The Foundation of Norms in Islamic Jurisprudence and Theology

In this book, Omar Farahat presents a new way of understanding the work of classical Islamic theologians and legal theorists who maintained that divine revelation is necessary for the knowledge of the norms and values of human actions. Through a reconstruction of classical Ashʿarī-Muʿtazili debates on the nature and implications of divine speech, Farahat argues that, rather than being a purely traditionalist position, the Ashʿarī attachment to revelation was a rational philosophical commitment emerging from debates in epistemology and theology. He further argues that the particularity of this model makes its distinctive features helpful for contemporary scholars who defend a form of divine command theory. Farahat’s volume thus constitutes a new reading of the issue of reason and revelation in Islam and breaks new ground in Islamic theology, law, and ethics.

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The Foundation of Norms in Islamic Jurisprudence and Theology

OMAR FARAHAT

McGill University
To my parents
Hala El-Beyaly and Nour Farahat
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