Introduction

Mapping Out the Problem of Practices

This book aims to provide a general analysis of social practices in order to advance our understanding of contemporary practices in international relations. Recently, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has experienced a 'turn' to practice, associated with Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot and inspired by social theorists such as Theodore Schatzki and especially French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.[1] A central premise underlying such sociological investigations is that practices represent doing or actions, including patterned actions carried out by a multitude of agents. In what follows, we do not elaborate on this sociological approach to practices but develop an independent account, a philosophical one, that is fundamentally critical of it. While our account owes much to Herbert L. A. Hart and John Rawls, it is above all indebted to Georg W. F. Hegel, the Hegelian philosopher Michael Oakeshott and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein.[2]

[1] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 [1972]); Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990 [1980]); Pierre Bourdieu, *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998 [1994]); Theodore R. Schatzki, *Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr-Cetina and Eike von Savigny (eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* (London: Routledge, 2001). We examine the practice turn in IR in Chapter 2. Its most prominent proponents are Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot – Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds.), *International Practices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also Peter Jackson, 'Pierre Bourdieu, the "Cultural Turn" and the Practice of International History', *Review of International Studies* 34 (1) 2008: 155–181; and Chris Brown, 'The "Practice Turn", Phronesis and Classical Realism: Towards a Phronetic International Political Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40 (3) 2012: 439–456.

[2] The core texts include G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967 [1821]); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968 [1953]); John Rawls, 'Two Concepts of Rules', *Philosophical*

Although each of these three thinkers considered individually has been discussed within IR, in this study we have reworked and integrated their ideas into a coherent conceptual position for making sense of practices which we call *practice theory*.[3] The theory is expounded in Part I, and Part II extends it to the sphere of international practices, hence the book's title, *Practice Theory and International Relations*.

A Philosophical Account of Practices

In contradistinction to a sociology of practices, we set out to develop a philosophy of practices. The benefits of a philosophical enquiry include conceptual precision, systematicity and open-endedness: conclusions reached are always open to further re-examination. To be sure, there are hazards as well. The greatest one is that the jargon employed by professional philosophers restricts the conversation to other professionals. Many would feel that this charge applies to Hegel, Oakeshott and particularly to Wittgenstein, given his riddle-like writing style. In venturing to translate Hegel's, Oakeshott's and Wittgenstein's insights about social practices to illuminate the puzzle of international practices, we recognise the need to use a vocabulary accessible to the non-specialist. However, in promising to craft arguments in plain English, we do not promise that the journey will be easy. A practice is a complex analytical object with multiple components which defy a neat

Review 64 (1) 1955: 3–32; H. L. A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

[3] For a Hegelian perspective of international relations, see Chris Brown, 'Hegel and International Ethics', *Ethics & International Affairs* 5 (1) 1991: 73–86; and Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). An Oakeshottian reading of international relations is provided in Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). Wittgensteinian readings include Karin M. Fierke, 'Links across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (3) 2002: 331–354; and Karin M. Fierke, 'Wittgenstein and International Relations Theory', in Cerwyn Moore and Chris Farrands (eds.), *International Relations Theory and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 83–94. Wittgenstein's notion of 'grammar' is explored in Véronique Pin-Fat, *Universality, Ethics and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2009), while 'meaning in use' is examined in Antje Wiener, 'Enacting Meaning-in-Use: Qualitative Research on Norms and International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 35 (1) 2009: 175–193.

summary. Clarifying the multidimensional relations between such components in their various aspects requires conceptual synthesis or theory. Inevitably, our exposition contains some repetition. This stems from the fact that the character of a practice cannot be ascertained by enumerating a list of essential features that are defining of it across all contexts; rather, practices have a 'core' of settled meanings and a 'penumbra' (Hart's terms), so it is important to know which contexts belong to the core and which to the penumbra.[4] Part I begins with a simplified account of practices (Chapter 1), is followed by an analysis of what we take to be a defective way of understanding practices (Chapter 2) and culminates in a fully fledged theoretical synthesis or practice theory (Chapter 3).

Let us define some key terminology. It is quite common to think that the term 'practice' refers to *action* (a doing that has an originator or 'agent') and that 'practices' represent different types of action.[5] In our view, this is a grave misconception – we argue that *a* practice (*practices*, in the plural) is not a type of action but an institution which constitutes a meaningful framework for interaction. This institution comprises rules of action as well as usages and understandings requisite for following the rules.[6] Henceforth, the emphasis is on rules of action and not on rules of reasoning, despite the fact that conduct may be and often is predicated on reasoning. The practice theory put forward in this book is a theory of institutions and norms, not of action per se.

The term 'theory' in *practice theory* indicates that we search for conceptual synthesis over and above a taxonomy of practices. Like Oakeshott, we do not distinguish theory from philosophy. For

[4] H. L. A. Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,' *Harvard Law Review* 71 (4) 1958: 593–629, p. 607.

[5] The idea that action is a doing that has an identifiable originator or 'agent' is a standard assumption in the philosophy of action. See, for example, Roger Scruton, *Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 59.

[6] Although we use the term 'institutions' as interchangeable with 'practices' in the sense defined by Oakeshott and Wittgenstein (a *practice* is an intersubjectively grounded, rule-governed domain of activity), there are also important distinctions. In Part I, we modify their views of practices. On 'practices', see Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, pp. 58–68; and Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§7, 202. On 'institutions', see Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §§198–199, 337, 380, 540. Thus by 'institution', we mean a *human* institution and not an abstract procedure for choice aggregation of predefined individual preferences, as in social choice theory.

Oakeshott, philosophy is an activity of 'theorising' directed at the understanding of a not-yet-understood identity. And even though the theorist seeks to arrive at theoretical conclusions – or 'theorems' – by making conceptual distinctions, explicating hidden assumptions and establishing coherence inside a world of ideas, what matters is the activity itself.[7] Wittgenstein likewise says: 'Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity.'[8] Theorising or philosophising in this sense cannot be confined to any single academic discipline.

Our brand of practice theory is interdisciplinary: it traverses the fields of IR, moral, social and political philosophy – the conventional purviews for investigating practices – and in pondering the character of language, rules and meaningful conduct, it engages the philosophy of action.[9] At present, discussions of practices in moral and political philosophy are somewhat strenuously tied to the tradition of 'public reason', descendant from the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, which separate private morality from public or political morality and appeal to impartial procedures for allocation of value that must be justified to all rational participants in the political process.[10] John Rawls's doctrine of political liberalism illustrates this tendency.[11] Rawls argues that given the fact of reasonable pluralism in modern societies expressed in citizens' disagreement about the good, a procedure of 'reasonable overlapping consensus' can

[7] Michael Oakeshott, *Experience and Its Modes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 82; and Michael Oakeshott, 'On the Theoretical Understanding of Human Conduct', in Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, pp. 1–107, esp. pp. 1–18.

[8] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1961), 4.112. The *Tractatus* was originally published in German in 1921 as *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*, and its text is numbered by consecutive paragraphs.

[9] Joseph Raz locates practices in the context of philosophy of action, an approach that shares affinities with ours. See Joseph Raz, *The Practice of Value* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

[10] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1968 [1651]); Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [1797]); Gerald F. Gauss, 'Hobbesian-Inspired Liberalism: Public Reason out of Individual Reason', in Gerald Gauss, *Contemporary Theories of Liberalism* (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 56–82.

[11] John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pbk. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

generate a liberal political constitution acceptable to all citizens.[12] Such views treat social practices as a limiting case for what at bottom are weightier considerations in theorising moral and political life, such as criteria of reasonableness or rules of impartiality.[13] We redirect the discussion away, though not against, this liberal public-reason tradition by elevating practices into a central concern and by reinstating the role of value in a comprehensive, ethical sense that extends beyond the remit of political value. Our argument is grounded in Hegel's view that the identity (ethical status) of self-conscious actors is constituted within social practices. Since, for Hegel, social practices, including the comprehensive practice of the state, are constitutive of identity, they themselves become a source of fundamental value.[14]

The ensuing enquiry does not commence by postulating some set of abstract properties by virtue of which practices can be said to exist. We ask, given that practices exist (in some non-abstract sense yet to be clarified), what is the procedure that an observer must use for *understanding them properly*? Espousing Hegel's assumption of the primacy of self-consciousness, we hold that whatever basic features a practice may have, it must be understood by a self-conscious agent – this leads to the problem of the mode of understanding or interpretation that is appropriate for making sense of practices that one does not yet understand. Typical here is the distinction between practice participants who must gain an understanding of their own practice in order to reproduce

[12] John Rawls develops the idea of reasonable overlapping consensus in *Political Liberalism*, pp. 15, 39 and Lecture IV, §3. Rawls's idea (stripped from the predicate 'reasonable') is the inspiration behind Charles R. Beitz's account of the global practice of rights in *The Idea of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 74–95. Rawls's conception of public reason is largely based on Kant's notion of practical reason (*Political Liberalism*, Lecture III) and Thomas M. Scanlon's contemporary idea of justification in terms of reasons that must be acceptable to everyone. On public reason, see *Political Liberalism*, Lecture VI, §§4, 7, 8 and Rawls's reference to principles of justice 'justifiable to all citizens' (p. 224). Rawls refers (p. xlvi) to T. M. Scanlon, 'Practices and Promises', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 19 (3) 1990: 199–226. The latter is refined in T. M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 7, pp. 295–327.

[13] This is notable in Scanlon's argument in 'Practices and Promises', which is that the moral obligation of promising is grounded *independently* from the social practice of promising. His position is criticised in Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace, 'Promises and Practices Revisited', *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 31 (2) 2003: 119–154.

[14] This is the core argument Hegel develops in his *Philosophy of Right*; see note 2.

it and a third party represented by the figure of the scholar (scientist, analyst) who observes, and in this sense attempts to understand, what practice participants understand themselves to be doing. Practices, that is, are not like chairs or stones; they are literally made of understandings. For this reason, the analysis of practices demands hermeneutic philosophy: the 'science of interpretation'. There are different variants of hermeneutics. Friedrich Schleiermacher, for instance, associates the procedure for interpreting texts with the discovery of original authorial intention.[15] Martin Heidegger, joined by Hans-Georg Gadamer, favours phenomenological hermeneutic, where the phenomenology (lived experiences) of the subject is to be understood by an ultimate appeal to the 'primordial' structures of 'Being'.[16] Such forms of hermeneutic enquiry point to foundations and ontology, whereas we are committed to a non-foundational Hegelian hermeneutic, as an epistemological project. As expressed by Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), the object of philosophical interpretation comprises the intersubjective understandings of agents, sublimated into social rules, practices and institutions. And if these institutions are to be understood properly, as concrete social forms, the philosopher must describe them in concrete terms, by transcending categories that are abstract and invariant.[17]

In this book, we seek to attain a fuller, more coherent understanding of the concrete practices that comprise the realm of international relations today. To this end, the general philosophical analysis of social practices will be brought to bear on the specific problem of international and global practices. As the intention is to contribute to both

[15] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics and Criticism*, trans. and ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1838]). The aim of hermeneutics, according to Schleiermacher, is 'understanding the writer *better* than he understands himself' (p. 228; emphasis added).

[16] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1962); Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

[17] G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 [1807]). In describing the journey of consciousness in *The Phenomenology*, from immediate sense perception all the way to the development of self-consciousness and its expression in public cultural forms ('Spirit'), Hegel remarks that 'consciousness is spirit as *concrete* knowing'. G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 28.

philosophy and IR theory, we construct a philosophically informed practice theory that has relevance for international relations without deriving it from the disciplinary debates within IR. The twentieth-century IR discipline is commonly portrayed as organised around three consecutive 'great debates' – realism versus idealism (1930s and 1940s), history versus science (1960s) and (from the late 1980s onwards) positivism versus post-positivism (post-structuralism, critical theory and constructivism).[18] To these theoretical distinctions are added methodological ones, drawn from the arsenal of social theory: 'power versus norms', 'material factors versus ideas' and 'agents versus structures'. Exponents of the practice turn in IR, whose conception of practices we reject, have employed two vocabularies: (1) Bourdieu's sociology of practice and (2) constructivist IR theory.

The notion of practice has been foreshadowed in the writings of some early IR constructivists. In his 1987 article on the agent-structure debate, Alexander Wendt claimed that practices constitute the missing nexus between agents and structures.[19] Social structures, Wendt writes, do not exist independently from the activities they govern: they are not reified things that stand apart from the agents.[20] Here, 'practices' are interactions that have a discursive dimension and reflect

[18] We follow Lapid's presentation of the third debate. Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (3) 1989: 235–254. Some prefer an alternative categorisation of four debates, where the third debate is realism/pluralism/globalism and the fourth debate (Lapid's third debate) is positivism/post-positivism. This alternative account is found in part 2 ('Legacies') of Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a recent assessment of the 'great debates' in IR, see Ole Wæver, 'Still a Discipline after All These Debates?', in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 297–318; and Brian C. Schmidt, 'On the History and Historiography of International Relations', in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: Sage 2013), pp. 3–28.

[19] Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization* 41 (3) 1987: 335–370, esp. 358–359.

[20] Wendt draws on Roy Bhaskar's argument in *The Possibility of Naturalism* (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979), pp. 48–49. However, while both Wendt and Bhaskar begin by recognising the meaningfulness of social structures, they ultimately explain their efficacy in the causal terms of scientific realist theory. We discuss the tension between scientific realism and practice theory in the concluding chapter.

agents' self-understandings. Invoking this early constructivist argument, leading figures in the recent 'turn' to practice, Adler and Pouliot, followed by Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, have contended that practices form an ontology that can bridge the material-ideational and agential-structural divides in IR.[21] One drawback of such talk of 'ontology' and 'agents/structures' is that without further qualification, it remains too abstract to be analytically helpful.[22]

A separate group of Wittgensteinian IR constructivists have linked the concept of practices to Wittgenstein's later philosophy in the aftermath of the linguistic turn.[23] In *World of Our Making*, the book which introduced constructivism to IR, Nicholas Onuf argues that people make society and society makes people via the mediation of linguistically grounded social conventions.[24] The book opens with Goethe's aphorism, 'In the beginning was the deed', quoted by Wittgenstein.[25] It captures the spirit of Wittgenstein's mature conception of language as a rule-governed social activity or practice that was responsible for

[21] Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, 'International Practices: Introduction and Framework', in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (eds.), *International Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1–35; Vincent Pouliot and Frédéric Mérand, 'Bourdieu's Concepts', in Rebecca Adler-Nissen (ed.), *Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR* (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 24–44, p. 30; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, 'The Play of International Practice', *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (3) 2015: 449–460, p. 453.

[22] Our argument prioritises the category of understanding and, as such, is epistemological. Whenever possible, instead of *labelling* a given position 'ontological' or 'epistemological', we have striven to explicate the *argument(s)* it contains.

[23] See Michael Dummett, 'The Linguistic Turn', in Michael Dummet, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, reprint ed. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014 [1993]), pp. 5–14, p. 6. Dummett associates the linguistic turn with Frege and Frege's 'contextual principle', stating that a word has meaning only within the context of a sentence. Gottlob Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: Eine Logisch Mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl* (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1884), §62. See also Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). In Rorty's view, the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy conveys the idea that philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved by turning to language.

[24] Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 35, 46.

[25] Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness', trans. Peter Winch, *Philosophia* 6 (3) and (4) 1976: 409–425, p. 420, quoted in Onuf, *World of Our Making*, p. 36.

the demise of his former view of language as a structure mirrored in the propositions of logic. On Onuf's reading, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language created a space for a social theory of practices (conventions), but it never produced such a theory.[26] An adequate social theory must show how agents, by participating in social conventions, generate asymmetric relations of advantage and disadvantage which implicate issues of legitimacy and authority.[27] In spite of his groundbreaking insight that speaking a language is a social practice, therefore, Wittgenstein must be considered a false beginning for constructivist social theory – both in IR and outside it. IR constructivist Karin Fierke has objected to this reading: Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, through its concepts of 'language-games' and 'rule following', enables us to make sense of social reality, including that of international relations.[28] A language-game is a human institution ('a practice', in our terms) constituted by rules. In the activity of rule-following, rules provide reasons for action. Such reasons are not mechanical causes, nor are they private motives hidden in the head of the individual; the acts of giving reasons and responding to reasons are carried out in a public language.[29] What a Wittgensteinian perspective discloses is that the world of international relations is a social world, constituted by language – by claims and counterclaims that are intelligible even amongst adversaries.

Naturally, such Wittgenstein themes are appealing to us. Nonetheless, IR theorists and, to a degree, contemporary philosophers have tended to regard the category of a social practice as intuitively transparent.[30] As a result, this category has seldom been problematised. Our theory of practices maps out such a problematic of practices by treading in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, Oakeshott and Hegel. The theory is predicated on Hegel's hermeneutic and structured around three central philosophical puzzles that occupied Wittgenstein and Oakeshott: (1) *rule-following*, as inscribed within social practices;

[26] Onuf, *World of Our Making*, pp. 44, 49.
[27] Onuf, *World of Our Making*, pp. 21–22.
[28] Fierke, 'Wittgenstein and International Relations Theory', pp. 87–88. Fierke's view is indebted to Baker and Hacker's reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following argument. G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), esp. p. 160.
[29] Fierke, 'Wittgenstein and International Relations Theory', pp. 86–87, 93–94.
[30] See note 12 on public reason.

(2) *descriptivism*; and (3) *internalism*. While descriptivism, seen as the converse of prescriptivism, is a straightforward view, rule-following and internalism (and their connection) have been the subjects of controversy.[31] Commentators have disputed whether by 'following a rule' Wittgenstein meant that a single individual can use a given rule as a guide for conduct in utter isolation from others on repeated occasions, or, conversely, whether a prior community agreement is necessary to determine what counts as following a rule in each case.[32] Wittgenstein and Oakeshott were also interested in the nature of the relation between knowing how to follow a rule and a proposition that expresses the rule. For Oakeshott, in expressing the rule, the proposition removes certain aspects of know-how which one has learned in using the rule: such aspects of actual rule use cannot be stated in the rule itself.[33] Wittgenstein similarly doubted that a rule, once formulated, can determine its own application for all future instances – a rule of this sort would be an oddity; it would look like rails extending to infinity.[34] Thus he concluded that 'obeying a rule is *a practice*'.[35] Part of our undertaking is to elucidate such troublesome philosophical questions.

Turning to IR, our central thesis is that those currently debating the character of social practices are prone to conflate the category of action

[31] Prescription is a rule telling the agents what they ought to do. A now classic study of the language of prescriptions is R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).

[32] Instructive here is the debate between two groups of Wittgenstein interpreters. Baker and Hacker make a case for the so-called 'regularity view', which holds that a rule is meant to guide the actions of a solitary individual on a regular number of occasions: 'The concept of following a rule is here linked with the concept of regularity, not with the concept of a community of rule-followers.' Baker and Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity*, p. 140. Malcolm defends a 'social practice view' (sometimes called the 'community view'), stipulating that rule-following presupposes a community of language users or language as a social practice. Norman Malcolm, *Nothing Is Hidden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) and 'Wittgenstein on Language and Rules', *Philosophy* 64 (247) 1989: 5–28, esp. p. 16. In this book, we follow Malcolm's reading.

[33] Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, pp. 68, 90–91. See also Oakeshott's early works, 'The Tower of Babel' (1948), in Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, new expanded ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991 [1962]), pp. 465–487, esp. pp. 478–480; Oakeshott (1950), 'Rational Conduct', in Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, pp. 99–131, p. 128.

[34] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §218.

[35] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §202, emphasis added.