Cultural Backlash

Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders have advanced in many countries, and gained power in states as diverse as the US, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland. Even small parties can still shift the policy agenda, as demonstrated by UKIP’s role in catalyzing Brexit. Drawing on new evidence, the book advances a general theory why the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fuelling support for Authoritarian-Populist forces in the US and Europe. The conclusion highlights the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.

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Cultural Backlash

Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism

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