

Rawls's Egalitarianism

This is a new interpretation and analysis of John Rawls's leading theory of distributive justice, which also considers the responding egalitarian theories of scholars such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen. Rawls's theory, Kaufman argues, sets out a normative ideal of justice that incorporates an account of the structure and character of relations that are appropriate for members of society viewed as free and equal moral beings. Forging an approach distinct amongst contemporary theories of equality, Rawls offers an alternative to egalitarian justice methodologies that aim primarily to compensate victims for undeserved bad luck. For Rawls, the values that ground the most plausible account of egalitarianism are real equality of economic opportunity combined with the guarantee of a fair distribution of social goods. Kaufman's analysis will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of political theory and political philosophy, particularly those working on justice, and on the work of John Rawls.

ALEXANDER KAUFMAN is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Georgia. His research explores the relation of central values of the democratic political tradition to issues in contemporary politics. His work examines the meaning and policy implications of the notions of freedom and equality that are centrally emphasized in the democratic tradition. Kaufman's research investigates these issues in the context of projects that examine the justification of the welfare state and the nature of egalitarian justice.





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ALEXANDER KAUFMAN

University of Georgia





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For Nomi, Jonah, Dafna, and Mira





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Abbreviations

Works by John Rawls are abbreviated as follows:

- DJ "Distributive Justice," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Politics, Philosophy, and Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967). Reprinted in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *John Rawls:* Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 130–53.
- JAF *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
- JF "Justice as Fairness," *Philosophical Review* 67/2 (1958): 164–94. Reprinted in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *John Rawls: Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 47–72.
- KC "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515–72. Reprinted in Samuel
 Freeman (ed.), John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 303–58.
- ODPE "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," *Philosophical Review* 60/2 (1951): 177–97. Reprinted in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *John Rawls: Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 1–19.
- PL *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, [1993] 1996).
- TCR "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review* 64/1 (1955): 3–32. Reprinted in Samuel Freeman (ed.), *John Rawls: Collected Papers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 20–46.
- TJ A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press [1971] 1999).

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