accountability. See executives, responsibility to the legislature; political responsibility
Act of Settlement (1701), 49–50
Adams, John, 35, 89
After Virtue (MacIntyre), 1
Albert, Prince, 167
The American Commonwealth (Bryce), 195
American Revolution, 73, 109
appointment of ministers, 122, 126
appointment of the chief executive, 183–185
Burke and, 78, 80
Constant and, 122, 125, 127
de Staël and, 97, 102
and Grand Elector, 90
Greg and, 187
Jeffrey and, 109–110
legislature’s approval of monarch’s appointments, 68–69
Louis XVI and, 88
Mill and, 182–185, 188–189
ministers appointed by the legislature (not the monarch) in practice, 181, 183–185, 187
Montesquieu and, 68–69
Mounier and, 91
Necker and, 94–95
and parliamentary republicanism, 97, 125, 194
Siéyès and, 90
Arendt, Hannah, 204–205
aristocracy
appointment of peers in France, 130, 133–134
Burke and, 71
Constant and, 121, 125–127, 133
de Lomme and, 41–42
de Staël and, 92
and Edinburgh Whigs, 111–112
and the English monarchy, 41–42
and the French Revolution, 118
Jeffrey and, 108
Mill and, 190
Montesquieu and, 18–20, 34–35
natural aristocracy vs. hereditary aristocracy in France, 92
Necker and, 97
and patronage, 71
representation of, 85, 111–112, 121. See also Chamber of Peers; House of Lords
Austria-Hungary, 4–5
Baghot, Walter, 4, 10–11, 105, 164–165, 175–181
account of English parliamentarism, 175–181
career, 175
criticisms of American constitutional model, 177–181
and culture of political deliberation, 177, 179–181
The English Constitution, 175
and harmony between legislature and executive, 177–178
and liberty, 176–177, 181
and ministers’ lack of accountability, 176, 181
and monarch as barrier to usurpation by faction or ambitious individual, 168
and patronage, 104, 190–192
and political parties, 174
and selection of executives, 180, 187
and supremacy of the House of Commons, 167, 175
Victoria and, 166
Vile and, 175
Baranger, Denis, 48
Barante, Prosper de, 99
Barrot, Odillon, 134, 156
Belgium, 4–5, 135
Bentham, Jeremy, 109
Blackstone, William, 32, 35, 54
Bolingbroke, Lord, 36–39, 48, 57–58, 67
Bourbon Restoration (1814–1815), 116–117, 136, 138–139
Bourke, Richard, 26, 31–32
Britain
Act of Settlement (1701), 49–50

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checks and balances
in American constitutional model, 146–147, 182–183
Bolingbroke and, 36–39
Burke and, 8–9, 60–61, 64–65, 68–69
Constant and, 116, 127–134
and control over revenue, 8, 18, 31–34.
See also revenue, control over
de Lolme and, 8–9, 42–44, 110
de Staël and, 99, 103–104
and dissolution of the legislature/dissolution of
ministers. See dismissal of ministers;
dissolution of the legislature
and House of Commons, 8–9, 18–19, 25–26,
See also House of Commons
and House of Lords, 8, 18, 167
impeachment power, 18, 31, 36–37
and independent source of revenue for the
monarch (Civil List), 35
and ministers in the legislature, 8–9, 19,
47–58, 132, 148–149. See also executives in
the legislature
monarch as barrier to usurpation by faction or
ambitious individual, 8–9, 13, 42–43, 111,
132–134, 167–169, 202
Montesquieu and, 8, 18, 30–32, 34–35, 39.
68–69, 91, 128
Mounier and, 90–91
and National Assembly, 86–91
Necker and, 91–96
and patronage. See patronage
and political parties, 61, 71–72
popular support for the monarch, 35–36
and proposals for neutral constitutional power,
124–125
and risks of legislative usurpation/tyranny,
8–9, 19, 39, 42–43, 58, 85–86, 92, 111,
128–131, 133–134, 145–146, 151
Russell and, 113–114
Stewart and, 107, 110
Tocqueville and, 146–149, 151
and veto power of the monarch, 8, 32–34,
68–69, 86. See also veto power of the monarch
Walpole and, 36–38
chief executives
governance by independent chief executives, 2,
126, 178, 182
independent monarchs, 35–36, 39–40, 67–69,
91, 110
selection by the legislature, 181, 183–185
selection by the people, 180, 183–184
See also presidency; American presidency,
French: presidency; German: prime
ministers
Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la
Révolution (de Staël), 98–99, 105
Civil List, 35, 62, 72–74
civil service
in Britain, 189, 196
bureaucracy and patronage in France,
139–141
modernization in France, 158–159
prohibition of government functionaries in the
Chamber of Deputies, 141, 158–159
Clark, J. C., D., 66
Clermont-Tonnerre, Stanislas de, 85
Cobbett, William, 109
Condorcet, Marquis de, 89
Congress, U.S.
and checks and balances, 146–147
executive's lack of entry into, 145
Grey and, 174
and legislative deliberation, 174, 178–179
and stalemates between the executive and the
legislature, 177–178, 183
Tocqueville and, 145–146
and tyranny of the majority, 146
Considerations on Representative Government
(Mill), 164, 184–185, 189, 193
Constant, Benjamin, 3–4, 9–11, 84, 89–90,
115–143
and appointment of ministers, 122, 127, 130
background, 118
and cabinet instability, 140–141
and checks and balances, 116, 128–134
Constant and, 125
contrast to Doctrinaires, 135–143
and control over revenue, 127–128, 136
and corruption, 117, 134
criticisms of Constitutions of 1791 and 1795,
130–133
De la possibilité d'une constitution républicaine
dans un grand pays, 126–127
de Lolme and, 129, 131
de Staël and, 118
death of, 143
and debate over who may introduce
legislation, 186–187
dilemmas of French parliamentarism,
133–143
and dismissal of ministers, 13, 125–127, 130,
133–134
and dissolution of the legislature, 13,
125–128, 130–131
at Edinburgh University, 106
and electoral systems, 119
and freedom of the press, 138–139
Index

Constant, Benjamin (cont.)
and the French Revolution, 118
Guizot and, 137
influence of, 133, 135–136
and legislative deliberation, 116, 119–120, 131, 141
and liberal opposition party, 141–142
Mackintosh and, 106
Mill and, 185–186
and ministers in the legislature, 132–133
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature, 39, 116, 120–124, 126
Montesquieu and, 18, 124–128
and neutral constitutional power, 11–13, 115–116, 122–126, 131, 133–135, 137–139, 182
and parallels between censorship and patronage as means of limiting dissent, 140
and patronage, 13, 104, 115–116, 139–143, 160, 192
political career, 4, 116–117, 138
and political parties, 13, 162
Principes de politique applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs, 125
promotion of constitutional monarchy, 120–128, 132–135
promotion of parliamentarism, 9, 116, 118–120, 125–126, 132–133
promotion of republicanism, 118, 124–127, 132
proposed French constitution of 1815, 116, 125–126
and public opinion, 126–128, 134
Réflexions sur les constitutions, la distribution des pouvoirs, et les garanties, dans une monarchie constitutionnelle, 125
and social equality, 118
and suffrage, 117, 129, 185–186
Tocqueville and, 162–163
and veto power of the executive, 126, 127
and Victorian parliamentarism, 165, 167–168
Weber and, 115
Constitution of 1791 (France), 60, 76–82
Burke and, 60–61, 75–82
collapse of, 9, 81–82, 88, 95–96, 109, 130–131, 147
Constant and, 130–133
de Staël and, 98
Duguit and, 100
Jeffrey and, 109
and Louis XVI’s use of veto, 81–82, 88, 147
Mounier and, 86, 88
Necker and, 105
provisions of, 76–80, 88, 130–131
responses to collapse, 88–104
Séyès and, 86–88
Constitution of 1795 (France), 89, 95–96, 98, 118, 130–133, 150
Constitution of 1848 (France), 150–151, 184–185
constitution of England. See English constitution
The Constitution of England (de Lolme), 40, 45
Constitution, U.S.
Bagot’s criticisms, 177–181
Bryce’s observations, 194–195
and checks and balances, 146–147, 182–183
contrast between parliamentarism and American constitutional model, 144–163
172, 174, 177–181
and failure to secure the supremacy of the legislature over the executive, 144, 172, 177–178, 182–183
Grey and, 172
Laboulaye’s preference for American-style system, 151–152
and legislative deliberation, 174, 178–179
Mill’s criticisms, 182–183
Necker and, 96
Tocqueville’s analysis, 144–147, 151
Victorian theorists’ critiques, 165, 172, 177–183 see also specific theorists
See also Congress, U.S.; presidency, American constitutional monarchy, 1–3
advantages over American political system, 172, 177–183. See also parliamentary government: contrast to American constitutional model
advantages over republics, 131, 148, 151, 182
and appointment or dismissal of ministers. See appointment of ministers; dismissal of ministers
as barrier to demagoguery, 201–202
as barrier to usurpation by faction or ambitious individual, 8–9, 13, 42–43, 111, 132–134, 167–169, 182, 202
Bolingbroke and, 36–39
Burke and, 60–68, 80
de Lolme and, 40–47
de Staël and, 101–104
dignity of hereditary monarch, 96–97, 100–101, 111–112
and dilemmas of parliamentarism, 11–13, 133–143
and dissolution of the legislature/dismissal of ministers. See dismissal of ministers; dissolution of the legislature and Great Reform Act of 1832, 114–116
and elections, 101–102, 112–114
democracy, 122–124, 155
and “inviolability” vs. “infallibility” of the monarch, 137, 139
“the king reigns but does not govern,” 12, 115, 135, 155, 182
Laboulaye and, 151–152
and logic of parliamentary system, 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 18–20, 64–65, 83, 111–112, 122–126, 133–134, 150–151
Mill and, 12, 181–189
Millar and, 111
Montesquieu and, 54
Necker and, 96–97, 100–101
and patronage. See patronage
Prévost-Paradol and, 194
and public opinion. See public opinion
Royer-Collard and, 116–117
Stewart and, 110–111
and subordination of the monarch to the legislature, 148, 151. See also House of Commons: supremacy of; legislative assemblies: supremacy of
Thiers and, 151–157
Toqueville and, 12, 147–154, 158, 162–163
and veto power of the monarch. See veto power of the monarch
Weber and, 12, 201–203
See also checks and balances; monarch, British; monarch, French; parliamentary government; parliamentary government (Britain); parliamentary government (France)
Conti, Gregory, 173
Coppet Circle, 84, 91, 100, 104–105
and Edinburgh Whigs, 105–106, 111–112
See also Constant, Benjamin; de Staël, Germaine: Necker, Jacques
Corn Laws, 173
corruption, 3–4, 12–13, 19–20, 50
Bolingbroke and, 17–18
Brougham and, 112–113
Burke and, 64, 65, 68–75
and Chamber of Deputies, 116–117
Constant and, 117, 134
de Stael and, 100–104
and Edinburgh Whigs, 112–113
and elections, 101–102, 112–114
George III and, 67–68, 73
and Great Reform Act of 1832, 114, 165–166
Guizot and, 157–158, 162–163
and House of Commons, 49–50, 52, 57–58, 64
and July Monarchy, 116–117, 192–193
Mill and, 189–190, 192–193
Montesquieu and, 34, 52
and National Assembly, 79–80, 99–100
Necker and, 100–101
and political parties, 12–13, 61, 71, 102–103, 112–113
and public opinion, 72–73
and public spirit, 192–193
Toqueville and, 158–162
and Victorian parliamentarism, 189–193
Walpole and, 50, 57–58, 71–72, 134
See also checks and balances; patronage
Cortes (Spanish constitution of 1812), 16–17
Craitu, Aurelian, 104–105
Crolly, Herbert, 197
Crown, the. See monarch, British
de Hauranne, Duvergier, 4, 99, 134.
156–157
De la possibilité d'un grand pays (Constant), 131
De la possibilité d'une constitution républicaine dans un grand pays (Constant), 116–127
de Lohme, Jean Louis, 11, 20, 31–32, 39–47
and active constitutional monarch, 44, 65–66, 123–124
and advantages of representative assemblies over popular assemblies, 40–47
background, 40
Burke and, 65–66
and checks and balances, 8–9, 42–43, 110
Constant and, 129, 131
The Constitution of England, 40, 45
de Stael and, 105
historical account of England, 41–42
and House of Lords, 43–44
and the legislature as a threat to liberty, 42–44, 129
and liberty and the theory of constitutional monarchy, 40–47
and the "magic of dignity," 43–44, 96–97
de Lolme, Jean Louis (cont.)
and ministers in the legislature, 8–9, 48
and monarch as barrier to usurpation by
individual or faction, 42–43
Montesquieu and, 45–46
Necker and, 105
and power of the House of Commons, 23,
40–46
Stewart and, 110
and veto power of the monarch, 33
de Mille, James, 172–173
de Ruggiero, Guido, 14–15
de Serre, Hercule, 136
de Staal, Auguste, 112
de Staal, Germaine, 3–4, 11, 84, 89–104
Burke and, 102–103, 105
and checks and balances, 99, 103–104
Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer
la Révolution, 98–99, 105
Constant and, 118, 126
and corruption, 100–104
Craitou and, 104
de Lolme and, 105
Jeffrey and, 106
and legislative deliberation, 98–99
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature,
39, 97
Montesquieu and, 18, 104
and patronage, 102–103
Pitt and, 103–104
and political parties, 102–104, 142
promotion of parliamentarism, 9, 91–97,
101–104
promotion of parliamentary republicanism,
92–93, 97–99
and relation between parliament and public
opinion, 84, 92–93, 97–98, 103–104, 128
shift in views on republicanism, 103–102
de Tracy, Destutt, 84
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
(1789), 76
Defoe, Daniel, 23
deliberation, 4, 28–29
and American constitutional model, 174,
178–179
Bagehot and, 177, 181
Burke and, 61, 76
Constant and, 116, 119–120, 133, 141
de Lolme and, 47
de Staël and, 98–99
and debate over electoral mandates, 26–27, 61
deliberation without direct control by the
electorate, 61, 63–64
and diverse social and geographic makeup of
elected assembly, 27–29
and education of public opinion, 29–30,
46–47, 179–180
Ellys and, 26–27
and French National Assembly, 76
and the House of Commons in the 18th
century, 23–30
Jeffrey and, 108
Manin and, 24
Mill and, 188–189
Milton and, 24
and ministers in the legislature, 8–9, 48–58,
94–95, 133, 169–170
Necker and, 94–95
Parker and, 24
and parliamentary procedure, 27, 47, 120,
173
and parliamentary systems in France, 117, 177
and patronage, 49–50, 56–57, 141, 159
and representatives’ loss of independence
following rise of party machines, 196
role of the press, 46–47, 120
and sharing information, 26
Sidney and, 24
Spelman and, 29–30
Tocqueville and, 159
and value of multiple viewpoints, 26–29,
173–174
and Victorian parliamentarism, 172–174
Weber and, 201
democracy
and American constitutional model, 144–147,
194–195, 197
Bryce and, 194–195
Coly and, 197
mass democracy and the rise of executive
power, 17, 189, 194–203
Mill and, 185–186, 188–189
and parliamentarism, 5–7, 17, 199–206
parliamentarism not equivalent to
constitutional democracy, 5–7
and political parties, 196
Schumpeter and, 205–206
and tyranny of the legislature, 151
Weber and, 199–203
Democracy in America (Tocqueville), 144–147,
149–151, 160
Dernières vues de politique et de finance (Necker),
101
Derby, Lord, 167
despotism, 58, 60, 93, 137, 145–146, 160–161.
See also legislative assemblies: risks of
legislative usurpation or tyranny; tyranny
A Dialogue on the Actual State of Parliament
(anonymous pamphlet), 54–57
Dicey, A. V., 7, 99–100, 167, 171, 198
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Index
More Information
Index

dignity

dignity of the British monarch, 65–66, 96–97, 175
dignity of the House of Lords, 173
French monarch’s loss of dignity, 60, 80
importance of dignity of the monarch, 96–97, 100–101, 111–112
and relationship between House of Commons and House of Lords, 43–44, 96–97
Directory, the (France), 89, 96, 98–99, 124
dismissal of ministers
Constant and, 13, 125–127, 130, 133–134
dismissal of ministers by the legislature, 122, 171–172, 180–181, 187
dismissal of ministers by the monarch, 13, 126, 130, 133–134
dismissal of ministers by a neutral power, 125–127
Greg and, 187
dissolution of the legislature
Baghouth and, 181
Constant and, 13, 125–128, 130–131
in constitutional monarchies, 13, 97–98, 103, 126–128, 130, 133–134
de Staël and, 97
and disarming ambitious individuals, 132, 194
George III and, 98, 103
Mill and, 183, 188
in parliamentary republics, 97
and preventing stalemates, 126–127, 177–178, 194
and preventing tyranny of the minority, 128–131
Prévost-Paradol and, 194
and public opinion, 13, 126–128, 131, 134, 181
Doctrinaires, 135–143, 155, 162, See also de Serre, Hercule; Guizot, François; Lainé, Joseph; Rémuas, Charles de; Royer-Collard, Pierre-Paul
double cabinet, 67–69, 73, 77–78
Dufaure, Jules Armand, 161
Duguit, Léon, 100
East India Reform Bill, 70–71, 126
Edinburgh Review, 105, 107, 109, 112
Edinburgh University, 105–106
Edinburgh Whigs, 84, 104–114
and Copper Circle, 106, 111–112
See also Brougham, Henry; Jeffreys, Francis; Mackintosh, James; Millar, John; Stewart, Dugald
electoral mandates, 24–26, 28, 61, 72
electoral systems

Brougham and, 113
Burke and, 63, 72, 79
Constant and, 119, 134
and corruption, 113, 139–140
and de Staël’s proposals for parliamentary republicanism, 97–99
and dissolution of the legislature, 127–128, 134, 183. See also dissolution of the legislature
Edinburgh Whigs’ defense of traditional
English system, 111–112
in France, 79, 139–140, 152–153
and Great Reform Act of 1832, 165–166
Mackintosh and, 113
Mill and, 183
Toqueville and, 152–154
in the U.S., 152–153, 195
Ellys, Anthony, 26–27, 47
English Civil War, 14–16, 24, 32, 42
English constitution
Baghouth’s account, 175–189
Burke’s account, 61–68
and corruption, 61
de Staël’s account, 103–104
France’s rejection of English constitutional model during early years of French Revolution, 9–10, 60–61, 85–91, 99–100
and independent judiciary, 31–32
Jeffreys’s account, 109–110
Montesquieu’s account, 8, 18–19, 54, 99–100, 106–107, 128
Stewart’s account, 106–107
and supremacy of the House of Commons, 18–19, 56–57
The English Constitution (Baghouth), 175
Essays Moral and Political (Hume), 33–34
Estates General (France), 75, 85
Eulau, Heinz, 10
executive officials, 64–65
and American constitutional model, 144–147, 172, 183
appointment and dismissal of. See appointment of ministers; dismissal of ministers
autonomy of, 12, 63, 122–124, 135
and cabinet unity, 187
and checks and balances, 8–9, 19, 146–147, 182–183
debate over patronage, 58. See also patronage
Directory (France), 89, 96, 98–99, 124
and dissolution of the legislature. See dissolution of the legislature and Doctrinaires, 137–138
executive officials (cont.)


high quality of selected executives, 180

House of Commons’ right to veto ministers selected by the monarch, 62–63, 65 and legislative deliberation, 48–58, 94–95, 98–99, 133. See also deliberation in the legislature. See executives in the legislature and parliamentary republicanism, 97–99 and political responsibility. See executives, responsibility to the legislature rise in executive power in the early 20th century, 2, 195–203

and risks of legislative usurpation or tyranny, 8–9, 42–44, 58, 110–111, 152, 183. See also tyranny

shadow cabinet, 67–68, 73, 77–78

subordination to the legislature, 9, 24, 30–39, 60, 78, 113–114, 144, 148, 150–151. See also House of Commons: supremacy of weakness of the executive under French Constitution of 1791, 76–78

See also chief executives; presidency, American; presidency, French; presidency, German; prime ministers

executives in the legislature, 2–3, 8–9, 19, 47–58

Bagehot and, 175–176 as barrier to usurpation, 132, 168–169, 182, 202

Burke and, 8–9

Constant and, 127, 132–133

de Lorraine and, 8–9

Grey and, 169

Hearn and, 168–169

independence of executive officials from the monarch, 12, 122–124, 155

Jeffrey’s warnings about consequences of lack of ministers in Parliament, 110

and legislative deliberation, 8–9, 48–58, 94–95, 133, 169–170

Macaulay and, 169

and ministers’ lack of accountability

(Bagehot’s views), 176 and need for supervising and controlling the executive, 24, 30–39, 78, 113–114, 150–151, 170–171, 175–176

and organization and leadership, 169–170

prohibition of ministers in the legislature in France, 60, 76–78, 81, 86–88, 90, 93–96, 98

and rejection of patronage in Victorian parliamentarism, 170

Russell and, 168

Toqueville and, 147–151

and Victorian parliamentarism, 168–170, 173–176

See also appointment of ministers; corruption; dismissal of ministers; executives, responsibility to the legislature; patronage executives, responsibility to the legislature, 2–3, 58, 83

Bagehot and, 175–176, 181

Bolingbroke and, 36–38


Brougham and, 112–113

Burke and, 39, 62–63, 88

Constant and, 116, 120–124, 126–127, 134
de Staël and, 39, 97

and Doctrinaires, 117–118


Guizot and, 137

Mill and, 39, 183, 188–189

ministers’ lack of accountability, 176, 181

Palonen and, 2 responsibility for mal-administration, 123–124

Thiers and, 155

Toqueville and, 39, 148–149 and Victorian parliamentarism, 171–172, 175–176

Weber and, 200

Ferguson, Adam, 57

Fox, Charles James, 67, 123, 126

France

Bourbon Restoration (1814–1830), 116–117, 136, 138–139

“Caesarist” regimes, 14, 176–177

censorship of the press, 117, 138–139, 176

Chartier of 1814, 116

Constitution of 1791. See Constitution of 1792

Constitution of 1795, 89, 95–96, 98, 118, 110–113, 150

Constitution of 1848, 150–151, 184–185

Declaration of the Rights of Man, 76

Doctrinaires, 135–143, 155, 162

electoral system, 139–140, 152–153

French Revolution. See French Revolution

Girondin Constitution, 89

Grand Elector, 90

July Monarchy. See July Monarchy

and lack of culture of political deliberation in Second Empire, 177
and local self-government, 148, 154
Mill’s recommendations for, 184–185
political parties not considered legitimate in, 83
popular referenda in, 89
public’s engagement with political affairs, 153–154, 160–161, 192–193
Revolution of 1830, 117, 156
Revolution of 1848, 99, 117, 150–151, 162–163, 184, 193
Second Empire, 176–177, 194–195
Second Republic, 117, 145, 150–154, 163, 184–185
and social equality, 136
and strict separation of powers, 90, 95–96
suffrage in, 117, 129, 139, 151, 156, 158
the Terror, 82, 88–89
Third Republic, 117, 194
turn towards liberal parliamentarism following
French Revolution, 83–104. See also
Constant, Benjamin; de Staël, Germaine; Necker, Jacques
unsuitability of American presidentialism for
France, 150–151, 155
See also Chamber of Deputies; Chamber of Peers; Directory, the; Legislative Assembly;
monarch, French; National Assembly;
parliamentary government (France)
La France nouvelle (Prévost-Paradol), 194
Francis, Phillip, 81
Franklin, Benjamin, 35
Frederick, Prince of Wales, 36
free state
Burke and, 78
de Lomle and, 40
defining features of, 1, 4, 8–9, 17, 83
Montesquieu and, 30–31
and Skinner’s “neo-Roman” or “republican”
theory of liberty, 14–16
freedom of the press, 138–139, 161, 163
French Revolution, 109
Burke and, 60–61, 75–79
Constant and, 118
and Doctrinaires, 136
Jeffrey and, 108
and the legislature as a threat to liberty,
128–129
Necker and de Staël and, 92
parliamentarism as dominant constitutional paradigm following end of, 9–10,
83–114
rejection of English constitutional model in the early years, 9–10, 60–61, 85–91,
99–100
and social equality, 136
Garsten, Bryan, 119, 129
Gauchet, Marcel, 101
George I, 66, 94
George II, 66, 79, 94
George III, 66–67
Burke and, 60, 66–67, 69, 72–73, 77–78, 98, 114
and dissolution of Parliament in 1783, 98, 103
and East India Reform Bill, 126
and independence of executive officials from
the monarch, 123
madness and regency, 77
and double cabinet, 67–69, 73, 77–78
and veto power, 94
George IV, 143
Germany, 4–5, 14, 109, 202–203
Gironadin Constitution, 89
Gladstone, William, 195–196
Gordon, Thomas, 44–45
The Governance of England (Low), 196–197
The Governance of England (Lowell), 197
Grand Elector (France), 90
Grange, Henri, 100, 104–105
Great Reform Act (1832), 114, 165–166, 190–191
Greg, William Rathbone, 187
Grey, Third Earl, 164, 169, 171–172, 174,
191–192
gridlock, 3, 177–178, 183, 194, 202. See also
dissolution of the legislature
Guizot, François, 84
and active constitutional monarch, 12, 137, 185
Burke and, 59–60
Constant and, 137
and corruption, 157–158, 160, 162–163
and Doctrinaires, 136, 155
and freedom of the press, 139
and harmony between legislature and
executive, 137–138, 158
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature,
137
opposition to, 155–156, 161–162
and patronage, 158, 160
political career, 4, 136
promotion of parliamentarism, 9
and Revolution of 1848, 162–163
Tocqueville and, 158, 160
Habermas, Jürgen, 205
Hamilton, Alexander, 35
Hawkins, Angus, 167, 195–196
Hearn, William, 166, 168–170, 191–192
Hegel, G. W. F., 135
Historical View of the English Government
(Millar), 111, 123–124

Index

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Index
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Index

Lainé, Joseph, 136
Langford, Paul, 10
Lanjuinais, Jean-Denis, 87–88, 134
Laquièze, Alain, 104, 156
Laski, Harold, 14–15
Lavelaye, Émile de, 198
Lebovitz, Adam, 88–89
Lecky, William, 196, 198
legislative assemblies
and American constitutional model, 144–146, 177–178
and checks and balances. See checks and balances
and control over revenue. See revenue, control over
and debate over who may introduce legislation, 186–187
and deliberation. See deliberation. See disadvantages of popular assemblies in ancient republics, 46–47
and electoral mandates, 24–26, 28, 61
executives (ministers) in the legislature. See executives in the legislature
gridlock, 3, 177–178, 183, 194, 202
and parallels between censorship and patronage as means of limiting dissent, 140
and parliamentary republicanism, 97–99. See also republics, republicanism
proposals for American colonial assemblies, 35–36, 42
and public opinion. See public opinion and representatives’ loss of independence following rise of party machines, 196
risks of legislative usurpation or tyranny, 8–9, 19, 39, 42–43, 58, 85–86, 92, 111, 128–131, 133–134, 145–146, 151
selection of the prime minister by the legislature, 183–185
and Skinner’s “neo-Roman” or “republican” theory of liberty. 15–16
in Spain, 16–17
supremacy over the executive, 2, 7–9, 24, 30–39, 60, 78, 113–114, 118–119, 144, 148, 150–151. See also House of Commons: supremacy of tyranny of the majority in American political system, 145–146
See also Congress, U.S.; corruption; House of Commons; Legislative Assembly; National Assembly; parliamentary government; parliamentary government (Britain); parliamentary government (France);
patronage; representation; representative assemblies
Legislative Assembly (France), 86–88, 129–130
legislative deliberation. See deliberation
Lessart, Claude de, 82
Lewis, George Cornewall, 164, 169–170, 192
Liberal Party (Britain), 167, 195–196
Liberals (Spain), 16–17
liberalism
connection between liberalism and parliamentarism downplayed in post-WWII scholarship, 15–16
and focus of scholarship on democracy, 5–7
and legacy of classical parliamentarism, 203–206
and Montesquieu’s account of the English constitution, 18
and spread of parliamentarism, 3, 14–15
term origin, 16
See also specific theorists
liberty
Bagehot and, 176–177, 181
and control over revenue, 32, 40–41
and de Lolme’s theory of constitutional monarchy, 40–47
executive as chief source of danger to liberty, 110–111, 152, 183
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature, 63, 188–189
and negative effects of patronage, 74
and parliamentary control over the executive, 8, 30–32, 40–41, 183, 188–189
Skinner’s “neo-Roman” or “republican” theory of liberty, 15–16
See also free state; tyranny
Lippmann, Walter, 204–205
Louis-Philippe, 117, 160, 192
Louis XVI, 81–82, 88, 93, 147
Louis XVIII, 116, 149
Low, Sidney, 196–197
Lowell, Abbot Lawrence, 197
Macaulay, Thomas, 105, 164
History of England, 190
and leadership by ministers in Parliament, 169
and ministers in Parliament, 169
and neutrality of the monarch, 135
and patronage, 190, 192
political career, 4
and public opinion, 173
and supervision and control of executive officials, 170–171, 176
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1

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Index

Mackintosh, James, 81, 84, 106, 113
Madison, James, 146
Manin, Bernard, 24
Massey, William, 168
May, Thomas Erskine, 32, 170–171
Meinecke, Friedrich, 15
Mill, John Stuart, 3–4, 10–11, 181–190
and appointment of ministers and chief executives, 181, 183–185, 188–189
Burke and, 59–60
and civil service, 189
Considerations on Representative Government, 164, 184–185, 189, 193
Constant and, 185–186
and control over revenue, 187
and corruption, 189–190
criticisms of American constitutional model, 182–183
defense of parliamentarism and constitutional monarchy, 164, 181–189
democracy, 189
d and dissolution of the legislature, 183, 188
and July Monarchy, 192–193
and legislation written by expert committee, 186–187, 189
and legislative deliberation, 188–189
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature, 39, 183, 188–189
and neutral constitutional monarch, 12, 181–182, 185
and patronage, 190, 192–193
and plural voting and proportional representation, 186, 188–189
political career, 4, 189–190
recommendations for France, 184–185
and republicanism, 182–183
and role of the legislature, 186–189
and selection of the chief executive, 183–185
and suffrage, 7, 185–186, 189
and supremacy of the House of Commons, 167, 181
Tocqueville and, 184–185
Millar, John, 84, 111, 123–124
Milton, John, 24
Miliukov, Paul, 5
ministers. See executive officials; executives in the legislature; executives, responsibility to the legislature
Miraudeau, Comte de, 75, 90
mirror theory of representation. See representation: legislature as image of the nation
monarch, British
and appointment of ministers, 122, 126, 181
Bolingbroke and, 36–39, 48
Burke and, 61–62, 65–66
and checks and balances, 8, 18, 33–34, 68–69.
See also checks and balances
and the Civil List, 35, 61, 72–74
Constant and, 115, 125–126
de Lomme and, 33, 40–41
degulation of powers by the Crown, 44–45, 64
dependence on Parliament for revenue, 22–23, 30–34, 40–41. 62. See also revenue, control over
and dismissal of ministers, 126–128
disolution of the legislature. See dissolution of the legislature and and the Civil War, 24, 32
Gordon and Trenchard and, 44–45
House of Commons’ control over, 30–39, 110. See also House of Commons: supremacy of Hume and, 33–34
influence over elections, 49, 101–102, 113, 166–167
influence over the House of Commons, 47–58, 64–66, 113, 166. See also executive officials; executives in the legislature; patronage
Jeffrey and, 109
Mill and, 181
and monarch as barrier to usurpation by individual or faction, 42–44, 111, 167–169
Montesquieu and, 18–20
neutral monarchs, 115, 125–126, 135, 143 and the Norman Conquest, 41–42
Patriot King idea, 36–39, 48, 67
popular support for the monarch, 35–36
veto power, 8, 18, 32–34, 63–64, 86, 109
veto power not used in practice, 33–34, 54–55, 58, 61–63, 94, 107, 109, 181
See also constitutional monarchy: specific monarchs
monarch, French
absolute monarchy, 40 and abuses of power, 78–79
active monarchs, 44, 65–66, 123–124,
116–117, 124, 125–126, 135, 143, 162–163, 185
and appointment of ministers, 82
and Grand Elector, 90
Mounier and, 86, 90–91, 93
Necker and, 93–94, 96–97
overthrow of, 82, 94
and rejection of Constant’s constitutional model, 135
Sieyès and, 90
veto power, 81–82, 86, 88, 90–91, 93–94
weakness of the French monarch under Constitution of 1791, 76–78, 80, 83
See also constitutional monarchy; specific monarchs
Monarchist party, 86
monarchy, See constitutional monarchy
Montesquieu, 31–32
account of the English constitution, 8, 18–19, 54, 99–100, 106–107, 128
Bolingbroke and, 39
Burke and, 68–69
and checks and balances, 8, 18, 30–32, 34–35, 39, 68–69, 91, 128
compared to Constant, 124–128
and control over revenue, 31–32
and corruption, 34, 52
de Lomme and, 43–46
de Staël and, 104
Dicey and, 99–100
and French National Assembly, 86
insufficiency of account of English constitution, 8, 18–19, 99–100, 106–107
Mounier and, 86, 91
Necker and, 104
and parliamentary control over the executive, 30–32
and patronage, 51–52
and role of the Crown’s offices, 51–52
The Spirit of the Laws, 8, 18–19, 30–31, 52, 86, 91, 107
Stewart and, 106–107
and veto power of the monarch, 8, 68–69
warnings about political imbalance in England, 34–35, 39
Mounier, Jean Joseph, 86, 88–91, 93–94, 104
Napoléon I, 90, 116, 138
Napoléon III, 14
Narbonne, Comte de, 82
National Assembly (France)
Burke’s criticisms, 60–61, 75–82
and checks and balances, 86–91
contrast to House of Commons, 85
and corruption, 79–80, 99–100
defenders of, 80–81
and despotism, 60
and elections and term limits, 79
formation of, 75, 85
initial rejection of parliamentary model, 9–10
lack of deliberative capacity, 76
and lack of harmony between legislature and executive, 77
Lanjuinais and, 87–88
Necker’s criticisms, 93–96
and patronage, 79–80
and prohibition of ministers in the assembly, 60, 76–78, 83, 86–88, 93–96
as representative body, 85
Séys and, 86
social composition of, 79–80
and strict separation of powers, 86–88
and unicameral system, 79
See also Constitution of 1791
Necker, Jacques, 9, 11, 84, 89–97
and American constitutional model, 96
background and career, 91–92
Burke and, 105
and checks and balances, 95–96
and collapse of Constitutions of 1791 and 1795, 95–96, 105
and corruption, 100–101
Crairu and, 104–105
de Lomme and, 105
Dernières vues de politique et de finance, 101
and Doctrinaires, 136
Grange and, 104–105
and harmony between legislature and executive, 54, 94–95
Laïgâtes and, 104
and legislative deliberation, 94–95
and ministers in the legislature, 93–96, 101
Montesquieu and, 104
Mounier and, 93–94
and need for hereditary monarchy, 96–97
and patronage, 100–101
promotion of parliamentarism, 9, 91–97
and public opinion, 92
shift in views on monarchy, corruption, and parliamentarism, 100–101
and veto power of the monarch, 93–94
Nelson, Eric, 35–36, 62
Newcastle, Duke of, 66
Norman Conquest, 41–42
North, Lord, 38, 66–67, 73–74
Paine, Thomas, 81, 109
Paley, William, 56–57
Palonen, Kari, 2, 5, 37, 172–173
Parker, Henry, 24, 119
parliamentarism. See chief executives;
constitutional monarchy; executive officials;
legislative assemblies; monarch, British;
monarch, French; parliamentary government; parliamentary government (Britain); parliamentary government (France); parliamentary republicanism;
representative assemblies
parliamentary government
adoption in many nations, 4–5, 198
parliamentary government (cont.)
classical theory of, 19, 58, 62–64, 83, 144, 198, 203–206. See also specific theorists
contrast to American constitutional model, 144–163, 172, 174, 177–183
and democracy, 5–7, 17, 194–198
dilemmas and pathologies of, 4, 11–13, 19–20, 102. See also cabinet instability;
corruption; gridlock; patronage; tyranny
lack of focus on, in contemporary scholarship, 5–7, 17
parliamentarism as dominant constitutional paradigm following end of the French
Revolution, 9–10, 83–114
rise in executive power in the 20th century, 2, 17, 195–198
summary of characteristics and logic of, 1–3, 11, 19, 83, 111–112. See also constitutional
monarchy; executive officials; legislative assemblies
See also appointment of ministers; checks and balances; constitutional monarchy;
corruption; deliberation; dismissal of ministers; dissolution of the legislature;
executive officials; executives in the legislature; executives, responsibility to the legislature;
legislative assemblies; monarch; British; monarch; French; patronage;
political parties; public opinion; representation; veto power of the monarch; and following headings
parliamentary government (Britain), 47–75, 85–91, 104–114, 175–189
advantages over American political system, 172, 177–181
and appointment of ministers, 68–69, 94–95, 110, 122, 181, 183–185, 187
Arendt and, 205
Bagehot’s account, 175–181
British parliamentarism adopted in postcolonial states, 165
Burke’s theory, 59–68
and cabinet instability, 66–67, 69, 191
contrast to French system during early years of the French Revolution, 85–91
and control over revenue, 8, 18, 22–23, 30–34, 40–41, 56–57, 93, 170–171, 187
and corruption. See corruption
debate over electoral mandates, 24–26
debate over parliamentary reform in the 1780s, 54–55
and deliberation, 23–30, 172–174, 179–180. See also deliberation
and democracy, 199–206
dissolution of the legislature, 97, 126–127, 181. See also dissolution of the legislature
and Edinburgh Whigs, 104–114
emergence of parliamentarism in the 18th century, 3–5, 7–8
and Great Reform Act of 1832, 114, 165–166, 190–191
Habermas and, 205
and harmony between legislature and executive, 53–54, 65, 84–95, 113, 178
and high quality of selected executive officials, 180
increase in parliamentary activity in the 18th century, 20–22
and leadership and organization, 169–170
Mill’s defense of, 164, 181–189
and ministers in the legislature, 47–58, 83, 168–170. See also executives in the legislature
neutral monarchs, 135, 143, 164, 166, 168, 181–182
parliamentary procedures. 27, 47, 120, 173, 197
and patronage. See patronage
presence of classical parliamentarism, 198
power struggles in the 17th century, 20–21
and public opinion, 103–104, 173–174, 179–180, 190–191
rise of the House of Commons after 1688, 20–30
Stewart’s account, 106–107
and strengthened plebiscitary executive, 195–198
and suffrage, 185–186, 189
supremacy of the House of Commons. See House of Commons: supremacy of
Victorian parliamentarism, 164–193. See also specific theorists
Weber and, 201–202
See also English constitution; House of Commons; House of Lords: monarch; British;
prime ministers: specific monarchs and prime ministers
parliamentary government (France), 88–104, 116–118, 133–141, 147–154
and appointment of ministers, 78, 80, 82, 88, 90–91, 122, 125, 130, 184, 194
Burke’s criticisms, 60–61, 75–82

and cabinet instability, 117, 134, 140–141, 149–150
Constant and the dilemmas of French parliamentarism, 133–145
and corruption. See corruption and de Staël’s proposals for parliamentary republicanism, 97–99
different conceptions of parliamentarism, 135–143, 154–156
and dismissal of ministers, 125–127, 130, 133–134
dominance into the 20th century, 108 and harmony (or not) between legislature and executive, 77, 99, 137–138, 149–150, 158
introduction of parliamentarism in 1814, 4–5, 12, 83–84, 116
Mill’s observations of corruption and patronage in the July Monarchy, 192–193
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature, 88, 126–127, 137–138, 148–149, 155
parliamentary systems of the 19th century, 116–118, 184–185
and patronage. See patronage
Prévost-Paradol’s promotion of, 194
prohibition of government functionaries in the legislature, 141, 158–159
prohibition of ministers in the legislature, 60, 76–78, 83, 86–88, 90, 93–96, 98
and public opinion. See public opinion
rejection of English constitutional model during early years of French Revolution, 9–10, 60–61, 85–91, 99–100
responses to collapse of Constitution of 1791, 88–104
and Second Republic, 150–154
and Tocqueville’s promotion of constitutional monarchy, 147–154
turn towards liberal parliamentarism following French Revolution, 83–104. See also Constant, Benjamin; de Staël, Germaine; Edinburgh Whigs; Necker, Jacques
See also Chamber of Deputies; Chamber of Peers; Director, the; Legislative Assembly; monarch, French; National Assembly; presidency, French; specific monarchs and constitutions
parliamentary republicanism
and appointment of ministers, 97, 125, 194
de Staël and, 97–99
and functional substitutes for monarchy, 2
Mill and, 185
See also republics, republicanism
Pasquino, Pasquale, 88
Patriot King, 36–39, 48, 67
patronage, 58
administrative officers in the House of Commons, 49–58
Bagehot and, 104, 190–192
Brougham and, 112–113
Burke and, 64–65, 68–75, 102
and Chamber of Deputies, 156–157
Constant and, 13, 104, 115–116, 139–143, 160, 192
de Staël and, 102–103
debate over, 12–13, 49–58, 189–193 see also specific theorists
and Doctrinaires, 136, 139–143
Ferguson and, 57
and French bureaucracy in 1814, 139–140
and French National Assembly, 79–80
and Great Reform Act of 1832, 166
Grey and, 191–192
Guizot and, 158, 160
and harmony between legislature and executive, 53–55, 65, 158
Hearn and, 191–192
Hume and, 51–52
Jeffrey and, 112
Jenyns and, 55–56
and July Monarchy, 192–193
and legislative deliberation, 49–50, 56–57, 141, 159
Lewis and, 192
Macaulay and, 190, 192
Mill and, 190, 192–193
Montesquieu and, 51–52
Necker and, 100–101
parallels with censorship as means of limiting dissent, 140
and political parties, 12–13, 13, 61, 71–72, 74–75, 102–101, 142–143, 148, 162
and public opinion, 162
and public spirit, 73–74, 160–161, 192–193
and restraints on the House of Commons, 51–52
Russell and, 113–114
Stewart and, 112
Tocqueville and, 104, 158–162
and Victorian parliamentarism, 164, 170, 189–193
Walpole and, 50–58, 140–141
Peele, Robert, 167
Pelham, Henry, 66
Pétion, Jérôme, 82
Pitt, William, 66–67, 79

Index

Pitt, William, Jr., 67, 77, 103–104
Pitts, Jennifer, 16, 154
plebiscitary executive, 195–203
Poland, 26
Political Dispositions (Burgh), 25–26
political parties, 3, 11, 61, 83, 173–174
Baghot and, 174
Bolingbroke and, 37
Brougham and, 112–113
Burke and, 61, 71–72, 74–75, 142
and cabinet instability, 12
and choice of presidential candidates, 195
Constant and, 13, 141–143, 162
and corruption, 12–13, 61, 71, 102–103, 112–113
de Staël and, 102–104, 142
democracy, 196
formation of organized parliamentary opposition, 37
not considered legitimate in France, 83
and patronage, 12–13, 61, 71–72, 74–75, 102–103, 142–143, 158, 162
and public opinion, 13, 142–143, 162
and public political engagement, 133–134
and representatives’ loss of independence, 196
Toqueville and, 153–154, 157–159, 161–162
Walpole and, 37, 53
political responsibility
Baghot and, 176
Burke and, 38, 62–61, 88
Constant and, 120–124, 126–127
and current conditions, 206
de Staël and, 39, 97
Mill and, 39, 183, 188–189
and ministers’ lack of accountability, 176
ministers’ responsibility to the legislature.
See executives, responsibility to the legislature
and neutral constitutional power, 126
and separation of the executive power from the monarch, 123–124
Toqueville and, 39, 148–149
Weber and, 200
Politics as a Vocation (Weber), 196
popular referenda, 89, 198–201
populism, 17, 206. See also plebiscitary executive
Portugal, 133
power of the purse. See revenue, control over presidency, American
Baghot and, 177–178, 180
Bryce and, 194–195
and checks and balances, 146–147, 182–183
competence (or not) of the president, 180, 183
disadvantages of system, 147, 151, 177–178, 180, 182–183
Laboulaye’s preference for American-style system, 131–132
Mill and, 182–183
and power of the executive, 197
president’s lack of entry into Congress, 145
and public opinion, 194–195
and stalemates between the executive and the legislature, 177–178
Toqueville and, 145, 147, 150–151
unsuitability of American presidentialism for France, 150–151, 155
veto power, 147
Weber and, 197
presidency, French, 150–152, 184, 194
presidency, German, 202–203
press, the
censorship in France, 117, 138–139, 176
Constant and, 138–139
de Lohme and, 46–47
and public opinion, 46–47, 120
Toqueville and, 161, 163
Prévost-Paradol, Lucien Anatole, 135, 194
prime ministers
and growing power of the executive, 195–195, 205
high turnover of, under George III, 66–67
and popular referenda, 199
selection by the legislature rather than the people, 183–185
See also cabinet instability, specific prime ministers
Principes de politique applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs (Constant), 125
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Paley), 56–57
proportional representation, 7, 186, 188–189, 194, 198
Prussia, 135, 159
public opinion, 183
and American constitutional model, 174, 194–195
Baghot and, 190–191
and Chamber of Deputies, 121
Constant and, 126–128, 134
and corruption in the legislature, 36, 72–73, 142, 161–162, 190–191
de Staël and, 84, 92–93, 103–104, 128
and de Staël’s proposals for parliamentary republicanism, 97–99
and debate over electoral mandates, 24–26, 28
and dissolution of the legislature, 13, 126–128, 131, 134, 181
### Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>and Edinburgh Whigs, 111–112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mill and, 185–186, 188–189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>populism and the current &quot;crisis of representation,&quot; 17. See also plebiscitary executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proportional representation, 7, 186, 188–189, 194, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Victorian parliamentarism, 171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See also suffrage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representative assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant and, 118–120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Staël and, 92–93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French National Assembly as representative body, 75–76, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necker and, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representation of the people and the aristocracy separated in the English parliamentary system, 85, 111–112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See also Chamber of Deputies; Congress, U.S.; House of Commons; legislative assemblies; Legislative Assembly; National Assembly republics, republicanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and accountability of executive officials, 31 and advantages of constitutional monarchies, 131, 148, 151, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant and, 118, 124–127, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Lolme and, 42–43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>de Staël and, 92–93, 97–99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and electoral mandates, 26–27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Second Republic, 145, 150–154, 163, 184–185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Third Republic, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laboulaye and, 151–152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mill and, 182–185, 187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Montesquieu and, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Necker and, 101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and need for neutral constitutional power, 124–125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tocqueville and, 148, 162–163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>See also parliamentary republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restoration. See Bourbon Restoration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Burke), 75–79

*Réflexions sur les constitutions, la distribution des pouvoirs, et les garanties, dans une monarchie constitutionnelle* (Constant), 125

Rémuat, Charles de, 4, 136 representation and the aristocracy, 85, 111–112, 121. See also Chamber of Peers; House of Lords Burke and, 62–64 and classical theory of parliamentarism, 58, 62–64 and debate over electoral mandates, 24–26, 28, 61 diverse viewpoints and legislative deliberation, 26–29, 119–120
Index

revenue, control over
Burke and, 62–64
and Chamber of Deputies, 127–128, 156
and checks and balances, 8, 18, 31–34
Civil List, 35, 62, 72–73
Constant and, 127–128, 156
de Lomme and, 40–41
Mill and, 187
Montesquieu and, 31–32
Mounier and, 91
Paley and, 56–57
Thiers and, 116
Weber and, 201
Revolution of 1830 (France), 117, 156
Revolution of 1838 (France), 99, 117, 150–151, 162–163, 184, 193
Robespierre, Maximilien, 87
Rockingham, Lord, 67
Rosenvallon, Pierre, 205
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 26
Royer-Collard, Pierre-Paul, 136–137
Russell, John, 113–114, 168
Russia, 4–5
Sandy, Samuel, 38
Savile, George (Marquess of Halifax), 21–22
Schmitt, Carl, 15, 59–60, 199, 203–204
Schumpeter, Joseph, 17, 204–206
Second Empire, 176–177, 194–195
Second Republic, 117, 145, 150–154, 163, 184–185
Senate, U.S., 152–153
Sidney, Algernon, 24
Sieyès, Emmanuel, 75, 85–87, 90, 123
Sismondi, Simonde de, 9, 84, 106, 112, 134
Skinner, Quentin, 15–17
Smith, Adam, 8, 31–34
Smith, Sydney, 105
Somers, John, 25
South America, 133
Spain, 4–5, 16–17, 135
Spelman, Edward, 29–30
Spencer, Herbert, 13–14
The Spirit of Patriotism (Bolingbroke), 37–38
The Spirit of the Laws (Montesquieu), 8, 18, 30–31, 52, 86, 91, 107
Stewart, Dugald, 84, 105–107, 110–112
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Habermas), 205

Struve, Peter, 5
suffrage
in Britain, 6–7, 28–29, 112, 173, 185–186
Burke and, 72
Constant and, 117, 129, 185–186
and Coppet Circle, 112
Dicey and, 7
in France, 117, 129, 139, 151, 156, 158
Mill and, 7, 185–186, 189
Toqueville and, 7, 158
Weber and, 7
See also electoral systems
Switzerland, 198–199
Terror, the, 82, 88–89
Thiers, Adolphe, 134, 155–157, 194
“the king reigns but does not govern” phrase, 115, 155, 182
Third Estate, 79–80
Third Republic, 117, 194
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (Burke), 38, 60–62, 67, 69–70, 88
Toqueville, Alexis de, 3–4, 10–11, 144–165
and active constitutional monarch, 12, 148, 157–158, 162–163, 185
analysis of American political system, 144–147, 151–152
and cabinet instability, 149–150
and checks and balances in American system, 146–147
and checks and balances in proposed constitutional monarchy, 148–149, 151
and Comte de Chambord, 163
Constant and, 162–163
and corruption, 158–162
criticisms of Constitution of 1795, 150
criticisms of the National Assembly after 1848, 151
dangers of elected head of state for European countries, 148
Democracy in America, 144–147, 149–151, 160
Guizot and, 118, 160
and indirect electoral systems, 152–154
Laboulaye and, 151–152
and legislative deliberation, 159
and liberal opposition party, 157–159, 161–162
and local self-government in France, 148, 154
Mill and, 184–185
and ministers in the legislature, 147–149
and ministers’ responsibility to the legislature, 139, 148–149
and modernization of the French administrative state, 158–159

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Montesquieu and, 18
and opposition parties, 133–154
and patronage, 104, 158–162
political career, 4, 143, 114–162
and prohibition of government functionaries in the legislature, 158–159
promotion of constitutional monarchy and liberal parliamentarism in France, 147–154, 157–158, 163
promotion of parliamentary republicanism, 162–163
and public’s political engagement in France, 153–154, 159–160
recommendations for European political systems, 147–154
and subordination of the monarch to the legislature, 148, 151
and suffrage, 7, 158
Thiers and, 157
and veto power of the executive, 147
Todd, Alpheus, 166, 168
Tories, 66
Trenchard, John, 44–45
Tuck, Richard, 198
tyranny
and checks and balances in American system, 146–147
and democracy, 151
risks of legislative usurpation or tyranny, 8–9, 19, 39, 42–84, 58, 85–86, 92, 128–131, 133–134, 145–146, 151
tyranny of the majority in American political system, 145–146
See also despotism

United States
American Revolution, 73, 109
Bagehot’s criticisms of American system, 177–181
Bryce’s observations on American democracy, 194–195
contrast between parliamentarism and American constitutional model, 144–163, 172, 174, 177–181
Grey and, 172
and legislative deliberation, 174, 178–179
local self-government, 154
Mill’s criticisms of American system, 182–183
Necker’s views of American constitution, 96
power of state legislatures, 145–146
proposals for American colonial assemblies, 35–36, 42
public’s engagement with political affairs, 174, 179–180

Senate, 152–153
and stalemates between the executive and the legislature, 177–178, 183
Thiers and, 155
Voltaire’s analysis, 144–147, 152
and tyranny of the majority, 145–146
unique conditions of, 148, 152
See also Congress, U.S.; Constitution, U.S.; presidency, American

Urbinati, Nadia, 187
veto power of the monarch, 32–34
Burke and, 63–64
and checks and balances, 8, 68–69, 86
Constant and, 126, 127
decline of British monarch’s use of veto power, 33–34, 54–55, 18, 83–84, 93–94, 107, 109, 167, 181
and French monarchy, 81–82, 86, 88, 90–91, 93–94, 147
Jeffrey and, 109
last use of, in Britain, 34
Louis XVI’s use of, 81–82, 88, 93, 147
Mill and, 181
Montesquieu and, 8, 68–69
Mounier and, 90–91, 93–94
Necker and, 93–94
Stewart and, 107
veto power of the U.S. president, 147
Victoria, queen
Bagehot and, 166
involvement in political affairs, 166
popularity of, 168
reputation as neutral monarch, 135, 143, 164, 166, 168
Victorian liberalism and parliamentary theory, 164–193. See also Bagehot, Walter; Grey, Third Earl; Lewis, George Cornwell; Macaulay, Thomas; Mill, John Stuart
Vile, M. J. C., 140
von Mises, Ludwig, 15
voting. See electoral systems; representation; suffrage

Waldron, Jeremy, 204
Walpole, Robert, 20, 36–38, 50, 206
Bolingbroke and, 36–38
Burke and, 71–72
and corruption, 37, 50, 57–58, 71–72, 134
and Doctrinaires, 136
and harmony between legislature and executive, 53–54

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More Information
Walpole, Robert (cont.)
  Hume and, 51–52
  Langford and, 50
  and patronage, 50–58, 140–141
  and political parties, 37, 53
Weber, Max, 7, 11–12, 17, 115, 196, 199–203
Whig History, 16, 205

Index
Whigs, 66–67, 74–75, 105. See also Edinburgh
  Whigs
  William III, 64–65
  William the Conqueror, 41
  Wilson, James, 35
  Wilson, Woodrow, 204–205
  Wollstonecraft, Mary, 81