HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT

This book argues that the humanitarian framing of disarmament is not a novel development, but rather represents a re-emergence of a much older and long-standing sensibility of humanitarianism in disarmament. It rejects the 'big bang' theory that presents the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention 1997, and its successors – the Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 – as a paradigm shift from an older traditional state-centric approach towards a more progressive humanitarian approach. It shows how humanitarian disarmament has a long and complex history, which includes these treaties.

This book further argues that the attempt to locate the birth of humanitarian disarmament in these treaties is part of the attempt to cleanse humanitarian disarmament of politics, presenting humanitarianism as a morally superior discourse in disarmament. However, humanitarianism carries its own blind spots and has its own hegemonic leanings. It may be silencing other potentially more transformative discourses.

Treasa Dunworth is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. She has acted as consultant for the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, providing legal advice regarding nuclear weapons disarmament. In 2017, she joined the delegation of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) at the negotiations for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Treaty.
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HUMANITARIAN DISARMAMENT

An Historical Enquiry

TREASA DUNWORTH

University of Auckland
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important humanitarian campaign responding to the human suffering engendered by the Vietnam War (Chapter 4). Matt and Julian stand as testament to the long history of the quest for disarmament propelled by a humanitarian sensibility – even if neither of them would express it like that. I was privileged to work for them and I am grateful to both of them for the many opportunities they afforded me. From that period of my professional life, I also acknowledge and thank Sergei Batsanov, Daniel Feakes, Walter Krutzsch, Kathleen Lawand, Lisa Tabassi and Anil Wadhwa. Conversations and discussions with all of them raised questions for me that I have only started to explore in this project.

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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978)

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978)

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 17 June 1925, (1929) XCIV LNTS 65–74 (entered into force 8 February 1928)


The Antarctic Treaty, signed 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, opened for signature 5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 43 (entered into force 10 October 1963)


Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed 28 June 1919 (entered into force 10 January 1920)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970)

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 20 September 2017 (not yet in force)
ABBREVIATIONS

AEC Atomic Energy Commission (United Nations)
AP I Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 1977
AP II Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non International Armed Conflicts 1977
APLM Anti-personnel landmine
APLM Convention Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction 1997
CCCA Commission for Conventional Armaments (United Nations)
CCM Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008
CCW Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 1980
CD Conference on Disarmament
Charter Charter of the United Nations 1945
Covenant Covenant of the League of Nations 1920
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1996
CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1993
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ERW Explosive remnants of war
Geneva Conventions 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 1949, Geneva Convention for the

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


Geneva Protocol Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 1925

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987
MTCA Mixed Temporary Commission on Armaments of the League of Nations

NAC New Agenda Coalition
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968

OEWG Open-Ended Working Group
PAC Permanent Armaments Commission of the League of Nations

Protocol II Protocol on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 1980

PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TPNW Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
WCP World Court Project
WHO World Health Organization
WILPF Women's International League for Peace and Freedom