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Essays on the Lottery Paradox
Edited by Igor Douven
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LOTTERIES, KNOWLEDGE, AND RATIONAL BELIEF

We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical (yes/no) and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' – at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve that paradox has been a matter of intense philosophical debate for over fifty years. This volume offers a collection of newly commissioned essays on the subject, all of which provide compelling reasons for rethinking many of the fundamentals of the debate.

IGOR DOUVEN is a CNRS Research Professor at Paris-Sorbonne University. His essays have appeared in numerous major philosophy and cognitive science journals, and he is the author of *The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals* (Cambridge, 2016).

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