Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first booklength treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly’s critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.

Marc Alspector-Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. His work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy has been published in numerous leading journals including Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.
AGAINST KNOWLEDGE CLOSURE

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## Contents

**Acknowledgments**

viii

1 Motivation, Strategy, and Definition

1.1 Closure as Axiom

1.2 Why Care?

1.3 Strategy

1.4 Defining Closure

1.5 KC

1.6 Transmission and Warrant

1.7 The Problem with KC

1.8 Transmission versus Penetration

2 Counterexamples

2.1 Zebra

2.2 Basis Fallibilism

2.3 Dretske Cases

2.4 Vogel against the Counterexamples

2.5 A Plethora of Inclusions

2.6 The Argument by Counterexample

2.7 The Chapters to Follow

3 Denying Premise 1: Skepticism

3.1 Why Skepticism?

3.2 Downgrading

3.3 Piecemeal and Wholesale Skeptical Hypotheses

3.4 The Skeptical Closure Argument

3.5 Front-Loading

3.6 Underdetermination

3.7 Conclusion

4 Denying Premise 2: Warrant Transmission

4.1 Warrant Transmission and Williamson’s Insight

4.2 No Inevitable False Negatives

4.3 NIFN, Fallibilism, and Insensitivity

v
## Contents

4.4 Method Individuation 67
4.5 Method Externalism 69
4.6 NIFN and Other Dretske Cases 71

5 Transmission, Skepticism, and Conditions of Warrant 73
5.1 Transmission and Skepticism 73
5.2 Transmission and Conditions of Warrant 77
5.3 Transmission and Safety 79
5.4 Transmission and Reliabilism 81
5.5 Transmission and Evidentialism 85
5.6 Summary of the Last Two Chapters 89

6 Front-Loading 90
6.1 Warrant Preservation without Transmission 90
6.2 Front-Loading 91
6.3 The Front-Loading Strategy 92
6.4 The Buck-Passing Argument 95
6.5 And Not Just Front-Loading 99
6.6 A Safe Way Out? 100
6.7 Explaining Transmission Failure 106
6.8 The Closure Advocate’s Dilemma 113

7 Denying Premise 3: Warrant for P as Warrant for Q 114
7.1 Setting Aside Buck-Passing 114
7.2 Putting Inference Out of a Job 114
7.3 The Irrelevance of B to Q 116

8 Denying Premise 4: Warrant by Background Information 118
8.1 Outline of the Chapter 118
8.2 Background Information and Wholesale Skeptical Hypotheses 119
8.3 Background Information and Piecemeal Skeptical Hypotheses 121
8.4 Explaining the Lottery Intuition 122
8.5 Warrant Infallibilism and the Lottery Intuition 131
8.6 Merricks’ Arguments for Warrant Infallibilism 139
8.7 Summary 147

9 Denying Premise 5: Warrant by Entitlement 148
9.1 Warrants by Entitlement 148
9.2 Entitlement and Skepticism 149
9.3 The Meaning of “Warrant” 150
9.4 Strategic Entitlement 152
9.5 Entitlement of Cognitive Project 160
9.6 Conclusion 165
Contents

10 Abominable Conjunctions, Contextualism, and the Spreading Problem 168
  10.1 Arguing against Closure Denial 168
  10.2 Abominable Conjunctions 168
  10.3 Abominable Conjunctions and Contextualism 170
  10.4 Contextualism and Anti-Skeptical Sources of Warrant 178
  10.5 Abominable Conjunctions and Interest-Relative Invariantism 187
  10.6 Abominable Conjunctions and Classical Moderate Invariantism 188
  10.7 Abominable Conjunctions and the Knowledge Rule 189
  10.8 Assumptions and Skepticism 201
  10.9 The Spreading Problem 208

11 Bootstrapping, Epistemic Circularity, and Justification Closure 212
  11.1 Bootstrapping 212
  11.2 Bootstrapping and NIFN 220
  11.3 Bootstrapping and Epistemic Circularity 222
  11.4 More Easy Knowledge 225
  11.5 Justification Closure 225
  11.6 Justification, Skepticism, and Assumptions 229

References 233
Index 242
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