Introduction

In 1843, just four years after the proclamation of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, which launched the Ottoman Empire into a century of accelerated reform, an unsigned editorial appeared in Ceride-i Havadis, the first semi-official newspaper of the empire. The anonymous author stated that, despite the fact that the Ottoman realms possessed “the most pleasant weather, fertile lands, and a population smarter than other climatic zones,” the other regions, where, according to him, the weather is harsh (vahim), and people are stupid (gabi), were militarily victorious and much more productive. Perplexed and dismayed by this predicament, the author concluded that the Ottoman Empire’s economic and military weaknesses could be ascribed to “its people’s lack of effort and ardor (sa’y u gayret).” The author believed that the Ottomans wasted their lives in vain and raised their children in “utter laziness.” They neither helped themselves nor benefited their society (halkın işine yaramak).

1 Anon., Ceride-i Havadis, no. 141 (15 Receb 1259/Aug. 1, 1843), 3.
2 Ibid. The author is referencing a prevalent气候 theory, in which climatic zones play a major role in the lifestyle and characteristics of peoples. According to this theory, the Mediterranean basin, the middle zone, is seen as the best zone, for being neither very hot nor very cold. A well-known articulation of this theory is seen in the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 63–4. Ibn Khaldun’s stage theory resonated with the Ottoman authors who were engaged with the Ottoman “decline” from the seventeenth century on. For Ibn Khaldun in the Ottoman Empire, see Marinos Sariyannis, Ottoman Political Thought Up to the Tanzimat: A Concise History (Rethymno, Greece: Foundation for Research and Technology, Hellas Institute for Mediterranean Studies, 2015), 279–325. For a reference to the climate theory from the early twentieth century, see Küliçizade Hakki, Itikadat-ı Batılaya Ilan-ı Harb (İstanbul: Sancakciyan Matbaası, 1329/1910), 14.
3 Anon., Ceride-i Havadis, 3.
Neither laziness nor its condemnation are new inventions. However, perceiving it as a social condition that afflicts a nation (or race) is. The idea (and ideology) that the indolence of a given population (constrained ideologically as a nation or race) could be eradicated through social, institutional, and moral reform, usually led and guided by those who see it as their responsibility to navigate them out of this condition, is even more recent. Just as the assumptions of nationalism spread around the world, so did the idea of social diseases. Laziness as a social disease, as in the above example and many others voiced throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is seen as a condition that afflicts nations, in this case that of the Ottomans, to such an extent that it defines them and their position in the international system, and hinders their march to progress.

In this book, I trace the development of a binary between work and laziness during the last century of the Ottoman Empire, and examine what I identify as the dynamic construction of a culture of productivity, both discursively and performatively. The culture of productivity was fundamentally linked with the modern world economy, and it was integral to the nation-formation processes of the nineteenth century. Taking a historical-comparative approach, I define the culture of productivity as a socially constructed series of anxieties, practices, and discourses on work and laziness that appeared almost simultaneously in different parts of the world. It appears that such constructions helped self-proclaimed leaders/nationalists to moralize, economize,


institutionalize, and nationalize work and stigmatize laziness, not only as an individual condition but also as a national problem. The resulting culture of productivity in the Ottoman Empire thus developed in contested ways during the reform period between the 1830s and the collapse of the empire after World War I.

The anonymous author’s remarks on “Ottoman laziness” can be situated in the long-established tradition of the Ottoman elite’s continual efforts to strengthen and reform their polity. This effort is not particular to the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman state found itself economically and militarily weak relative to European states. Ottoman advice (nasihat) literature and political treatises of the early modern era are filled with criticisms of specific policies of the ruling elites and institutions; they were held responsible for the empire’s problems. The common folk, far from causing the empire’s problems, were seen as those who suffered the most at the hand of failing elites and should be saved. Up until the nineteenth century, for Ottoman thinkers, the list of those who should be held responsible for the empire’s tribulations was quite long and included the unruly

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janissaries, the weak-natured sultans, policies that blurred the perceived distinction between the ruler and the ruled, waning of the military spirit, and the “meddling women of the palace.” Let alone being presented as the cause of the empire’s problems, as late as the late eighteenth century, common folk (ahali, reaya) appeared in reform treatises as “entrusted by God” and “God’s gift” and were often portrayed as being maltreated under the heavy hand of local forces, waiting to be saved from the grasp of deteriorating institutions and abusive leaders.

The remarks can be situated in another context that is nineteenth-century-specific and not limited to the Ottoman state. In the Ottoman literary tradition, the above remarks represent a break from earlier Ottoman writers’ long-established discursive traditions. Early modern political treatises did not consider the people a cohesive category with a presumed homogeneity, nor did they regard them as the source of the state’s problems, other than people’s rebellions and unwillingness to pay taxes. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, as in contemporary Europe, the perception of society as a resource, as the

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8 Ergin Çağman, ed., III. Selim’e Sunulan Islahat Layihaları (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010). This book contains a set of reform treatises submitted to Selim III in the final decade of the eighteenth century by high-ranking bureaucrats, statesmen, scholars, and military men. For specific references to ahali as “God’s gift” (vedi‘atullah), see “Sadrazam Koca Yusuf Pasa Layihası.” Çağman, III. Selim’e Sunulan Islahat Layihaları, 60; for the reference to ahali as “entrusted by God” (emanetullah), see the treatise by Muhasebe-i Evel El-Hac Ibrahim Efendi. Çağman, III. Selim’e Sunulan Islahat Layihaları, 36.

9 This had to do more with how the limits of politics and its players were defined by the elite. As Ussama Makdisi has shown in the context of Mount Lebanon, elite formulations of power depended on the discursive exclusion of the “people” from the realm of politics. Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 34–5. For how the political field expanded and/or power loci changed in the Ottoman Empire, see Peirce, The Imperial Harem; Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire; Ali Yayçoglu, “Provincial Power-holders and the Empire in the Late Ottoman World: Conflict or Partnership?”, in The Ottoman World, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2012), 436–52; Dina R. Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul 1540–1834 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
basis of state strength, and as a living organism that suffers from social diseases was becoming dominant in political debates and social commentary. When addressing the Ottoman Empire’s problems, like the Ceride-i Havadis author, many reformists did not enumerate the traditional culprits of the early modern advice (nəsihat) literature and political treatises. Rather, they accused the entire society in an abstract and essentialized way. They scrutinized the social and moral characteristics of “the Ottomans” as a population, and in the process, they presumed that they shared a homogenous culture. In this case, the culture of laziness.

The omnipresent references to Ottoman societal ills, with particular reference to a pathology of indolence among the Ottomans, do not merely reflect the concerns of loyal Ottomans trying to correct their loss of power in global status, or instilling an ethos of productivity to thwart the ongoing disaggregation of the empire. In the intellectual, socioeconomic, rhetorical, and cultural context that represents the late Ottoman realities, it can also be read as an effort to produce new norms, set social codes, and establish difference in an emergent regime of renewal, reform, and discipline.

The construction of the ideal citizen who would contribute to progress involved descriptive markers, such as hard work, discipline, and productivity. As civilization and civilized society became aspirational concepts, an idealized Ottoman’s productivity was elevated to a civilizational marker. In the grand scheme of the world order, in which the elusive standards of civilization qualified political communities for the right of sovereignty and survival, Ottoman statesmen introduced reform bills and regulations, and public intellectuals (moralists, novelists, polemicists, bureaucrats of various ranks, educators, journalists, members of the Muslim scholarly community [ulema]), in brief, culture producers of all types, took on the role of eradicating laziness and building a nation of producers. Through new and transformed literary genres distributed in various media, such as morality books (ahlak kitapları), periodicals, novels, plays, and treatises on citizenship, public advocates formulated, reformulated, and disseminated ideas about productivity as an individual, social, at times religious, and national duty integrally related to the ideas of belonging to a nation.

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A new way of thinking and speaking about laziness and productivity became a constitutive element of these efforts to imagine the Ottoman, both as a political subject and a nation.\(^\text{11}\) For many of its advocates, productivity was not merely an instrument of progress. Productivity was progress, hence, modernity itself. Behind these formulations was a tacit assumption that the efforts of each individual created the basis and the energy of national progress, with the salvation or destruction of the nation as a whole depending on each citizen’s active and conscious contribution to the commonwealth. In other words, each individual was morally and materially responsible for the progress of the nation.

The Ottoman culture producers, largely composed of educated professionals with or without official positions, drew upon repertoires, both indigenous and foreign, that cast productivity as a moral, national, and often Islamic duty and declared laziness a sin, a crime, and a national affront. While doing so, they transformed religious concepts and, in the process, altered how one understood religion. In advancing productivity as a duty, they used Islamic terms liberally and Islamicized others. More importantly, they sought to purge what they saw as outdated religious concepts, schemes, and institutions that hindered productive lifestyles. This leads us to question, at the very least, the basic tenets and binaries of secularization theory, which argues that, as societies progress, a linear evolution from “religion/tradition” to “secular” occurs.\(^\text{12}\) The complexity of the transformations of religious terms and the transformative power of this

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\(^{11}\) For a work that focuses largely on Turkish republican models of the ideal citizen, see Füsun Ustel, *Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde, II. Meşruyetten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2008).

\(^{12}\) Secularization theory posits that the passage from religious to secular is not only inevitable, but is also a requirement of modernity. The theory has been criticized on multiple levels. While some take it to task for its Eurocentrism, others argue that the theory does not even hold true in relation to the European experience. For a critique of secularization theory, see Jeffrey K. Hadden, “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” *Social Forces* 65, no. 3 (Mar. 1987): 587–611. For a summary of the critiques of secularization theory, see James L. Gelvin, “Secularism and Religion in the Arab Middle East: Reinventing Islam in a World of Nation States,” in *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief and Politics in History*, ed. Derek R. Peterson and Darren Walhof (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 115–30; Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in *The Modern Middle East*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury, and Mary Wilson (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
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terminology points to a dynamic process that does not fit into the secular vs. religious binary.

As the terms homeland (vatan), nation (millet), politics (siyaset), and patriotism (hamiyet) entered popular parlance with transformed meanings, a simultaneous process redefined the terms duty (vazife), industriousness (sa’y u gayret göstermek, çalıskanlık), struggle (cehd), and rational effort (ictihad). The meanings of these notions, however, were not static and were deeply political. The multiple – and at times, conflicting – formulations of these heavily layered concepts were employed to label who was deemed worthy of belonging to this imagined nation and who was not. Analyzing the transformation of productivity and its various articulations by different agents and in different planes of Ottoman society during this period exposes the intertwined fields of religion and modernity.

In this study, in order to focus on the dynamics, compellers, and conflicts of this cultural transformation, I do not dwell on the origins of the culture of productivity because the search for origins may blind us to the originalities of a history that made the culture of productivity an essential part of the state and nation formation in Ottoman society. Attempting to locate where “it” started first, and attributing priority and determinacy to an earlier (European) experience, and evaluating other experiences as replicas renders such complex cultural transformations derivative and unoriginal. Recent historiography has placed the dynamics and conflicts of the larger transformations in the region at the focus of historical investigations, arguing that histories of change and continuity in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire can and should be told by “circumventing the whole project of genealogy and

In this monograph, I focus on the ways in which norms of productivity spread, were practiced, and were challenged and interpreted, through a reticulation of minute daily practices, as well as values, and codes. Clearly, in these efforts, I do not argue that the Ottoman culture of productivity is a historically unique phenomenon. The larger question concerns how particular Ottoman social actors thought, acted upon, and negotiated cultural meanings in particular historical conditions and contexts. In this work, I attempt to rethink the link between Ottoman discourses and practices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the culture of productivity, while centering this culture on the Ottoman experiences.

The Ottoman discussions on productivity and the social condemnation of laziness appear in academic literature almost tangentially. Historians noted the transformation of Islamic concepts, including sa’y (work/effort) and tevekkûl (resignation). Focusing on the writings of the political texts of ‘Islamists,’ Ismail Kara’s work, for instance, historicizes the changing trajectory of such terms and points to their reinterpretation by Ottoman intellectuals. Other than the assumption that the recent meanings of these terms are aberrations from the “original” ones, Kara’s work is important in its exploration of the modern and dynamic nature of “Islamist” discourses. The theme of work also appears in the histories of bureaucratic reforms or labor movements, without addressing the larger cultural debates and the pathways in which productivity came to be a cultural yardstick of national development.


bureaucracy in the nineteenth century, for example, offer a description of work habits in the ‘new’ Ottoman bureaucracy.\(^\text{17}\) Employing a Weberian progression of the conceptualization of work, that is, its passage from parochial to modern and rational, Findley, in part, attributes the problems of the modernizing bureaucracy to the persistence of “traditional faults of Ottoman administration.”\(^\text{18}\) Recent studies, however, abandon this dichotomous approach to the Ottoman transformations. Studies on Ottoman and Egyptian temporal cultures, particularly as they relate to the quotidian practices of assessment of time, urban transportation, and new technologies, bring to the fore the Middle Eastern labor history, see D. Quataert and E.J. Zurcher (eds.), *Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic 1839–1950* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995); Joel Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Yavuz Selim Karakışla, *Women, War, and Work in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archive and Research Center, 2005).


\(^{18}\) Ibid., 253. This approach reflects a clear-cut division between the traditional and the modern, a mark of modernization theory (in the Ottoman case, the conflict between “traditional and modern”), but does not scrutinize the binary. For applications of modernization theory in the Middle East, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). For instance, Berkes sees a bifurcation in the responses to Tanzimat, a bifurcation that was caused by the adoption of Islam into modern civilization (p. 137). For the general tenets and critiques of modernization theory, see Dean Tipps, “Modernization Theory and the Contemporary Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,” *Comparative Studies in History and Society* 15 (March 1973): 199–226. For critiques of this theory by British Marxists, see Harvey Kaye, *British Marxist Historians* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995). Reading the Ottoman experience through such bifurcations has also been a constitutive element of the Orientalist narrative. Older bifurcations include the ulema vs. the ghazis, and for the later periods, the ulema vs. secular intelligentsia, and Westernizers vs. traditionalists. This separation of the Ottoman state into two institutions or groups that were in inherent conflict with each other can be traced back to the work of Gibb and Bowen. H. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957). Also see Albert Howe Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (New York: AMS Press, 1978). See the critique of such approaches in Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: Introduction to the Sources* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 174–7; Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: History and Politics of Orientalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 103–10 and passim.
complexity and extensiveness of such transformations in the nineteenth-century Middle East. These works successfully advance the critique of unscrutinized binaries, such as the tradition–modernity binary, which for a long while occluded the transformed continuities of the pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman world, as well as the particularities of the historical transformation experienced by late Ottoman societies.

The history of the culture of productivity is not a history of the transition from traditional to modern, in which Western ideas are imposed over “oriental” peoples. Nor should it be understood as the result of top–down reform projects planned by a handful of statesmen and intelligentsia acting under the influence of European ideas. Rather than treating change as something that emanates from Europe or as imposed by the state on a supine population, in this monograph, I stress the importance of the diversely experienced new practices and the (re)formulations of indigenous knowledge(s), both of which are rooted and enriched in the context and atmosphere of the Ottoman reforms and larger Ottoman transformations. The problematization of industriousness, and the condemnation of wasting time and energy in the march to progress, emerged, developed, and was practiced in a multilayered process that involved the interaction of many actors and developments. Laziness as a social disease and productivity as duty were constitutive aspects of an emerging Ottoman nation and its civic culture. A closer examination of the history of the laziness–productivity binary reveals dynamic socioeconomic, political, cultural, and ideological developments and exposes the operative anxieties, aspirations, failures, and fault lines of late Ottoman society.


20 For a critique of this binary, see Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” *Occasional Papers Series* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986).

21 For the slipperiness of the term “influence” (particularly when it is used to attribute causality) and how it deprives historical subjects of agency, see M. Norton Wise, “Kultur als Ressource: Die Rhetorik des Einflusses und die Kommunikationsprobleme zwischen Natur- und Humanwissenschaften,” in *Wissenschaftsfeinde?: “Science Wars” und die Provokation der Wissenschaftsforschung*, ed. Michael Scharping (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2001), 63–88. Special thanks to Dr. Wise for providing an English version of this article to the participants of Dr. James L. Gelvin’s Historiography of the Middle East seminar at UCLA in 2005.