There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centred on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over her own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant’s conception of moral virtue as it is developed in his later work, chiefly the Metaphysics of Morals. Melissa Merritt’s book is a distinctive contribution to this recent turn to virtue in Kant scholarship. Merritt argues that we need a clearer and textually more comprehensive account of what reflection is in order not only to understand Kant’s account of virtue, but also to appreciate how it effectively rebuts longstanding objections to the Kantian reflective ideal.

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KANT ON REFLECTION
AND VIRTUE

MELISSA MERRITT
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To Markos and Eirene
Considered in its complete perfection, virtue is therefore represented not as if a human being possesses virtue but rather as if virtue possesses him; for in the former case it would look as if he still had a choice (for which he would need yet another virtue in order to select virtue before any of the other wares on offer).

Metaphysics of Morals (6:406)
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Abbreviations and Conventions for Citing Kant’s Works

1 Kant’s Texts in German

References to the works of Kant, with the exception of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, follow volume and page of the German Academy edition: *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, later the Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Walter de Gruyter (and predecessors), 1902–). I have used both the complete print edition and the electronic edition, which comprises only volumes 1–23 (Berlin: Karsten Worm, 1998) and is available in the Past Masters humanities texts database (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex).

References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* follow the Academy edition, but are cited according to the pagination of the first (‘A’) and second (‘B’) editions of 1781 and 1787, respectively. If the cited passage is included in both editions, the citation includes both A and B page references.

When context makes it obvious which text I am referring to, I drop the abbreviation of the title and cite just the Academy volume and page (or A/B pagination in the case of the first *Critique*). I have typically rendered all points of emphasis in Kant’s texts with italics, ignoring the difference between bold and *Sperrdruck* as two distinct modes of emphasis found in the Academy edition. Generally, I explicitly remark on emphasis only if I have altered Kant’s beyond this, so it may be taken for granted that any emphasis in my quotation tracks an emphasis in the original German.

My abbreviations of Kant’s works track the German titles, as follows:

A Works Published During Kant’s Lifetime

Anth *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* = *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) – Ak. 7
Abbreviations and Conventions for Citing Kant’s Works

Aufklärung = ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?’ = ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ (1784) – Ak. 8

Beo = Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen = Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) – Ak. 2

G = Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten = Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) – Ak. 4

KpV = Kritik der praktischen Vernunft = Critique of Practical Reason (1788) – Ak. 5

KrV = Kritik der reinen Vernunft = Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) – Ak. 3/Ak.4

KU = Kritik der Urteilskraft = Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) – Ak. 5

MAM = Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte = Conjectural Beginning of Human History (1786) – Ak. 8

MS = Die Metaphysik der Sitten = Metaphysics of Morals (1797) – Ak. 6

Rel = Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft = Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) – Ak. 6

LJ = Logik Jäsche = Kant’s lectures on logic, edited by G. B. Jäsche (1800) – Ak. 9

Orientiren = ‘Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren?’ = ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ (1786) – Ak. 8

Prol = Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können = Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) – Ak. 4

Päd = Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik = Kant’s lectures on pedagogy, edited by Theodor Rink (1803) – Ak. 9

VKK = Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes – Ak. 2

B Nachlas

Notes and Fragments (Reflexionen)

References to Kant’s Reflexionen have three elements: first, the abbreviated title and reflection number (e.g. RL-2564); second, the estimated date of the remark, in square brackets (according to the suggestions of Adickes noted in the front matter to Ak. 14); and third, the citation according to volume and page in the Academy edition.
Abbreviations and Conventions for Citing Kant’s Works

RA  Reflexionen zur Anthropologie = Kant’s handwritten notes on anthropology – Ak. 15
RL  Reflexionen zur Logik = Kant’s handwritten notes on logic – Ak. 16
RMet Reflexionen zur Metaphysik = Kant’s handwritten notes on metaphysics – Ak. 17–18
RMor Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie = Kant’s handwritten notes on moral philosophy – Ak. 19

Unpublished Manuscripts
EE  Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urtheilskraft = the first introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, unpublished in Kant’s lifetime – Ak. 20
H   Handschrift = handwritten manuscript of the Anthropology, which includes marginal notes and crossed-out passages not in the published text – Ak. 7

Records of Kant’s Lectures
On logic (Ak. 24):
LB   Logik Blomberg (early 1770s)
LBu  Logik Busolt (c. 1789)
LD-W Logik Dohna-Wundlacken (c. 1792)
LPh  Logik Philippi (1772)
LPö  Logik Pölitz (c. 1780)
WL   Wiener Logik (c. 1780)

On anthropology (Ak. 25):
ABu  Anthropologie Busolt (1788–89?)
AColl Anthropologie Collins (1772–73)
AMr  Anthropologie Mrongovius (1784–85)
AParow Anthropologie Parow (1772–73)
Menschenkunde Anthropologie Menschenkunde (1781–82)

On moral philosophy (Ak. 27):
MC   Moralphilosophie Collins (c. mid 1770s; see Naragon 2006)
MV   Moralphilosophie Vigilantius (early 1790s)

On metaphysics (Ak. 29):
MetMrong Metaphysik Mrongovius (early 1780s)
Abbreviations and Conventions for Citing Kant’s Works

2 Kant’s Texts in Translation

For the most part, translations from Kant’s texts are my own, although I consult the translations in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (abbreviated CEWIK) when available (and, in the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Norman Kemp Smith translation as well). The series editors of the CEWIK, published by Cambridge University Press, are Paul Guyer and Allen Wood; the editors and translators of given volumes vary. Where I discuss or dispute a point of translation in the text, I indicate the translator in question. However, I do not make a note of every point of departure from the CEWIK translations.

The following editions of Kant’s work in English translation were consulted: