

Cultural Backlash

Authoritarian-Populist parties and leaders have advanced in many countries, and gained power in states as diverse as the US, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland. Even small parties can still shift the policy agenda, as demonstrated by UKIP's role in catalyzing Brexit. Drawing on new evidence, the book advances a general theory why the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fuelling support for Authoritarian-Populist forces in the US and Europe. The conclusion highlights the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.

Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Laureate Fellow and Professor of Government and International Relations at Sydney University, and Director of the Electoral Integrity Project. An award-winning author and researcher, her books include *Why Electoral Integrity Matters* (Cambridge University Press, 2014), *Why Elections Fail* (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and *Strengthening Electoral Integrity* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Ronald Inglehart is Professor of Political Science and Program Director at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. He has previously collaborated with Pippa Norris on *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World* (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and is the author of many publications including *Modernization and Postmodernization* (1997), *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2005, with Christian Welzel) and *Cultural Evolution* (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

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Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism

PIPPA NORRIS

*Harvard University
Sydney University*

RONALD INGLEHART

University of Michigan



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¹ www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/