

Introduction

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When Japanese consular police in Shanghai discovered Ogura Nobu in September 1929, she was on the ferry *Nagasaki-maru*, just arriving from Kobe via Nagasaki. She was trying to continue southward toward Gaoshan, a town in Fuqing, a remote county in coastal Fujian Province, south of the treaty port of Fuzhou. Dressed as a Chinese and pretending to speak no Japanese, Ogura claimed she was Chen Wusong, the wife of her traveling companion Chen Zhaopin, a cloth peddler from Fuqing. Suspicious, the officials separated her from Chen, interrogated her, and got her to reveal her true name. Ogura (age 28) stated that she and Chen (age 27) had married the previous April in her hometown in Chiba Prefecture and that her parents had approved the marriage on condition that the couple not move to China. But then Chen's parents contacted them and asked to meet his new wife, so they decided to go for a three-month visit.

The officers detained Ogura at the Japanese Consulate and warned her of the dangers she faced, of the fates of women who had been taken to Fuqing, from where many peddlers originated, only to endure harsh abuse or enslavement from which escape was virtually impossible. Only two months earlier, they told her, consular police and Chinese armed forces had mounted a major "rescue operation" in the region. Ogura, however, rebuffed their warnings, stating that she was traveling with her family's permission and pleading with them to let her continue on her journey. But despite her vociferous remonstrations, consular officials put Ogura on a ship two days later and sent her back to Kobe, while authorities in Japan circulated mug shots of Chen, affixed to a report titled "Re: Chinese abductor of Japanese woman," and recommended that he be prohibited from ever reentering the country.

On the return trip, Ogura told harbor police in Kobe that she felt perfectly safe traveling to China because her aunt had married a Fujianese trader and was now living happily in Shanghai, and that Chen planned eventually to set up shop there as well. (These claims may have been a script the couple had rehearsed; given that Ogura had

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also tried to pass as Chinese, they appear to have prepared for multiple contingencies. In fact, when they departed Kobe, Chen had told dubious inspectors that he and his wife had married ten years earlier in their native village before migrating to Japan.) A subsequent report from the Chiba governor's office indicated that Ogura had previously eloped to Tokyo with a local shop clerk, with whom she had a daughter, only to return to her village and separate from him. She was renting a house and taking in sewing piecework to make ends meet when she met Chen, and the two eventually became lovers. Her parents opposed the relationship and sent her to live in a different village (the family were a respectable sort), but Chen pursued her there and the couple departed together for China (without her daughter Kimie, about whom we have no information). Ogura, officials reported, was determined to get to Fuqing.

Three months later, police officers attached to the Japanese consulate in Fuzhou reported that Ogura was residing in Chen's village of Nanshi, that she had chosen to move there even after having read newspaper reports about women abducted to Fuqing, and that she had no plans to return to Japan in the foreseeable future. And four years after that, they reported that Ogura had exited Fuqing and returned to Japan, without citing the reasons for her departure. As she moved about the region, Ogura Nobu clearly did not conform to social and political expectations: in choosing to depart or stay and to love or leave, she challenged and negotiated the various structures, from parental authority to community customs in multiple locations to state power and media discourses, that constrained her agency.¹ But as the border encounters and consular police reports demonstrate, her movements themselves also enabled the operations of those forces, creating moments of connection and separation that gave new shape to Japan and East Asia.

The case of Ogura Nobu and Chen Zhaopin is one of many that this book uses to bring into view the histories of people who moved, the relationships they created, and the anxieties they provoked in the spatial and social borderlands between Japan and China from the 1860s to the

¹ For documents relating to Ogura Nobu and Chen Zhaopin: Shanghai Consul General Shigemitsu to Foreign Minister Shidehara, September 16, 1929; Hyōgo Prefecture Governor Takahashi to Home Minister Adachi, Foreign Minister Shidehara et al., September 17, 1929; Fukuoka Prefecture Governor Matsumoto to Home Minister Adachi, Foreign Minister Shidehara et al., September 17, 1929; Chiba Prefecture Governor Gotō to Home Minister Adachi, Foreign Minister Shidehara et al., September 26, 1929; Nagasaki Prefecture Governor Itō to Home Minister Adachi, Foreign Minister Shidehara et al., October 16, 1929; Fuzhou Consul General Tamura to Foreign Minister Shidehara, January 9, 1930; and report by Foreign Ministry Police Officer Matsumoto Shigeru et al., June 14, 1934, all in *Zaigai hiyūkai fujoshi kyūshutsu kankei zakken*, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (hereafter DAMFAJ) K.3.4.2.3.

1940s. *Japan's Imperial Underworlds* considers how Japan's imbrication in new geopolitical structures and spatial flows engendered forms of intimacy that were seen as problematic, or even horrific, because they transgressed notions of territory marked by stable, defensible borders and notions of place marked by distinct identities and social roles. Yet rather than see those borders and roles as already established and thus violated, this book uses cases of transgressive intimacy to highlight the ways in which territoriality and spatial imaginaries were being articulated in the imperial era. *Japan's Imperial Underworlds* excavates long-forgotten histories of child trafficking, ethnic intermarriage and marriage migration, travel and adventure writing, and piracy to bring into stark relief the subaltern geographies and media discourses that shaped Japan's imperial world. It shows how mobile subjects in marginal locations not only destabilized official projects for the regulation of territory and the policing of underworlds, but also stimulated fantasies that opened new spaces for the elaboration of imperial power in its material and discursive forms.

Japan's Imperial Underworlds offers new perspectives on the evolving history of relations between Japan and China during an era marked by the destabilization of the Sinocentric regional order and then decades of informal and formal imperialism first punctuated and then consumed by warfare.² Yet while I refer to important developments including the 1871 Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War and cessation of Taiwan, the 1919 May Fourth Movement and subsequent anti-Japanese boycotts, the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and the outbreak of all-out war in July 1937, my purpose is not to rehearse the grand narrative of Sino-Japanese political, diplomatic, and military history. Rather, this book uses ground-level encounters between ordinary Japanese and Chinese from the 1870s to the 1940s to depict engagements

² For recent work in Japanese, see, e.g., Matsuura Masataka, "*Dai Tō-A Sensō*" *wa naze okita no ka: han-Ajia shugi no seiji keizai shi* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2014), and the extensive list of sources cited therein. For recent work in English, see, e.g., Joshua A. Fogel, *Maiden Voyage: The Senzaimaru and the Creation of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Michael Schiltz, *The Money Doctors from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1895–1937* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012); Paula S. Harrell, *Asia for the Asians: China in the Lives of Five Meiji Japanese* (Portland, ME: MerwinAsia, 2012); Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009); Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931–1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See also Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and the War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); and *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

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with the Sinosphere as a fragmented series of landscapes of fear and desire.

I use the term Sinosphere to designate a system of flows of people and things on which China exercised a gravitational pull, but which were not necessarily controlled by a political entity or sovereign state called China. This approach imbues this spatial conception with a greater longevity than that ascribed to it in many studies of modern Japanese history.³ Historians of the Sinocentric East Asian regional order have shown how it was constituted through an evolving series of center–periphery relations, in which relationships among the various peripheries also affected the overall dynamics of the system. Tribute trade and diplomacy between the “civilized” center and “barbarian” peripheries served as principal integuments, but as Hamashita Takeshi has shown, changes in economic conditions and state policies during the Qing era (1644–1911) led to the expansion of private trade through overseas Chinese networks that eventually displaced tribute trade as the main form of circulation. As this process unfolded, the introduction of Western imperial power and systems of international law in the nineteenth century permitted states on the Qing periphery, particularly Japan and Vietnam, to challenge Qing suzerainty.⁴ Reflecting on the long span of Sino-Japanese relations, Joshua Fogel suggests that the Sinosphere lost much of its power “as an operative worldview” in the mid-nineteenth century and “became a distant memory at best” after the Japanese victory in the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War radically altered the nature of bilateral relations between China and Japan.⁵

³ For a related view: Ueda Takako, “Chūka teikoku no yōkai to Nihon teikoku no bōkkō,” in *Teikoku igo no hito no idō: posutokoroniarizumu to gurōbarizumu no kōsaten*, ed. Araragi Shinzō (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2013), 46–55.

⁴ Hamashita Takeshi, *Chōkō shisutemu to kindai Ajia* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013); Takeshi Hamashita, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Linda Grove and Mark Selden (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁵ Joshua A. Fogel, *Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4–6. On new academic emphasis on the Sinosphere following more compartmentalized studies, see Joshua Fogel, “East Asia, Then and Now,” paper presented at Leiden University, June 8, 2017. The “rise of China” since the 1990s, combined with the ongoing crisis of capitalism under US hegemony, has also led to significant scholarly interest in the possibilities of using China’s historical regional practices to think about the future of the global order. See, e.g., Giovanni Arrighi, *Adam Smith in Beijing* (London and New York: Verso, 2008), esp. 314–78; and David Kang, *East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). For critical reviews/symposia, see, e.g., *Journal of World-Systems Research* 15, no. 2 (2009) on Arrighi, and *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 77, no. 1 (2017), on Kang; and see Peter C. Perdue, “The Tenacious Tributary System,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 96 (2015): 1102–14.

While the rise of Japanese imperialism in the late nineteenth century certainly broke down any notion of Japan being in China's political or diplomatic (or, at the popular level, cultural) orbit, the networks of the late imperial Sinocentric economy had actually extended into Japan after the "opening" of that country in the 1850s. Indeed, one of the main premises of this book is that the "opening" of Japan was as much a reopening to the Sinosphere as it was an accommodation to Euro-American imperialism. Overseas Chinese trading networks played crucial roles in the elaboration of European colonial infrastructures in Southeast Asia; similarly, the opening of treaty ports in China following the first and second Opium Wars permitted the extension of these networks, which by the 1860s came to include Chinese traders now based in Japan's new treaty ports. Economic historians have shown, for example, how Kobe's economy became linked to a network centered in Shanghai, and have pointed out that Meiji Japan's trade and industrialization efforts flowed in no small part in directions shaped by Chinese control over much of the circulation of goods in the region.⁶ Moreover, until 1894, Japan occupied a relatively weak position vis-à-vis the Qing Empire in the emerging international order.

Meanwhile, some 15 centuries of encounters with and discourses about China continued to shape Japanese imaginings of the region, including the imperialist drive to replace China as the center of a reconfigured regional system.⁷ Stefan Tanaka, Harry Harootunian, and others have

⁶ Carl A. Trocki, "Chinese Revenue Farms and Borders in Southeast Asia," *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 1 (2009): 335–62; Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang, eds., *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Kagotani Naoto, *Ajia kokusai tsūshō chitsujō to kindai Nihon* (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2000); Furuta Kazuko, "Shanghai nettowaaku no naka no Kobe," in *Nenpō kindai Nihon kenkyū 14: Meiji Ishin no kakushin to renzoku: seiji, shisō jōkyō to shakai keizai*, ed. Kindai Nihon Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992), 203–26; Hamashita, *China, East Asia and the Global Economy*; and Hiroshi Shimizu and Hitoshi Hirakawa, *Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan's Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870–1965* (London: Routledge, 1999), esp. chapter 3. These processes differ from, but connect to, the transpacific emergence of what Robert Chao Romero, has called a "transnational Chinese orbit" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Robert Chao Romero, *The Chinese in Mexico, 1882–1940* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010). See also Kornel S. Chang, *Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

⁷ On these long-term encounters and discourses, see, e.g., David Pollack, *The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Marius B. Jansen, *China in the Tokugawa World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Harry D. Harootunian, "The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought," in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 9–36; Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Atsuko Sakaki, *Obsessions with the Sino-Japanese Polarity in Japanese Literature* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii

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elucidated the processes through which intellectuals from the late Tokugawa period to the early twentieth century worked to depose China from its place as *Chūgoku*, the center of civilization, and reframe it as *Shina*, an example of historical decline and ruin that Japan should avoid and against which it could posit its own superior, civilized qualities, thereby justifying Japanese projects for appropriating Chinese space and resources and asserting Japanese primacy in the modern regional order. This discourse traveled easily into the realm of journalism and popular history writing, and by the second decade of the twentieth century had become standard fare in government-edited school textbooks. Kawamura Minato has also identified a “popular Orientalism” that in the early twentieth century enabled Japanese readers to see other Asians as uncivilized “natives” (domin/dojin) or “savages” (banjin) against whom they could differentiate their “civilized” selves.⁸ Yet as the cases in this book demonstrate, this project of decentering China, not only geopolitically but also in terms of cultural and ethno-racial hierarchies, was always at best incomplete.

Throughout, I emphasize that for the people who lived it, the Japanese nation-empire was one of several overlapping spatial formations that emerged from modern Japan's relations with a region in which the historically central Chinese presence continued to loom large. The gravitational fields of the Sinosphere were constituted differently and exercised different strengths and impacts at different scales, attention to each of which helps us to expand our understanding of the history of this era. The following chapters demonstrate ways in which ordinary Japanese and state agents engaged with Chinese migration and trade networks, negotiated relationships on the Chinese mainland or in the social spaces emanating from it, and fantasized about the romance, adventure, and dangers to be encountered by those who entered the Chinese world.

Press, 2006). Taking a long temporal perspective, Sakaki has examined what she calls a persistent “desire to propose and/or authenticate the binary between” (p. 2) imagined Chinese/ness and Japanese/ness, categories that were contingently constructed and reconstructed. Of particular interest in relation to this study is Sakaki's focus on “gender as an inevitable factor in the formation and transformation of the Sino-Japanese dyad” (p. 15).

⁸ Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*; Harootunian, “The Functions of China in Tokugawa Thought”; Hashikawa Bunsō, “Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Coprosperity,” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 328–55; Kawamura Minato, “Taishū Orientarizumu to Ajia ninshiki,” in *Bunka no naka no shokuminchi*, vol. 7 of *Iwanami kōza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, eds. Ōe Shinobu, Asada Kyōji, Mitani Taiichirō, Gotō Kenichi, Kobayashi Hideo, Takasaki Sōji, Wakabayashi Masatake, and Kawamura Minato (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993), 107–36; and Kawamura Minato, “Popular Orientalism and Japanese Views of Asia,” trans. Kota Inoue and Helen J. S. Lee, in *Reading Colonial Japan: Text, Context, and Critique*, ed. Michele M. Mason and Helen J. S. Lee (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 271–98.

Chinese in Japan and Japanese in South China

Many of these experiences were contingent on Chinese migration to Japan, which grew dramatically after the implementation of the 1858 Ansei Treaties with the Euro-American powers (the so-called unequal treaties) and the opening of the treaty ports at Nagasaki, Yokohama, Kobe, Hakodate, and Niigata (the latter two under the terms of the Japan–US Treaty of Peace and Amity), as well as the foreign concessions in Tokyo and Osaka. Historical scholarship on the Chinese in Japan has focused largely on the emergence of Chinatowns/communities in the treaty ports, on the economic networks of the overseas Chinese, and on the activities of overseas Chinese students in the decades after the first Sino-Japanese War.⁹ A few works have examined the situation of unskilled laborers in Yokohama and Tokyo, where anxieties surrounding their presence led to the murder of nearly 700 Chinese and the wounding of almost 100 more, more than half of them in the Tokyo working-class neighborhood of Ōshima-chō (in present-day Kōtō Ward), in the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake in September 1923. Many of them were “mistakenly” identified as Koreans, Japan’s “recalcitrant” (*futei*) colonial subjects who were victims of rumor-mongering and even more extensive pogroms during the chaos; but Japanese laborers’ fears about the presence of low-wage competitors in a time of economic instability no doubt fueled the attacks.¹⁰ (At their prewar peak in 1940, the Chinese in

⁹ I will refer to specific Japanese scholarship throughout the chapters. In English, Eric Han’s recent study of Yokohama’s Chinatown analyses the complexities of identity formation over more than a century marked by regional wars, revolution, national partition, and globalization. Eric C. Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown: Yokohama, 1894–1972* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2014). See also Timothy Yun Hui Tsu, “Japan’s Yellow Peril: The Chinese in Imperial Japan and Colonial Korea,” *Japanese Studies* 30, no. 2 (2010): 161–83. Brief essays by Andrea Vashisth, Noriko Kamachi, and J. E. Hoare remain frequently cited but regrettably limited. Andrea Vashisth, “A Model Minority: The Chinese Community in Japan,” in *Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*, ed. Michael Weiner (New York: Routledge, 1997), 108–39; Noriko Kamachi, “The Chinese in Meiji Japan: Their Interaction with the Japanese before the Sino-Japanese War,” in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 58–73; J. E. Hoare, “The Chinese in the Japanese Treaty Ports, 1858–1899: The Unknown Majority,” *Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies* 2 (1977): 18–33. See also Joan Judge, “Talent, Virtue, and the Nation: Chinese Nationalisms and Female Subjectivities in the Early Twentieth Century,” *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (2001): 765–803. On general histories of Chinese emigration/diaspora, see, e.g., Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009); Wang Gungwu, *The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); and Adam McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 58, no. 2 (1999): pp. 306–37.

¹⁰ See especially Niki Fumiko, *Shinsaika no Chūgokujin gyakusatsu* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1993); Yamawaki Keizō, *Kindai Nihon to gaikokujin rōdōsha: 1890-nendai kōhan to 1920-*

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Japan numbered fewer than 40,000, less than one-twentieth of the Korean population in that year.) Meanwhile, along with a growing interest in Chinese food, the Japanese press had since the early Meiji era promoted a discourse on Chinese criminality well out of proportion to the incidence of actual Chinese misbehavior. The Chinese who continued to reside in Japan, as well as those who continued to come, had to find ways to exist in a society marked by these divisions, even as they embodied them in their daily movements across Japanese space.

Following the revision of the unequal treaties and abolition of extra-territoriality in 1899, the Japanese government, fearing the influx of low-wage Chinese workers, had imposed restrictions preventing most Chinese laborers from moving beyond the former treaty ports and concessions. But these immigration orders did permit the entry of itinerant peddlers, provided that they registered with the police in their various destinations.¹¹ These peddlers, like Ogura Nobu's husband Chen Zhaopin, engaged in what has been called low-end globalization: "the transnational flow of people and goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, sometimes semilegal or illegal, transactions commonly associated with 'the developing world'."¹² They constitute key actors in my study, for their transgressive mobility enabled that of many of the Japanese who appear in this book. With only a few exceptions, however, scholars have largely neglected the experiences of Japanese who entered these Chinese migrant networks, and the intimate, visceral moments of "sharing and exchange" as well as "tension, friction, and even hostility and anger" that these translocal encounters engendered.¹³ *Japan's Imperial Underworlds* opens new ground in identifying such

nendai zenhan ni okeru Chūgokujin, Chōsenjin rōdōsha mondai (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1994); Ōsato Hiroaki, "Zainichi Chūgokujin rōdōsha, gyōshōnin: senzen no keisatsu shiryō ni miru," in *Chūgoku minshūshi e no shiza: Shin Shinorōji hen*, ed. Kanagawa Daigaku Chūgokugo Gakka (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1998), 203–35; and Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown*. On the massacre of Koreans, see, e.g., Sonia Ryang, "The Great Kanto Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans in 1923: Notes on Japan's Modern National Sovereignty," *Anthropological Quarterly* 76, no. 4 (2003): 731–48; and Michael Weiner, *The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910–1923* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).

¹¹ Ōsato, "Zainichi Chūgokujin rōdōsha, gyōshōnin"; Yamawaki, *Kindai Nihon to gaikokujin rōdōsha*; Kyo Shukushin, "Nihon ni okeru rōdō imin kinshi hō no seiritsu: chokurei dai 352 gō o megutte," in *Higashi Ajia no hō to shakai: Nunome Chōfū Hakase koki kinen ronshū*, edited by Nunome Chōfū Hakase kinen ronshū Kankōkai Henshū Inkai (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1990), 553–80. In English, see Tsu, "Japan's Yellow Peril."

¹² Gordon Mathews, *Ghetto at the Center of the World: Chungking Mansions, Hong Kong* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 19–20.

¹³ Kevin Dunn, "Embodied Transnationalism: Bodies in Transnational Spaces," *Population, Space and Place* 16, no. 1 (2010): 6. For examples of scholarship that has addressed these encounters and relationships: Iwakabe Yoshimitsu, "Nihonjin josei no tai Shinkokujin kon'in keitai to shijo shūseki mondai ni tsuite: Nisshin senchū sengo

interactions and their ramifications for larger questions of Sino-Japanese relations and the shifting composition of East Asian space. Doing so involves attention not only to Chinese within Japan, but also to the movements of Chinese and their Japanese intimates between Japan, its colonial sphere, and the Chinese mainland.

In particular, my study follows mobile Japanese into South China, especially Fujian and Guangdong Provinces, as well as into the littoral spaces of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and northern Indochina and the Gulf of Tonkin. Despite its strategic significance, this region has been largely eclipsed in the literature on Japan's engagements with East Asia by the voluminous work on Manchuria and northern China.¹⁴

Japanese interest in South China as both a strategic foothold and a field of economic activity emerged shortly after the Meiji Restoration and grew rapidly in the late Meiji years. Japanese forces had briefly invaded Taiwan in 1874 as part of an effort to colonize the island. Although the Qing government responded by making Taiwan a province of China (it had previously been a prefecture within Fujian Province) and taking new measures to pacify its indigenous population and urbanize and develop its economy, the Qing defeat in the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War led to Taiwan's becoming a Japanese colony. Japanese colonial officials and their supporters in Tokyo quickly sought to extend their control to Fujian (partly through an abortive invasion plan in 1900), and made repeated efforts to ensure that China did not cede any part of the province to another foreign power. South Chinese treaty ports were the sites of energetic anti-Japanese boycotts during and after the 1919 May Fourth Movement: violent clashes with Japanese nationals in Fuzhou in 1919 led to the deaths of several Chinese students and the landing of Japanese marines, and the Cantonese port of Shantou came to be known as a particular hotbed of anti-Japanese agitation.¹⁵ Concerns with piracy in

o chūshin ni," *Kanagawa Kenritsu Hakubutsukan kenkyū hōkoku: jūbun kagaku* 13 (1987): 1–15; Han, *Rise of a Japanese Chinatown*. For an essay emphasizing the need for research on such interactions and coexistence, see Timothy Yun Hui Tsu, "Miidasu, kanren saseru, orikomu: Nihon no Chūgoku imin to shogaikokujin komyunetii no shiteki kenkyū," *Kaikō toshi kenkyū* 5 (2010): 133–44.

¹⁴ Matsuura Masataka makes this point most forcefully: Matsuura Masataka, "Joshō: kadai to shikaku," in *Shōwa – Ajia shugi no jitsuzō: teikoku Nihon to Taiwan, 'Nan'yō,' 'Minami Shina,'* ed. Matsuura Masataka (Tokyo: Minerubua Shobō, 2007), 1. For a discussion of what constitutes South China, see Yoshikai Masato, "Rekishigakusha to 'Minami Shina,'" in *Shōwa – Ajia shugi no jitsuzō*, 75, n.32.

¹⁵ On these developments: Robert Eskildsen, "Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan's 1874 Expedition to Taiwan," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (2002): 388–418; Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); W. G. Beasley, *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–95* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 75–76, 108–15; Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen* (Cambridge:

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the borderlands of the Taiwan Strait and further southwest marked the thinking of Japanese military officers based in Taiwan, and of the police officials of the colonial government-general who sought to extend their authority over a large swath of the south Chinese coast in order to promote the colony's security. And in the years from the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 to the outbreak of all-out war in July 1937, Japanese agents, operating under the slogan of "Greater Asianism," initiated a variety of overt and covert operations in pursuit of the strategy of southern advance (*nanshin*), with Taiwan as their main base.¹⁶

If studies of the political and economic history of Japan's engagements with South China have been relatively limited, so have treatments of the social history. A number of scholars have highlighted the role of so-called Taiwan *sekimin*, either Taiwanese on the mainland who as colonial subjects were legally Japanese nationals or mainland Fujianese who adopted Japanese nationality and used it to take advantage of extraterritorial privileges in Xiamen, Fuzhou, and other treaty ports. Their activities ranged from legitimate businesses to smuggling and narcotics and sex trafficking. Taken together, these enterprises strengthened transnational networks in the region, thereby generating profits for participants who defied or manipulated borderlines, compelling the Chinese Republic to step up its efforts to secure its claims of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, and creating opportunities for Japanese imperial expansion across South China and Southeast Asia.¹⁷

Harvard University Press, 1954), 99–104; Yasuoka Akio, *Meiji zenki Nisshin kōshōshi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1995), 193–221; Lin-Yi Tseng, "A Cross-Boundary People: The Commercial Activities, Social Networks, and Travel Writings of Japanese and Taiwanese Sekimin in the Shantou Treaty Port (1895–1937)," Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 2014.

¹⁶ Matsuoka, "Dai Tō-A Sensō" wa naze okita ka; Matsuoka, ed., *Shōwa – Ajia shugi no jitsuzō*; Adam Schneider, "The Taiwan Government-General and Prewar Japanese Economic Expansion in South-China and Southeast Asia, 1900–1936," in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: Iudicium-Verl., 1998), 161–82; Ken'ichi Goto, "Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan," *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (2004): 15–44. As I discuss below, pirates remain understudied; Chapters 3 and 4 of this book are an effort to address that neglected topic.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and the War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); Barbara J. Brooks, "Japanese colonial citizenship in treaty port China: the location of Koreans and Taiwanese in the imperial order," in *New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953*, ed. Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 109–24; Lian Huahuan, "Taiwan Sōtokufu no taigan seisaku to 'Taiwan Sekimin'," in *Bōchō suru teikoku no jinryū*, Vol. 5 of *Iwanami kōza Nihon shokuminchi*, ed. Ōe Shinobu et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), 77–100; and Nakamura Takashi, "'Taiwan Sekimin' o meguru shomondai," *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (1980): 422–45. See also Philip Thai, *China's War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life, and the Making of the Modern State, 1842–1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).