Jurisprudence has up until recently largely neglected international law as a subject of philosophizing. *The Nature of International Law* tries to offset this deficiency, by providing a comprehensive explanatory account of international law. It does so within an analytical tradition, albeit within the one which departs from the nowadays dominant method of the metaphysically driven conceptual analysis. Instead, it adopts the prototype theory of concepts, which is directed toward determining typical features constitutive of the nature of international law. The book’s central finding is that those features are: normativity, institutionalization, coercive guaranteeing, and justice-aptness. Since typical features are context sensitive, their specificities at the international level are further elucidated. The book, finally, challenges the often raised claim that fragmentation is international law’s unique feature, by demonstrating that international institutional actors, particularly adjudicative ones, largely perceive themselves as officials of a unified legal order.

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To my parents
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I have been dealing for quite some time with topics falling within the ambit of the philosophy of international law. As a visiting scholar I have been giving lectures on these topics at the University of Geosciences (Wuhan), Lucernaiuris Institute (University of Lucerne), the University of Katowice, and the Institute of the Foundations of Law (University of Graz). At various international conferences I have presented several papers of that sort: “Interpretation in International Law and International Rule of Law,” at the 2012 annual conference of the Serbian IVR Section “Courts, Interpretation, the Rule of Law”; “Revisiting the Concept of International Law – Methodological Aspects,” at the 2013 conference “Methodology of Legal Theory,” University of Zagreb; “Dworkin on International Law: Not Much of a Legacy?,” at the 2014 conference “The Legacy of Ronald Dworkin,” McMaster University, Hamilton; “Theorizing ‘Unidentified Normative Objects’ of the Global Regulatory Regimes,” at the 2015 conference “Unity and Diversity of Global Administrative Regimes,” Centre for Research in Public Law, University of Lisbon; and “Is Legality like Virginity? An Essay on the Normativity of International Law,” at the 2015 World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), Washington, at the 2015 annual conference of the Serbian IVR section, Belgrade, as well as at the 2015 conference “Validity and Public Trust,” University of Groningen. Some of the papers have been published in the meantime and they served as a starting point for discussions in this book (references to those works are scattered throughout the book).

In the process of book writing I have especially benefited from a June–July 2014 research stay at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, where I conducted research on the topic “Revisiting the Concept of International Law – Philosophical Foundations.” I finalized this
research, under a slightly revised name – “The Concept of International Law Revisited – A Jurisprudential Inquiry” – in the period of July–September 2017 at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, as the 2016 Brandon Research Fellow. I was there provided with a setting in which I had everything I needed for good quality research. For this, special thanks go to Karen Fachechi and Anita Rutherford. On more than one occasion I also had fruitful conversations with collaborators and other research scholars of the Centre. This is particularly true of discussions with members of the so-called Kitchen Consensus group – Julia Kapelańska-Pręgowska, Rossana Deplano, Justyna Chrzanowska, Enrico Milano, and Guo Ran.

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