

## Introduction

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μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξεύρημα εὕρηται ἐς τὸν βίον μνάμα καὶ  
 ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν.

The greatest and finest discovery to be found for life is memory; it is  
 useful for all purposes, for inquiry and wisdom.

This celebration of memory, which opens the final section of the anonymous Greek treatise known as *Dissoi Logoi* (*Contrasting Arguments*),<sup>1</sup> finds an echo in numerous other texts, both ancient and modern. Nowadays it is widely agreed that memory not only is a cognitive faculty fundamental for the acquisition, retention, organisation and transmission of information, but is also essential to our self-definition as individuals, to direct our actions and shape our experiences and feelings in our everyday life, just as it is essential to the identity, functioning and decision-making of larger groups and communities. Indeed, memory, as a way to locate ourselves within the world, as individuals or communities, is central to our human existence: deprived of memory, as individuals we lose not only a fundamental share of our knowledge of the world, but also our sense of self; and without shared memories a society loses its unity and coherence in time. And yet, the term ‘memory’ is used in such a variety of ways and in such a wide range of contexts that defining what it refers to is not easy: ‘memory eludes our attempts at understanding it’.<sup>2</sup>

Because of the significance, breadth and elusiveness of the concept of memory, it is not surprising that since antiquity human beings have reflected upon, and debated, the sources, nature, functioning, uses, powers and limitations of memory. Close examination of different theories of memory, whether explicit or implicitly manifested in different usages of the

<sup>1</sup> *Dissoi logoi* 9.1. On the treatise, whose date is uncertain (see the cautious position of Burnyeat 1998), see Becker and Scholz 2004, who favour a late fifth century BC date, and the discussion (with further references) in Sassi’s chapter in this volume, pp. 346–8.

<sup>2</sup> Nikulin 2015: 4.

vocabulary of memory and in different ‘memory practices’, can reveal fundamentally diverse conceptions of human psychology, the relation between human nature and the divine, and the way in which human beings, as individuals and societies, construct and preserve their knowledge, identities and interactions through time. The picture is complicated by the fact that, with the increasing specialisation of distinct and ever-narrowing areas of research, memory has featured more and more as a separate object of study in a number of different disciplines: literature and literary criticism, rhetoric, history and historiography, philosophy, pedagogy, cognitive and clinical psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, political theory, to mention only the most important. This vast multi-disciplinary attention towards memory has expanded and enriched our understanding of the breadth and complexity of the phenomenon; it has not consistently led, however, to sustained inter-disciplinary approaches to the study of memory.<sup>3</sup>

The present collection of studies exploring ancient Greek theories and practices of memory spans a variety of literary genres, and a number of what were recognised in antiquity, or would later be recognised, as distinct disciplines. We hope that the analysis of how different approaches to memory co-existed, developed and cross-fertilised across the centuries within the same broad cultural tradition can exemplify the fruitfulness of an approach to the study of memory that crosses disciplinary boundaries.

Over the last few decades the surge of new research and publications on memory across all the disciplines mentioned above has been accompanied by an effort to distinguish and catalogue the variety of ways in which we talk of memory in different contexts, and the many different ‘types’ or ‘kinds’ of memory corresponding to them.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the taxonomy of *memories*, rather than the inquiry into memory as a monolithic phenomenon, is often the focus in recent studies. Without trying to approximate the exhaustiveness of the list presented in the appendix of Tulving’s playful article ‘Are There 256 Different Kinds of Memory?’,<sup>5</sup> it will be useful to introduce some key distinctions made in these taxonomies.<sup>6</sup> The first of

<sup>3</sup> For an ambitious manifesto of ‘memory studies’ as a properly inter-disciplinary field, see Roediger and Wertsch 2008.

<sup>4</sup> This systematising effort is reflected, for example, in the recent publication of a number of handbooks and companions on memory and ‘memory studies’ (e.g. Tulving and Craik 2000, which looks at memory from a psychological, cognitive, neuronal point of view, and Erll and Nünning 2008), as well as on ‘metamemory’, understood as the way in which humans control their memories (e.g. Dunsloky and Tauber 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Tulving 2007: 50–2.

<sup>6</sup> The following discussion is based on Fentress and Wickham 1992; Assmann 2008; Nikulin 2015; Sutton 2010 and Michaelian and Sutton 2017, as well as the above-mentioned handbooks.

such distinctions is one that has already been presented above, between *individual* and *collective* memory. It is on individual memory that most of the psychological and philosophical inquiry has traditionally tended to focus. The distinction between *declarative* and *non-declarative* memory is a standard one within individual memory. Declarative memory, the kind of memory that can be linguistically expressed in a declarative sentence, can in turn be *episodic* or *recollective*, if it concerns a past experience of the individual (I remember visiting Rome last year), or *semantic* or *propositional* (I remember that Rome is the capital city of Italy). Non-declarative memory includes *habit* or *procedural* memory, the kind of memory involved in our ability to do something, which cannot be codified as a set of declarative sentences, and need not even be entertained consciously (I remember how to ride a bike).<sup>7</sup> A different taxonomy, which only partially overlaps with the one just introduced, focuses on the kinds of items we can remember (corresponding to different possible grammatical objects of the verb ‘to remember’): *things or people* (I remember my schoolteacher), *properties* (I remember the smell of jasmine), *actions* (I remember to turn off the heating), *experiences* (I remember eating ice cream yesterday), *events* (I remember that Socrates died in 399 BC), *facts* (I remember that the atomic number of uranium is 92). At least some of our action memories are ‘prospective’, as they concern the future performance of previously planned actions. As for collective or ‘social’ memory, the complex ways in which shared memories are negotiated, constructed, preserved and transmitted within large communities, societies and cultures (e.g. the German collective memory of the Holocaust) have been at the centre of a real scholarly boom over the last few decades, especially in history and the social sciences. Finally, more and more attention has been placed in recent years on *external memory*, as something distinct from, and supplementing (but also, possibly, endangering), individual or collective memory: for example, the external memory of an archive, a book, or the internet.

It is an important question of philosophy of memory whether all these different kinds of memories really have the same nature and ontological status, or the variety of uses of the term ‘memory’ risks obscuring essential differences in the phenomena described. Those who take episodic memory, with its connection to the past experience of individuals, as our ‘core’ notion of memory, will look with suspicion at kinds of memory which appear

<sup>7</sup> The distinction between short- and long-term memory, important in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is less relevant to our discussion; all the examples of declarative and non-declarative memories given above would count as long-term memories.

radically different in their workings and functions (e.g. semantic memory, or collective memory). But the breadth and apparent dishomogeneity of the kinds of memories classified in modern taxonomies need not be discounted as the merely contingent result of the fact that the term ‘memory’ and its cognates have come to be used so broadly (*too* broadly, according to some) in English (the same, *mutatis mutandis*, for many other modern languages). Many elements of the modern taxonomies appear equally applicable to ancient Greek language and culture, including those elements that appear more deviant to some modern theorists. For instance, the Homeric verse ‘Be men, my friends, and remember fierce strength’ (ἀνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς, *Il.* 15.487) is usually interpreted, like a number of similar expressions (e.g. ‘let us remember sleep’, ‘let us remember food and drink’), as an appeal to ‘action’, ‘prospective memory’.<sup>8</sup> And yet, equating the two would be too simplistic: as Bakker has pointed out, there is a link in ancient Greek between the verb *μυμήσκομαι*, ‘I remember’, seemingly designating a cognitive ability, and forms deriving from its root *μεν-*, such as *μένος* (‘vigour’, ‘strength’) or *μῆνις* (‘to be in a rage’), which refer to physical and emotionally charged impulses; the link is provided by the notion of embodiment.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, when the poet says, at the beginning of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, ‘I shall remember and not forget Apollo who shoots from afar’ (μνήσομαι οὐδὲ λάθωμαι Ἀπόλλωνος ἐκὰς τοιο, *Hom. Hy. Ap.* 1), mentioning Apollo is meant to make him present to the ritual action.<sup>10</sup> Remembering Apollo has a performative function and force that are not captured by the ‘memory of people’ of our taxonomy of memory.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> For a catalogue of these expressions, see Simondon 1982: 23–59, who considers them under the label ‘mémoire d’action’; see also Bakker 2002a: 70 and nn. 11–12; Nikkanen 2012. For exhortations to remember battle, see e.g. *Il.* 6.112; 8.174; 11.287; for forgetting battle, *Il.* 13.721–2; 15.322; 16.356–7; 22.282; for remembering to stand guard: *Il.* 7.371; 10.99; 18.299; eating and drinking: *Il.* 19.231; 24.129, 601, 602, 613; *Od.* 10.177; 20.246; sleep: *Od.* 7.138; 16.481.

<sup>9</sup> Bakker 2008: 67–70. When Athena/Mentes ‘reminds’ (ὑπέμνησεν) Telemachus of his father in *Od.* 1.320–3, she is not activating the memory of his father (whom he has never known), but rather, in Bakker’s words (2008: 70–1), she is giving him ‘a shot of paternal *menos*’. It is however interesting to note that Telemachus ‘in his phrenes understood, and was amazed in his thumos’ (ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσι νοήσας | θάμβησεν κατὰ θυμόν), recognizing the presence of a god: there is a cognitive aspect to this embodiment. On the etymology of *μυμήσκω* see, besides Bakker 2008: 67–9, Benveniste 1954; Chantraine 1969: 702–3; Simondon 1982: 18–19; Beekes 2010: 953–4, and 929–31 for *μένος*, *μέμνημι*; and Ustinova 2012 for the interconnection of memory and *μῆνις*, ‘madness’, ‘inspiration’.

<sup>10</sup> Bakker 2002a; Bakker 2008: 67: ‘the act of remembering will perform and make present the thing remembered’.

<sup>11</sup> For another example of the difficulty of matching ancient conceptions of memory with modern taxonomies, cf. Castagnoli’s discussion, in this volume, of the difference between Aristotle’s ‘memory of the past’ and ‘our’ episodic memory.

It is thus important to note that, despite the continuities and connections between the ancient and modern perspectives, the particular language, theories and practices of memory (both individual and collective) are always inextricably linked to their particular environment, to their society or culture, and to the different media in use in it. Each society has different ways of remembering, and of thinking and talking about memory. As Vernant pointed out in his path-breaking paper on 'Mythic Aspects of Memory', 'at different periods and in different cultures, there are close links between the techniques for mental recall, the inner organization of the function of memory, the place it occupies in the system of the ego, and the ways men picture memory to themselves'.<sup>12</sup> The aim of this volume is to examine the emergence and development of some central ideas and themes underlying the theories and practices of memory in the Greek world, from the archaic period to late antiquity, across a number of literary genres, through a selection of case studies highlighting both shared traits and specificities. The following ten sections provide a sample of some of these central ideas and themes explored in the sixteen chapters, and offer some essential background for their analyses.

### 1. Memory, Time and History

Although, as we have seen, memory is not necessarily 'of the past', memory is intimately connected to time more generally: it is a means by which individuals and communities situate themselves in history, either retrospectively or prospectively.<sup>13</sup> But the relationship of memory and time is not a simple one. A common trope within archaic and classical Greek poetry is that the relationship of memory and time is profoundly antagonistic: memory salvages matters of value for the identity of an individual or group against the relentless ravages of time, Chronos, the 'all-subduer' (πανδαμάτωρ) who threatens to pulverise any and all human achievements into oblivion.<sup>14</sup> Thus for instance Simonides affirms that 'Time is sharp of teeth, and wears away all things, even the most violent' (fr. 88 W<sup>2</sup>); a fragment from an unknown play of Sophocles states that 'time makes all things dark and brings them to oblivion' (χρόνος δ' ἀμαυροῖ πάντα κεῖς λήθην ἄγει, F 954). The same notion reappears in the words of the

<sup>12</sup> Vernant 1959 [2006: 115].

<sup>13</sup> Bakker 2002b: 11; Calame 2006b: 13–37. On Greek constructions of time, see the essays in Darbo-Peschanski 2000.

<sup>14</sup> Time the 'all-subduer': Simonides 531 *PMG*; Bacchylides *Ep.* 13.205; παντελής χρόνος, 'time that accomplishes all', Aesch. *Cho.* 965. Chronos does not play a role in Hesiod's *Theogony*, and there are no traces of a connection of Chronos with Mnemosyne (Memory) and the Muses; but for

eponymous protagonist of Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*: 'to the gods alone old age and death never come, but all-powerful time sinks everything else into chaos' (τὰ δ' ἄλλα συγχεῖ πάνθ' ὁ παγκρατὴς χρόνος, Soph. *OC* 607–9).<sup>15</sup>

Yet, even as time is hailed as all-destroyer, the possibility that a memory of deeds survives through time, and because of time, is affirmed: time is not only a powerful destroyer, but also provides the matrix for productive creation; its destructive action can be resisted, and in time things are born and grow.<sup>16</sup> Time can also serve to bring out the truth, whittling away the inessential or outright false. Thus Bacchylides argues that 'truth loves to prevail, and all-conquering time always fosters the deed that is well done; but the foolish speech of enemies dwindles out of sight ...' (ἃ δ' ἀλαθεία φιλεῖ | νικᾶν, ὃ τε πανδ[α]μάτωρ | χρόνος τὸ καλῶς | ἐργόμενον αἰὲν ἀέξει· | δυσμενέων δὲ μα[ταία] | γλῶσσ' αἶδ' ἥς μιν[ύθει, *Ep.* 13, 204–9). A similarly striking, slightly paradoxical proclamation of the resilience of human deeds is made by Pindar: 'Once deeds are done, whether in justice or contrary to it, not even Time, the father of all, could undo their outcome. But with a fortunate destiny forgetfulness may result.'<sup>17</sup> This is not a topic limited to lyric and elegiac poetry: tragedy too abounds in such statements. The double power of Chronos is best exemplified in the opening of Ajax's great speech: 'All

Pherecydes of Syros, in the sixth century, Chronos is one of three divinities who were not born, but always existed, and who open his *Theogony*: 'Zas and Chronos always were and Chthonie' (fr. 14 Schibli = DK 7 B1 = D.L. 1. 119), cf. fr. 60 Schibli = DK 7 A 8 = Damascius *De Principiis* 124b. Pherecydes here plays on the (paretymological) closeness of Kronos and Chronos: see Schibli 1990: 135–9; Kirk and Raven 1957: 54–7. Chronos also appears in the Derveni papyrus, rather surprisingly as the equivalent of Olympos ('Olympos and time are the same', 'Ὀλυμπ[ος] καὶ χ[ρ]όνος τὸ αὐτόν, col. 12.3, with Betegh 2004: 249–52); for a discussion of the role of Chronos in the Orphic cosmogonies, see Betegh 2004: 140–52. Plutarch (*Is. Os.* 32) states that there are some 'Greeks who say that Kronos is but a figurative name for Chronos'; Cic. *ND* 2.25 (64) had called this idea an 'ancient belief'. For the influence of Kronos on the Western notion of Chronos/Time, Panofsky 1939: 69–91 ('Father Time') is still essential. But the Muse (*Moisa*), Truth (*alatheia*), Kronos and Chronos (Time) are inextricably interlinked also in Pindar's *Olympian* 10 (discussed in detail by Agócs in this volume, pp. 79–81), esp. at vv. 3–7 and 49–55; the association is early.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Soph. *Aj.* 714–15: 'The long time makes all fade (πάνθ' ὁ μέγας χρόνος μαρᾶνει), and so I would not say that anything was beyond belief.' For discussion of statements underlining the destructivity of time, see Bakker 2002b.

<sup>16</sup> See Bakker 2002b, who refers to passages such as Hdt. 5.9.3: 'In the long time everything can happen', contrasting it with the destructive *chronos* Herodotus confronts at the opening of the *Histories*.

<sup>17</sup> Pind. *Ol.* 2. 15–18: τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων | ἐν δίκῃ τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαν ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἄν | Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατὴρ δύναιτο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος· | λάθῃ δὲ πτόμῳ σὺν εὐδαίμονι γένοιτ' ἄν (transl. Race).

things long and countless time brings to birth in darkness and covers after they have been revealed.<sup>18</sup>

One poet who persistently explored the complex relationship between time and memory in his oeuvre is Simonides, who in his epigram for the fallen at Thermopylae famously stated that their glory, remembered in his poem, would defeat time: ‘Of the dead at Thermopylae glorious is the fortune, fair the fate, an altar the tomb, in place of laments remembrance (μνᾶστίς), of pity praise. Such a shroud as this neither dank decay nor time that subdues all will render faint’ (531, 1–5 *PMG*). Glory and remembrance survive here detached from, and indeed beyond, the physical monument; yet next to such ‘optimistic’ statements, pessimistic views about the possibility of both stone monuments and poetry to survive abound.<sup>19</sup> Simonides’ attention to remembrance and time is attested also in some other of his surviving fragments; noteworthy in particular is the ‘Plataea’ elegy, 11.24–5 *W*<sup>2</sup>, because of its fascinating twist in the request for help addressed to the Muse ‘so that someone later recall the men who for Sparta ...’, (ἵνα τις [μνή]σῃται ὕμνῳ | ἀνδρῶν, οἱ Σπάρτῃ ...).<sup>20</sup> This attention attracted the interest of later authors: Theocritus, Callimachus, and possibly already Aristotle feature Simonides in stories that have to do with remembrance, or allude to his poems on memorialisation.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Soph. *Ai.* 646–7: ἀπανθ’ ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος | φύει τ’ ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται (transl. Lloyd-Jones).

<sup>19</sup> For the divorce between physical marker and poem in 531 *PMG*, see Steiner 1999, but also Fearn 2013, who emphasises Simonides’ ability to engage with the written support of his epigrams. Pessimistic statements: e.g. the song composed as an answer to Cleobulos of Lindos, 581 *PMG*, affirming the foolishness of trusting in the staying power of a statue, and more generally Austin 1967; Brillante 2015.

<sup>20</sup> See also 89 *W*<sup>2</sup> ‘and I say that no one equals Simonides in memory’; 521 *PMG*; fr. 19 and 20 *W*<sup>2</sup>; and particularly interesting, the probably Simonidean 947 *PMG* (= 254 *Poltera*): ‘The Muse does not, deprived of resources, taste the present only (οὐκ ἀπόρως γέυει τὸ παρὸν μόνον) but goes forward, harvesting all things.’

<sup>21</sup> Callimachus: *Aetia* fr. 64 Pf. (‘the Tomb of Simonides’, a poem appropriately defined by Bing 1988: 69 as ‘a commemoration of a commemoration of a commemoration’; ll. 9–10: δὲ τὰ περισσὰ | .. καὶ μνήμην πρῶτος δὲ ἐφρασάμην, ‘who first invented the extra ... and memory’ are particularly intriguing), with Morrison 2013. Theocritus: *Idyll* 16. 36–47, the Scopadae ‘would have lain forgotten, leaving behind those many and prosperous things, among the wretched dead for long ages, if a divine singer, the Ceian, had not sounded his varied songs to the many-stringed lyre and made them famous among men of future generations’ (42–6). Aristotle, *Physics* iv.13, 222b16–19 (= 645 *PMG*): ‘in time all things come into being and are destroyed. That is why some consider time the wisest of things; but the Pythagorean Paron considered it the most incapable of learning, since people forget in time.’ Commenting on Aristotle on the basis of a passage from Eudemus (fr. 90 Wehrli), Simplicius (*On Aristotle’s Physics* ix 754, 5–17) identifies the first position with that of Simonides, who at Olympia would have praised time as very wise, because in it both learning and recollection occur; as for the Pythagorean Paron, Simplicius advances the hypothesis that Paron may not have been a personal name, but simply the participle ‘being present’. Whatever the truth of this,



The Simonidean attention to memory, remembrance or commemoration, and their ability to resist the destructive power of time is shared by early Greek historiography: it appears for instance prominently in the proem of Herodotus' *Histories*, 'so that what has come to be through men may not become extinct with time' (ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, 1.1). Those engaged in historiographical endeavours continue the tradition of trying to render their recorded memories 'timeless', immune from oblivion, or, in Thucydides' phrase, 'a possession for all posterity' (1.22.4). The Muse of history, Klio, is after all a daughter of Memory, whether she works within an intentionalist framework or not.<sup>22</sup> And yet, the emergence of historiography also offered different means of thinking about time and recording events. In archaic Greece the high value placed on memory (to the point of its deification: see Section 2 below) had not led, in Vernant's words, 'to any attempts to explore the past or to the construction of an architecture of time. Memory is revered as the instrument of knowledge, omniscience, or as the instrument for escape from time ... Memory [also in Plato's theory of anamnesis] is not the "thought of time" but an escape from it.'<sup>23</sup> Historiography, in contrast, develops a distinctive discursive configuration, which among other things emphasises writing; it also, importantly, 'colonises' time by developing various temporal frameworks, from those grounded in specific *polis*-communities to abstract conceptions of universal history.<sup>24</sup> Nowadays we know better than to oppose 'history' and 'memory' and have begun to understand (written) historiography as one of the forms in which historical memory manifests itself;<sup>25</sup> and one of its important contributions is its ability to articulate significantly more differentiated conceptions of time than those to be found in oral traditions.

it is striking that it is someone 'present' who argues that time does not bring any wisdom. Good discussion of this passage in Brillante 2015: 211–3, with further references.

<sup>22</sup> On the relationship between memory and history, see most recently Grethlein 2010: 1–11; Price 2012; Smith 2012. For the concept of 'intentional history', see n. 25 below and M. Canevaro's chapter in this volume.

<sup>23</sup> Vernant 1959 [2006]: 134–5. Indeed, the phenomenon of the floating gap, and the attending hour-glass effect typical of oral tradition, applies to Greece as well: see Thomas 2001.

<sup>24</sup> For the development of chronological frameworks negotiating and articulating time, see Clarke 2008. For the distinction between non-historical *polis*-oriented genres, such as elegy, and the works of the first historians, who work with a larger scope and context, and are thus encouraged to use the past in a different way and for new purposes, see e.g. Grethlein 2010. Calame 2006b offers four case studies illustrating the way in which spatio-temporal frameworks are discursively constructed in Hesiod, in Bacchylides, in the inscription concerning the foundation of Cyrene and in the (Dionysiac? Orphic?) gold lamellae.

<sup>25</sup> See for instance Gehrke 2001, who puts forward the notion of 'intentional history'; Luraghi 2010, who makes the case for an 'intentional history' directed by the people, which becomes a foundation for identity, exactly as collective memory is assumed to do; Shrimpton 1997: 28–9 and 2014, who argues that 'ancient history was predominantly memory'; and Darbo-Peschanski's chapter, below.



## 2. The Divine Nature and Transtemporal Power of Memory

The ability of memory to ‘see’ (and give access to) events and figures, irrespective of whether they belong to the past, the present or the future, is reflected in the genealogy and power of the Muses, daughters of Mnemosyne, the Memory goddess, and Zeus (Hesiod, *Theogony* 52–63; 915–17). Mnemosyne herself appears as a primeval, pre-Olympian deity, born of the union of Gaia (Earth) and Ouranos (Heaven), and sister of Themis (Order), among others (Hes. *Theog.* 132–5).<sup>26</sup> When, in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, the young Hermes picks up his lyre and begins to sing the story of how gods and earth came to be, ‘first among the gods he honoured Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, in his song; for she had obtained the son of Maia as her lot’ (Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῇ, | μητέρα Μουσῶν· ἥ γὰρ λάχε Μαιάδος υἱόν, *Hym. Herm.* 429–30). The young god then continues with the other divinities, describing how they came to be: the power of Mnemosyne and her daughters, the Muses, here enables the very possibility of talking and singing of the distant past.<sup>27</sup> It is clearly by virtue of their kinship with memory that the Muses represented for the Greeks omniscient sources of super-human knowledge that mortals might access through the medium of inspired poetry; hence the poet’s typical address and request for help, famously exemplified in Homer *Iliad* 2.484–93, or Hesiod *Theogony* 22–33.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, this is a knowledge impossible for human beings to control: to Hesiod’s invocation the Muses reply that ‘we know how to speak many false things as though

<sup>26</sup> For Mnemosyne as the mother of the Muses, see also Eumel. 16 Bernabé (= 34 West) and the very similar Solon fr. 13.1–2 W<sup>2</sup>; Pind. *Paean* 6.54–6; Pind. *Isthm.* 6.74–5; Terpanther fr. 4 Campbell (‘Let us pour a libation to the Muses daughters of Memory’, σπένδωμεν ταῖς Μνάμας παῖσιν Μούσαις). Alcman fr. 3.1, 8, 9, 27 and 28 Campbell also has the usual genealogy (or simply addresses the Muses as Olympian); but an alternative tradition, attested in Alcman fr. 67 Campbell, made the Muses the daughters of Gaia and Ouranos, just like Mnemosyne herself in the Hesiodic tradition (cf. Diod. Sic. 4.7.1). Mimnermus fr. 13 W<sup>2</sup> and Musaeus fr. 82/86 Bernabé mention two generations of Muses, a first born of Ouranos (or Kronos in Musaeus), a second of Zeus and Mnemosyne.

<sup>27</sup> There are other traces of a connection between Hermes and Mnemosyne/memory, possibly because a messenger needs to be able to remember and repeat precisely a message. Thus, a metrical inscription of ca. 500 BC on a herm from the Athenian Acropolis proclaims that ‘To Hermes this brilliant gift the herald Oin[obios? Oiniades?] giving thanks dedicated here as a memorial’ (because of his memory?) (ἡερμεί[αι : τόδε] | ἄγαλμα [: διδός] | χάριν : ἐν[θάδε : εἰ]- | θεκεν : | Οἶν[...]- | 5 : κέρυχς : μ[νεμ]- | οσύνης : ἡ[νεκα], *IG I<sup>3</sup>* 776 = *CEG I* 234, with Furley 2011: 166); Apollonius of Rhodes 1. 640–5 narrates of the herald Aethalides, to whom Hermes, his father, had granted a memory of all things, that never grew dim (οἱ μνηστὶν πόρε πάντων | ἄφθιτον), to the point that even after he died, in Hades, forgetfulness (λήθη) did not sweep over his soul. For the connection between Aethalides’ memory, Pythagoras and immortality, see note 107 below.

<sup>28</sup> For the relation between memory, the Muses, poetic inspiration and knowledge, see e.g. Notopoulos 1938; Murray 1981, who points out how *Iliad* 2.484–93 (the invocation to the Muses before the

they were real; but we know, when we will, to utter true things' (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, | ἴδμεν δ', εὔτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι, Hes. *Theog.* 27–8).<sup>29</sup> Although the Muses can be deceitful, they can, if they so desire, proclaim *alēthea*, things that are, literally, 'not hidden' or 'not forgotten', and thus true.<sup>30</sup>

In the *Iliad*, this special knowledge is linked to the Muses' ability to be always present: 'for you are goddesses and are in all places and know all things, while we hear only report and know nothing' (ὕμεις γὰρ θεαὶ ἐστε πάρεστε τε ἴστε τε πάντα, / ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδὲ τι ἴδμεν, *Il.* 2.485–6); the Muses know by virtue of having witnessed (presumably seen) what they know.<sup>31</sup> Their knowledge concerns not only the past, cosmogonic (e.g. Hesiod) and heroic (e.g. Homer), but also the present and the future: the Muses sing 'what is, what shall be and what was' (τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, *Theog.* 38).<sup>32</sup> The same nexus connecting Mnemosyne and the Muses to wisdom and sight (or its opposite, blindness) is present in one of Pindar's *Paean*s: 'And I pray to Ouranos' well-robed daughter, Mnemosyne, and to her children [i.e. the Muses], to provide facility, for blind are the minds of men, if anyone without the Heliconians seeks the deep path of wisdom.'<sup>33</sup> This is then a special type of knowledge, dependent on a special type of remembering: not so much recollection or retrieval of past experience from a memory storage as constant 'mindfulness' or 'presence'. This type of knowledge the Muses

*Catalogue of Ships*) is a request not just for inspiration, but also for facts; Collins 1999; Yamagata 2005; Ustinova 2012, who links this inspiration to *μανία*; for Plato's take on this, see Capra's chapter in this volume, pp. 182–3.

<sup>29</sup> For the history of the interpretations offered of these verses (mainly, criticism of heroic poetry as opposed to the Hesiodic brand of hexameter poetry; or acknowledgement that language imitates reality, but may at times *be* reality, and that humans cannot discern the difference), see Pucci 2007: 60–70.

<sup>30</sup> For the etymology and meaning of ἀλήθεια, see Chantraine 1969: 618–9, s.v. λανθάνω; Beekes 2010, s.v. ἀλήθης; composed of privative α and λήθη, 'forgetfulness', or perhaps, more generally, privative α and the root λαθ- 'to be hidden, unknown'; Cole 1983; for further references, see Capra's and Wygoda's chapters in the volume, pp. 183 and nn. 15–16, and 207 n. 33.

<sup>31</sup> The Muses have a 'protocartographic' view (so Purves 2010: 2 and *passim*) of the *eusynoptos* ('easily taken in at a glance') plot of the *Iliad*, and ultimately of the world: maybe a hint of what will later develop into the technique of the *loci*, and at any rate a clear pointer to the importance of representation. See also Alcman fr. 133 Campbell, discussed below.

<sup>32</sup> A similar formulation appears slightly earlier in the text: the Muses have given Hesiod a 'divine voice, so that I could sing the glory of things past and things to happen' (αὐδὴν | θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, Hes. *Theog.* 31–2). See West 1966: 166 for discussion and further passages; Pucci 2007: 74.

<sup>33</sup> Pind. *Paea.* 7b, 15–20: ἐ]πεύχο[μαι] δ' Οὐρανοῦ τ' εὐπέπλω θυγατρὶ | Μναμ[ο]σύ[ν]α κόραισι τ' εὐ- | μαχανίαν διδόμεν. | τ]υφλα[ί] γὰρ ἀνδρῶν φρένες, | δ]στις ἀνευθ' Ἑλικωνιάδων | βαθεῖαν ε . . | . . ὦν ἐρευνᾷ σοφίας ὁδόν (Race's text and translation).