Introduction

The Exploitation of Man by Man Has Been Abolished!

On a cold evening in November 1989, human rights triumphed, and the Berlin Wall disintegrated. Ninety-nine red balloons vanquishing the evil empire.… Or at least that is how the story is usually told: the dictatorship of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) crumbled in the face of several thousand citizens demanding their innate and natural rights. Once the Berlin Wall opened, elections were held, and the state-socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) vanished, absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The artificial division of the German nation was overcome, and 18 million people regained their human rights, all of them now "former" citizens of the GDR, a state thrown onto the trash heap of history. Writing in 1978, the East German intellectual Hermann Klenner seemed to have predicted all of this: "Illusion and hypocrisy may be able to delay recognition of truth in the question of human rights, but progress is inevitable. […] The people will see to this."[1] Surprisingly, this late 1970s testament to the enduring power of human rights was not about a burgeoning circle of dissidents challenging SED rule, but was in fact about the glories of "real existing socialism" in the GDR. The "illusion and hypocrisy" whose days were numbered were those of the capitalist West. For Klenner, the rapid rise of Western human rights activism in the 1970s represented a reactionary attack on progress, an attempt to undermine the valiant work of the natural leaders in the field of human rights: East Germany and the rest of the Socialist Bloc led by the Soviet Union.

Few today would name the German Democratic Republic among the historical pillars of modern human rights. The core tenet of the modern international human rights movement, as it has been propagated since the 1970s, maintains that all human beings possess individual rights that both exist above and beyond the state, and that limit the power of governments to constrain the freedom of their citizens. By this definition,

[1] Hermann Klenner, "Human Rights – Hypocrisy and Truth," *Bulletin – GDR Committee for Human Rights* 3, no.1 (1978), 15.

East German citizens were severely lacking in rights. From the founding of the GDR in 1949 to its collapse 40 years later, East Germans had no legal means to claim rights against the state. Under SED rule, political and civil rights – such as freedom of speech and assembly – were strictly limited and policed for ideological content. Popular elections were not competitive and served only to confirm SED rule. The Ministry of State Security – the *Stasi* – conducted mass surveillance, held political prisoners in arbitrary detention, and engaged in psychological torture to suppress dissent and quash opposition.[2] While the Christian church did exist behind the Berlin Wall, the state pressured citizens to renounce their religious affiliation by withholding social and career opportunities and conscientious objectors to mandatory military service faced a harsh alternative as uniformed labourers.[3] To control the movement of its citizens, the SED built a complex of deadly border fortifications, including a 140 km long *wall* around West Berlin, an island located in the heart of the GDR. To get to the West without the requisite permissions, one had to pass through the "death strip" and face a gauntlet of dogs, mines, self-firing weapons and armed guards authorised to use lethal force to stop those intent on committing the crime of "fleeing the Republic." A total of 101 victims were attempting to cross the border, 30 had no intention of crossing, 8 were GDR border guards killed on duty, and one was a Soviet soldier killed by accident.[4]

Since German reunification in 1990, the Stasi and the Berlin Wall have become popular metaphors, symbols of oppressive secret police and inhuman border regimes; the GDR has become synonymous with the abuse of human rights.[5] According to the SED, however, the GDR was a leader in the field of human rights. Almost from its inception in 1946, the

[2] Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Jens Gieseke, *The History of the Stasi: East Germany's Secret Police, 1945–1990* (New York: Berghahn, 2014).

[3] On conscientious objectors, see Bernd Eisenfeld and Peter Schicketanz, *Bausoldaten in der DDR: Die "Zusammenführung feindlich-negativer Kräfte" in der NVA* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2012).

[4] A total of 101 victims were attempting to cross the border, 30 had no intention of crossing (including a Soviet soldier), and 8 were GDR border guards killed on duty. Hans-Hermann Hertle and Maria Nooke, *Die Todesopfer an der Berliner Mauer 1961–1989: Ergebnisse eines Forschungsprojektes des ZZF Potsdam und der Stiftung Berliner Mauer* (August 2017) (www.berliner-mauer-gedenkstaette.de).

[5] On popular representations of Stasi oppression as the epitome of the GDR, see the film *The Lives of Others* (2006), or Anna Funder's bestseller *Stasiland: Stories from behind the Berlin Wall* (London: Granta Books, 2011). On East Germany and the Berlin Wall as symbols of human rights abuses, see Nick Hodgin and Caroline Pearce, *The GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State since 1989* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011), 2; Manfred Wilke, *The Path to the Berlin Wall: Critical Stages in the History of Divided Germany* (New York: Berghahn, 2014), 1.

SED claimed to be at the vanguard of human rights, and in 1959 – two years *before* the founding of Amnesty International – the Party created the first human rights organisation in the Eastern Bloc. The SED claimed that the realisation of socialism on German soil had eradicated the roots of fascism and had forever prevented the resurgence of Nazism, which represented the very antithesis of human rights. The end of capitalist class conflict had ushered in a true form of democracy, both politically and in the workplace. Social and economic rights were provided through the state subsidisation or the direct provision of basic needs, which extended to transportation, education, jobs, recreation and cultural opportunities. Only under socialism – where "the exploitation of man by man has been abolished!" – could one truly experience human rights.

The SED also saw itself as a steadfast champion of human rights beyond the borders of the GDR: it fought for the rights of oppressed antifascists, communists and peace activists in West Germany, which they claimed (not entirely without merit) was run by former Nazis, many of whom sought to suppress the Left and remilitarise the German nation. On the world stage, the SED supported the rights of women; attacked imperialist racism in Africa and Asia; campaigned against military regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America; and offered humanitarian aid to fellow socialists around the world.[6] For the SED, this was more than just sloganeering and propaganda: the GDR legally committed itself to multiple UN covenants and treaties – often several years before Western nations – and agreed to the human rights provisions contained in the Helsinki Accords in 1975 on the basis that East Germany was already in full compliance with the norms of international human rights law.

Such claims of socialist superiority in the field of human rights are – clearly – at odds with the way the history of human rights in the Cold War is usually told. The standard narrative emphasises those Western activists, diplomats and statespeople, who successfully campaigned to impose the values of liberal democratic individualism onto recalcitrant socialist states through human rights treaties.[7] In this retelling, the Eastern Bloc

[6] On women's rights and state socialism, see Celia Donert, "Whose Utopia? Gender, Ideology and Human Rights at the 1975 World Congress of Women in East Berlin," in Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); On solidarity with the Global South and black liberation, see Quinn Slobodian, *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York: Berghahn, 2015). On GDR humanitarianism, see Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[7] Rosemary Foot, "The Cold War and Human Rights," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. III.*, eds. Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge

defied human rights in all of its forms by abstaining on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, and only relenting under duress in 1975 with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) signed in Helsinki by 35 countries in Eastern and Western Europe and which included provisions recognising the validity of international human rights.[8] The Helsinki Accords ostensibly marked the beginning of the end of state socialism as the Eastern Bloc was hit by a "boomerang effect" wherein their citizens suddenly recognised the hypocrisy and cynicism of state socialist promises and rose up to demand their human rights.[9] Under pressure from domestic dissident, foreign diplomats and international NGOs, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev relented and began to implement the human rights he already committed to in the Accords and this spread across the Eastern Bloc toppling countries like dominos in 1989.[10] The end of the Cold War and the victory of human rights were one and the same.

But there was no inherent "bulldozer logic" of human rights that drove East Germans towards revolution, and this book is not a history of the innate power of human rights to spark democracy, freedom and justice in the face of tyranny.[11] Rather, this is a history of how human rights acted to legitimise a socialist dictatorship, before playing a crucial role in its downfall. The SED advanced its own vision of socialist human rights, and East German elites were active participants in the creation of human rights politics within Europe – and later on the world stage. From below,

University Press, 2010), 445–65. Works arguing that human rights were absent from East German politics before 1975 include Christian Joppke, *East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist Regime* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 116; Jürgen Wüst, *Menschenrechtsarbeit im Zwielicht: zwischen Staatssicherheit und Antifaschismus* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 32; Steven Pfaff, "The Politics Of Peace in the GDR: The Independent Peace Movement, the Church, and the Origins of the East German Opposition," *Peace and Change* 26, no. 3 (2001), 287.

[8] The main work asserting that the Helsinki Accords had a revolutionary impact in the Eastern Bloc is Daniel Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). Michael Ignatieff argues that the Eastern Bloc had already accepted social and economic rights, but denied the validity of political and civil human rights prior to Helsinki, see *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 19. Sarah Snyder provides a more nuanced interpretation by examining Helsinki through the lens of transnational social movements, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

[9] Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[10] Daniel Thomas, "Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005), 110–41.

[11] Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights* (New York: Norton, 2008), 160.

East Germans were not simply passive recipients of a liberal democratic human rights politics delivered to them, prepackaged, by Western activists. On the path to 1989, the people of the GDR had to first reimagine human rights from a domestic perspective to fight for religious freedoms within the socialist system, for the right to emigrate from East Germany or for a new version of socialism that would fulfil the promise of real democratic emancipation. This book is a history of how East Germans, over the four decades of the GDR's existence, imagined, propagandised and instrumentalised human rights in the name of a multitude of shifting ideals: socialism, antifascism, anti-imperialism, Christianity, peace, the environment, democracy and ultimately – the creation of a unified German state.

Human rights, as an idea, had no political or social power without human actors; the abstract rights listed in treaties and covenants only gained meaning in everyday life when they were translated into the cultural and political language of local environments.[12] The question thus becomes how and why a variety of actors within East Germany chose to engage with the growing global human rights system to advance their own particular, and often conflicting, agendas. For most of the actors in this story, human rights were not a lofty concern divorced from the messiness of politics and society, but a moral, legal and rhetorical lens through which to understand the problems of justice and equality both at home and abroad. This book explores how various East Germans adopted global human rights ideas from UN treaties and international activists and imbued this language with local cultural and political meaning to legitimise a state socialist dictatorship under the SED, to demand the reform of the socialist status quo and eventually to justify a revolution and the dissolution of the GDR.

A central theme here is how the SED and East German elites came to understand human rights as a fundamental element of state socialist ideology and the global Cold War. Historians have often struggled to explain how the leaders of the SED could have been so foolish and reckless as to sign on to treaties that contained human rights provisions that were so self-evidently contrary to all fundamental aspects of the East

[12] For a classic critique of "ideas [that] get up and do battle on their own behalf," see Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969), 11. On translation and "vernacularization," see Sally Engle Merry, "Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle," *American Anthropologist* 108, no. 1 (2006), 38–51. On the importance of centering people – and not norms – in human rights history, see Lora Wildenthal, *The Language of Human Rights in West Germany* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 169.

German political system. One theory is that the GDR and other Eastern Bloc countries were outmanoeuvred by canny Western diplomats who managed to insert the language of human rights into the Helsinki agreement against the will of communist negotiators unprepared to engage with this issue.[13] Some argue that the SED did recognise human rights as a political danger, but was coerced into signing the Accords out of economic desperation.[14] Others claim that SED chief Erich Honecker dismissed human rights as a triviality, or cynically agreed to the Accords as a ploy to gain international prestige without any intention of living up to its contents.[15] Or they allege the SED wanted to demonstrate its strength and to sadistically prove that they, the people, held no power.[16] Others still remain perplexed as to how senior members of the SED could not see that their entire system of rule violated international human rights.[17]

By presuming that the SED viewed human rights as a threatening and alien notion, scholars have been at a loss to explain its actions and, in turn, missed the implications of socialist human rights politics in the evolution of East German diplomacy and the rise of a domestic opposition. From the perspective of the SED leadership and GDR elites, it was self-evident that human rights legitimised the cause of socialism, and that UN human rights treaties intended to secure the right to self-determination and state sovereignty for all in the face of (and most definitely not in the service of) Western imperialism. According to the view of the SED, there were bourgeois forces within the GDR and in the West that sought to corrupt the concept of human rights and use it as a tool for foreign interventionism. But such forces were in a minority

[13] Ferraris claims that "once having accepted – at the preparatory stage in Helsinki – that the principle of human rights should appear in the list, the USSR and the other Socialist countries found that it was more appropriate not to contest too strongly the legitimacy of the principle, but to formulate instead their own interpretation of it." Luigi Ferraris and Mario Alessi, *Report on a Negotiation, Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki, 1972–1975* (Geneva: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), 106.

[14] Imanuel Geiss, *The Question of German Unification: 1806–1996* (London: Routledge, 1997), 102; John Schmeidel, *Stasi: Sword and Shield of the Party* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 61.

[15] On the side of triviality, see Mary Elise Sarotte, *The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 18. For cynicism, see Charles Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 127.

[16] Anthony Glees, "Social Transformation Studies and Human Rights Abuses in East Germany after 1945," in *Recasting East Germany: Social Transformation after the GDR*, eds. Christopher Flockton and Eva Kolinsky (Portland: Frank Cass, 1999), 175.

[17] Frederick Taylor, *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961–1989* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 381.

position, and they faced a united opposition by the rest of the Socialist Bloc, as well as by the growing power of the Afro-Asian Bloc.

The SED developed this perspective through a long-standing engagement with the concept of human rights, beginning in 1946, as they defended their newborn party against attacks from the more established Social Democrats (SPD). From there, the SED both founded the Eastern Bloc's first human rights organisation in 1959 and developed an academic field of "socialist human rights," led by GDR-trained legal experts. The SED integrated the idea of human rights into its discourse, ideology and diplomacy in an era – the 1960s – when the recently decolonised states of Africa and Asia were dominant in international affairs and had put self-determination and economic sovereignty at the centre of the UN human rights agenda.[18] In the years leading up to the Helsinki Accords, anti-colonialism was a much more powerful force in comparison to the fledgling Western liberal non-governmental organisation (NGO) movement, providing an international structure that bolstered the SED's confidence in signing onto the Helsinki Accords.[19] In place of a narrative in which liberal norms originated in the West and spread to the rest of the world, the evolution of human rights in the GDR can only be understood in the context of the Socialist Bloc's engagement with a global system in which multiple ideological conceptions of human rights competed for legitimacy, influence over international institutions and the hearts and minds of people around the globe.

Just as the concept of human rights was not inherently threatening to the SED, it was also not always seen by East Germans as a means of overthrowing state socialism. In challenging the dictatorship of the SED, East Germans often borrowed from the language of the state to

[18] Martin Sabrow, "Dictatorship as Discourse: Cultural Perspectives on SED Legitimacy," in *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR*, ed. Conrad Jarausch (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 195–212; Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Steven Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[19] Some have noted the SED's willingness to agree to human rights provisions, but without contextualising its prior engagement with human rights ideology: Hermann Wentker, "Pursuing Specific Interests within the Warsaw Pact: The GDR and the CSCE-Process," in *The Helsinki Process: A Historical Reappraisal*, ed. Carla Meneguzzi Rostagni (Padova: CEDAM, 2005), 45–61; Oliver Bange, "The GDR in the Era of Détente: Conflicting Perceptions and Strategies, 1965–1975," in *Perforating the Iron Curtain : European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985*, eds. Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (Copenhagen: Tusculanum Press, 2010); Anja Hanisch, *Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972–1985: Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, Westabgrenzung und Ausreisebewegung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012).

press for freedoms at the margins or for greater rights within the system, rather than demanding revolutionary change outright. Thus, long before human rights became a popular rallying cry for democratisation in 1989, East Germans used the language of international human rights as a tool for negotiating their place within the SED dictatorship. Indeed, GDR human rights protests only began in 1968, when the SED introduced a new constitution to coincide with the UN International Year for Human Rights and asked citizens to submit feedback on the draft, prior to a national referendum on its adoption. The new constitution greatly reduced formal protections for religious freedom, and East German Christians wrote to the state by the thousands – referencing UN human rights treaties – to demand the preservation of their religious freedom. Rather than challenging SED authority, however, the Christian community argued that these rights were necessary so that they could be good socialist citizens. The language of human rights thus served as a tool of negotiation for greater freedom within socialism – not as a means to destroy it.

Despite the explosion of international NGO activism in 1970s (not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe), the use of human rights as a tool for democratisation and political reform in the GDR only began in the mid-1980s, with the founding of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights (Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, or IFM). The GDR human rights movement emerged from existing movements for peace, the environment, and anti-imperial solidarity and it sought to democratise East German socialism rather than end it entirely.[20] For the IFM and many other East German dissidents and reformers, human rights was seen as a means of saving the ideals of socialism from its current state of bureaucratic stagnation and abuse as realised in the Eastern Bloc.[21] As the SED struggled to cope with a steadily escalating economic crisis and a massive outflow of citizens in the late 1980s, many East German elites became disillusioned with the realities of SED-led state socialism. Hard-line SED leaders alienated lower-level state officials, who watched in dismay as the system around them collapsed through inaction and ideological rigidity. With dissident groups demanding democratised

[20] On the rise of human rights dissidents demanding democratisation, see Wolfgang Rüddenklau, *Störenfried: DDR-Opposition 1986–1989* (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1992); Marianne Schulz, *Von der Illegalität ins Parlament: Werdegang und Konzepte der neuen Bürgerbewegungen* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1992); Thomas Klein, *"Frieden und Gerechtigkeit!": die Politisierung der Unabhängigen Friedensbewegung in Ost-Berlin während der 80er Jahre* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).

[21] On human rights as a minimalist post-socialist utopian movement, see Samuel Moyn, *Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010).

socialism from below, human rights acted as shared language between protestors and those state officials who now saw the need for reform. This sense of common purpose helped to forestall a violent crackdown on mass demonstrations and prepared the path to the peaceful transition of power. Human rights did not spark the revolution of 1989, but the idea did help mobilise a broad cross-section of East German society against the dictatorship. The multivalent capacity of human rights to hold a wide variety of meanings and to represent a diversity of political and social aspirations allowed for the creation of a heterodox coalition of interest groups, ranging from radical environmentalists, disaffected artists, conservative Christians and reform communists.

The irony of human rights in East Germany is that the same human rights propaganda and ideology that acted to stabilise and legitimise the SED for decades ultimately contributed to its rapid downfall, as even party members lost faith in the righteousness of the party's dictatorship.[22] In the hands of the state, the idea of human rights was one more tool of legitimisation, but once successfully wrested from the SED by dissident groups, human rights began to serve as a unifying ideal for peaceful revolution. For many lower-tier state functionaries, the meaning of human rights radically shifted as the Party proved itself both incapable of addressing the ongoing crisis and brutal in its response to those who seemed to be presenting constructive criticism.[23] The example of the GDR reveals how, in the words of Costas Douzinas, "human rights are Janus-like, they carry the dual ability to emancipate and dominate, to protect and discipline."[24] The SED's monopolisation of the human rights discourse forestalled the opposition that bubbled up in the 1970s, but its long-term enthusiasm for the concept also meant that when mass protests did erupt in 1989, dissident human rights demands were devastatingly effective in co-opting mid-level elites who sympathised with this message.

In the end, the opening of the Berlin Wall was not the final triumph for East German human rights dissidents, but instead led to the shattering of

[22] On the "paradox of stability and revolution," see Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, 1945–1989* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992); Detlef Pollack, "Modernization and Modernization Blockages in GDR Society," in *Dictatorship as Experience*, 27–46; Andrew Port, *Conflict and Stability in the GDR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[23] On the rapid shifts in meaning within the discursive world of late socialism, see Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[24] Costas Douzinas, *The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century* (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2000), 175.

the broad coalition that had formed through their opposition to SED rule. Not only did the end of the SED eliminate the focal point that united the mass protests, it raised new questions about how these multivalent visions of human rights would be realised in practice. Only after November 1989 was the idea of human rights widely deployed within the GDR to legitimise economic and political liberalisation through unification with West Germany. While the dissident movement sought to work with reform communists to create a renewed democratised socialism, they were crushed in elections held in March 1990, heralding the end of an independent GDR. Without an independent East Germany, the idea of legitimising a socialist dictatorship in the name of human rights became absurd and led to the erasure of socialist human rights from historical memory and scholarship – a process so complete that the traces that remain are written off as mere propaganda produced by a cynical state. Along with socialist human rights, the diversity of dissident thought has also been subsumed into grand historical narratives of liberal (or neoliberal) human rights sweeping through the Eastern Bloc. The example of the GDR shows, however, that human rights are far from timeless or self-evident, but are always in a state of perpetual reinvention, and that hegemonic regimes of human rights can fall apart with remarkable speed.

Until recently, the history of human rights was written as a linear narrative of progress – from ancient times to the French and American Revolutions – culminating in the postwar creation of the UDHR and the late twentieth-century rise of international NGO activism.[25] Rather than trying to trace the evolution of human rights as a singular universal ideal, the scholarship has turned towards a focus on discontinuities in the meaning of rights between different eras. While historical actors from the American Revolution, 1960s anti-colonial activists and Western human rights NGO workers in the 1990s all spoke about inherent human rights, the political and social agenda they were describing was often radically different, even contradictory.[26] In the past decade, a new wave of scholarship has argued, in the words of Jean Quataert, that "rights are

[25] Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Micheline Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

[26] Moyn argues that the contemporary human rights movement can be traced back to the proliferation of NGO activism in the 1970s, while Hoffmann argues that it is more accurately a product of the post–Cold War era with the turn in the 1990s towards military interventionism in the name of protecting human rights. Moyn, *Last Utopia*; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, "Human Rights and History," *Past & Present* 232, no. 1 (2016), 279–310.