hand that the judiciary had no jurisdiction to enforce appropriation legislation against the Treasury, having successfully argued the point as counsel two years before publishing his lectures on constitutional law. 15

Dicey’s Legacies

Of course, Dicey did not design the UK’s system of public finance, but his intellectual positioning of the constitutional principles concerning public finance left three intellectual legacies, which were passed down to later generations of constitutional jurists. The first was framing those principles within the language of ‘parliamentary control’ rather than available alternatives like: ‘[t]he Crown demands money, the Commons grant it

10 Ibid., 171 (original emphasis).
11 (29 & 30 Vict, c 39).
12 Ibid., 174.
13 Ibid., 200.
14 Ibid.
15 In R v. Inland Revenue (1884) 12 QBD 461 the Court of Appeal upheld Dicey’s submission that earlier authority permitting the issue of mandamus against the Treasury for breach of an appropriation Act could not ‘be maintained on any ground’ and was ‘wrong’: at 476, 480. Chapter 3 explains the episode in greater detail.
and the Lords assent to the grant’ or the ‘executive’s financial initiative’.16

The language of ‘parliamentary control’ was not unknown before Dicey. It was tossed about in the House of Commons in relation to public expenditure from (at least) the 1840s and was invoked in relation to Gladstone’s financial reforms of the 1860s.17 Building on those artefacts of Victorian political culture, Dicey elevated the idea that parliament controlled public finance to a position of constitutional predominance.

Dicey’s second legacy was to selectively rank the financial activities of government: taxation first, expenditure second, audit third, while sovereign borrowing and the Bank of England’s public financing role were wholly ignored.18

Dicey’s concentration on tax is understandable. Tax is constitutionally significant because it is the revenue-generating activity uniquely possessed by the state in virtue of its monopoly on lawful coercion. Everyone can bargain to raise funds; only the state can command people to fund it. But, even in Dicey’s time, tax was neither the sole nor the most potent method of raising public money. In the decade before The Law of the Constitution, large sums were routinely advanced from the Bank of England to the Treasury. In 1877, the Bank advanced the Treasury £1 million, representing 1 per cent of total public receipts and 19 per cent of income tax receipts. In 1885, that number rose to £2.5 million (1 per cent total tax and 21 per cent of income tax receipts).19 Between the 1850s and the 1880s, the annual average of outstanding Treasury debt stood at ~£18 million, representing ~22 per cent of total receipts and ~200 per cent of income tax receipts.20 Both the advances from the Bank of England and the debt issued by the Treasury were authorised by legislation ignored by Dicey.

Dicey’s attention to the constitutional practices surrounding public expenditure is equally understandable, particularly his focus on the annual process of parliamentary appropriation. Annual appropriation legislation has an obvious constitutional significance by tethering the

16 May (1851), 411.
17 HC Deb 11 August 1848, cc 93–100, and again following Gladstone’s financial reforms of the 1860s (e.g., HC Deb 08 June 1875, cc 1522–60) about which more is said in Chapter 2.
20 BHS, 582–583, 602.
executive’s budget to parliamentary will expressed through statute. Once again, however, the story is more complicated than depicted by Dicey.

When Dicey wrote, Britain’s expenditure on debt-servicing costs was authorised under legislation which stood outside the annual parliamentary processes: *standing appropriation legislation.*21 The amount of interest paid, and principal repaid, under that legislation was enormous. Between 1875 and 1885, public debt repayment averaged 35 per cent of total public spending, while non-debt military and civil expenditure averaged 32 per cent and 21 per cent respectively.22 The proportion of public expenditure authorised by standing appropriation legislation would only increase as Dicey penned the latter editions of his tome. By the publication of his eighth edition in 1915, standing legislation had been enacted providing authority for early welfare state spending.23 The large, and increasing, share of public expenditure authorised outside the annual appropriation process sat awkwardly with Dicey’s ideas on parliamentary control of expenditure.

Dicey’s third legacy was locating the idea of parliamentary control of public finance within the twin pillars of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and the ‘rule of law’. His conclusion that public finance was ‘governed by law, or, what is the same thing, may become dependent upon the decision of the judges upon the meaning of an Act of Parliament’,24 is exemplary of his broader project to model the English constitution within the confines of the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.25 Thereby, Dicey framed the issue of the constitutionality of public money as one concerning parliament and the judiciary.

Notably underplayed was the executive’s role, as well as the massive legal and administrative power held by the Treasury. Notwithstanding Dicey’s famous antipathy to the growing British bureaucracy,26 that is a curious omission. He acknowledged select parts of the *Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866* but omitted those which delegated vast financial authority to the Treasury: to determine how departmental

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21 Notably the *Act of 1787* (27 Geo III, c 33) which created the Consolidated Fund.
22 BHS, 588, 602.
23 *National Insurance Act 1911* (1 & 2 Geo, c 55).
24 Dicey (1885), 178.
25 Ibid., 180.
26 Dicey attacked the ‘administrative methods’ of early welfare state legislation, such as the *National Insurance Act 1911* (1 & 2 Geo V, c 55), on the basis that they ‘harmonise with the principle or the sentiment of collectivism’, and called the combination of universal adult suffrage and old-aged pensions ‘evil’: Dicey (1917), *Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century*, xxxv, xxxix.
accounts would be prepared, to refuse a department’s request for funds granted by parliament, to direct the Comptroller and Auditor-General to carry out audits and to determine the terms of public borrowing (from the Bank of England) to make up shortfalls in tax revenue. When Dicey wrote, those provisions bolstered the Treasury’s, rather than Parliament’s, control over the administration of public expenditure. Unaltered in all material respects, they endure today.

Parliamentary Control of Public Finance

For constitutional jurists, the Diceyan idea of parliamentary control of finance became a basic unit of thought, even though interest in the legal and constitutional dimensions of public finance waned throughout the twentieth century.

Predictably, Wade and Phillips followed Dicey in framing their analysis of finance via ‘parliamentary control of expenditure and taxation’. Although they took fleeting notice of sovereign borrowing and observed the ‘functions of the Treasury’, they stayed within the Diceyan mainstream. Jennings’ engagement with public finance was characteristically focused on the legislative and administrative aspects of government, but he still understood ‘financial control exercised by the Commons’ as a core constitutional principle. His drift away from Dicey was, however, evident, including by recognising the importance of the Treasury and surveying the details of legislation concerning annual and standing appropriations. But public borrowing and banking were not prominent parts of Jennings’ ‘functionalist-style’ analysis of constitutions in the British tradition. Thereby, Jennings remained within the slipstream of Dicey’s constitutional modelling of public finance.

At the outset of the third millennium, parliamentary control is established at the intellectual core of the constitutional dimension of public

27 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 (29 & 30 Vict, c 34) ss. 12–14, 21–23.
28 Wade and Phillips (1931), Constitutional Law, 191; (1946), Constitutional Law, 155.
30 Rather than the judiciary: Loughlin (1992), Public Law and Political Theory, 168.
31 Jennings (1939), Parliament, 282; (1957), Cabinet Government, 283.
32 Loughlin (1992), 168.
33 Specialist public finance texts, where they existed, also invoked ‘parliamentary control’ as the dominant constitutional principle concerning public money: see, e.g., Durrell (1917), The Principles and Practices of Parliamentary Grants, 3.
finance. McEldowney expressed ‘Parliamentary control of the purse’ as a ‘basic principle of the [UK’s] constitution’, and *Halsbury’s Laws of England* states, as a ‘basic’ constitutional principle, that ‘Parliamentary control is exercised in respect of (1) the raising of revenue; (2) its expenditure; and (3) the audit of public accounts’.

Throughout the common law world, ‘parliamentary control’ also features prominently in constitutional actors’ own explanations of the principles governing public money. In Dicey’s home jurisdiction, the parliament spoke frequently in those terms. The UK’s *National Audit Act 1983* (UK) bore the long title ‘[a]n Act to strengthen parliamentary control … of public money’. Two decades later, the Commons would explain one of its ‘core functions’ as exercising ‘effective control’ over ‘government expenditure’. New Zealand’s parliament adopted the same verbal formula in s. 22 of the *Constitution Act 1986* (NZ), entitled ‘Parliamentary Control of Public Finance’. Executive agencies in Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand also frame their institutional relationship over finance through the idea of parliamentary control over ‘government spending’.

On the rare occasion that common law judiciaries have considered issues of public finance, they stayed close to the Diceyan shore. In 1912, a judge of the Chancery Division stated that ‘[b]y the . . . Bill of Rights . . . it was finally settled that there could be no taxation in this country except under authority of an Act of Parliament’. In 1923, the Privy Council stated that ‘[a]ny payment out of the consolidated fund made without Parliamentary authority is simply illegal and ultra vires’. The substance of those statements has since been adopted by the common law canon.

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36 Liaison Committee (2009), ‘Financial Scrutiny: Parliamentary Control over Government Budgets’.


while an adventurous Australian court has written Dicey’s principle of parliamentary control directly into its constitutional jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{41}

In the world of mainstream constitutional debates, the position of public finance, and parliamentary control, is less visible. As the ‘concept of fundamental law in modern constitutional regimes’ skewed towards ‘the institution of judicial review’,\textsuperscript{42} scant attention has been paid to the constitutional dimension of finance. Debates about parliamentary sovereignty focus on the, supposed or real, friction between parliament’s legislative sovereignty and the judiciary’s law-speaking and law-finding functions.\textsuperscript{43} Little ink has been spilt working out where the relationship, financial or otherwise, between parliament and executive fits in that debate. Contemporary rule-of-law debates are typified by a preoccupation with the common law judiciary’s intellectual methodology,\textsuperscript{44} particularly thick/substantive and thin/procedural/formal conceptions of the rule of law.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, analyses of the separation of powers (outside America) have tended to be conducted by reference to the judiciary’s institutional independence from the non-judicial arms of government.\textsuperscript{46}

As those debates are presently orientated, there is scarce room to think about the constitutional position of public finance,\textsuperscript{47} which, taxation aside, operates almost entirely outside the purview of judges. No meaningful judicial time has been spent thinking about Auditors-General’s legislative powers,\textsuperscript{48} and annual appropriation legislation falls within the

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{42}] Loughlin (2010), Foundations of Public Law, 288.
\item [\textsuperscript{43}] The positions are collected in Knight (2009), ‘Bi-Polar Sovereignty Restated’; Goldsworthy (2001), The Sovereignty of Parliament. Arguments for a more nuanced perspective on parliamentary sovereignty frame their preferred position in a similar way: see, e.g., Barber (2011), ‘The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty’.
\item [\textsuperscript{44}] A broader understanding of the rule of law, as constituted by ‘the constant disposition to act fairly and lawfully’ of the ‘settled ethical character’, has not featured in anglophone constitutional thought: Shklar (1987), Political Theory and the Rule of Law, 3, a position attributed to Dicey by Loughlin (1992), 151.
\item [\textsuperscript{45}] Craig (1997), ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law’.
\item [\textsuperscript{46}] Allison (2007), The English Historical Constitution, chapter 4.
\item [\textsuperscript{47}] Being mentioned only en passant: e.g., Barber (2018), Principles of Constitutionalism, 80.
\item [\textsuperscript{48}] The few existing cases have not been important enough to report: e.g., Bakewell v. McPherson (1992) BC9200236 (Supreme Court of South Australia).
\end{itemize}
core of subject matter which is not appropriate for judicial digestion: a fortiori legislation providing legal authority for sovereign borrowing and monetary financing.  

Given the low visibility of public finance in mainstream constitutional debates, public law scholars interested in public money have begun cultivating greener pastures.  

Explicitly rejecting any debt to Dicey, Daintith and Page studied the constitutional dimension of finance using 'systems theory' and the idea of 'structural coupling' of parliament and executive. Building on that heritage, Prosser analysed the position of finance within the 'economic constitution' with the assistance of 'the concept of regulation as both an academic discipline and a concern of practical politics', while assuming parliamentary control as a basic constitutional principle concerning 'getting and spending' public money. Both works make significant contributions to scholarly understandings of the workings of public finance in the parliamentary tradition, but neither provides a root-and-branch rethink of the descriptive accuracy or normative power of Dicey's idea of parliamentary control of finance, nor do the few deeply sceptical accounts which follow Bagehot's view that parliamentary control of finance is more constitutional fact than fiction.  

49 E.g., National Loans Act 1968 (UK) ss. 12(1) and (7), 20A, Sch. 5(4); Commonwealth Inscribed Stock Act 1911 (Cth), s. 3A; Financial Administration Act 1985 (Can), s. 43; Public Finance Act 1989 (NZ), s. 47. Exceptional cases exist at the supra-national level concerning the lawfulness of the European Central Bank's Outright Monetary Transactions Program (Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag (c-62/14)) and Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (Weiss and others (c-493/17)) under the prohibition on some forms of monetary finance contained in Art. 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  

50 Scattered offerings in the Diceyan mould can be found, but only as piecemeal treatments of discrete cases or statutes, such as Jaconelli’s analysis of Bowles v. Bank of England ((2010), ’The ”Bowles Act” – Cornerstone of the Fiscal Constitution’) and McEldowney’s critique of the Contingencies Fund ((1998), ’Contingencies Fund and Parliamentary Scrutiny of Public Finance’); treatments available elsewhere in the common law world are deeply embedded in local constitutional and statutory regimes; Lawson (2008), ’Re-invigorating the Accountability and Transparency of the Australian Government’s Expenditure’ 879–921.  


52 Prosser (2014), The Economic Constitution, 17–18, 84, 111. An in-depth account of the ’regulatory enterprise’ can be found in Prosser (2010), The Regulatory Enterprise.  

53 E.g., Harden (1993), ’Money and the Constitution: Financial Control, Reporting and Audit’. 