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Introduction: Rethinking Political Participation

It's hard to overstate what's at stake in popular participation in elections and protests. If turnout had been higher in parts of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin on November 8, 2016, Hillary Clinton might have become the 45th president of the United States. If turnout had edged up among young British voters on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom might have decided to remain in the European Union. If a wave of protests had not taken off in Kiev in the winter of 2013–14, the government of Viktor Yanukovich might have remained in power instead of falling, as it did in February 2014. Russia would not have invaded Crimea and war would not have broken out in Eastern Ukraine. Changes in levels of popular participation can alter world history.

Yet the theories and ideas that social scientists – and, to a degree, campaigns and activists – rely on to explain why electoral turnout rises or falls, and why movements explode or fizzle, fall short. Some rely on assumptions that take little account of human psychology. Others fail to predict regularities that we observe the world around.

These shortcomings are well illustrated by the 2016 US presidential election and its aftermath. The campaign featured harsh language aimed at Muslims and at Mexican immigrants. In this period, many Muslim citizens who had not bothered to register to vote did so, and many Mexican immigrants initiated the process of becoming US citizens (Pogash 2016, Gonzalez-Barrera 2017). A natural explanation is that the harsh campaign rhetoric made members of these groups angry and fearful, and they saw the upcoming election as crucially important to them. For decades, “a lot of Muslims didn't see a lot of difference between the parties” explained a man at a registration drive in an Oakland, California mosque. A woman who had just picked up six voter-registration forms for herself and family members said, “This is the most important vote in our life” (Pogash 2016).

The day after Donald J. Trump's January 2017 presidential inauguration, the largest protest in US history took place. Between 3.2 and 5.2 million people took part in demonstrations in more than 650 cities across the country

(Chenoweth and Pressman 2017). Though billed as the Women's March, many men took part and, judging from the signs and slogans, what brought many to the streets was pent-up anger and disgust at the tone and content of the Trump campaign, and dismay at his victory.

Yet our prevailing social-science theories of political participation would reject these explanations for why people go to the polls and why they protest. The idea that people are driven to take part in collective action by their sense that much is at stake for them (or stay away when they see little at stake) cannot be easily accommodated by prevailing frameworks. What's more, fear, anger, and other emotions are mainly ignored. Leading theories struggle to make sense of the dynamics that seem so obviously at work in the mosque in Oakland or on the streets of Washington DC, New York, and other cities. Citizens who had earlier seen little difference between the parties and their programs had stayed away from the polls. They became more willing to vote when they began to see a real difference and to care much more about which candidate won and which lost. Protesters were angry at the incoming president and fearful about his administration's likely policies. They were therefore willing to bear the costs and risks of going into the streets.

In fact, from a theoretical standpoint, many social scientists find political participation puzzling, though the puzzlement is less widely shared by lay observers. We often find ourselves in awkward, even comical conversations with our friends, relatives, and students in which we explain to them why it is surprising that they vote and engage in other forms of mass participation. You should be puzzled, we patiently explain, by people's bothering to take part, given that their actions won't change the outcome and given that they will benefit (or suffer) equally, whether or not they participated. But don't worry, we hasten to add, we can explain this odd behavior! If they vote, perhaps they are expressing their partisan identification – but expressing it to whom, and what if they don't like political parties? Alternatively, they may be obeying a democratic norm that says it's their duty to take part. If they protest, perhaps they are part of a social network that values activism and shames the apathetic; yet what if images of the national flag do not appear in their mind's eye each Election Day, and what if they sometimes buck friends' subtle pressure to go to the rally, but at other times join in? Why do norms or the urge for political self-expression kick in, and why is social pressure effective, in some opportunities for collective action but not in others?

Well, the social scientist responds, maybe some elections or movements just don't seem important to them. But wait, the interlocutor counters, you just reminded me that my individual actions will not change the results. So I seem to have no concrete reason to take part, even if I care a lot.

Perhaps, then, the factor that shifts from election to election, and from small demonstrations to mass uprisings, are the obstacles in would-be participants' way: how hard it is to register to vote, or how likely a protester is to have an unhappy encounter with police batons and water cannons. These discouragements can be thought of as the *costs of participation*, and they

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certainly make a difference in participation rates. Varying costs of participation are often the social scientist's go-to explanation for why turnout goes up or down, or why a mass protest emerges from a small demonstration or fails to do so.

If the costs of participation were the whole story, however, we would never expect to see these costs rise and participation to go *up*.

If participation rose and fell with how costly it is – how much time, money, and planning it requires, and how much risk it entails – then legal barriers to voter participation should reliably depress turnout. But reality tells us otherwise. In the United States, laws aimed at making it more difficult for certain groups, such as African-Americans, to vote have certainly been effective over the decades. But research (reviewed in Chapter 2) shows that recent voter ID laws have been relatively ineffective. Though these laws discourage turnout, they also can be a mobilizing opportunity for leaders and energize the targeted groups.

In protests too, the costs of participation clearly rise when demonstrators encounter harsh police tactics: pepper spray and tear gas, rubber bullets, active batons. Yet, around the world, repression often has the opposite effect of the one intended. Harsh police tactics not infrequently turn small rallies into mass uprisings. Something more complex than the rise and fall of costs of participation seems to be going on.

The theory we develop in this book focuses on the interplay between the costs of participation and what we call *costs of abstention*. The former place burdens on people's pocketbooks and schedules. The latter place burdens on their psychic comfort and peace of mind. To focus on the former kinds of costs alone is to tell only half the story. Participation is determined by the net effect of the costs of participation *and* abstention.

Before delving into theories of participation, it's important to stress that our study also has practical implications. On voter turnout, in recent decades academics and campaigns have come together around a "get-out-the-vote" (GOTV) agenda – joint efforts to understand and increase participation in elections. One focus of this work has been on how best to *deliver* mobilizing messages to would-be voters in the most effective manner. This work teaches us, for instance, that marginal resources should be spent on face-to-face canvassing over robocalls. We have also learned, with field experiments, about how social pressure can be deployed to get people to the polls. This work casts a powerful light on one emotional motivator: shame.

Much less work by GOTV investigators has focused on the *content* of the messages delivered to would-be participants, though obviously campaigns have long found focus groups and other message-testing techniques to be of great value. What we shall see is that the last type of effort is by no means in vain. The message matters; and, as we shall demonstrate in this book, it matters not least for its work in eliciting emotional responses that draw people to collective action. These emotional responses go well beyond shame and include anger and moral outrage, enthusiasm, and, in some settings, anxiety.

Likewise, getting the theory right on protest participation has practical import. One example has to do with the effects of violence at protests, whether carried out by the police and authorities, or by movement participants. To the extent that both sides are concerned about broader public opinion, they will be helped by the perception that any violence which takes place has been committed by the other side, while they remain peaceful.¹ A disciplined passivity, while the other sides engages in harsh tactics, will garner not only more external support but may also draw in large numbers of participants. In the United States, early in the Trump administration, conservatives in several state legislatures proposed to shield drivers who might injure protesters from legal sanctions, if the protesters were demonstrating on roads or highways. Our study indicates that such laws would be counterproductive from the standpoint of their proponents: they are as likely to build support for protests as they are to scare demonstrators away.

LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT THEORIES

The limitations of theories of mass political participation have not kept social scientists from collecting data and crafting sophisticated accounts of the kinds of people who take part and those who do not, or from *explaining* participation, in the sense of making accurate predictions about who will take part in what kind of action. But like physical scientists observing bodies fall to the ground before the Newtonian revolution, our lack of adequate theories makes a deeper understanding elusive, and leads to questionable interpretations of the observations we make.

A leading but problematic interpretation is that mass participation is well-explained by rational choice theory. With regard to voting, the problem is on display in two important empirical studies on turnout in the United States, published roughly 20 years apart: Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen's *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* (1993), and Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler's *Who Votes Now?* (2014). Both pairs of authors tried, not entirely successfully in our view, to press their findings into the box of rational choice. Rosenstone and Hansen noted that people lack individual incentives to vote or to seek out information relevant to politics, burdensome tasks that can be left to others. They wrote that "Left to their own devices . . . the public's involvement in the political process would be defeated by two difficult problems: the paradoxes of participation and rational ignorance" (2003[1993]: 6). These obstacles are overcome, they argued, by political parties and campaigns, which rationally make an effort to get people to the polls. So the motivation to participate is extrinsic to the individual – he or she will not do so unless prodded by campaigns or political parties. By extension, demonstrators would not take to the streets without the prodding of activists.

¹ As explained in Chapter 4, this idea has been addressed in the context of the US civil rights movement by Denis Chong (1991).

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Two decades later, Leighley and Nagler (2014: 122) espoused “a cost and benefit framework of voter turnout.” An important finding they report is that “an individual will be more likely to vote when candidates take policy positions providing the voter with more distinct choices” (p. 124). Their words evoke the Muslim-American citizen who suddenly sees a world of difference between Democratic and Republican candidates, where earlier they looked like Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee. But there is a tension in Leighley and Nagler’s invocation of the difference in candidates’ policy position as a prod for getting citizens to the polls. Cost-benefit accounts discount such differences. The reason, again, is that however enormous the gap in benefits to an individual of her preferred candidate’s winning, her ballot will not make her preferred result more likely to any perceptible degree. Therefore Leighley and Nagler have to do some work to squeeze the polarized-policy effect on turnout into the box of costs and benefits.

They turn to a seminal theoretical paper by John Aldrich (1993), who pointed out that the costs of voting are usually very small and campaigns can easily overcome them. When candidates offer sharply different programs, Leighley and Nagler also reason, parties invest more resources in getting people to the polls. So again we have people responding entirely to extrinsic pressures to participate. Why they respond to these extra efforts by parties is unclear; within the tenets of rational choice theory, they should not. The Aldrich–Leighley–Nagler approach, like Rosenstone and Hansen’s, falls back on *costs* of participation, even though their findings point to the perceived *benefits* that people anticipate gaining if their favored candidate prevails as a key factor driving them to the polls.

Social scientists who have crafted general explanations of why people protest have been less troubled by classic problems of collective action. But their accounts, too, have tended to fall short of a model that simultaneously incorporates a sense of the material costs and risks that protesters face, as well as the social, psychological, and moral compulsions that can turn bystanders into participants. There is much to be gained, we hope to persuade the reader, from a general framework for explaining participation that can be modified to make sense of people’s decision to vote or abstain and their decisions to protest or stay at home.

WHY STUDY VOTING AND PROTESTING TOGETHER?

Why people turn out to vote and why they join protests are questions that are usually studied separately. Political scientists examine electoral participation; sociologists and social psychologists, movement participation. Whatever the reasons for this scholarly division of labor, it has not arisen because the choices that would-be participants make are vastly different in the two settings. Whether the choice is to vote or to demonstrate, financial and time constraints can get in the way. Both, what’s more, involve cognitive effort: a person has

to figure out what protesters are calling for and whether she agrees with their goals, or which candidate is honest or proposes policies that she supports. The outcomes both of elections and of protests are public goods, so people may well ask themselves about both activities, *Why bother?*

To be clear, there are differences between voting and protesting. As we explain in later chapters, the costs involved in protesting tend to be greater – on average, joining demonstrations is more demanding in time and presents greater risks than voting. People may feel a sense of duty to participate in both settings, but duty *to whom* differs – to society at large for voters, to friends, acquaintances, and fellow-travelers for protesters. In both cases, would-be participants are sensitive to the strategic context in making their choices. But these strategic contexts are different. For instance, anticipation that an election will be close may move voters to the polls, whereas people may be moved to join protests the larger they expect the crowds on the streets to be – in this case, the greater the number of participants, the better.

The key point is that would-be voters and would-be protesters take the same factors into consideration when they decide whether to participate or stay home, though the factors will weigh differently in their decisions. More technically, the basic parameters are the same, even if their values will typically be different, and even if they interact in distinct ways.

By placing these two crucial instruments of popular participation in the same framework, we call attention to an underlying unity across disparate spheres of political action. People are drawn to the polling place or the rally when they see the outcome as important – notwithstanding that the outcomes are public goods. They may be driven to act by emotional responses to elite actions; we will show that one key emotion, anger, is a powerful propellant to collective action, whether that action is to vote or to demonstrate. Would-be participants in both kinds of action may be sensitive to a sense of moral obligations to act; however, we will show that these moral obligations are more situational than absolute.

Democratic theorists place quite different values on these two forms of popular action. Once we have developed and tested a theory that, in modified form, accounts for both, at the end of the book we touch on the value of elections and protests as instruments of democracy. Where many theorists of democracy place elections at the center and protests at the periphery – or beyond the pale – we find them to be complementary, each one making up for the shortcomings of the other as instruments of accountability, representation, and political equality.

In this book, we do not merely assert that similar factors influence people's decisions about whether to participate in these two distinct venues of collective action. We treat the assertions as testable propositions and subject them to testing. We do so with novel data of diverse kinds – sample surveys, survey experiments, in-depth interviews, and field observation – and gathered from disparate locations – the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Brazil, Turkey, and Ukraine. Cutting-edge techniques allow us to disentangle knotty

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questions. To give a few examples, it has widely been shown that important (e.g., presidential, national) elections elicit higher turnout than less-important (e.g., local) ones. Is the explanation simply that candidates for high office work harder, their parties pouring more resources into mobilizing voters, when the stakes are high? Could it also be the case that voters are sensitive to the importance of the post to be filled, independent of elite efforts to mobilize them? With observational data it is hard to adjudicate between the two explanations. The experimental techniques that we deploy allow us to show that intrinsic forces induce people to participate in important elections, even when they are not mobilized by elites.

In turn, social movement theorists have appropriately criticized “grievance” models of protest, which posit that features of the social environment (say, inequality) create grievances and the aggrieved are at heightened risk of collective action. It has been pointed out that scholars in this mold have failed to measure grievance levels among those who demonstrate and those who stay home. To overcome this problem, we carry out sample surveys in key cities where major protests have taken place. Doing so allows us to compare participants with nonparticipants. Likewise, cascade models of social movements rest on the intuition that many people will join a rally when they anticipate that it will be large but stay home when they anticipate that it will be small. Yet, surprisingly little systematic evidence has been gathered to confirm this suspicion; we gather just such data. We also delve more deeply into what lies behind protest cascades.

WHAT WOULD A GOOD THEORY DO?

If received theories fail to make sense of people’s decisions to take part in collective civic action, what would a satisfactory theory accomplish? It would do two things. First, it would rely on *basic assumptions* that make sense, ones that accord with the findings of experts and the intuitions of lay citizens. Second, it would produce *accurate predictions*, ones that make sense of observed facts about participation – who does and who does not take part, and why participation swells under some circumstances and ebbs under others.

In our effort to construct such a theory, we are by no means starting from scratch. Indeed, the allusion to the Newtonian revolution in a previous paragraph is misleading. Much existing theory does not rely on fundamental errors, equivalent to the belief that the universe revolves around the Earth. Instead, in writing this book we have drawn on a wealth of insightful but incomplete (and, at moments, ill-considered) theorizing. The party-mobilization theory, alluded to a moment ago, is a case in point. No one would deny that parties and campaigns work hard to get out the vote, but we need to look more closely at what they do to achieve this end and why it works. We will argue in Chapter 6 that one thing they do is offer causal interpretations of adverse circumstances that voters face, interpretations that elicit citizens’ anger and move them to the polls. So mobilization models are not so much incorrect as incomplete; they

place the sun at the center of the galaxy but have not fully fleshed out the nature of the gravitational pull.

What is needed, then, is not so much a paradigm shift as a paradigm realignment. As Chapter 2 makes clear, beginning a half century ago, economic approaches to democracy became deeply influential in shaping our understanding of mass political participation. In some respects these influences sent us, collectively, in the wrong direction, obscuring important insights into the psychological and social bases of collective action. Theorists who tried to press participation into a narrow mold of individual cost-benefit calculations came up empty-handed, failing to make sense of a most basic fact about democracy, viz: that rational individuals do vote in mass elections, just as they do take part in protests, even – in the latter case – at risk of bodily injury. But the economic approach was not unproductive. It eventually spawned models which, though still failing to fulfill the criterion of sensible assumptions, came closer to success than previous efforts. What's more, though economic theorists remained insensitive to the emotional substrate of mass action, their insistence that participation imposes costs on those who act, and that these costs, too, must be part of the equation, was an important lesson not to be forgotten. In Chapter 2 we review theories of electoral participation and offer our own alternative, which, we hope, employs realistic assumptions and makes sense of observed patterns. In Chapter 4 we modify this model so that it can yield insights into protest participation.

Three general points are worth making about our model in advance:

(1) **Abstention can be costly.** Received theory, as we have just noted, emphasizes the costs of participation as a factor that, on its own, works against people taking part in voting, protesting, and other forms of collective political action. But this view is one-sided. Just as there are costs of participation, so there are also costs of abstention. The former are material and cognitive, the latter intrinsic and psychological, but no less real for that.

That abstention can be intrinsically costly helps explain why people sometimes bear very high costs to be able to participate; and they do so, typically, because they care a lot about the outcome. Referendums that pose basic questions about rights, sovereignty, and identities often see very high rates of participation (LeDuc 2015). The 2016 British referendum on EU membership drew close to 34 million people to the polls: 72% of the electorate, compared to the 66% who voted in the previous general election in 2015. The 2014 referendum on Scottish independence drew 85% of eligible voters to the polls. This turnout rate was 20 percentage points higher than the average in Scotland in the prior four British national elections.²

² Qvortrup (2013) and Butler and Ranney (1994) find that turnout in referendums varies more than in general elections. According to Butler and Ranney, turnout is lower, on average, in referendums than in candidate elections, but the standard deviation is higher – a subset of referendums, like those cited here, drive participation up to unusually higher levels.

What Would a Good Theory Do?

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People sometimes bear heavy costs to take part in collective action. Protesters in democracies new and old can face police clubs, tear gas, jail, and worse. Voting is usually not dangerous, but it can be costly. Ireland held a referendum on same-sex marriage in 2015. Irish citizens living in the UK traveled by sea and air to vote in it. Airline tickets between London and Dublin sold out on the day of the vote (Hakim and Dalby 2015). Why would people pay so much money and go to so much trouble to cast a ballot? Hannah Little, an Irish woman living in London who flew back to vote, explained,

“With Irish pals, every time we meet up, going home for the referendum has been at the forefront . . . My plan is to go home to settle and have children. If my kids turn out to be gay, I want my voice to be heard now” (McDonald 2015).

Did Hannah Little not realize that her vote was extremely unlikely to be the decisive one in favor of same-sex marriage in Ireland? Did she not realize that if she moved back to Ireland and had gay offspring, they would be able to legally marry same-sex partners whether or not their mother had troubled herself to make the pilgrimage back for the 2015 referendum? We present evidence in the pages to come that the answer to both questions, for her and for many people like her, is “yes,” they do understand these facts. They take part when they care a lot because *not* participating would be to enter into a state of dissonance: these are costs of abstention.

We are certainly not the first to notice these latter kinds of costs. Rational choice theory dug itself out of the “paradox of voting” – its prediction of near-zero turnout in large electorates – by adducing a *duty* to vote. People who feel this duty would forgo the payoffs derived from fulfilling it, were they to abstain. But the construct of duty does not solve every problem. Conceptualized as an encouragement to vote, it is static and does not explain the ups and downs in levels of turnout across elections. Nor does it explain why common people take part in collective political action for which there is no generally recognized duty to take part, such as in street protests. Network and shaming models, where a person runs the risk of being shunned if he or she stays home, also imply that abstention is costly. But these models focus excessively on the role of one’s immediate personal networks in driving political participation. They struggle – as duty models do – to explain why particular kinds of elections predictably spark widespread participation, whereas in others, popular involvement is anemic.

A key move we make, then, is to posit costs of abstention: straight-up disutility from not taking part, the magnitude of which depends, *inter alia*, on how much a person sees as at stake in the outcome.

(2) **Many people think about the strategic setting of elections and protests from a supraindividual point of view.** To unlock the mysteries of political participation, just as important as the particular factors that influence whether a person will take part is the vantage point from which people approach the decision.

Prior theorists, for understandable reasons of parsimony and elegance, have stuck to one level at once, usually that of the individual, who is seen as thinking about the costs and benefits of action entirely as they influence him or her, individually. Others have posited that people think about what to do from the vantage point of a social planner or party leader; citizens are thought to consider both benefits and costs at this macro level. Our theory of costly abstention posits that people are capable of thinking at distinct levels. They consider the costs of participation from the vantage point of their own time and effort. They consider the strategic context – the probabilities of the movement succeeding, the favored candidate winning – from a vantage point above the individual, typically of a candidate or party or movement leader. Regarding the *benefits* of alternative outcomes, they regard these at both individual and higher levels. What our multilevel theory gives up in parsimony, it gains in accuracy.

(3) **To understand political participation, we need less economics, more psychology.** Political scientists are well aware of the ways in which cognitive distortions and biases influence the perceptions and choices of citizens (and of political elites). We are becoming increasingly aware that emotions also influence our political perceptions and actions. A new appreciation has emerged in the social sciences of emotions and cognition as not in tension with one another, but working in concert. The recent psychological turn, advanced in no small measure by behavioral economists, has nurtured the field of political psychology, and in some measure we will be advocating a return to social-psychological ideas about participation which many scholars set aside with the rise of rational choice.

We take rational choice theory seriously and have used it heavily in our own work. But our desire to understand collective action has drawn us toward psychology. An initial intuition, as we began our research, was that when people care about who their elected leaders will be and what courses their communities and countries will take, they may find themselves drawn to collective action. They will vote and perhaps even demonstrate, even without anyone telling them they should, sometimes without having to think very hard about their decisions to participate. Not just social shame or moral reflection but also something much quicker and more spontaneous often spurs people to act.

Some of our intuitions come from introspection. We consider what it would feel like to care a lot about the outcome of an election but to stay home and let others decide. We imagine this as an uncomfortable state of dissonance. We soon found our intuitions echoed in the words of people we interviewed. For instance, a man in Kiev told our interviewers about the events that drew him to activism in 2013, in what would become the Euromaidan protests. He remembered how he felt when he saw the image of a young woman who had been beaten at a rally: “You know, there are sometimes moments when you feel like you are coming apart because it is no longer possible to tolerate the situation.”

A Map of the Book

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We groped, initially, with phrases like “internal dissonance”; later we learned much more, from social and political psychology, about preconscious responses, approach emotions, and the tricky, sometimes surprising effects of anger, moral outrage, anxiety, and guilt. Though we have by no means become political psychologists, we have certainly leaned heavily upon political psychology to help us make sense of the world of popular participation.

A MAP OF THE BOOK

What comes next? Chapters 2 and 3 focus on voting. The first task we undertake in Chapter 2 is to demonstrate the achievements, but also the shortcomings, of inherited theories of electoral participation. The range and inventiveness of the accumulated theory make an extensive review necessary. Our second task in the chapter is to offer our own theory, which places intrinsic costs of abstention at the center.

Chapter 3 tests our theory against others. We find support for the construct of intrinsic costs of abstention, alluded to here and discussed more fully in Chapter 2. Costs of abstention do indeed influence people’s willingness to vote and clearly rise and fall with how much people see as at stake in the outcome. We also test propositions about close elections making people more willing to vote – even when they are not prodded to do so by campaigns or parties – and about the power of a sense of civic duty to get people to the polls. We show that civic duty makes a difference; but we find it to be more of a conditional than an absolute norm, so that when it is an internalized norm, it is like other costs of abstention.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on protests. Chapter 4 asks, *What explains why people join protests?* We begin with a review of the rich theoretical literature to provide some explanations, and then present a costly abstention theory of participation, modified in ways that make it relevant to protests. In Chapter 5 we draw on original research in several developing democracies, as well as extensive secondary literature on protests in many regions of the world, to test key propositions derived from our model. We probe whether the goals of protests matter and to what kinds of people; whether bystanders’ expectations about the size of protests influence their decisions to take part; and show that police repression can indeed make protests grow. This last issue can appear paradoxical if one does not take into account that repression can drive up the costs of abstention at the same time that it drives up the costs of participation.

Chapter 6 demonstrates the importance of taking emotional responses into account when explaining the ebbs and flows of both forms of popular participation. In particular, it is hard to make sense of the dynamics of participation while ignoring the role of anger and moral outrage. We demonstrate the power of emotions in several countries. Scholars have tried to explain unemployed Americans’ drop in turnout rates (and, in some settings, revival

of these rates over time) with reference to the opportunity costs that they bear when they go to the polls. Their behavior is better explained, we demonstrate, by taking into account the emotions they experience, emotions which strategic politicians sometimes choose to stir up. Outside of the United States, the key role of emotions in mobilizing people comes through in nationally representative surveys in Britain and Sweden, which we also analyze. In turn, when the police in Turkey attack demonstrators and protests surge, the explanation is not that Turkish citizens' support for the government has dropped or that they are newly confident in the potential for success of the protests. Instead, we demonstrate how anger and moral outrage turn bystanders into participants. Hence, approach emotions like anger are key to simulating collective action, both at the polling place and in the streets.

In Chapter 7 we reprise the costly abstention theory and its predictions, our methods for testing it, and the empirical support that we have adduced for it. We also anticipate objections to the theory and respond to them. Next, we assess the payoffs from thinking side-by-side about voting and protesting. We consider what our theory of turnout implies for theories of vote choice once people are inside the voting booth. We also pose the question, *What is the appropriate normative status of these two key tools of popular participation?*

A word, finally, on the geographic sources of our data and research. The theories we test are fairly general, the scope conditions broad. The theory of electoral participation is relevant to democracies in general, though the relevance will be less in some cases, such as places in which voting is compulsory or where vote buying is common. We test propositions about voting mainly with survey experiments of US voters, though we also work with survey data from other countries. Our focus on US respondents is purely a convenience, reflecting the availability of online samples for recruitment into survey experiments.³ Likewise, the theory of protest mobilization is general to democracies, though we incorporate insights from protests in authoritarian regimes (such as in the Arab Spring countries). As explained in Chapter 4, the role of political violence is aptly demonstrated in new democracies.

³ We make use of Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) and Survey Sampling International (www.surveysampling.com) online samples, as indicated. In Aytaç's (Turkey) and Stokes's (Latin America) regions of special expertise, compulsory voting is widespread. Compulsory voting (especially with real sanctions) drives up participation and makes it less variable (see the review in Blais 2006). Therefore we pay less attention to these regions on the elections side of the study, though they offer important evidence on the protest side. Outside of the United States, on voting, the British Election Study and the Swedish National Election Studies have included verified measures of turnout, confirming their respondents' participation or abstention from constituency records, making them valuable sources, since most others use self-reported voting.