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edited by
Yujin Nagasawa
University of Birmingham

RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT

Helen De Cruz
Oxford Brookes University





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Religious Disagreement

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Helen De Cruz
Oxford Brookes University

Abstract: This Element examines what we can learn from religious disagreement, focusing on disagreement with possible selves and former selves, the epistemic significance of religious agreement, the problem of disagreements between religious experts, and the significance of philosophy of religion. Helen De Cruz shows how religious beliefs of others constitute significant higher-order evidence. At the same time, she advises that we should not necessarily become agnostic about all religious matters, because our cognitive background colors the way we evaluate evidence. This allows us to maintain religious beliefs in many cases, while nevertheless taking the religious beliefs of others seriously.

Keywords: epistemology of disagreement, permissivism, uniqueness, conciliationism, religious belief

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