The Conquest of Boulogne and the History of Tudor England

In the summer of 1544, Henry VIII invaded France with 36,000 soldiers – the largest army sent overseas by an English ruler until the reign of William III. This campaign led to the greatest expansion of English territory on the continent since the Lancastrian conquests of the early fifteenth century. As well as bringing the important Channel port of Boulogne under his rule, Henry VIII captured tens of thousands of acres of prime agricultural land in the surrounding region, the Boulonnais. Rather than seek to rule Boulogne and the Boulonnais as the rightful king of France as he had done at Tournai in the 1510s, Henry VIII annexed this territory to his English crown. The conquered lands, which had been almost entirely depopulated during the war of 1544–6, were surveyed and leased out to English settlers, while both the common law and Henry’s Reformation were extended to the region. This new part of England was protected by a ring of fortifications, which were built according to the latest advances in military architecture and defended by the largest garrisons found anywhere in the English monarch’s domains.

While the establishment of an English colony at Boulogne was one of Henry VIII’s most significant ventures, it is largely ignored in the historiography of Tudor England. David Potter has provided a thorough study of the organisation of the war between Henry VIII and Francis I in the 1540s, though he does not deal with the nature of English rule at Boulogne. More widely, the central position which the Reformation

occupies in the historiography of sixteenth-century England has encouraged historians to pass over Henry’s final years in favour of picking up the story of religious change again during the reigns of his children. As a result, English rule at Boulogne rarely receives more than a cursory mention in the voluminous literature on Tudor England. If Henry’s conquest of Boulogne is mentioned at all, it is typically in a highly critical manner. William Palmer has termed Henry’s final invasion of France ‘a complete disaster’, while W. G. Hoskins found that the ‘egomaniac’ Henry VIII squandered £1,000,000 ‘on one useless military endeavour’. Bruce Lenman has echoed this view, criticising the English monarch for ‘pouring millions into a futile bid to re-create the Anglo-French empire of Henry V’ and placing his government ‘deep into debt in pursuit of strategic lunacies in France’. Yet Henry VIII was not seeking to recreate the Lancastrian Dual Monarchy, and the significant developments which took place in English rule in France during the reign of Henry VIII were much more than ‘strategic lunacies’. This book provides a detailed study of the conquest and colonisation of Boulogne and shows that we need to reassess our understanding of a number of key aspects of Tudor rule in the light of Henry VIII’s actions in France in the 1540s.

First, this book argues against claims that the English employed unique methods of violence against the Irish. From the nineteenth century, historians have emphasised the annihilationist nature of English violence in Ireland, which is portrayed as genocide avant la lettre. In his 1878 history of England, William Lecky wrote that the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland was ‘literally a war of extermination’, while Raphael Lemkin, who devised the concept of genocide in response to Turkey’s massacre of its Armenian population, considered English actions in sixteenth-century Ireland to constitute genocide. In his highly influential examination of genocide in human history, Ben Kiernan writes that English policy in sixteenth-century Ireland was based on ‘ethnic and annihilationist thinking’; for Anthony Fletcher and Diarmaid MacCulloch, war in Tudor


Ireland was 'turned into a genocidal conflict, in which English forces saw themselves as fighting a barbaric race who deserved no mercy'. A number of historians have reaffirmed the special character of English violence in early modern Ireland. In the same year in which Kiernan’s *Blood and Soil* was published (2007), the editors of an influential collection of essays examining conflict in early modern Ireland wrote of ‘a level of violence in Ireland that was more intense and vicious than elsewhere in the Tudor and Stuart kingdoms’. Some historians see the violence which the English used in Tudor Ireland as being unique even in European terms. For Vincent Carey, Lord Mountjoy’s scorched earth campaign in Ulster in 1602 ‘was novel, and perhaps unprecedented even by contemporary European standards’ because of its ‘scale and systematic nature’. While undoubtedly destructive, there was nothing novel or unprecedented about Mountjoy’s campaign. As we shall see, the killing of peasants, scouring of woods, burning of houses and destruction of crops to create famine conditions amongst a people the English deemed to be rebels were all measures Henry VIII had implemented in the Boulonnais in the 1540s, almost seven decades before Mountjoy laid waste to Ulster.

The upsurge of violence in sixteenth-century Ireland has been portrayed as the product of a visceral English hatred of the Gaelic Irish. Nicholas Canny writes that ethnic differences between the Protestant English and Catholic Irish provided ‘pretext for extermination’ because it ‘absolved [the English] of all normal ethical constraints’, while Ben Kiernan has emphasised the centrality of ethnicity to what he terms the genocidal behaviour of English armies in sixteenth-century Ireland. According to this view, the English viewed the Irish – as they would later view the native Americans – as
savages, and thus the restraints on violence typically used when fighting other Europeans did not apply when campaigning in Ireland. Harold E. Selesky writes that the English conduct of war in sixteenth-century France was markedly different from that in Ireland and the Americas. Yet in this book I show that the English did not use special methods of warfare in Ireland and America. Henry VIII’s commanders pursued a military strategy in France in the 1540s which was designed to inflict the maximum amount of damage on the civilian population of the Boulonnais. Tudor commanders in France could justify the burning of crops and destruction of food supplies because French soldiers could use these goods, while a fear that the native peasantry was helping the Valois monarch’s soldiers led the English to clear refugee populations from the woods, cave systems and other remote spots of the Boulonnais. Furthermore, the killing of the clergy, women and children could be justified when they were helping the French army. While many died as a result of direct killing, scorched earth was the most devastating form of warfare used against the native population of the Boulonnais. This form of combat—which the English had used extensively in France during the Hundred Years’ War and, perhaps most devastatingly, during the Black Prince’s chevauchées in the mid-fourteenth century—was designed to cause as much damage as possible and create a man-made famine, the effects of which were compounded by the impact of epidemic diseases.

Claims that the English employed special methods of violence against the Irish draw on the traditional narrative of the emergence of the early modern British Empire, which is widely believed to have started with the establishment of colonies in Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century. Examining the interplay between violence and colonialism in sixteenth-century Ireland, David Edwards finds that the brutal character of English violence became especially pronounced during the ‘colonial wars’ which accompanied the establishment of English plantations in Laois and Offaly from the late 1540s. The redevelopment of a conquest strategy in

sixteenth-century Ireland and the establishment of these colonies is often taken as marking the beginning of a new era of English imperialism. In his influential thesis on the development of Tudor plantations in sixteenth-century Ireland, Dean White wrote that for ‘the English the first steps in the path of empire were made in Ireland’, with the establishment of colonies in Laois and Offaly acting as ‘precursors of the colonizing of the new world’. Recently, several historians have reasserted White’s claim that the settlement of the midlands of Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century represented a major evolution in English colonial development. The editors of Age of Atrocity declare that Ireland was ‘the first colony of the fledging British empire’, with the Laois–Offaly plantation forming the ‘very first state colony’, while Annaleigh Margey has called these colonies ‘exemplars of future British imperial expansion’. Likewise, John Patrick Montaño writes that Laois and Offaly were the ‘earliest plantations and colonies in British imperial history’, while Vincent Carey has stated that settlement of Laois and Offaly provided the bedrock ‘for the long-term development of English colonization’.

Rather than consider the plantations established in Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century as the ‘laboratory’ for a new form of empire, this book argues that they should be viewed along with the Boulogne venture as the English crown’s final attempt to establish colonies overseas through the use of state resources alone. As we shall see in the following chapters, there was a range of connections between English actions in France and Ireland in the mid-sixteenth century. Indeed, many of the features which are typically seen as a product of the conquest of Ireland were put into effect in France in the 1540s. For William Smyth, ‘the establishment of permanent garrisons later supported by an adjacent settler colony’ – key

features of early modern English imperialism – were devised in Ireland and then applied in America.\(^\text{16}\) Yet this garrison strategy was implemented at Boulogne and then introduced into Ireland by men who had served in France. The magnitude of the expedition which led to the conquest and colonisation of Boulogne ensured that it would have an impact on other English military actions of the period. Half of the adult peers of the realm participated in the 1544 campaign, while Boulogne and its surrounding forts housed the largest garrison in the English king’s dominions during the mid-sixteenth century.\(^\text{17}\) The long duration of the conflict in the Boulonnais, coupled with a need to set up new administrations to rule and defend these lands on behalf of the king, provided large numbers of men from noble and gentry families with their first experience of frontier warfare and administration.

While historians tend to see the drive to create self-sufficient colonial settlements as a product of English expansion in sixteenth-century Ireland, it was a paramount concern for English monarchs in France, first at Calais and then at Boulogne.\(^\text{18}\) Henry VIII implemented a soldier-settler strategy in the Boulonnais in 1540s partly because he wanted to reduce government spending by having the population produce food for the garrisons. English settlers were given farms in the Boulonnais, while skilled workers were encouraged to take up residence in the towns and villages the Tudor monarch established in the region. Although Henry VIII wanted to develop an exclusively English colony in the Boulonnais, economic necessity and a need to farm all the lands he had conquered meant that it became necessary to reintroduce French peasants to act as a labour force. Yet these people returned to a land which was markedly different from the one they had left because Henry VIII had anglicised the region. As well as living under English laws and customs, the French were made subject to the Church of England. While there is a large volume of work on the colonial role of the Church of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, its contribution to imperial ventures before the late sixteenth century is largely unknown. Historians have paid little heed to the development of a colony in the Boulonnais, and there is nothing on the Church of England in the English lands in France in the \textit{Oxford History of Anglicanism}.\(^\text{19}\) Although Rowan Strong and Louis B. Wright briefly touch on a pre-eighteenth-century colonial dimension to the Church of


\(^\text{17}\) S. J. Gunn, \textit{The English People at War in the Age of Henry VIII} (Oxford, 2018), 53.


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England, they date this to the very late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, as does W. M. Jacob. While Eric Klingelhofer writes that ‘the Church establishment [in Tudor England] had little real involvement in overseas expansion’, I show that the newly formed Church of England played a central role in the imposition of English rule in France in the 1540s, where it intersected with the right of conquest – by which Henry VIII claimed to be the sole political and religious authority in these lands – to strengthen the Tudor monarch’s control over the region. Henry VIII based his claim to the Boulonnais squarely on the right of conquest rather than on his claim to the French crown, which he had used to justify his previous invasions of France. By setting aside a claim founded on a right to rule the French people and asserting instead one that was focused on territory won by force, Henry could remove any obligations he had to the native population – who were declared to be rebels – and thus distribute their lands as he saw fit. Henry’s officials redrew the political topography of the Boulonnais and leased these lands to his English subjects. While maps are typically seen to have emerged as a tool of English territorial expansion as a result of actions in Ireland and America, they had already played a crucial role in the conquest of the Boulonnais. Henry drew on recent developments in cartography to give a precise definition to the lands he had conquered. English engineers employed the latest geometric methods in map-making to survey the region and provide a linear border with France. In his study of the relationship between cartography and the emergence of the modern state, Michael Biggs notes that ‘as lands were surveyed and mapped, they were reshaped into a territory: a homogeneous and uniform space, demarcated by linear boundaries. The old dynastic realm was transformed into a distinctively new shape, the territorial state.’ While Biggs considers this to be a development of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Henry VIII was already advancing towards this position in the 1540s as a consequence of his move to justify his actions in the Boulonnais by right of conquest rather than through dynastic succession.

While Henry VIII’s conquest of Boulogne played an important role in the re-emergence of English imperialism during the mid-sixteenth century, France has been excluded from the historiography of the early British Empire. English lands on the continent receive no treatment in the *Oxford History of the British Empire* beyond cursory remarks that Calais was the ‘last toehold of the Angevin empire’ and that the loss of Calais spelt the end of ‘England’s medieval empire’ on the continent. Historians tend to consider the manner by which the English crown enlarged its ‘medieval empire’ on the continent as being fundamentally different to its territorial expansion in Britain and Ireland. While R. R. Davies demonstrated that English imperialism – in the sense of the spread of both people and institutions – was a product of the twelfth century, he argues that this process, which he saw as being confined to England’s relations with its island neighbours, came to a halt in the early fourteenth century, when the English monarchy began to put its efforts into pursuing the French throne and when a series of severe famines and then the Black Death reduced the surplus population which had been moving out of England to establish colonies in territories such as Ireland and Wales. In the book of his Ford Lectures, Davies gives the year 1343, when Edward III’s eldest son was made prince of Wales, to mark a convenient conclusion to this first period of imperial expansion. Yet within four years Edward III had captured Calais, expelled the native population and re-peopled it with English settlers, who lived under English laws and customs. While Calais was the most important colony the English monarchy established during the later Middle Ages, it was not the only one. Henry V expelled the population of Harfleur in 1415 and re-peopled it with English settlers; when he returned to conquer Normandy two years later, he targeted a number of key towns lying near to the coast for English settlement. Yet the Hundred Years’ War was not a colonial


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conflict, and – rather than focus on establishing English settlements on the continent – Henry V sought to rule the French people as the rightful king of France. While significant numbers of English came to Normandy in the early fifteenth century, the Lancastrian monarchs did not favour these settlers above their ‘loyal’ French subjects, nor did they attempt to impose English laws or customs on them. Overall, the Lancastrians put the bulk of their efforts into developing a composite dual monarchy rather than seeking to annex continental lands to their English crown.

Henry VIII followed his predecessors’ actions during the early years of his reign, when he repeatedly invaded France in pursuit of his ancestral rights and sought to govern the French people as their rightful ruler. While Henry VIII hoped to be crowned in Paris in 1513, in imitation of his ancestor, Henry VI, he had to make do with the town of Tournai, which he ruled as king of France for five-and-a-half years. While T. F. Mayer claimed that ‘Henry [VIII] developed and successfully tested a complete theory of imperial kingship’ at Tournai in the 1510s, Cliff Davies has convincingly demonstrated that ‘the significance of Tournai lay not in any assimilation of the conquered territory into the English crown; but rather in its very separateness, its status as part of Henry’s dominion as “king of France”’. Henry’s final attempt to win the French throne came with the duke of Suffolk’s march on Paris in 1523, which Steven Gunn has observed was ‘in effect, the last campaign of the Hundred Years War’. Although the Tudor monarch hoped the French people – his subjects, as he saw it – would back his claim to the Valois throne, their support never materialised. While Henry VIII had always been flexible about his claim to the French throne, nonetheless he had given up on his efforts to recreate the


Lancastrian Dual Monarchy by the time he invaded France for the final time in the summer of 1544. The breakdown of the Valois–Habsburg peace in the early 1540s and the restoration of amicable relations between Henry VIII and Charles V led to the invasion of France in 1544. Yet while the Anglo-Imperial agreement of December 1543 stated that the English army would invade Picardy and march on Paris where it would join the emperor (who would attack through Champagne), the Tudor monarch instead decided to focus on a conquest of the Boulonnais. Rather than seek to rule the French people as their legitimate monarch, Henry VIII attached the lands he conquered in France in 1544 to his English kingdom. The colonisation of Boulogne and the Boulonnais was part of a major shift in English attitudes towards France, which in many ways represented a return to the colonial policy employed in Wales during the reign of Edward I, which set a clear precedent for colonial ventures in the sixteenth century, when the Tudor monarchs sought to re-people conquered lands with English settlers to bring the frontiers of the realm more firmly under royal control.

This book also seeks to challenge the view that the break with Rome in the 1530s led the English monarch to become more insular in outlook. A key strand of the historiography of early modern England finds that during the 1530s the Tudor monarchy turned away from pursuing continental aims to focus instead on a ‘British Policy’. P. S. Crowson called the 1544 invasion of France ‘the swansong of the English monarchy’s quasi-chivalric role ... battling out feudal claims in the fields of northern France’, which led to England becoming ‘an island state, detached from Europe, outward-looking and yet defiant of all intruders’. This judgement has been echoed by Mark Fissel, who calls the Boulogne campaign ‘the final chivalric enterprise against France’. According to this view, the conquest of Boulogne was the relic of a medieval dynastic conflict for the throne of France, whereas Tudor actions in Ireland and Scotland during the 1540s represented the return of the English monarchy’s real mission to focus on expansion in Britain and Ireland. For historians such as David Armitage, this apparent move away from the continent to focus on consolidation...