BREXITLAND

Long-term social and demographic changes – and the conflicts they create – continue to transform British politics. In this accessible and authoritative book Sobolewska and Ford show how deep the roots of this polarisation and volatility run, drawing out decades of educational expansion and rising ethnic diversity as key drivers in the emergence of new divides within the British electorate over immigration, identity and diversity. They argue that choices made by political parties from the 1960s onwards have mobilised these divisions into politics, first through conflicts over immigration, then through conflicts over the European Union, culminating in the 2016 EU Referendum. Providing a comprehensive and far-reaching view of a country in turmoil, Brexitland explains how and why this happened, for students, researchers and anyone who wants to better understand the remarkable political times in which we live.

Maria Sobolewska FRSA is a Professor of Political Science, and Deputy Director of the Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research, at the University of Manchester. She writes about race and ethnicity in British politics, from elections to political representation. She is co-author of The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain (2013).

Robert Ford FRSA is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Manchester. He is an expert on immigration, public opinion and party politics in Britain. His first book, Revolt on the Right (2013), was named Political Book of the Year in 2015. He writes regularly on British electoral politics for national and international media outlets.
‘A sharp, accessible investigation of the key fault lines of modern British politics: education, immigration, age and identity.’

Helen Lewis, author of Difficult Women

‘Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford have produced the best account I have read of our cultural civil wars. The work is not just an explanation of the way we live now, but of how we reached a state of institutionalised rage and why peace will be so hard to find.’

Nick Cohen, The Spectator and The Observer

‘Brexitland brilliantly unpicks the old and new forces that shaped our brittle political age. Who is exploiting the anger? And is it with us for good? A fascinating and convincing study: essential reading for anyone wanting to understand why tolerance of the other side in British politics seems to have disappeared. How did our political background turn so ugly and intolerant? Brexitland delves deep into decades of history and attitudes to race and ethnic identity to answer that question and does it with style. Sobolewska and Ford have written the new political bible of our times: how did we die debating and start shouting? Can normal service resume? Brexitland is a razor sharp and compelling answer to those questions.’

Gary Gibbon, Channel 4 News

‘A brilliant, original, powerful book. For Remainers, Brexeters or indeed anyone interested in why divided Britain cut itself adrift from the EU, this is unmissable. It is also totally riveting.’

Toby Helm, The Observer

‘Whether we like it or not, we are all living in Brexitland. In the forensic detail Sobolewska and Ford plot the long road of social change which led us here. En route they look ahead to where the UK’s explosive culture wars would take us next. Essential reading for those not wearing blinkers.’

Adam Boulton, Sky News
Brexitland

Identity, Diversity and the Reshaping of British Politics

MARIA SOBOLEWSKA
University of Manchester

ROBERT FORD
University of Manchester
CONTENTS

List of figures and tables page x
Acknowledgements xv

1 INTRODUCTION: HOW BRITAIN BECAME BREXITLAND 1
Brexit is not Year Zero 1
Part I Demographic change and the emergence of new political divides over identity 4
Part II Identity conflicts from New Labour to the Coalition 8
Part III Brexitland 11
Inevitable limitations and omissions 15
Conclusion 16

PART I DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POLITICAL DIVIDES OVER IDENTITY 19

2 SOCIAL CHANGE, ETHNOCENTRISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW IDENTITY DIVIDES 21
Introduction 21
Education: university expansion and the rise of the graduate class 24
Racial diversity and immigration: the rise of multiracial Britain 27
Ethnocentrism: how educational and ethnic divides translate into political conflicts 33
From demographic change to political conflict: conviction liberals, necessity liberals and identity conservatives 43
Educational expansion and the rise of conviction liberals 43
### CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity and necessity liberal ethnic minorities</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline and backlash: identity conservatives</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity polarisation: generations and geography</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From demographic change to political change: is demography destiny?</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 DIVIDED OVER DIVERSITY: IDENTITY CONSERVATIVES AND IDENTITY LIBERALS</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity conservatives: ethnocentrism as a political agenda</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate conviction liberals: social norms and the politics of anti-racism</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority necessity liberals: discrimination, linked fate and strategic alliances</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why identity conflicts are polarising: a clash of social norms</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 LEGACIES OF EMPIRE: COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRATION AND THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF IDENTITY POLITICS DIVIDES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The origins of the first wave: the entanglement of citizenship and Empire</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opposition to migration in the first wave</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The elite–mass divide on immigration in the first wave</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political activation of ethnocentrism: Enoch Powell and ‘Rivers of Blood’</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After Powell: the consolidation of an identity politics divide</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation on the left: entrenching anti-racism norms</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: why did liberal immigration policies persist for so long?</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II Identity Conflicts from New Labour to the Coalition 119

5 THE LONG DIVORCE: PARTIES AND VOTERS
PARTING WAYS 121
Introduction 121
Parties leaving voters: centralisation and professionalisation 124
Voters leaving parties: de-alignment and disengagement 135
A flag to rally around: the second wave of immigration and the activation of identity politics 142
Ethnocentric activation: how immigration mobilised identity divides into politics 146
Conclusion 153

6 THE IDENTITY CONSERVATIVE INSURGENCY AND THE RISE OF UKIP 156
Introduction 156
Riding on reputation: the Conservatives and immigration under New Labour 159
Early warning signs: the BNP and UKIP under New Labour 164
Betrayal: the failure of the immigration pledge and the opening of the electoral market 169
Mobilising the backlash: UKIP during the Coalition 175
Hijacking the agenda: UKIP’s impact on the Conservatives 181
Conclusion: how UKIP changed politics without winning at Westminster 186

7 CHANGE WITHOUT RECOVERY: HOW THE COALITION CATALYSED LABOUR’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION 189
Introduction 189
Red to purple: UKIP’s challenge to Labour during the Coalition 192
The Liberal Democrats’ collapse and Labour’s consolidation of white graduates 197

The past versus the future: the geographical conundrum created by Labour’s changing electoral coalition 203

A more demanding electorate? 208

Conclusion 212

PART III BREXITLAND

8 BREXITLAND AWAKENED: IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE EU REFERENDUM 217

Introduction 217

Setting up the storm: the 2015 general election 221

Framing the choice: the referendum campaign 224

Brexitland awakens: identity divides and 2016 vote choices 229

Two tribes go to war: the emergence of Brexit political identities 237

Conclusion 248

9 DANCING TO A DIFFERENT TUNE: IDENTITY POLITICS AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN SCOTLAND, 2007–19 250

Introduction 250

The demographic roots of ‘exit’ politics: Scotland and England compared 253

Mobilising support for the exit option 262

Why ‘Yes’ failed but ‘Leave’ succeeded 269

Two stones thrown in the pond: the impact of two referendums in quick succession 273

Conclusion 280

10 BREXITLAND AFTER BREXIT: THE ELECTORAL FALLOUT FROM THE EU REFERENDUM 284

Introduction 284

A Brexit re-alignment? Identity conflicts in the 2017 and 2019 elections 286
Contents

The ghosts of elections past: reputations and temptations 304
Paths through Brexitland: three scenarios for the future of British politics 311
Conclusion: unstable coalitions, uncertain outcomes 321

11 CONCLUSION: THE NEW POLITICS OF BREXITLAND 323
The road to Brexitland 323
Global Brexitland 326
Identity conflicts beyond party politics 332
The future study of identity politics 336
What next for Brexitland? 338

Bibliography 345
Index 381
FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

2.1 Share of respondents who report having no formal qualifications and who report having an undergraduate degree or more  

2.2 Ethnic minority population of the UK, 1951–2011

2.3 Migrant populations resident in Britain by broad region of origin, 2005–17

2.4 Share of under forties and over seventies belonging to the core identity conservative and identity liberal demographic groups, 1986–2016

2.5 Local authority change in ethnic diversity 2001–11 by starting levels of ethnic diversity in 2001, England and Wales

3.1 Share of people in different generations expressing ethnocentric views (percentages)

3.2 Ethnocentric national identity among white school leavers, white graduates and ethnic minorities (percentages)

3.3 Share of white graduates and school leavers accepting the idea of an ethnic minority in-law

3.4 Share of respondents who would dismiss an employee for different forms of rudeness to a customer (percentages)

3.5 Predicted probability of dismissing the employee and of taking no action by levels of motivation to control prejudice

3.6 Views about the benefits of diversity, with and without ‘political correctness’ counter-argument (percentages)

4.1 Opposition to immigration and support for migration restrictions, 1961–6 (percentages)

4.2 ‘Do you think on the whole this country has benefitted or been harmed through immigrants coming to settle here from the Commonwealth/Ireland?’
List of figures and tables

4.3 Support for Powellite positions on immigration before and after ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in April 1968 100
4.4 Voters’ perceptions of Conservative and Labour immigration policies, 1970 102
4.5 Prevalence of misperceptions about Conservative and Labour migration policies in 1970 and 1974 (percentages) 106
4.6 Conservative advantage and Labour disadvantage in party identification among ethnocentric voters 112
5.1 Economic ideology in the Labour and Conservative manifestos, 1945–2017 126
5.2 Spending by Conservatives and Labour in safe seats as a share of maximum legal limit, 1959–2010 (percentages) 127
5.3 Educational background of Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates, 1992–2015 (percentages) 131
5.4 Percentage of voters and candidates who feel equal opportunities for ethnic minorities have ‘gone too far’, 1992 and 2005 133
5.5 Partisan attachments in the British electorate, 1987–2010 137
5.6 Generational differences in partisanship among identity conservatives and identity liberals, 2006–10 138
5.7 Turnout among white school leavers and among graduates and ethnic minorities, 1992–2010 140
5.8 Share of respondents naming migration as one of the most important problems, 1997–2018 (percentages) 144
5.9 Public sentiment about immigration, 1995–2013 148
5.10 Predicted probability of naming immigration as the most important problem facing the country, 2001, 2005, 2010 151
5.11 Voter ratings of Labour’s performance in 2005 on asylum and other issues by sentiment towards immigrants 152
6.1 Ratings of the Labour government and Conservative opposition on immigration, 2010 (difference in percentages) 160
6.2 Predicted likelihood of switching from Labour to the Conservatives by attitudes to immigration 163
6.3 ‘Which party is best able to handle immigration?’
   2005–14  
6.4 Net approve–disapprove ratings for handling of migration, Conservatives and Labour, 2004–13  
6.5 UKIP support among white school leavers, and among graduates and ethnic minorities in England and Wales, 2010–15  
6.6 Identity conservative attitudes and UKIP support, 2014  
6.7 Identity conservatism and predicted probability of switching to UKIP in 2014 among 2010 Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat voters  
7.1 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Conservative voters, by views of national austerity cuts  
7.2 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Labour voters, by salience to immigration  
7.3 Rates of switching to Labour and UKIP in 2014 among 2010 Liberal Democrat voters (percentages)  
7.4 Share of Labour voters in England and Wales who are white school leavers and graduates/ethnic minorities  
7.5 Views of the cultural impact of immigration among Labour voters, 2005–16 (percentages)  
7.6 Share of different groups of 2015 Labour voters who expressed little or no Labour partisanship (percentages)  
7.7 Probability of ever voting for the Liberal Democrats among different groups of Labour 2015 voters, 2014–17  
8.1 Identity conservative attitudes and Euroscepticism in 2003  
8.2 Impact of various motivations on voting for Conservatives vs Labour in 2015 and for Leave vs Remain in 2016, England and Wales only  
8.3 Relationship between economic perceptions and vote choices between Labour and the Conservatives in 2015 and between Leave and Remain in 2016  
8.4 Views about immigration and vote preference between Labour and the Conservatives in 2015, and between Leave and Remain in 2016 in England and Wales  
8.5 Demographic divides in support for Conservatives vs Labour in 2015 and Leave vs Remain in 2016 in England and Wales
List of figures and tables

8.6 Share of voters describing ‘Leavers’ and ‘Remainers’ as working class, old or young (percentages) 240
8.7 Expressions of emotional attachment to parties and referendum sides, autumn 2016 (percentages) 242
8.8 Share of Leave and Remain voters rating each Brexit tribe as ‘intolerant’ and ‘reasonable’ (percentages) 243
8.9 Relative impact of neighbour characteristics on probability of being welcomed (above 0) or shunned (below 0) as a new neighbour (average marginal effect) 244
8.10 Change in views about Britain’s economic performance between spring 2016 and spring 2017 by strength of Leave or Remain identity, England and Wales 246
9.1 Ethnocentric attitudes in Scotland and England (percentages) 255
9.2 English identification with Europe and Scottish identification with Britain (percentages) 258
9.3 Generational distribution of volunteered European identity in England and strong British identity in Scotland (percentages) 260
9.4 Support for exit options before and after the referendums among white school leavers and graduates/ethnic minorities (percentages) 266
9.5 Change in support for the exit options before and after the Independence and EU referendums (percentages) 267
9.6 Change in support for exit option before and after referendum campaign by level of union identity 268
9.7 Generational distribution of support for the two exit options 272
9.8 Change in support for the SNP and Conservatives 2015–17 by referendum choice combinations 277
9.9 Combinations of independence and Brexit positions among voters in Scotland in 2017 and 2019 (percentages) 278
10.2 Conservative and Labour support among Leave and Remain voters, 2015–19 (percentages) 294
10.3 Changes in support for the Conservatives and Labour, 2015–19, by views about the cultural impact of immigration 296
10.4 Economic perceptions and vote choices, 2015–19 298
10.5 Attitudes to immigration and vote choices, 2015–19 299
10.6 Political disaffection and vote preferences, 2015–19 301
10.7 Average vote changes, 2015–19, in the eighteen ‘red wall’ seats which elected their first Conservative MPs since at least 1945 in the 2019 general election 302
10.8 Party support in 2019 among Leave voters and Remain voters (percentages) 314

Tables
3.1 Ethnocentrism and views on political issues involving group conflict page 63
3.2 Positive views of out-groups and attachment to anti-prejudice social norms among white graduates and white school leavers 68
4.1 Education gradients in attitudes to immigration and race among white respondents 1964–84 94
9.1 Scottish Anglo scepticism and English Euroscepticism compared 256
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